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mances, modified their structures and style of operation, and assumed
responsibility for welfare state reform.
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Content and organizational form of welfare states
The term ‘welfare state’ is often used in a rather indiscriminate manner.
The emphasis is on ‘welfare’ rather than on ‘state’. What is meant is usually
not so much a ‘state’ as a regime for the provision of welfare programmes.
The state could play a role in such provision, whether directly or indirectly,
but this does not necessarily have to be so. A more precise term would be
‘welfare society’, with the state being a variable in it.
However, the use of the word ‘state’ is more than a mere slip of the
tongue. Even if entirely absent, the state would still play a role in it, albeit
in a negative way: by its absence, or by tolerating private arrangements of
organizations in civil society. That tells us something about the role of the
state in that particular society as well. Indeed, ‘welfare states’ are also
‘states’, and that aspect has remained underdeveloped in the ‘welfare state’
literature. They are expressions of state traditions, and of traditions in the
relation between state and civil society. As witnessed by the familiar
typology which Esping-Andersen (Esping-Andersen 1990) developed, follow-
ing the earlier work of Titmuss: liberal, social democratic and corporatist
welfare regimes. 
These different national welfare regimes refer both to organizational form
and to the substance of the welfare provisions. Actually, the terms refer in the
very first place to the organizational form: who provides and/or regulates the
programmes, what conception of state–economy relations lies behind them.
Nevertheless, most of the welfare state literature deals with the substance of
the programmes, the degree and type of protection provided, their
consequences for economy and society, and the changes therein over time.
The use of the names of the organizational regimes for the substance of the
programmes implies however that form has apparently consequences for
substance. This is implied by the terms of Titmuss and Esping-Andersen.
The terms refer to a dominant political ideology in the relations between
state and society/economy, which has consequences for the substance of
welfare state programmes, as indicated in Table 1.1, which summarizes the
most important characteristics of the different welfare states. 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Under a liberal ideology the state yields to the market. Citizens are
primarily responsible themselves for their insurance against the risks of
sickness, disability, unemployment, and old age. They can buy such security
on the market from private insurance companies. The state merely
provides a minimal collectively financed safety for the very needy, a system
of poor relief, and assistance in kind in housing, social and health care. By
contrast, social democratic ideology holds the state primarily responsible
for insuring citizens against the risks of working life. The programmes are
universalistic. They provide a decent benefit to all, at a level equal for all
citizens. Contributions however, usually collected through taxes, are
income-related. The system is hence quite redistributive in character.
Corporatist regimes give an important position to private interest asso-
ciations on the labour market in the formulation and implementation of
programmes; this implies that programmes are often specific to (categories
of) workers, so called workmen’s compensation plans. Contributions and
benefits are related to wages earned. Within specific programmes there is
some redistribution. Overall, the programmes tend to be rather generous. 
Welfare state programmes in the different types of regimes are hence
rooted in different relations between the state and the society/economy, in
different styles of state intervention in civil society and in the economy;
these have also found expression in a number of other political, legal and
administration institutions, and in general and political cultural values,
such as universalism/particularism, egalitarianism, or pragmatism/legalism.
Together, these institutions and values form more or less integrated systems,
which have been the product of long-term processes of state formation.
Both the systemic character and their long history tend to make them
pretty persistent over time. 
Problems, criticism, crisis
The close link between form and substance implied that when problems
arose with the substance of the programmes, when criticism mounted, the
organizational forms got their share of the blame. 
Industrial restructuring, recession, rising unemployment, individualiza-
tion and aging of the population were factors that increased the use and
costs of welfare state programmes, with the result that policy-makers were
confronted with social security expenditures that seemed to have taken off
into uncontrolled and sustained growth. This happened at the very same
time that economic internationalization – a factor also behind industrial
restructuring – made those policy-makers believe that their countries were
forced to moderate or even reduce wage costs, including the costs for
welfare state programmes, and to increase the efficiency in public expendi-
tures in order to stay competitive. The self-imposed constraints of the EMU
provided a additional impetus for public austerity among European
countries. Large-scale long-term unemployment was considered to be an
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indication of welfare state dependency among an increasing size of the
population – an issue popularized by Charles Murray among others in the
USA – and such ‘perversions’ of the welfare state supposedly required an
intensive overhaul of the system. All these developments posed challenges
and threats to welfare state programmes. 
In corporatist welfare states, the organizational form got its part of the
blame. Corporatist concertation came to be held responsible for bringing
about all the ills of the welfare state: uncontrollable growth of social
security expenditures, high wage costs, loss of competitiveness in world
markets, rising unemployment, budget deficits, welfare dependency; and
an incapacity for reform: inflexibility and immobilism in policy-making,
protection of vested interests, hostage holding of governments, sclerosis of
economic governance institutions, etc. A famous and stereotypical case has
been the Dutch disability compensation plan. The large-scale use of
benefits under this plan (with at its peak about 20 per cent of the working
population receiving a disability benefit) could be traced to earlier sectoral
concertation externalizing the costs of industrial restructuring to the
collective disability pension plan. Employers’ associations and trade
unions had jointly steered redundant older un- or semi-skilled workers in
mining, shipbuilding or textiles, who had no chance of getting a job in
new industries, to the disability compensation plan, which provided higher
benefits (80 per cent of last wages until retirement) than a regular
unemployment benefit. Thus, corporatism and welfare programmes came
to be seen more and more as the problem, rather than the solution that it
originally had been – to the problems posed by the uncertainties of
capitalist life. 
Reforms
Given the various problems, almost all governments of developed welfare
states set out to reform their welfare state programmes in the past two
decades. They have done so in different ways, with different policy goals,
channels and instruments; and also in different times, periods and phases.
Most reform policies – and the literature on them – have focused in the
first instance on substance – as the goal was to control expenditures to
make the system more financially stable. Given the close link between
substance and form, sooner or later the organizational forms came also
under attack. However, at the same time these organizational forms have
also been channels for formulating and/or negotiating reform. 
The first major attempts at reform were made in the late 1970s and
early 1980s in the Anglo-Saxon world, with the conservative revolutions of
Reagan in the USA and Thatcher in Britain. They tried to reduce the
already minimal liberal welfare state programmes even further. Befitting
the policy style typical for state–economy relations in these countries, and
befitting the political convictions of the then leaders, the latter choose a
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radical, impositional and adversarial strategy. Paul Pierson (Pierson 1994)
has shown in his study of these policies, ‘The Retrenchment of the Welfare
State’, that these policies were not very successful. To some extent his study
is a study in policy-immobilism.
A decade later other European countries followed, countries with more
developed welfare state provisions. They pursued less ambitious and
radical goals. Not a complete overhaul of the system was attempted, but a
modification reducing the malign consequences of the welfare state: welfare
state dependency, long-term unemployment, immobilism, uncontrollable
public expenditures, loss of national competitiveness. They followed
different reform styles and used different channels for formulating reform,
in line with their different traditions of state intervention in the economy,
and their different regulatory styles. The emphasis has been on concerta-
tion and negotiation instead of imposition; on consensualism instead of
adversarialism; on stimulating bottom-up initiatives and self-regulation
from civil society instead of top-down authoritarianism. This included
using channels and institutions of corporatist concertation, which were well
established in some countries, while others have attempted to create such.
The organizational forms were used to renegotiate the substance of the
programmes. Such attempts have been made in most continental European
countries: the Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, Ireland, Italy,
Germany, Spain. 
They all seemed to agree with Visser and Hemerijck when they write
(Visser and Hemerijck 1997): 182):
Societal consensus is crucial for effective reform of the welfare state. In
all welfare states there are many veto points and actors with powers to
obstruct. A politics of imposition is likely to provoke conflicts which
may retard or even reverse the process. Modernization of the welfare
state . . . requires the construction of a political will and long-term
commitments, built on norms of trust and networks of civil engage-
ment, in order to overcome the inevitable opposition of groups who
will lose.
Unlike the Anglo-Saxon retrenchment attempts, these governments still
fitted the model that Ehrmann already described in 1961 as the ‘modern
form’:
Today extensive consultation between group leaders and civil servants
is generally considered as a fundamental democratization of the
administrative process. . . . there exists by now in all countries
widespread agreement on the propriety and convenience of continuous
consultation both when the (state) bureaus are drafting legislation and
when they administer enacted laws.
(Ehrmann 1968, orig. 1961: 259) 
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It should be noted however that the new forms of corporatist concerta-
tion differed from older ones. States have rethought their policy regarding
involving interest associations in policy formulation and implementation;
and they have tried to find new modes of regulating the economy and the
welfare state. The mix of state, market and associations has been reshuffled,
with states reasserting some of their responsibilities and trying to make
more room for market coordination in providing welfare state programmes.
While associational governance was pushed towards the background for
some time, it has now been revived. European governments have again
turned to centralized corporatist concertation to ‘oil’ welfare state reform.
These initiatives have met with different success. Some countries have been
more successful than others in reforming their welfare states and adjusting
them to changing circumstances.
Reinventing corporatism: reform through renegotiation
The revival of corporatist concertation has been a curious one. Originally
institutions of corporatist concertation were blamed in part for the financial
problems and a perceived sclerosis of continental conservative welfare
states. ‘Corporatist is dead. Long live corporatism!’, wrote Schmitter over
ten years ago (Schmitter 1989). He meant however two different kinds of
corporatism. The dead one was macro-level centralized socio-economic
concertation and negotiation. The alive one was concertation at the sec-
toral level, also called meso-corporatism. 
However, since Schmitter wrote these words, macro-level concertation
has also experienced a revival. In some countries corporatist institutions
seem to have been able to learn from bad performance and experience, to
modify their structures and styles of operation, and the social partners have
again been willing to assume responsibility for socio-economic performance
of the nation. Governments have encouraged social partners in doing so
and/or have taken initiatives for centralized concertation. In quite a
number of countries attempts have been made to revive or newly introduce
centralized concertative bargaining during the 1980s and 1990s. The
success of some countries with this has encouraged others to follow the
lead. Country experiences differ of course, among others in the capacity of
institutions to change. These differences are related among others to the
historical presence or absence of a tradition of corporatist concertation,
and to the (perceived) seriousness of the various policy problems, including
the threats and opportunities of internationalization. 
One of the first countries going this way again has been a country with a
traditionally open economy, vulnerable to internationalization – and a
country with a strong corporatist tradition: the Netherlands. The 1982
Wassenaar Accord between the peak associations of employers and workers
set the stage for wage moderation and serious modifications of social
security (in exchange for working-time reduction), and laid the foundations
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for the remarkable economic come-back fifteen years later. By now it has
almost acquired mythical proportions. Subsequent central agreements
concerned employability, vocational training, parental leave and child care,
all measures to increase the popularity of part-time work and to raise the
labour participation ratio. In April 1996 the Dutch peak associations of
labour and capital concluded the ‘Flex-agreement’, which deregulated the
labour market in exchange for more security for flex-workers on the labour
market. This agreement, incidentally, also broke a government stalemate
over this issue. It was codified in the 1999 Act on Flexibility and Security,
which provided a legal framework for social partners to regulate further
the position of flex-workers. Corporatism as the resolute decision-maker,
instead of the long-despised decision-staller? 
Sooner or later several countries followed this example. In Italy, social
partners and the government concluded a tripartite national agreement in
1993, introducing two-level collective bargaining with different standards
for wage setting. At the sectoral level the norm should be the expected
inflation, at the company level the improvement of company productivity.
A new central pact in 1998 linked sectoral bargaining to the projected
average inflation level in the EU rather than the Italian figure. The
Portuguese concluded a tripartite strategic concertation pact in 1996 for
the period 1996–9 recommending to the bargaining partners at the
sectoral and company level that wage increases should remain at half the
productivity increase. Other countries where similar centralized social pacts
were concluded were Norway (1993, for the period till 1997), Ireland
(1997, Partnership 2000 for the period 1997–2000), Belgium (1998, for the
period till 2000), Finland (1997), Austria (1996, ‘Sparpaket II’). 
There have been important differences between the various country
experiences. Some were early with the revival of centralized corporatist
concertation (the Netherlands), others late (Austria, Belgium), and yet others
where it never really developed fully (Switzerland) or where a revival did not
take place (Sweden). For some countries it was really a ‘revival’, that is, it took
place in a country with a strong corporatist tradition (the Netherlands), for
others it was relatively new (Ireland, Portugal, Italy). And in yet others central
corporatist concertation has never really been away (Austria). 
Curiously enough, early attempts at concluding central social pacts in
countries with a corporatist tradition failed at first. The Dutch had tried
several times before their successful Wassenaar Accord. The Belgian social
partners failed still in 1996, and were only successful in December 1998.
The Austrian government tried for the first time in postwar history to
conclude a Budget Consolidation Package in 1995 without involving the
social partners. The attempt failed and in the subsequent year the social
partners came with the successful initiative for the Sparpaket II. Attempts by
Chancellor Kohl to revive the Konzertierte Aktion with the Bündnis für Arbeit
to counter the serious economic problems failed. New attempts by the
present Schroeder government have been somewhat more successful.
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Some countries with strong corporatist traditions have also tried to
popularize the model of consensual bargaining within the European Union.
The Dutch chair of the European Union organized in January 1997 an
international high level conference on social policy and consensual bargain-
ing as economic assets rather than liabilities. The Austrian chair of Europe
did the same in September 1998. 
Thus consensual bargaining or corporatist concertation seems to be back
on the agendas both of policy-makers and of social science, a little more than
twenty-five years after the start of the corporatist debate with the publication
of Schmitter’s well-known article ‘Still the Century of Corporatism?’
(Schmitter 1979 (orig. 1974)) and Lehmbruch’s study on ‘Konkordanzdemo-
kratie’ (Lehmbruch 1967).
Principal questions posed by the book
The contributions to this volume study and discuss these attempts at rene-
gotiating the welfare state through channels of corporatist concertation.
They try to find answers to some of the following questions.
1 Where and in what countries has centralized consensual bargaining
experienced a revival?
2 What have been the issues and subjects of such renewed corporatist
concertation? Have different policy issues been interlinked?
3 What is the difference between the earlier experiences of welfare state
reform in the USA and the UK? Is corporatist concertation providing
an alternative to the command and control and drastic policy measures
of those who set out with the retrenchment of the welfare state,
Thatcher and Reagan?
4 What can explain this renewed enthusiasm for social pacts?
5 How successful have these social pacts been? How stable? How real, in
the sense that they actually influenced the behaviour of lower-level
bargaining? Have they provided constraints to other parties, or
windows of opportunity? Have some countries been more successful in
this respect than others?
6 If so, which conditions for success can be identified? Which variables
make for the difference between a flexible, adaptive and pragmatic
corporatism, on the one hand, and sclerotic corporatism, on the other
hand? 
7 What future is there for institutions of corporatist concertation? Is
internationalization not also a direct threat to corporatist concertation?
Does it not make such institutions outdated and obsolete? Or is it on
the contrary providing a stimulus for renewed vitality? Does concerta-
tion not require some national autonomy in socio-economic policy-
making? In short, what is the future of corporatism in an age of
increased internationalization and need for reform of the welfare state? 
8 Are there any prospects for concertation at the European level?
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In the remainder of this introduction we will provide a summary of some of
the tentative answers to these questions, found in the individual
contributions to the volume. 
Issues, subjects
Most social pacts served several goals at the same time: they were meant to
help reduce unemployment; and to aid states in consolidating their budget.
Under a Keynesian policy regime these would have been considered contra-
dictory goals; not so under a policy regime inspired by policy theories of
supply-side economics, which has gained prominence since the 1980s. Both
goals could be served by moderation of overall gross wage costs. It was
believed that moderating wage costs would improve the cost competitive
position of a country in comparison with its major trading partners and
hence the prosperity if not survivability of various economic sectors import-
ant for employment; moderation of especially the minimum wages and other
wages at the bottom of the pay scale would reduce the tendency of firms to
automatize less skilled work and to maintain or even recreate lower-skilled
jobs; moderation of wages in the private sector would also mean moderation
of wages in the publicly financed sectors and of social security benefits, often
linked to wage developments; and this would aid the state in reducing budget
deficits; and of course a decrease of unemployment and an increase in the
labour participation ratio would reduce costs of unemployment and other
social programmes, and raise the income-based tax-income. Less costs and
more income would also contribute to budget consolidation. 
The first and foremost subject of these pacts were the direct wage costs, the
average increase in wage levels. Almost all first social pacts concluded
contained limitations of average wage raises. Unions were persuaded to
accept this because they were made to believe that such would improve the
unemployment situation. In addition, the government offered specific
measures to help reduce unemployment, e.g. special programmes (sub-
sidies, tax rebates) for the young, the elderly, the disabled, women or
ethnic minorities. 
Sooner or later, however, other factors influencing gross wage costs
and labour participation got to be included, such as working hours,
working conditions and flexible work. A reduction of the statutory
working week has been considered in several countries, as a way to share
scarce jobs. In many countries it was an issue introduced by the unions.
Inclusion of weekly working hours in social pacts was a way to get support
from them. Flexible work has been considered both an instrument for
sharing scarce work (by the unions) and an instrument of greater
flexibility of production organizations (by the employers). The Dutch
central ‘flexicurity’ pacts facilitated the creation and maintenance of
temporary and part-time work, and improved the legal status of tempor-
ary employment agencies; in exchange for measures which increased the
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security of such flexible work: pension rights; job protection after some
period of having worked, special collective wage agreements for tempor-
ary labour intermediation bureaus.
Last but not least, welfare state programmes became the subject of
centralized concertation. They do not only form a major part of gross wage
costs, but were also considered to influence the work incentives and hence
unemployment and the participation rate. Two different paths were followed,
one regarding the generosity of programmes and one concerning their use,
the so-called ‘volume’ policy. The first line of policy tried to reduce the
generosity by a retrenchment of welfare state programmes, i.e. a lower
benefit levels, longer waiting periods, etc. Such policies served to reduce costs
directly, and to sharpen incentives for looking for work, hence reducing the
volume of benefit receivers and thus indirectly also the costs of programmes.
The so-called ‘volume’ policy was directly aimed at reducing the number of
benefit recipients. The Dutch tried to reduce the numbers of recipients by
several laws, all literally called ‘Law for reducing the use of . . .’ (sickness,
disability pension plan, unemployment insurance). This included measures
to make programme entry more difficult, measures to reevaluate benefit
recipients, creating additional incentives to look for work including some
moderate forms of work-fare; and programmes to aid the inactive part of the
population in finding work. That is, social security reform led sooner or later,
and also to a different degree in different countries, to more active labour
market policies. Sometimes such policy intentions and measures were directly
included in social pacts; in other cases such policy was carried out through
one-sided state regulation, but supported by declarations in central social
pacts, which were to provide a base of legitimacy. 
Social pacts also contained reform of funding bases of welfare state
programmes. An example was the Finnish pact on ‘EU buffers’, concluded
in 1997. Social partners agreed to create two buffer funds for pensions and
unemployment insurance, to be fed by somewhat higher social security
contributions in periods of economic boom; and to be used during reces-
sions. Thus the effects of cyclical shocks on social security, which Finland
could counter less after its entry into the EMU, were to be cushioned
somewhat.
These various policy fields are often interlinked. The links can be
immediate: wage restraint was usually the new starting subject of social
pacts and where social security benefits were linked to wage increases this
also set a cap on the growth of welfare state expenditures. External effects
could, however, also be negative. Early retirement as a way to reduce the
pressure on the labour market, a popular measure in the late 1980s,
increased the costs of pension plans. Policies could also be interlinked in
the sense that reform in the one field required reform in another.
Reduction of the volume of benefit receivers often required a more active
labour market policy. Hemerijck, in his contribution to this volume, even
perceives a logic of sequential interdependence between policy fields:
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Shifts in macro-policy, wage formation, social security, and labour
market policy were sequentially related. Over time, policy reforms
across different policy areas created the conditions and the demand for
one another, and neither of these domain-specific policy changes could
have been successful on their own account.
The renewed relative success of central concertation in socio-economic
policy increased its popularity and led to a (renewed) diffusion to yet other
policy areas, where cooperation by those subject to the policy and greater
legitimacy for such policies were sought. This was the case both in ‘old’
policy fields with well-established relevant (peak) associations, such as
health policy; and relatively new policy areas where such associational
positions were less well established, such as environmental policy. Concer-
ted cooperation between state agencies and industrial associations in such
fields may have had different names and legal forms, e.g. ‘gentleman’s
agreements’ or ‘covenants’ under civil law. However, they look suspiciously
much like corporatist concertation. 
Causes: internationalization cause rather than threat
There were two main categories of motivations for such pacts. An urgent
first reason was European monetary integration. This required govern-
ments to keep inflation and budget deficits within the norms agreed upon.
Wage restraint was considered necessary to keep inflation low, and for
controlling public expenditure on civil servants’ salaries, thus allowing
budget consolidation. Hence, European integration and monetary union
seem to have been an incentive for governments to conclude (again) social
pacts. Many of the social pacts in the second half of the 1990s explicitly
refer to the need for the country to satisfy the Maastricht criteria for EMU-
participation. This holds for the Italian, Portuguese, Irish, Belgian and
Austrian agreements.
A second motive for governments to try to get social partners to
conclude central contracts was ‘regime competition’. National competi-
tiveness had to be increased by keeping wage increases below that of the
major neighbouring trading partners. With this came a danger that it
would result in a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ of countries undercutting each other’s
levels of wage increases. 
Indeed, quite a few of the new centrally concluded social pacts were
explicit forms of ‘competitive corporatism’: competition between sets of
national corporatist institutions, competing in their outcome for more
moderate wages; often by explicitly referring to wage and inflation levels of
neighbouring countries. Thus, for example, the Belgian intersectoral agree-
ment concluded in December 1998 for the period 1999–2000 set a norm
for maximum wage increases for 1999–2000 of 5.9 per cent. This figure
was calculated on the basis of assumed increases in the neighbouring
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trading partners France, Germany, and the Netherlands. The Norwegian
social pact covering the period between 1993 and 1997 went even further:
it fixed as the norm for wage increases the rates of Norway’s main
competitors minus 2 per cent. 
Thus we may conclude that internationalization has been an important
cause behind the revival of central corporatist concertation. This is a
curious conclusion considering that not too long ago it was precisely
internationalization and globalization that quite a number of both social
scientists and politicians considered a major threat to corporatist institu-
tions and practices.
Neo-liberal policy-makers have used the perceived threat of inter-
nationalization to try to undermine such economic governance arrange-
ments, even, or rather, especially, in countries with corporatist traditions.
Thus, leading Dutch politicians and top civil servants in the economics
ministry embarked 1995 on a long-term comprehensive plan for deregul-
ation of the traditionally Dutch species of ‘organized capitalism’, including
the abolishment of some institutions for corporatist concertation. (This
notwithstanding that simultaneously, elsewhere, centralized concertation
was gaining in popularity.) In backing up their policy plans these policy-
makers often referred to ‘globalization’, as leaving the government no
other choice. Policy competition between countries would necessarily have
to lead to the abolishment of such institutions, as they were considered
liabilities rather than assets to the competitive position of nation-states. 
Not only proponents of neo-liberalism viewed internationalization as a
threat. Those more favourably disposed to economic governance were also
concerned about the effects of internationalization. Schmitter wrote in
1992:
The Single European Act poses a special threat to a wide range of class,
sectoral and professional arrangements – in particular to the operation
of ‘private interest governments’ (PIGs) – within the twelve member
states of the Community. . . . The countries of Europe could be
deprived of some of their most venerable and distinctive socio-
economic institutions, many of which have contributed significantly to
sustaining their respective national versions of a generically European
style of ‘organized capitalism’ and to underwriting their capability to
compete effectively within the specialized niches of ‘diversified quality
production’. . . . The fact that Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland
have all announced their wish to become full members of the EU could
eventually deprive us of some of the richest native accumulations of
governance mechanisms in existence.
(Schmitter 1992: 2, 7–9, note 36, 50) 
And Streeck added: ‘The “negative” mode of integration implied in
“mutual recognition”, a subtle form of de facto deregulation, undermines
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national corporatisms even where the national political resources of labour
are still comparatively strong’ (Streeck 1992: 111). Many others, from trade
unionists to industrial relations researchers (e.g. Keller 1995), have
expressed a related fear of ‘social dumping’. They argued that unrestricted
competition from countries with low wages and low social security protec-
tion would exert a downward pressure on wages, working conditions and
social security in countries with higher levels of these. And with govern-
ments and employers less able and/or willing to make concessions, unions
would be less inclined to agree to social pacts, thus uprooting corporatist
institutions and practices.
And indeed, under the fury of neo-liberalism and the perceived threat of
globalization, corporatist concertation seemed to have lost some of its
legitimacy for a while and has had to singe some of its feathers. Several
concerted economies with well-organized and regulated markets, such as
Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany and Austria have instituted policies of
deregulation, privatization and dissolution of organizations of corporatist
concertation. The Dutch government considered for a while curtailing or
even abolishing the statutory compulsory trade associations which exist in
about one-quarter of the Dutch economy. Voluntary trade associations have
had to reduce some of their self-regulatory activities, and governments
have been hesitating about delegating the implementation of EU-directives
for which they are held legally responsible to private interest associations.
The statutory extension of sectoral wage agreements has been questioned
by economic advisors because of their supposed rigidities and by lawyers
because of the lower density ratios of the contract partners. Price regulation
by the Austrian Paritätische Kommission was abolished when the country
entered the European Union. The politically and culturally well-established
Austrian compulsory Chambers seemed for a while to lose out in legiti-
macy, as one ‘scandal’ of overpaid Chamber functionaries with accumulated
functions followed another in the press. A popular vote on the legitimacy of
compulsory membership was feared but eventually reconfirmed the Chamber
system. For a while a complete liberalization of the Austrian system of
market entry and vocational training system in the small trade sector
(Gewerbeordnung) was considered. And macro-corporatist concertation
seemed to lose in importance as the disciplinary capacity of the peak
associations as against their member-associations and unions has decreased.
However, as argued, the last few years have seen a return to central
social pacts. At least macro-level concertation seems to be back from having
been away. ‘Corporatism is dead. Long live corporatism’, wrote Philippe
Schmitter a few years ago (Schmitter 1989). At that time he meant that
macro-corporatism, to which most attention in the corporatism discussion
originally went, has practically disappeared, but that corporatism at the
sectoral level was still very much alive and kicking. Now it seems that one
could turn around the meaning of the statement. Quite a few corporatist
institutions and practices at the sectoral level have experienced a silent (or
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less silent) death; while macro-corporatism seems to have entered a second
life. And in both cases internationalization and in particular European
integration seems to have been a major factor behind death and life.
Conditions
What have been the conditions for a successful conclusion of central social
pacts? Which factors have enhanced their conclusion, and/or have hindered
if not blocked them? And under which conditions could they have become
stable and successful? In the end this boils down to identifying the factors
that enabled and induced the parties concerned to agree to a central social
pact, to observe it and to defend it for the rank and file.
If we compare the different country experiences on which authors report
in this volume we can identify a number of factors, which we can group
under the headings ‘actors’, ‘incentives’, ‘situation’ and ‘institutions’.
Actors: capacity and willingness
An important condition for successful corporatist concertation is the
existence of parties which are able to and can afford to bind themselves in
central social pacts, and which are able to deliver upon what they have
agreed to, to ensure its observation by the ‘rank and file’. The older
corporatist literature from the 1970s and 1980s has called this the ‘Achilles’
heel’ of corporatism. Parties that are not able to provide some minimum
guarantees that the agreements will be observed are not attractive partners
for others in negotiations. Does this condition still hold; and is it being
satisfied once more?
On the side of the state, this requires an administration with enough
authority, self-confidence and a reputation for autonomy and neutrality, to
allow them to maintain close contacts with organized interests, to delegate
policymaking to them and to maintain consensual relations, without
immediately being suspected of bias and corruption. As Peters (1989: 156)
wrote:
Societies that have had among the most positive conceptions of the
public bureaucracy – Germany, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian
countries – have been much more successful in accommodating the
role of pressure groups into policy making than have political systems
that have a less exalted conception of their civil servants. In fact, a
relative positive evaluation of the civil service may be required to allow
the civil servants latitude in dealing with the pressure groups and in
making accommodations to their commands.
And Wilson (1985: 159) added: ‘A teacher whose authority is assured may
be able to adopt a more friendly and relaxed approach than a teacher
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whose authority seems highly uncertain.’ The contrast is especially striking
in comparison with the USA, where lower legitimacy of politicians and
administrators means that close cooperation between state agencies and
private interests is more readily seen as ‘corruption’ or ‘capture’ (Bernstein
1955; McConnell 1966; Mitnick 1980). One might add that where
administrators have a more open attitude towards industry, the latter might
see them less as natural adversaries. Hence it will be more likely to consult,
cooperate with and get involved in corporatist arrangements. In general: a
more positive public attitude towards the state, politicians and civil servants
alike, reduces mutually the cultural if not structural separation between
state and society and that allows for closer cooperation. In continental
Europe France is the anomaly. Not that the state does not have the
authority, self-confidence and neutral reputation. On the contrary. There a
barrier to central social pacts is the paternalism of the French state and its
traditional distrust of organized interests.
In most of the other continental European countries, experimenting
again with central social pacts, this condition on the side of the state seems,
however, to have been met. And it has also not really changed over the last
decades, so in this respect there has been no difference in the conditions
for the ‘old’ corporatism of the 1950s–1960s, and the revival in the 1990s.
The state should, however, not only be legitimized to involve private
interests in public policy, but also to deliver upon whatever it has promised
or included in central social pacts. Too many checks and balances in the
political system may detract from the capacity of the state to do so.
Federalism, dualism in the relation between government and parliament, a
strong parliament, two competing and both powerful parliamentary
chambers, judicial review and the possibility of referenda may all reduce
the capacity of governments to govern, and may even threaten to lead to
political paralysis as, for example, Lazare (1996) has argued. Such reduc-
tions of governability may also restrict the power of the government to bind
itself in central social pacts. 
Typically, several corporatist countries do not have many checks and
balances in their system of political institutions. The Netherlands and
Austria, for instance, do not have strong dualism between executive and
legislative, the second chamber is relatively weak, and the Netherlands has
no federalism, judicial review nor referenda, while Austria may have them,
but all three in a rather weak form. By contrast, the limits imposed by
strong federalism to central state authorities on committing themselves to
organized interests are demonstrated in the Swiss case. Armingeon in this
volume concludes in his chapter on Switzerland that
Swiss corporatist institutions could never attain such a dominant
position in economic and social policy making as in other countries
[because] the results of the corporatist bargains have to be accom-
modated to the results of governmental and parliamentary decisions of
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at least four large parties and the decisions of twenty-six autonomous
cantons and their populations.
This has first limited the expansion of welfare state programmes, and
subsequently reduced the need for cutbacks. In Germany, federalism was
no hindrance to a Bündnis für Arbeit, but that was because economic and
social policy were rather centralized. Furthermore, political fragmentation
may be offset by political parties, who can act as ‘integrator’ (Friedrich
1968: 341; Lehmbruch 1998) and coordinate positions of political actors in
different state institutions, and this even more so in a political culture
emphasizing the importance of consensus- and compromise-finding, as is
typical for most corporatist countries. Most corporatist countries have such
‘integrator’ parties and a consensual culture. Overall, these institutional
conditions for governability are rather stable over time, and indeed have
not really changed over the last decades. 
While there has not really been a change in the capacity of the state to
involve itself in central corporatist concertation, there definitely has been
some fluctuation in the willingness of states to do so. As already indicated, in
some countries like Sweden and the Netherlands, corporatism has been
blamed for a while for the ‘sclerosis’ and inflexibility of the welfare state.
The Dutch government has for some time given preference to advice by ad
hoc expert committees, headed by former leading entrepreneurs such as
Wagner of Shell, and put the social partners and their official advisory
bodies such as the Social Economic Council (SER) at a distance. Parliament
even accepted a proposal in 1994 to abolish the legal duty of the
government to get the advice of the SER on any intended socio-economic
measures. In the Netherlands the pendulum has swung back in the mean-
time, and the government has been again cooperating closely with the
social partners in socio-economic policy, including welfare state reform. In
Sweden this has been less the case, but that is also due to the unwillingness
of the employers’ associations to commit themselves to central social pacts.
Currently, the willingness on the part of the state has become somewhat of
a problem in Austria, where the present christian-democratic/conservative-
liberal coalition seems less inclined to listen to the social partners, in
particular labour in the form of the Arbeiterkammer.
On the side of interest associations a condition for successful central
corporatist concertation is the presence of strong, nationally organized and
encompassing interest associations, which can aggregate a great diversity of
interests and which have enough internal disciplinary capacity to ensure
the observation of agreements by their members. This poses two more or
less contradictory imperatives to interest associations.
In order to perform the functions of preference aggregation and reform-
ulation to more general interests well, interest associations and their
functionaries need a certain autonomy, a certain discretionary space to
interpret interests, to give and take in the negotiations between subgroups
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of members, and in external negotiations with other interests as well. So do
members of parliament by the way, who are elected without duty of consult-
ation, in order to allow them to move their positions in reaction to the
exchange of information and arguments. This requires a certain distance to
the membership, which is realized in many associational systems by a
hierarchical structure of associations and peak associations and by the step-
wise selection of functionaries. Peak associations are further removed from
the membership than their affiliates. Union members elect union leaders,
and these in turn appoint representatives in peak associations and other
organizations at higher levels of aggregation in the system of interest
associations. 
Hierarchy and indirect elections of functionaries entail prospective
dangers of limiting participation and increasing alienation of members
from the association. Individual members may not recognize their indi-
vidual interests any more in the much more generalized and often more
‘technical’ interests distilled in the aggregation process by economically
trained functionaries, who may have developed in their frequent inter-
action with negotiation partners from the other side some understanding
for their interests and constraints, a process which is not and cannot be
followed by the rank and file.
Such alienation may threaten the other imperative which interest associ-
ations are under, namely the need to have some organizational capacity to
mobilize, control and discipline the membership whenever necessary, and
to ensure the observation of agreements by the membership. This could
require instruments of coercion, such as compulsory membership and
various sanctions. Furthermore, it may necessitate hierarchic centralization
between peak associations and their affiliates. However, too blatant use of
such instruments may again threaten to alienate members from their
associations, and affiliates from peak associations, and thus be self-
defeating.
An added problem of close and permanent cooperation between private
associations and state agencies, whereby the first may even assume public
tasks, is that associational functionaries may come to be seen more as
‘servants’ of the state or as an independent oligarchic clique, rather than as
representatives of the interest group. Furthermore, increasing indepen-
dence and discretionary authority also of course entail the danger of abuse
of power, of corruption, by associational functionaries, thus threatening
their legitimacy in the eyes of the members, and reducing their organiz-
ational capacities. 
Alienation, loss of legitimacy, loss of discretionary space and loss of
internal disciplinary capacity, this is what has happened to comprehensive
systems of interest intermediation in the countries where corporatism once
reigned. It started in the Netherlands and Sweden and eventually reached
the stronghold of corporatism, Austria. This is manifested in lower density
ratios, lower participation in associational elections, in public criticism of
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compulsory membership (in Austria), of associational self-regulation and of
the practice of extending collective wage agreements negotiated by associ-
ations which represent only a minority of the working population; and it has
been particularly evident in electoral gains of political parties critical of
social partnership or of close involvement of associations in public policy,
such as the liberal FPO in Austria or the VVD and ‘Lÿst Pim Fortuyn’ in the
Netherlands. It has affected both trade unions and employers’ associations.
Various factors have contributed to this. First of all, the disintegration of the
pillars or Lager to which these associations belonged and from which they
derived their identity. Second, the loss of appeal of political ideologies in
general. Third, the increased individualism of members, with the rise in
education and social mobility of members, makes them less inclined to follow
directions of the leadership of the groups and associations to which they
belong. Fourth, corruption scandals have contributed to a loss in legitimacy.
A case in point is Austria. Public criticism on the organizational base of
Austrian corporatism, the compulsory Chamber system, mounted in the
first half of the 1990s. A popular revolt seemed to be near. Indications
have been the very low participation rate in the Arbeiterkammer elections
in 1994 (30 per cent instead of the usual 50 per cent); a loss of the
established parties SPÖ and ÖVP and a gain of the FPÖ in the Chambers;
and successive disastrous results of the first two parties in the general
elections in 1994 and 1998, and huge gains of Haider’s FPÖ, the opposi-
tion party which has made a point of attacking the Proporzdemokratie, the
elite oligarchy of leaders of interest associations, Chambers and the
government. The media blamed it on the typical abuses of an established
oligarchy, not subject to many political controls: the ‘self-service republic’
of the associational functionaries, the accumulation of functions and
salaries by the socio-economic elite (the president of the Arbeiterkammer
collected triple salaries and earned, with US$16,000 dollars a month, 2–3
times more than a cabinet minister (Der Standard 7 October 1994)), the
Vetternwirtschaft (nepotism), Filz (corruption) and Privilegien (privileges),
the Absicherung der Pfründe (securing benefices). Already after the elections
of 1994 the relatively progressive paper Der Standard wrote: ‘Eine Reform-
Regierung müßte das Kammer-System umkrempeln, müßte sich viel
rigoroser von den Doppel- und Dreifach-Funktionären verabschieden,
müßte die Verfilzungen zwischen Politik und Sozialversicherung beenden,
müßte drastische Sachreformen einleiten. Vor allen: Die Parteien müßten
sich selbst ändern – in Richtung Bescheidenheit und Effizienz. Ob das die
vielen, an Pfründe und Privilegien gewöhnten Kammer- und Gewerk-
schaftsfunktionäre hinnehmen werden?’ (10 October 1994).1
In the meantime, however, the criticism in Austria has again subsided
somewhat. Important in this respect was the outcome of a referendum on
the compulsory membership of Chambers. The Austrians voted with a clear
majority in favour of maintaining it. This has again legitimized the
existence and political self-consciousness of the Chambers. 
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Notwithstanding the problems experienced by more or less encompas-
sing peak associations in almost all continental European countries, these
associational systems have not broken down everywhere. They have shown
themselves to be quite resilient to the challenges listed. One reason could
be that member mobilization may have become less important as a source
of power. Their institutional power, their access to the arenas of political
decision-making, seem to have acquired a life of their own, becoming
rather stable and institutionalized. In addition, in some countries like the
Netherlands associations have amassed quite significant financial reserves,
so much that at least financially they could survive as organizations for
decades, even if they lost all their members. Symbolic of the political
influence of peak associations in the Netherlands is that they have become
the most important recruitment area for leading politicians. The previous
Prime Minister Kok was formerly the leader of the largest trade union
confederation, and his predecessor Lubbers made a career in the metal-
working employers’ association. Hence in countries such as the Netherlands,
Austria, Finland and Ireland the associational preconditions for central
social pacts have remained firmly in place or have regained their earlier
importance.
The most important exception is Sweden, as we can read in the chapter
by Jochem. Here the peak employers’ association SAF, originally in the
1930s the driving force behind the centralization of labour relations in
Sweden, seems to have enduringly given up on centralized corporatist
concertation. The legitimacy for it has been lacking among its members and
the organization has been both unwilling and unable to lead the members
back to the central bargaining table. However, Sweden was not quite alone.
In Germany the employers’ associations have also experienced an internal
rank and file revolt – especially in the Eastern part of the country – against
central commitments, and this has contributed to the difficulties of
concluding central social pacts there. The fragmentation of the German
system of business associations between a peak employers’ association BDA
and a peak trade association BDI has added to the problems. It allowed
rivalry to develop between both. The BDI has challenged the prerogative of
the BDA in the field of labour relations and has tried to give its members,
sectoral trade associations, a task in wage negotiation. Both in Sweden and
in Germany employers have given preference to a more decentralized, and
presumably more flexible, system of wage negotiations. The economist
Teulings in this volume provides good logical and empirical arguments that
such a position should not really be in the employers’ interest. Centralized
bargaining makes for easier overall wage restraint.
While employers’ associations have hindered the return of central cor-
poratist concertation in Sweden and Germany, resistance in the ranks of
the trade union movement has obstructed the conclusion of central social
pacts in Belgium and France. In Belgium the unions backed out of some
central agreements at the very last moment.
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Incentives
Why should parties in central social pacts have been willing to conclude
them? In large part because they provided incentives for each other, either
negatively, or positively. They were threats to each other; or possible aides
or alliances. 
The existence of powerful comprehensive peak associations means that
they can offer enough resistance to state plans for welfare reform if not
involved and committed in the decision-making process. The failure of the
first Austrian Sparpaket in 1995 is a case in point. At the same time, the
existence of such integrated associational systems means also that states
have potentially attractive partners in central consultations, partners that
represent rather moderate positions given their comprehensive character,
and partners that somehow also manage to enforce agreements internally.
Conversely, a strong and self-confident state, which clearly indicates that
it will go at it alone with reform measures if the social partners refuse
collaboration, provides an important incentive to get trade unions and
employers’ associations to return to the central bargaining table and to
make concessions. Credible threats of state intervention can and do chastise
social partners. Hemerijck in this volume has called this the ‘shadow of
hierarchy’. An example of this process was the determination of the Dutch
Cabinet under Lubbers to introduce wage measures and to reform the
invalidity pension plans in 1981–2. This determination   brought the social
partners to eventually conclude the by now famous Wassenaar Accord of
1982. Paradoxically enough, by first reaffirming the primacy of politics the
government managed to reinforce corporatist concertation. A second
example was the initiative of the Austrian social partners to introduce a
budget consolidation package, after the government had made quite clear
that it was intent upon doing so. The ‘cold shoulder’ that the new 1999
centre-right coalition has shown to the social partners may in time produce
similar results to those seen earlier in the Netherlands. A third case was the
Belgian inter-sectoral pact concluded finally in 1998. An earlier attempt by
the social partners in 1996 to agree voluntarily failed. Subsequently the
government took legal measures in order to ensure that Belgium could
qualify for participation in the EMU. It introduced a ‘competitiveness law’,
which fixed the legal wage norm for 1997–8, stipulating that average wage
increases should not exceed those in the neighbouring countries France,
Germany and the Netherlands. Under pressure of this state intervention the
social partners were able to reach an agreement in 1998. They preferred
their own contract over government regulation. This case demonstrates
again the importance of European integration. Whereas in the past the
national central banks provided the ‘whip’ for wage negotiations (Iverson et
al. 2000), now this task was taken over by the European Monetary Union.
A final and major incentive for engaging in central social pacts is of
course its success. That is, they derive legitimacy from their output, their
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performance. If parties experience that such agreements are successful in
the sense of furthering their goals – be it a reduction of unemployment,
industrial recovery or budget consolidation – they will obviously be more
inclined to continue on the road taken. In this sense central corporatist
concertation can experience a spiral of positive reinforcement. 
This has clearly been the case in the Netherlands and Ireland. The very
positive economic performance of these countries over the last five years
has, certainly in the Netherlands, changed the public perception of
corporatist concertation. Up to 1995 a dominant stream in the political
discourse associated corporatism with stalemate and sclerosis. A turnabout
came when foreign newspapers in 1995 started to point to the strong
economic performance of the country, and linked it to its institutions of
consensual bargaining. Thus quickly the dominant stream in Dutch political
discourse came to perceive these institutions proudly, first as the Dutch
‘deltamodel’, and subsequently as the ‘poldermodel’ (van Waarden 1995).
This change to a positive perception has popularized concertation within
socio-economic policy-making, but also in other policy fields.
Of course positive experiences can come from the country and parties
themselves, but also from neighbouring countries. In that sense, modelling
and imitation can and do also foster the conclusion of central social pacts.
The positive experiences of countries like the Netherlands and Austria
have induced others, e.g. the Mediterranean countries or Germany, to try
hard to be successful with such an approach as well. 
Situation
The willingness of social partners and the state to engage in centralized
corporatist concertation and to agree to central social pacts has certainly
been enhanced if not occasioned by a jointly shared sense of crisis, of
imminent and escalating problems which threaten to run out of control.
The variables that imbued a direct sense of crisis have been different to
different actors. For the state it was a fiscal crisis: rising expenditures for
welfare state and other social programmes, declining income due to falling
growth rates, resulting in escalating budget deficits. For the unions it was
rising unemployment and declining membership. For the employers it was
a loss in competitive strength and declining profit rates. The important
thing was that parties realized that these could be ‘traded’, and/or that the
different problems had similar roots: a slow-down in growth, industrial
restructuring, loss of competitive position. Such a realization was facilitated
by sudden changes or shocks and by a joint national sense of vulnerability.
Many of those countries experimenting with social pacts again have
traditionally felt such a sense of vulnerability, owing to an openness to
international competition. Belgium, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark,
Switzerland and Ireland all have rather open economies. In earlier times
this has led to a sense of shared responsibility to withstand the ‘foreign
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enemy’. In the immediate postwar years this was a very strong sentiment in
Dutch socio-economic policy networks for example. This thesis of a link
between openness of the economy and corporatist concertation, originally
formulated by Katzenstein (Katzenstein 1985), seems to hold again for the
new wave of social pacts. 
An extreme and interesting case has been Finland, which experienced a
sudden shock around 1990 with the loss of the traditionally important
Russian export markets, following the political and economic revolutions
there. This led to a strong concerted and unified response of the whole
society, which also found expression in a very active industrial policy,
focusing all state and societal resources on reducing its dependency on
forestry and developing the ICT sector (Nokia!). 
Institutions and culture
The capacity and willingness of actors to engage in centralized corporatist
concertation is also influenced by the political institutions and the political
culture of a country. The institutions set the rules of the game, and thus
they facilitate or hinder the conclusion of central social pacts.
This is most clearly seen for the government as actor. Its capacity to
enter into centralized negotiations with comprehensive interest associa-
tions, to bind itself in such negotiations and to deliver upon its promises is
clearly determined by its political room for manœuvre. In a political system
with many checks and balances on the power of the government this
capacity is obviously reduced. Thus institutions like federalism, judicial
review, a strong dualism between government and parliament, or a refer-
endum set limits to the conclusion of central social pacts. Such institutions
filter and correct decisions and reduce the capacity of the state to deliver
upon its promises. 
What is helpful on the other hand, are legal and political instruments
that allow governments to threaten credibly with intervention. Thus the
legal Tarifautonomie of social partners in Germany, which limits the power
of the state to intervene in wage negotiations, does not really aid the state
there to provide a credible ‘shadow of hierarchy’.
Also important is some measure of political stability and continuity of
governments and their political composition. Such stability reduces the
options for social partners to wait for a new government, perhaps more
positively inclined to their interests, which may even overturn decisions of
the present government deemed undesirable, and thus postpone the
conclusion of central social pacts. 
However, a state should also not be too strong and centralized, because
then it may decide to go it alone, in particular when it finds only relatively
weakly organized social interests in civil society. This has been the case in
France, where legal government intervention, for instance, regarding the
weekly working week, has now further eroded the possibilities of interest
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associations to demonstrate their usefulness to their rank and file, thus
undermining further their already weak power position.
Also conducive to concertation are institutionalized channels for contact
and concertation, like formal advisory councils to the government, and the
constitutional possibility for governments to involve interest associations in
public policy. The continued existence of the Social Economic Council in
the Netherlands, but also of a myriad of other policy or sector specific
councils, boards, committees, in which the social partners and government
officials frequently meet – often with the same people meeting again for
different purposes in different arenas – has certainly aided the revival of
centralized concertation in that country. 
Finally, the importance of political culture should not be underrated. It
makes quite a difference whether actors trust each other; are capable and
willing to have some understanding for the opponents’ interest and are
willing to take account of this; have some tolerance towards the opponents,
rather than vilifying each other as much as possible (either seriously or as
part of the game); and are used to compromise and looking for consensus,
rather than going for ‘winning all or nothing’. That is, cultural values that
emphasize consensualism as against adversarialism, tolerance as against
intolerance, trust as against distrust, collectivism as against individualism,
pragmatism as against legalism, tend to facilitate the conclusion of
compromises, including central social pacts.
The development and maintenance of such cultural values do not come
as ‘deus ex machina’ in political arenas. They have developed over long
periods of time and found expression in political, legal and administrative
traditions and institutions, which in turn continue to support such cultural
values. Thus a majoritarian political system in which the ‘winner takes all’,
and the frequent use of a legal system (high litigation ratio) that in the end
identifies a winner and a loser, both tend to further an adversarial culture,
also in the relations between interest associations and between them and
the state. Conversely, a political system based on proportional repre-
sentation and cooperative federalism condemns political actors to each
other, condemns them to build coalitions. Such a system is first of all
already an institutional expression of a culture that values tolerance for
minorities and compromise; in turn it tends to support the continued
existence of such a culture. In the relation between the state and organized
interests the presence of many institutionalized channels and arenas in
which actors meet is important. This does not only allow for generalized
exchange, it also allows actors to get to know each other and develop some
sense of basic trust. In such cooperative systems of labour relations actors
may have developed provisions which give them an further interest in
continuing their good relations. 
An interesting example are the Dutch ‘O and O funds’. Quite a few
sectoral collective agreements contain stipulations that employers pay a
certain sum per worker to these funds. The sectoral associations pay for the
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provision of sectoral collective goods (vocational training, health and safety
at work, etc.) out of these funds; but increasingly they have also begun to
secretly finance their own organizations out of this fund. The consequence
is that both parties have acquired an interest in continuing their good
relations, because only then can collective agreements be concluded and
these funds continue to be filled. 
The underdevelopment of the institutional and cultural dimension is a
weak point of the otherwise interesting study of Visser and Hemerijck
(1997) on Dutch corporatism. They emphasize that
the Dutch trajectory of adjustment and reform was paved with many
contingencies, such as a major recession, a change in the balance of
power between capital and labour, a spiraling crisis of inactivity, and
changes in the political landscape. . . . There is no uniform
institutional format for a common ‘polder model’ across policy
domains. ... Likewise, there is no constant ‘Dutch culture’ of consensual
decision-making, which only has to be mobilized in times of
international danger and crisis to the nation. The breaking of the
political stalemate of corporatist immobility required hard-won
changes and slow learning processes, and success was not assured.
(1997: 184)
They give a prominent place to what they call ‘policy learning’. However,
this concept appears a bit like a ‘deus ex machina’. Why were actors willing
to ‘learn’, and why could they? Why did they do so less in other countries?
In other words, the authors cannot really explain why Dutch policy-makers
were capable of such policy learning and why German or Belgian policy-
makers, for instance were less capable. A comparative approach would have
led them to ask questions that they did not ask in a case study of the
Netherlands. Explaining the differences between countries requires
recourse to differences in institutions and political culture. They may be
right in emphasizing that corporatist institutions do not automatically
produce consensual outcomes; it goes too far to conclude, as they seem to,
that institutions do not really matter. It may be that they are not a sufficient
condition, but they certainly may be a necessary – or perhaps better,
conducive – condition for concertation.
Conclusion: national room for manœuvre for change/reform
Interest associations have often been seen in the literature as constraints on
governments, as additional checks and balances in the political system,
limiting the room for manœuvre of the state further, and threatening to
produce stalemates. In systems with many checks and balances, interest
associations have also used these to block or seriously delay government
decision-making when this served their interest. The clearest case is that of
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the USA. American interest associations have used all the possibilities that
the American dualist political system, its federalism and the elaborated and
fragmented ‘politicized’ legal system (with its judicial review and high
uncertainty of decisions (van Waarden 1993)) offer to block or frustrate
decisions, either in the phase of policy formulation, or in that of policy
implementation. An adversarial political culture, reinforced by adversarial
and ‘winner takes all’ institutions has further reinforced this. But also
European governments have been confronted with the power of interest
associations. A major political strike by British miners, unions forced a
government out of power and paved the way for the tough, adversarial and
impositional tactics of the Thatcher governments. Something similar had
also happened earlier in France. In the smaller continental European
countries powerful comprehensive associations have also produced stale-
mates in institutions of centralized corporatist policy formation. Thus for
some years the Social Economic Council, whose Dutch acronym is SER,
came to be called ‘Sociaal Economische Rem’, meaning ‘socio-economic
brake’. This was enhanced by a temporary adversarial political culture,
stemming from the revival of class conflict in the 1970s.
Increasing technical, economic, political and legal internationalization
gave policy-makers the idea that dangers were imminent, and that
countries had to adapt faster to the changing international environment,
that they had to be more flexible in policy-making, that they needed more
room for manœuvre. Interest associations and institutions of corporatist
concertation were considered hindrances to this for a while. Hence both
policy-makers and observing social scientists expected that international-
ization would be a threat to corporatist concertation. And indeed, it
seemed to be so for a while.
However, a revival turned out to be just around the corner. Confronted
with still powerful comprehensive interest associations some governments
decided that they could actually increase their room for manœuvre by
again integrating and committing social partners to intended reform
measures. Some political elites came to the conclusion that they would have
greater chances for realizing reforms by gradually building a consensus
base among powerful interest groups. There have even been cases where
governments used agreements with social partners to break stalemates in
the political arena. And as we have argued, rather than internationalization
and globalization being a threat to such concertation, they actually turned
out to be motors and motives for it. Many recent central social pacts were
occasioned by the need of governments to satisfy the EMU-entrance
criteria.
Once some countries had success with this approach, others followed the
model provided. However, not all countries could equally successfully adopt
this approach. A major condition for success was a capacity of the state to
bind itself in central negotiations with interest associations. This leads to
the paradoxical conclusion that corporatist concertation has been most
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successful in countries that may need it least. Assuming that concertation
actually increases a government’s room for manœuvre, governments who
have less of that would be in greater need. However, governments that are
already less ‘burdened’ by many political and legal checks and balances,
that have already relatively more room for manœuvre, find it easiest to
further enlarge their room for manœuvre by engaging in corporatist
concertation. Those governments who already experience important
institutional limitations to their room for manœuvre also find it more
difficult to conclude successful central social pacts which are meant to
increase their room for manœuvre.
Note
1 [A reform-government ought to radically change the Chamber system, should
distance itself more rigorously from functionaries collecting double and triple
salaries, should end the corrupt entanglements between politics and the social
security system, and should initiate drastic substantive reforms. Most of all: the
political parties ought to change themselves – and become more modest and
efficient. But will the many Chamber and trade union functionaries, used to
benefices and privileges, accept that?]
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2 The resurgence of Dutch 
corporatist policy coordination 
in an age of globalization1
Anton Hemerijck
Introduction
The ‘Dutch model’ today occupies a prominent place for progressive
European politicians pondering the possibilities of a new model of
capitalism with a human face in an era of economic internationalization.
Foreign politicians, central bankers and union leaders alike praise the
combination of fiscal conservatism, wage moderation, consensual welfare
reform, job creation and the maintenance of overall social security. They
highlight the extraordinary proportion of Dutch people, male and female,
in part-time jobs, the sustained policy of wage moderation by the trade
unions; the success in holding the course for EMU and the absence of
social unrest. Best of all, they observe, the Netherlands is the only EU
member state to have more than halved its unemployment rate during the
past decade, from 13-plus per cent in 1983 to 5 per cent in 1998. Its
annual growth rate in jobs of 1.6 per cent is four times the European
average, and as good as the American ‘job machine’, but without the US’s
sharp increase in earning inequality and life-chances. 
Although it attracted international attention only in the 1990s, the
Dutch ‘job miracle’ has its basis in policy changes in the early 1980s. Over
the past three decades we can observe four consecutive policy reversals
across four different policy areas. The shift to a hard currency regime in
macro-economic policy was made in the wake of the breakdown of the
system of Bretton Woods and became firmly established in 1983. In 1982
the social partners agreed to resume a cooperative strategy of wage
moderation. In the late 1980s and the early 1990 a series of reforms in the
system of social security took place. From the mid-1990s, finally, the
adoption of an active labour market policy stance together with additional
reforms in labour market regulation gained political currency. 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the lengthy and delicate
process of renegotiating the Dutch welfare state over the past two decades.
I will demonstrate that the shifts in macro-policy, wage formation, social
security and labour market policy were ‘sequentially’ related. I will show
how, over time, policy reforms across different policy areas created the
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conditions and the demand for one another, and that neither of these
domain-specific policy changes could have been successful on their own
account. As the sequence of policy reforms were practically all conditioned
by the larger political institutional surroundings of consociational demo-
cracy and corporatist business–government relations in the Dutch political
economy, the evolution of policy adjustment in the Netherlands is best
characterized as a process of ‘negotiated change’. 
The chapter is organized into eight parts. First I will present a short
overview of recent labour market performance in the Netherlands. In the
next section I develop a number of theoretical considerations for exploring
the sequential and composite character of policy adjustment. The emphasis
is on important interaction effects between interdependent policy areas over
time. In the following four sections, I will employ these insights for the
empirical analysis of sequential policy adjustment in the Netherlands across
the policy areas of macroeconomic policy, industrial relations, social security,
and labour market policy. In the concluding section I will explore the
political conditions under which the Dutch welfare state was able to overcome
the pathology of ‘welfare without work’, so typical of a continental welfare
regime, through a lengthy and cumbersome process of negotiated change. 
Labour market performance
The miraculous employment performance of the Netherlands reveals a
clear departure from the current unemployment malaise in the European
Union and the Dutch recent past. Where there are so few examples of
strong job growth in Western Europe, and so few signs that it is possible to
consensually adjust the institutional, social and mental pattern of a passive
welfare state, the Dutch example does invite closer scrutiny. Table 2.1
compares the performance of the Netherlands with the European Union
average on six broad measures: real GDP growth, private consumption,
investment, employment, unemployment and net labour force partici-
pation. We observe that in the 1990s the Netherlands did better on each of
these indicators. This has been achieved while bringing down the budget
deficit to 2.2 per cent of GDP in 1996, well within the 3 per cent norm of
the Economic and Monetary Union (it was 3.8 per cent in 1970, 7.2 per
cent in 1980). The collective expenditure quote has fallen for four years in
a row and with it the GDP share of taxes and social charges. In 1996 this
share was 44.4 per cent (47.3 per cent in 1970, 57.2 per cent in 1980),
which is still a respectable sixth place in the European Union, behind
Denmark, Sweden, Belgium, Finland and France. The total public dept has
decreased to 78.5 per cent in 1996 while inflation averages under 2.5 per
cent for the last decade. 
If we concentrate on labour market performance, the Dutch experience
clearly contradicts the continental pathology of ‘welfare without work’.
Dutch job growth was four times the average for the European Union
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between 1983 and 1993, and thereafter still double the EU average (see
Table 2.2). Unemployment has come down from an all time record in 1984
to 3.3 per cent in 1999, while the EU average remained at over 9 per cent
(see Table 2.3). Since 1995 it has also been higher than the famous
American jobs machine. However, in contrast to the latter, Dutch job
growth is less associated with a sharp increase in earnings inequality.
Inequality has increased, but the Netherlands has been able to maintain a
middle rank between Germany and Scandinavian countries on the one
hand, Britain and the US on the other. 
The extraordinary growth of part-time jobs has contributed to the
massive entry of women in the labour force, and the replacement of older
workers by younger, cheaper and possibly more flexible and skilled
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Table 2.1 Economic performance of the Netherlands in comparison to the
European Union, in percentages
Netherlands European Union
(Average growth per year, 1991–6) 
GDP 2.2 1.5
Private consumption 2.3 1.5
Investment 1.3 0.2
Employment 1.5 0.5
Unemployment level 6.2 11.1
Employment/population ratio 64.2 60.6
Source: DNB (Dutch Central Bank), Annual Report 1996, Amsterdam, 1997, p. 24; and
OECD, Employment Outlook, Paris, various years.
Table 2.2 Employment growth in the Netherlands, the European Union and
selected OECD countries, 1983–2000, in percentages
1983–93 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000a
Netherlands 1.8 0.8 2.4 2 2.5 3.3 3.0 2.5
EU 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.6 1.5 1.6 1.5
Belgium 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.3 1.2 0.9 1.4
Germanyb 0.7 1.8 0.3 1.2 1.3 0.4 0.3 0.5
France 0.1 0.4 0.9 0.0 0.3 1.1 2.0 2.3
Italy 0.0 1.7 0.6 0.4 0.0 1.1 1.2 1.5
Denmark 0.2 1.2 1.6 1.3 2.3 2.1 0.8 0.8
Sweden 0.6 0.7 1.6 0.9 1.0 1.5 2.2 1.9
UK 0.6 1.2 0.8 1.1 1.7 1.2 1.0 0.9
USA 1.8 3.2 1.5 1.4 2.2 1.5 1.5 2.1
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, Paris, July 1996, July 1997 and June 2000, Table 1.2
Notes:
a Projections
b Until 1993 West Germany only.
workers. With some delay, the Dutch trade unions have come around in
support of these changes and taken a positive attitude towards part-time
employment and flexibility. The share of part-time work has surged from
less than 15 per cent in 1975 to 35 per cent in 1994, a share well above that
of any other OECD country. Of all part-time employment, 75 per cent of
part-time jobs are held by women: 55 per cent of all female workers are
employed part-time. The incidence of part-time work among men is at 12
per cent the highest among OECD countries (see Table 2.4). The
Netherlands has the highest rate of part-timers among young people in
Europe (25 per cent). This suggests that entry into the labour market is
commonly channelled through part-time work.
The growth of female participation is perhaps the most revolutionary
development in the Dutch labour market. Female labour force participation
has been extremely low in the Netherlands in comparison to most OECD
countries. Over the last decade participation of women in the labour market
increased from under 35 per cent in 1983 to 61 per cent in 1999 (see Table
2.5). The growth in labour force participation is concentrated among women
who are either married or cohabiting: they now represent a quarter of the
active labour force. The majority of working women find employment in the
commercial and non-commercial service sectors. The demand for a flexible
workforce in the service sector agrees with a general preference of women to
work part-time. As a consequence of the increase in labour market
participation of women, there is also a growing interest among men for part-
time work, so as to combine gainful employment work with unpaid family
care. 
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Table 2.3 Unemployment in the Netherlands, the European Union and selected
OECD countries, 1983–99, in percentages
1983 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Netherlands 9.7 6.2 6.6 7.1 6.9 6.3 5.2 4.0 3.3
EU 9.2 8.1 10.7 11.1 10.7 10.8 10.6 9.9 9.2
Belgium 11.1 6.7 8.9 10.1 9.9 9.7 9.4 9.5 9.0
Germanya 7.7 4.8 7.9 8.5 8.2 8.9 9.9 9.4 8.7
France 8.1 9.0 11.7 12.3 11.7 12.4 12.3 11.9 11.3
Italy 7.7 9.1 10.2 11.2 11.6 11.7 11.7 11.9 11.4
Denmark – 7.7 10.1 8.2 7.3 6.8 5.6 5.2 5.2
Sweden 3.9 1.8 9.1 9.4 8.8 9.6 9.9 8.3 7.2
UK 11.1 7.1 10.5 9.6 8.7 8.2 7.0 6.3 6.1
USA 9.6 5.6 6.9 6.1 5.6 5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, Paris, July 1996, July 1997 and June 2000, Table A.
Notes:
a Until 1993 West Germany only.
It should be emphasized that with the increase in part-time and tempor-
ary work, and the surge of female market participation, average annual
working hours per worker have come down significantly since 1973 (see
Table 2.6). Notwithstanding the overall increase in labour market particip-
ation rate (Table 2.5), the participation rate for older men (in the 55–65
age bracket) came down in the first half of the 1990s from 50 per cent in
1983 to 40 per cent in 1996, after which it started to rise again. This
reflects a return from the early retirement policy (Table 2.7). 
The Dutch job miracle represents a significant departure from the
scenario of ‘welfare without work’, so typical for the continental welfare
states. However, all that glistens is not gold. The present state of nearly full
part-time employment may be judged a second-best solution only. The low
unemployment rate of 3 per cent does not reflect the true state of slack in
the Dutch labour market. The level of structural inactivity, although
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Table 2.4 Incidence of part-time employment in the Netherlands and selected
OECD countries, by sex, 1983–99, in percentages
1983 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999
Men
Netherlands 6.8 13.4 11.3 11.1 12.4 11.9
Belgium 2.0 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.9 7.3
Germanya 1.7 2.3 3.7 4.1 4.6 4.8
France 2.5 4.4 5.7 5.9 5.8 5.8
Italy 2.4 3.9 4.7 5.1 4.9 5.3
Denmark 6.5 10.2 10.2 11.1 9.8 8.9
Sweden 6.2 5.3 6.7 6.5 5.6 7.3
UK 3.3 5.3 7.7 8.2 8.2 8.5
USA 10.8 8.3 8.4 8.3 8.2 8.1
Women
Netherlands 49.7 52.5 55.5 54.8 54.8 55.4
Belgium 19.7 29.8 32.1 32.3 32.2 36.6
Germanya 30.0 29.8 29.9 31.4 32.4 33.1
France 20.1 21.7 24.1 25.2 25.0 24.7
Italy 9.4 18.2 20.9 22.2 22.4 23.2
Denmark 43.7 29.6 24.2 24.2 25.4 22.7
Sweden 45.9 24.5 23.5 22.6 22.0 22.3
UK 41.3 39.5 41.4 40.9 41.2 40.6
USA 28.1 20.0 20.2 19.5 19.1 19.0
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, Paris, July 1997 and June 2000, Table E.
Note
a Until 1993 West Germany only.
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Table 2.5 Employment/population ratios by sex in the Netherlands, the European
Union and selected OECD countries, 1983–99
1983 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999
Men
Netherlands 69.1 75.2 75.7 77.9 79.6 80.3
EU 75.8 74.7 70.3 70.4 71.3 72.0
Belgium 70.4 68.1 66.8 67.1 67.0 67.5
Germanya 76.6 75.7 72.9 72.2 72.5 73.1
France 74.4 69.7 66.7 66.2 66.5 66.8
Italy 76.6 72.0 65.3 65.0 66.7 67.1
Denmark 78.4 80.1 80.5 81.3 80.2 81.2
Sweden 84.7 85.2 73.2 72.4 73.5 74.8
UK 78.7 82.1 76.3 77.4 78.1 78.4
USA 78.9 80.7 79.7 80.1 80.5 80.5
Women
Netherlands 34.7 46.7 54.8 56.9 58.9 61.3
EU 42.9 48.7 50.3 50.7 51.6 53.1
Belgium 36.6 40.8 45.6 46.7 47.5 50.2
Germanya 47.8 52.2 55.5 55.4 56.0 56.5
France 49.7 50.3 51.7 51.5 52.3 52.9
Italy 34.9 36.4 36.1 36.2 37.1 38.1
Denmark 65.2 70.6 67.4 69.4 70.3 71.6
Sweden 75.5 81.0 69.9 68.9 69.4 70.9
UK 55.3 62.8 63.3 64.0 64.2 64.9
USA 57.7 64.0 66.3 67.1 67.4 67.6
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, Paris, July 1996, July 1997 and June 2000, Table B.
Note
a Until 1993 West Germany only.
Table 2.6 Average annual working hours per employee in the Netherlands and in
selected OECD countries, 1973–99
1973 1979 1983 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999
Netherlands 1724 1591 1530 1433 1374 1365 – –
Germanya 1804 1699 1686 1562 1523 1524 1531 1535
France 1771 1667 1558 1539 1608 1605 1604 –
Italy 1842 1748 1724 1694 1577 1577 1575 –
Sweden 1557 1451 1453 1480 1623 1625 1628 1634
UK 1929 1821 1719 1773 1738 1736 1731 1720
USA 1896 1884 1866 1936 1951 1966 1955 1976
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, Paris, July 1997, and June 2000, Table G.
Note
a Until 1993 West Germany only.
declining in absolute and relative terms, including all unemployed and
inactive persons of working age receiving a social security benefit and
persons enrolled in special job creation programmes, remains high at 20
per cent of the current labour force. New jobs have gone predominantly to
younger and better-skilled recruits to the labour market and many are part-
time, sometimes for a limited number of hours only. The share of long-
term unemployment may have decreased to 43 per cent in 1999, and is
even low by European standards, but is still high in absolute terms (Table
2.8). Unemployment remains a huge problem for unskilled and immigrant
workers, with unemployment rates two to three times the national average.
In short, the success of the employment and labour market performance of
the Netherlands is relative, to be set against the background of the dismal
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Table 2.7 The unemployment and employment/population ratios for men, 55 to
65, 1983–99
1983 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999
Employment/population ratio
Netherlands 50.5 44.5 40.7 43.0 46.2 48.8
EU 58.5 53.2 47.5 47.7 47.9 48.3
Belgium 47.7 34.3 32.2 32.2 32.1 35.1
Germanya 57.4 52.0 48.0 47.9 47.6 48.0
France 50.4 43.0 38.6 38.4 37.9 38.9
Italy 55.3 50.9 42.1 41.5 41.5 40.8
Denmark 63.1 65.6 58.4 61.0 58.5 59.9
Sweden 73.9 74.4 66.0 64.7 65.8 67.1
UK 62.6 62.4 57.0 58.6 58.3 59.4
USA 65.2 65.2 64.7 65.5 66.2 66.1
Unemployment
Netherlands 6.7 2.8 3.5 3.2 1.8 2.1
EU 6.9 6.2 9.2 9.3 8.6 8.4
Belgium 5.8 3.1 4.7 4.8 5.3 4.5
Germanya 9.0 9.9 12.8 14.1 13.7 12.8
France 6.0 7.3 8.6 8.6 8.3 8.7
Italy 1.5 1.7 4.3 4.6 4.7 4.6
Denmark 6.2 5.2 6.0 4.4 4.2 3.2
Sweden 4.0 1.3 9.4 9.4 7.8 7.3
UK 10.6 8.4 9.5 7.8 6.8 6.4
USA 6.1 3.8 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.7
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, Paris, July 1997 and June 2000, Table C.
Note
a Until 1993, West Germany only.
experience of the recent past, on the one hand, and the lacklustre
performance of most neighbouring European countries on the other. There
is no full employment yet and the present state of nearly full part-time
employment should be judged a second-best solution only.
The sequential logic of policy adjustment
The theoretical argument of this chapter builds on five propositions. First,
social and economic policy adjustment is a fundamentally dynamic process.
Second, policy adjustment impinges on a wide variety of policy areas. For
our purposes, the most important are: macro-economic policy, industrial
relations, social security and labour market policy and regulation. Third,
trajectories of policy adjustment are paved with interaction effects between
policy choices adopted in different areas and ongoing changes in the
international economic environment. In the face of interaction effects and
cumulative changes in the international political economy, fourth, policy
makers have responded by making sequential adjustments in different
policy areas, usually by addressing one policy problem in one policy area at
a time. Policy responses adopted in one policy area subsequently impinge
on other policy domains, which in turn, encourages policy-makers to make
additional policy changes that follow from earlier choices made elsewhere.
Fifth, the extent to which policy interdependencies are the object of explicit
institutional coordination and the degree to which non-state corporate
actors participate in processes of policy adjustment are crucial institutional
variables in the process of sequential policy adjustment. Together, changes
in the international economy, interaction effects across policy areas and
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Table 2.8 Long-term unemployment in the Netherlands and in selected OECD
countries, percentage unemployed longer than 12 months, 1983–99
1983 1990 1996 1997 1998 1999
Netherlands 48.8 49.3 50.0 49.1 47.9 43.5
EU – 48.6 49.3 50.1 49.1 47.5
Belgium 64.8 68.7 61.3 60.5 61.7 60.5
Germanya 41.6 46.8 47.8 50.1 52.6 51.7
France 42.2 38.0 39.5 41.2 44.1 40.3
Italy 58.2 69.8 65.6 66.3 59.6 61.4
Denmark 44.3 26.5 26.5 27.2 26.9 20.5
Sweden 10.3 12.1 30.1 33.4 33.5 –
UK 45.6 34.4 39.8 38.6 32.7 29.8
USA 13.3 5.5 9.5 8.7 8.0 6.8
Source: OECD, Employment Outlook, Paris, July 1997: Table H and June 2000: Table G.
Note
a Until 1993, West Germany only.
time, and efforts at cross-sectoral policy coordination shape the pace,
scope, character and direction of policy adjustment.
Policy interdependencies
Ever since the late 1960s, the economic environment of the advanced
welfare states in Europe and North America has been subject to substantial
and continuous change. The challenges brought on by accelerating infla-
tion, stagflation problems associated with the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system, the two oil crises, the resurgence of mass unemployment, the
liberalization of capital markets, path-breaking advances in the process of
European integration, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the crisis in the
European Monetary System, have triggered a variety of highly diverse
trajectories of policy adjustment across different economically advanced
welfare states. In the process, many European welfare states have been
gradually recasting their once stable policy repertoires of macro-economic
policy, industrial relations, social security and labour market policy commit-
ments. 
How are we to make sense of the great variety of trajectories of policy
adjustment across the economically advanced welfare states in response to
dramatic international economic changes over the last quarter of the
twentieth century? It is my contention that for an adequate analysis of
policy adjustment it is necessary to draw together in a single study a wider
range of policy areas than has generally been thought relevant in compara-
tive political economy research. Under conditions of baffling change, we
should focus on the composite character of policy choices adopted across
different policy areas. Trajectories of policy adjustment are paved with
interaction effects between policy choices adopted in different policy
domains. For the analysis of national patterns of policy adjustment, I
consider four interdependent policy domains. These are macro economic
policy (including monetary and fiscal policy), industrial relations (including
labour market regulation), social security policy and labour market policy. 
During the Golden Age of postwar prosperity, these four policy areas
developed as relatively autonomous, functionally separated, policy domains,
each with their own sector-specific methods of provision and regulation.
Although fundamentally engaged in the tasks of meeting and stabilizing
the material needs of citizens, the four policy areas vary in substantive
policy content and are governed according to different rules of policy
making. Macro-economic policy designates the role of the state in helping
to stabilize the macro-economic policy environment and facilitate economic
development. The domain of industrial relations structures the relationship
between the trade unions and the formal employing organizations of the
labour market, and regulate, under labour law, procedures of collective
bargaining, working conditions, hiring and firing legislation, and patterns
of consultation, representation, cooperation of the two sides of industry.
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Social security regulation is politically disengaged from the regular labour
market, serving to protect the non-working population – the aged, the sick,
the unemployed – by providing them with sources of income, social security
and public assistance. The fourth domain of labour market policy enter-
tains a tenuous position between those inside and outside the labour
market. The ‘right to work’, difficult to uphold in a capitalist economy, is
commonly anchored in public commitment to pursue full employment by
way of an active labour market policy. 
In the Golden Age of postwar capitalism, different advanced political
economies achieved relatively stable, coherent and functional clusters of
macro-policy, industrial relations, social security, and labour market policy.
These different ‘golden age’ policy repertoires, in retrospect, displayed a
high degree of ‘goodness-of-fit’ over the prolonged period of postwar
prosperity, political stability and social inclusion. However, we should not
exaggerate the degree of harmony among separate policy areas. The
relatively benign economic environment of the 1950s and 1960s made
practically every national social and economic policy repertoire equally
successful in securing high growth rates, full employment, price stability
and the expansion of the welfare state. Since the early 1970, stagflation,
low growth and the resurgence of mass unemployment have come to
unsettle these once stable repertoires of social and economic regulation. In
addition, in the 1980s the class compromise that originally supported the
policy formats of the postwar decades crumbled under the shift in the
balance of power from left to right, unleashing various conservative attacks
on the welfare state in different countries (Hall 1999).
Over the past quarter century, dramatic international economic and
related domestic political changes have resulted in a substantial reconfigur-
ation, to different degrees in different countries, of the basic policy
repertoire around which the welfare state is organized. Under conditions of
rapid international economic integration successful policy responses
increasingly depend on the capacity of policy-makers and producer groups
to swiftly adjust to changing economic conditions. For a better understand-
ing of the process of policy adjustment I wish to draw special attention to
interaction effects between different policy decisions adopted in different
policy areas. The interdependencies between the policy areas of macro
economic policy, industrial relations, social security and labour market
policy, in the context of international economic integration are fairly
obvious. In the open economy generous standards of social protection
depend heavily on and in turn affect substantially the competitiveness of
the economy to create the wealth, jobs, and the tax and contribution bases
for high-quality welfare provision. As a consequence, policy responses
executed in one policy domain are likely to shape and constrain options for
reform in a neighbouring policy area. Although sectoral policy actors are
often unaware of the interdependencies between policy areas, they usually
respond to unanticipated spillover effects by way of local adjustment to
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previous choices adopted in other areas of social and economic regulation.
Spillover effects not only constrain the range of policy options in the
affected policy areas, they also create the opportunities for the realization
of much desired policy changes that have heretofore been blocked. 
Sequential character of policy adjustment
By drawing the policy areas of macro-economic management, industrial
relations, social security and labour market policy together in a single
analysis, we are able to bring out the composite character of policy adjust-
ment. As efficiency gains won in one policy area are likely to incur efficiency
losses elsewhere, which are likely to gain political salience in a next cycle of
reform, patterns of social and economic policy adjustment seem to follow a
temporal or sequential-diachronic logic. Over time, spillover effects in
another area create additional problems of adjustment in a neighbouring
area of social and economic regulation. By the same token, policy continu-
ity in one area, in the face of ongoing changes in the policy environment,
can affect policy changes in other policy domains. Initial choices are
especially important in shaping the content and scope of consecutive
reform efforts. From this, it follows that when countries adopted different
policy solutions to tackle the crisis of stagflation in the late 1970s, they may
unintentionally have created additional problem loads in other policy
areas. The composite effects of these temporally interrelated policy choices
subsequently interacted with novel changes in the international economic
environment. Moreover, it should be emphasized that national policy
responses are not wholly independent from other national responses.
National policy choices in macro-economic policy will be influenced by
macro-economic policy choices made elsewhere. To be sure, towards the
end of the 1980s the Bundesbank increasingly came to delineate the space
for monetary policy choices in the majority of European political economies.
To give an example: the Swedish choice of a soft currency response to
the fall in aggregate demand, resulting from the first oil shock, helped to
restore the competitiveness of the Swedish economy, while maintaining
high levels of employment. When solidaristic wage bargaining eventually
broke down in the face of a revolt from metalworking employers, Swedish
policy-makers were unable to contain inflation. Rising interest rates
resulted in a loss of competitiveness. When capital controls were lifted in
the second half of the 1980s and when the Swedes finally decided to peg
the krone to the German mark in the early 1990s, a radical surge in
unemployment could no longer be avoided. The Scandinavian recession
was exacerbated by the high interest rates policy of the Bundesbank in
response to the Chancellor Kohl’s decision for a one-to-one conversion of
East German marks into D-marks over unification.
The Dutch followed a distinctly different adjustment route. The basic
choice of a hard currency in response to the second oil crisis resulted in the
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early 1980s in a loss of competitiveness, rising public deficits and massive
increase in unemployment. This predicament persuaded the social partners
and state officials, after a long period of policy stalemate, to resume a
concerted strategy of wage restraint in order to recoup corporate profits,
investments and jobs. Fiscal discipline and wage restraint in the Netherlands
ultimately paid off in terms of revolutionary job growth in the second half
of the 1980s when growth picked up in the world economy. Furthermore,
low wages and increased demands for Dutch exports in the new German
Länder helped the Netherlands to successfully weather the global recession
of the early 1990s. 
Failure-induced policy learning
Policy adjustment seems to take place by trial and error. Necessity often is
the mother of invention. Following the canons of organizational theory, it
could be argued that processes of policy adjustment follow a pattern of
‘failure-induced search’ (March 1994; Cohen and Sproull 1996). When
policy performance falls below acceptable targets, i.e. when inflation,
unemployment and public deficits reach double-digit figures, search
activity is increased. No consistent policy repertoire can maintain a severe
discrepancy between targets and aspirations for very long. In periods of
sustained poor performance, even the most entrenched policy-makers
come to understand that standard rules of procedure are no longer
adequate. The focus of policy adjustment under pressure brings out the
central role of policy actors, willing to learn from experience and able to
change policy and innovate the institutions within which they operate.
Accumulated policy failures provoke a readiness for learning, engendering
an ‘unfreezing’ process, in which old policy paradigms are shaken and new
ideas are accommodated (Hall 1993).
Under conditions of faltering performance, many elements of the
existing policy repertoire may be up for grabs, but again, given the limited
attention spans of policy-makers, not everything can be attended to all at
once. And as the political economy of the welfare state is made up of
interdependent policy domains, policy failure is likely to produce a struggle
for political attention between different problem areas. Macro-economic
policy-makers may draw attention to accelerating inflation as the root cause
of all evil, whereas social policy-makers argue that growth should be
stimulated to fight unemployment through demand stimulation. Policy
changes, prioritizing full employment over price stability and vice versa,
more often than not depend on temporary political disequilibria, which
allow certain policy actors to impose their definition and diagnosis of
policy failure and its appropriate solution on the rest of the policy
repertoire. 
Policy reform is contingent on social and political support. Powerful
actors are able to stimulate research and mobilize resources for tackling the
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problems they find most pressing. With the passing of time, as a conse-
quence of sectoral spillover, the locus of problem attention and policy
action is likely to shift to yet again another policy area. 
Organizational theorists emphasize the role organizational slack in
processes of organizational change (Cyert and March 1963). Slack accumul-
ates in good times, can serve as a buffer in bad times. In the face of
organizational decline, managers discover ways to decrease slack by cutting
costs and through organizational restructuring. However, in the world of
policy and politics, especially welfare policy, aspirations adapt to
performance. The Golden Age of economic prosperity, full employment
and rising expectations saw the institutionalization of generous social
benefits and entrenched price-wage indexation clauses, which over time
became appreciated by target groups as inalienable rights. If wages are
sticky, as economists argue, than generous social rights and tough hiring
and firing regulations, enshrined in law, are probably even more so. This
makes it extremely difficult for policy-makers to simply rationalize on social
rights, collective bargaining and labour market regulation in hard times.
Given the importance of employment and social security in the lives of
many citizens, to be sure, the politics of ‘dismantling the welfare state’ is
not an attractive ticket for political competition (Pierson 1994). By its very
nature, the process of adjustment implicates the polity, bringing the
distribution of power, institutional structures and styles of decision-making,
together with patterns of interest representation, to the centre of an
analysis of policy responses. Effective policy responses must be functional,
politically viable, socially acceptable and institutionally feasible, preferably
all at once. The options for welfare retrenchment depends on the degree to
which former political commitments embodied in prevailing social rights
are resilient or vulnerable to political attacks. Are entrenched social rights
supported by strong political forces, institutional constraints and
ideological foundations? Do they offer credible policy solutions to problems
at hand? Have cumulative policy failures undermined their status in
political discourse? The more resilient received social rights are, the more
difficult welfare retrenchment will be. The more vulnerable they are, the
easier it is to renege on former social and political commitments. However,
it should be emphasized that the mere ease of reform does not imply that
effective policy solutions are up for grabs. Boundedly rational policy actors
face important cognitive constraints that may prevent them from adopting
and implementing effective policy responses. And even economically sound
policy solutions which result in declining living standards are likely to
provoke political protest and electoral shifts which can disrupt the
adjustment process. 
So far, little attention has been given to the composite, temporal and
failure-induced character of national patterns of policy adjustment. The
institutionalist literature, bent on identifying rather uniform national
responses, provides little basis for understanding the interactive dynamic of
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policy adjustment. In particular, those studies which merely focus on single
policy areas, such as industrial relations or social protection, are not able to
offer an apt understanding of policy adjustment. The prevalence of
interaction effects makes it practically impossible to isolate the indepen-
dent effect of central bank independence, peak-level bargaining, payroll
social security and active labour market policy (Regini 1999). Moreover, as
policy actors, engaged in processes of sequential policy learning and
problem displacement, call important aspects of the established rules of the
game of policy-making into question, institutional parameters lose their
portent as explanatory variables. 
By drawing attention to policy change rather than institutional continuity,
I am not advocating a radically indeterminist approach to the study of
policy adjustment. I would not like to dismiss many of the important
insights gained from the institutionalist literature. The great achievement
of corporatist scholars like Crouch, Lehmbruch, Schmitter and Streeck and
the contribution of Esping-Andersen to comparative welfare states lies in
their having brought a large degree of coherence back into the idio-
syncracies of advanced political economies. However, policy legacies and
institutional parameters are not impervious to policy change. To be sure,
the options available to policy-makers at any point in time are not
independent of resilient institutions and policy choices made in the past.
Many of the stark differences in pattern of policy adjustment are indeed
directly related to the specifics of the prevalent historical configurations of
the four policy areas at the time of the closing of the Golden Age of
postwar prosperity, which is the basic reference point for any analysis of
policy adjustment. 
Policy repertoire, interaction effects and political institutions
In the postwar era the Dutch economic and social policy repertoire
developed around a cluster four interrelated features. These are: (1) restric-
tive macro-economic policy priorities; (2) highly coordinated patterns of
collective bargaining at the sectoral level; (3) conditional employment-
related arrangements of social security, and, last but not least; (4) a policy
legacy of a distinct lack of active labour market policy priorities. 
(Macro)economic policy priorities
Macro-economic policy-makers in the Netherlands endorse the policy
priorities of stable prices and hard currencies. The Dutch central bank, De
Nederlandsche Bank, is independent from the government and constitu-
tionally committed to price stability. Ever since the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system, as a standard rule of procedure, Dutch monetary authorities
follow German monetary policy choices, in order to ensure that inflation
and interest rates do not diverge too far from German levels. 
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Coordinated sectoral industrial relations
In the industrial relations literature, the Netherlands is usually grouped
under the label of ‘intermediate bargaining systems’ (OECD 1996: 63; cf.
OECD 1994). The level of union organization in the Netherlands is fairly
moderate by international standards. About 30 per cent of Dutch workers
are member of a trade union (Visser 1987, 1992). By contrast, Dutch
employers are very well organized (Traxler 1995; van Waarden 1995).
Collective bargaining predominantly takes place at the sectoral level
(OECD 1994: 175–7). The coverage of collective bargaining is high, while
coordination between trade unions and employers’ associations at the peak
level is considerable. Invariably, collective agreements have a legally
binding status. The level of industrial conflict is low and if strikes occur,
they are highly organized. State intervention has traditionally been very
strong in Dutch industrial relations. 
Conditional employment-related social security
Following the canons of comparative welfare studies, the Netherlands are
usually grouped, together with Austria, Belgium, Germany, France and
Italy, under the label of the regime-type of the continental, ‘Bismarckian’,
conservative or Christian democratic welfare state (cf. Kersbergen 1995;
Esping-Andersen 1990, 1996; Huber and Stevens 2001). Continental social
policy is based on the principle of industrial insurance against occupational
risks, financed by earmarked payroll contributions from employers and
workers. Employment-related social security programmes revolve around
income replacement and are targeted at the (male) breadwinner in order to
safeguard traditional family patterns. As important financiers of the system
(through premiums and contributions), the social partners are strongly
involved in the management, administration and implementation of social
security provisions. 
Passive labour market policy priorities
The status of labour market policies is strongly correlated with the overall
character of social security. Whereas the Scandinavian welfare states are well
known for their strong emphasis on active labour market policy, the
continental welfare states seem to have placed ‘welfare before work’. Also
public sector employment is modest compared to the Nordic countries. In
the Netherlands, the public employment ratio even declined from 7.2 to
6.2 per cent between 1977 and 1995.
The productivity whip and the inactivity trap
For the Dutch experience, the particular combination of disinflationary
macro-policy, coordinated sectoral bargaining, payroll financing of the
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system of social security, and the lack of an active labour market stance, has
had important consequences for the road of policy adjustment travelled in
the Netherlands. In particular, the intimate ties between sectoral industrial
relations and payroll social security served in the 1970s and 1980s as an
institutionalized support structure, allowing the social partners to exter-
nalize the costs of economic adjustment onto the social security system
(Hemerijck and Manow 2001). The interaction between a hard currency
regime, sectoral industrial relations and payroll social security, has put a
virtuous Schumpeterian ‘productivity whip’ – due to the considerable non-
wage costs imposed on workers and employers in the form of social
insurance contributions – on organized industry in the Dutch economy.
However, in due course this has given rise to a vicious ‘inactivity trap’ – due
to the various pathways into non-employment that the continental welfare
state, lacking any form of active labour market policy commitment, so
generously provides for. A stylized account of the interplay between sectoral
industrial relations and payroll social security contains the following features:
under increased competitive pressure, firms in high-wage economies can
only survive if they are able to increase labour productivity. This is most
commonly achieved by way of raising the productivity levels of workers
through high-quality vocational training and education, labour-saving
investments and/or by laying off less productive or ‘too expensive’, mostly
elderly, workers. Under the principle of traditional breadwinner family
dependence, the latter strategy drives up taxes and payroll social security
contributions. The Schumpeterian productivity whip, in turn, puts pressure
on wage costs, which provides new ground for reassessing the remaining
workforce in terms of their level of productivity, most likely leading to
another round of dismissals. Hereby a virtuous cycle of productivity growth
could run into a vicious cycle of high wage costs, exit of less productive
workers, rising social security contributions, requiring further productivity
increases in competitive firms, eliciting another round of reductions in the
work force. In the absence of political intervention, this dynamic engenders
a pathological spiral of ‘welfare without work’. Jobs disappear in sectors
where productivity increases stagnate and prices of goods and services
cannot be easily raised. The overall labour markets effects of the interplay
between sectoral industrial relations and payroll social security are: low
employment and high structural unemployment; low female participation
rates; declining participation of older workers; underdevelopment of part-
time jobs; and a below-average job growth in the service sector, because
comparatively high wages and non-wage labour costs block job-creation in
the low-productivity segment of the labour market. In turn, low
employment, high levels of inactivity, short working times, high (non-wage)
labour costs and unfavourable population dependency ratios have
important repercussion for the welfare state. 
The interaction of the productivity whip and the inactivity trap points to
the possibility that national economies may be perfectly able to maintain
48 Anton Hemerijck
and restore their international competitiveness through high productivity
strategies of ‘diversified quality production’. However, with the passing of
time, they prove unable to defend welfare state objectives of high levels of
employment and social protection. Moreover, the self-regulatory character
of social security administration seems to reinforce the already existing
insider-bias in the continental welfare state. There is a distinct possibility
that export-oriented ‘productivity coalitions’ will be formed between
employers and employees at company and sectoral levels, which further
limit the opportunities of low-skilled groups of ever getting a job. 
During the 1980s the Dutch welfare state, like many other continental
welfare states, was trapped in a pathological vicious cycle of what Esping-
Andersen called ‘welfare without work’ (Esping-Andersen 1996). While in
Germany early retirement provided for the main labour market exit route,
in the Netherlands generous and lenient sickness and disability insurance
served this purpose.
Political institutions: consociationalism and corporatism
Policy adjustment cannot be explained by a dominant system logic of
spillover and interaction effects between different policy areas over time.
Political institutions provide important constraints and opportunities for
political intervention in the policy repertoire, especially when it engenders
pathologically perverse effects. 
The political system of the Netherlands is traditionally considered as
one of the clearest manifestations of consociationalism (Lipset and Rokkan
1967; Lehmbruch 1967; Lijphart 1968, 1984; Daalder 1974). Central to
consociational democracy, the ideal-typical alternative to the majoritarian
Westminster model, is that various party elites cooperate in a spirit of non-
competitive acceptance in both government and parliament. In his seminal
theoretical case-study of Dutch politics, The Politics of Accommodation (1968),
Lijphart delineates consociational democracy in terms of four character-
istics: proportional representation, power sharing by grand coalitions,
mutual veto rights and subgroup autonomy. In the Netherlands usually
three to four parties, representing confessional, social-democratic and
liberal subgroups, are represented in oversized coalition governments. In
the second half of the 1960s the Dutch segmented or pillarized cleavage
structure system began to disintegrate. This process of depillarization
challenged the traditional elitist and confessional authority structure of
Dutch society, which in turn led to more unstable and less effective
government coalitions in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. 
The Dutch political economy usually ranks high as a corporatist political
economy. It is furnished with a firmly established apparatus of bi- and
tripartite boards for nation-wide social and economic policy-making. For
the purpose of wage policies the most important is the Foundation of
Labour (STAR, Stichting van de Arbeid). STAR is a private body, founded
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in 1945, owned by the central union and employers organizations, and
intended as their meeting place. Twice every year, in the spring when next
year’s budget is prepared, and in the autumn, when a new round of wage
negotiations is about to begin, the Foundation meets with a delegation
from the Cabinet (van Bottenburg 1995). The Social Economic Council
(Sociaal Economische Raad, SER), founded in 1950, is a tripartite organi-
zation. Since its recent reorganization in 1995, employers and unions each
have eleven seats, the other eleven are occupied by crown members
appointed by the government, usually professors of economics, the
President of the Central Bank, the Director of the Central Planning Bureau
and, recently, some ex-politicians. In the first twenty years of its existence
its role in setting the targets for wage policy and advising the government
on the expansion and organization of the welfare state was very important.
As the foremost economic forecasting agency, the Central Planning Bureau
carries much weight as the key supplier of ‘commonly observed facts’ of the
state of the Dutch economy, on the basis of which the social partners define
their collaborative strategies of collective action. 
Together consociationalism and corporatism delineate the institutional
opportunity set of Dutch policy-makers for policy adjustment. As policy-
making is critically dependent upon the agreement of different coalition
parties and important measures of consensual support from the social
partners who participate in policy decision-making processes, cabinets are
constrained to respond autonomously to external pressures and demands.
The institutional parameters of consociationalism and corporatism forge
policy actors on to an adjustment path of negotiated change.
In the next four sections I will trace the progressive reconfiguration of
the Dutch welfare state. I will show how the shift to a hard-currency regime,
the resurgence of organized wage moderation and path-breaking social
policy and labour market policy reform were sequentially related, and what
role consociationalism and corporatism played in the Dutch endeavour to
reverse the immanent crisis of ‘welfare without work’.
The Dutch disease
The collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and the first oil price
shock of 1973 accelerated domestic inflation, flattened effective demand
and squeezed corporate profitability in the Netherlands. Given the strong
Dutch commitment to trade liberalization, macro-economic policy-makers
chose to let the Dutch guilder follow the German mark within the European
snake mechanism. Pegging exchange rates on the DM changed the
hierarchy of macro-economic targets from a balanced consideration of
price stability in relationship to growth and employment to a more narrow
consideration of exchange rate stability ‘tout court’ (Jones 1995). The first
oil price shock of 1973 undermined whatever political consensus remained
among state officials and the social partners over Dutch social and
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economic policy. The leftist Den Uyl administration (1974–7) responded
with mandatory wage, price and energy controls. True to the government’s
political credo of ‘redistribution of wealth, knowledge, and power’ and its
belief that ‘the strongest shoulders should carry the heaviest burdens’, the
crisis measures were couched within policies favouring the low-paid and
privileging the trade union movement. Impressed by the rapidly deterior-
ating economic situation, the trade unions accepted a wage intervention
measure in late 1973, by means of the special enabling act (Machtigingswet,
1974), without much discontent. In 1974 the controversial decision was
taken to link the minimum wage and, indirectly, the related social security
benefits, to contractual wage developments in the private sector. The
minimum wage itself was indexed to wage developments in order to ensure
that everybody would participate in real income improvement. At this time
virtually all private sector contracts contained automatic price escalators,
which made them inflation-proof. The result of this system was that, when
new contracts were negotiated between unions and employers in the
private sector, government costs went up automatically. The same applied
to the salaries of an increasing number of civil servants, various semi-public
employees of the welfare state and the increasing number of social security
recipients. Together, the growing volume of benefits and their linkage to
inflation and pay rises in the private sector led to higher costs that were
insufficiently met by either social charges or taxes. It might have seemed to
the governments of the 1970s that the linking of benefits to wages was a
necessary condition for wage restraint and would provide a built-in brake
on rising claims of and rivalry between different groups. However, when
tripartite bargaining over wage restraint floundered throughout the 1970s,
the linking system spurred social security expenditures. Moreover, it made
the government the prisoner of the outcome of negotiations and tactical
games between unions and employers (Hemerijck 1995). 
In 1976, Wim Duisenberg, Finance Minister under Den Uyl, put on the
brakes and formulated his so-called 1 per cent norm or rule that total public
expenditure should not rise with more than 1 per cent of the net national
income per year. This was a considerable revision of the projected 2.4 to 3
per cent at the time (Van Zanden and Griffiths 1989). The Central Bank
joined in to pursue a restrictive monetary regime in order to retain parity
with the German mark. The restrictive macro-economic policy shift played
an ambiguous role in the Dutch economy – making it at the same time more
austere and less competitive (Jones 1995). After 1976, the restrictive macro-
policy response began to appear in declining profitability, weak private
investment, capital flight, rising unemployment and increasing current
account deficits, leading to the infamous ‘Dutch disease’. The windfall benefit
of huge gas resources turned out to be a blessing in disguise. The inflow of
wealth from natural gas was used to pay for rapidly rising social transfer
payments. As this stimulates consumer demand for goods and services, it
invariably puts upward pressure on salaries and wages. Gas exports also led
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to the appreciation of the guilder and thereby caused a worsening of the
terms of trade for import competition and put Dutch export at a dis-
advantage. Although the Dutch central bank succeeded in mitigating
inflation by sticking to the German currency, this only exacerbated the
problem of export competitiveness in the Netherlands. The rise in interest
rates, starting in the late 1970s, finally resulted in the mid-1980s a massive
burst of corporate bankruptcies and a massive surge in unemployment. 
The years between 1976 and 1982 are characterized by a protracted
policy stalemate in both corporatist industrial relations and consociational
party politics. The new centre-right administration (1977–81), led by
Andries Van Agt, was a weak coalition, internally divided, in particular
within the newly formed Christian Democratic party, and had hardly a
majority in Parliament. The Van Agt administration followed the policy
legacy of Den Uyl with respect to wage policies and the linking of social
benefits. It was unable to bring public finances under control (Toirkens
1988) and was locked in internal fights (Hemerijck 1995). In 1978 the
government announced a further reduction in spending and a series of
small curtailments in the index for calculating civil servants’ salaries and
social benefits, to be implemented in small steps until 1981. But because of
internal obstruction from spending departments, little support in parlia-
ment and no support from the unions, little was accomplished (Toirkens
1988). An internal cabinet clash between Finance Minister Mr Andriessen
and the Minister of Social Affairs Mr Albeda escalated in the second half of
1979. When the so-called ‘almost accord’ of 1979 between the central
organizations, so carefully arranged by Albeda, failed, Andriessen clamored
for an extended wage freeze for a period of two years. As this demand was
considered outlandish, even by his Liberal coalition partners, Andriessen
rapidly lost support in parliament and had to resign from the cabinet in
early 1980. The commitment to concertation had triumphed over the
objective of fiscal restraint, but not for long. When the second oil crisis of
1979 hit the Netherlands much harder than the first and left the country’s
economy and public finances in a much greater disarray. Albeda had no
option but to apply the Wage Act and impose a wage freeze. 
The crossroads at Wassenaar
The 1981–3 recession was exceptionally severe, by international standards
and in the light of the post war history of the Netherlands (van Zanden and
Griffiths 1989). National income declined during eight consecutive
quarters and the net investment rate, which had decreased from 7 per cent
in the decade before the first oil crisis (1973) to 4.6 per cent in the second
half of the 1970s, slumped to a mere 2 per cent. The predicament of rising
unemployment, increasing public deficits, declining competitiveness, rela-
tive to Germany, and falling growth rates forged a remarkable shift in
policy orientation. 
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Public finances and unemployment were singled out as the most pres-
sing problems of the day. The ‘financing deficit’, calculated as the difference
between government revenue and expenditure, minus the amount paid on
long-term loans, which had decreased to just over 4 per cent in 1977, rose
dramatically to 10.7 per cent in 1983. Between 1981 and 1983 300,000
jobs were shed, mostly in industry. Unemployment soared at a rate of
10,000 per month to a record 800,000 in 1984 and seemed unstoppable.
Meanwhile, the trade unions lost 17 per cent of their members and of the
remaining membership nearly one-quarter was out of work, on social
benefits or in retirement. Union density plummeted and stood at a mere 25
per cent by 1987, compared to 35 per cent before 1980. 
A growing awareness of the causal relationship between high real wages,
unemployment and unstable public finances shifted the attention of policy-
makers away from demand stimulation toward supply-side measures for
policy adjustment. Although the ‘hard-currency policy’ provided for greater
macro-economic stability, it also meant that changes in the international
political economy had to be answered for by voluntary wage moderation
and/or productivity increases. After the government brought inflation
under control, wages and the welfare state became the prime targets for
policy adjustment. 
The general elections of 1981 resulted in a patched-up coalition between
the Christian and Social Democrats, but the new administration immedi-
ately fell back into policy immobilism. The government lasted only nine
months, from September 1981 to May 1982. The fall of the cabinet, again
led by van Agt (CDA) and with PvdA leader, Den Uyl, as Minister of Social
Affairs, raised the level of drama and ended the political basis for a Social
Democratic management of the crisis. 
Politically, 1982 is a turning point. New elections brought to power a
true ‘no nonsense’ austerity coalition, led by Ruud Lubbers, and relegated
the Social Democrats to the opposition for nearly the whole duration of the
1980s. The new coalition of Christian Democrats (CDA) and Liberals
(VVD) commits itself to a three-track strategy of, first, a drastic reorganiz-
ation of public finances in order to reduce the ‘financing deficit’, lower
interests and inflation; second, economic recovery through improved
business profitability, lower labour costs, industrial restructuring and less
regulation; and, third, work-sharing without extra costs to business in order
to alleviate the unemployment problem. Unveiling its plans on 22 November
1982, the new cabinet declares that ‘it is there to govern’. Eight years of
centre-right rule provoked a break with corporatist immobilism as the
Lubbers government – no longer committed to full employment as a prim-
ary policy objective – disengaged itself from critical dependence on
corporatist bargaining. A major goal was to guarantee that collective
bargaining outcomes would no longer have a direct effect on government
expenditures. The government achieved this by severing price indexation
and breaking the statutory couplings between wage increases in the market
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and those in the public sector, and between wages and social security
benefits. This put the trade unions in a tight corner. With unemployment
soaring at a postwar record, the trade union movement was in no position
to wage industrial conflict. After a decade of failed tripartite encounters,
based on Keynesian presuppositions, the new coalition’s entry into office
was crowned by a bipartite social accord in December 1982. 
With the Accord of Wassenaar, the unions recognized that for a higher
level of investment, essential for the creation of more jobs and the fight
against unemployment, a higher level of profitability was required. This
path-breaking accord marked the resurgence of corporatist adjustment on
the basis of a commonly understood ‘supply side’ diagnosis of the crisis
(Visser and Hemerijck 1997). The path-breaking ‘Wassenaar Accord’,
named after the hometown of VNO chairman Chris van Veen, at whose
house the agreement was prepared, marked the resurgence of corporatist
adjustment in the political economy. The accord encouraged proliferation
of cooperation between the social partners based on: (1) in terms of policy
content, the exchange of wage moderation for a reduction in working
hours to fight unemployment and help restore the profitability of industry;
and (2) in terms of institutional structure, a process of ‘organized decentral-
ization’ in the Dutch system of industrial relations. Weakened but in a
political environment of unquestioned institutional security and semi-
public status, they returned to the consensual policy style which had
characterized Dutch corporatism in the early postwar years. It was helpful
that the (by now dysfunctional) institutional framework of a concertation
economy was still there and did not have to be invented. For employers, on
the other hand, an agreement with the unions is a means to forestall
government intervention, because they feared political interference in the
form of a statutory and uniform reduction of the working week.
The response to the Wassenaar agreement was swift. Although negoti-
ations over shorter hours proved cumbersome, in less than a year two-
thirds of all collective agreements were renewed, mostly for two years,
during which the payment of price compensation was suspended and a 5
per cent reduction of the average annual working hours was to take place.
By 1985, cost-of-living clauses had virtually disappeared; less than 10 per
cent of all collective agreements included a fully paid escalator clause.
Average real wages fell by 9 per cent in real terms. The share of labour in
the net enterprise income, still 89 per cent in 1982, fell to 83.5 per cent in
1985 (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 105). 
Assured of restraint, the government had its hands free to get control
over public sector finance. In the spring of 1983, preparing the Budget for
1984, the government decided to play its card as the country’s largest
employer and step up restraint. The unveiling of its plan to reduce public
servants’ salaries, minimum wages and benefits by 3.5 per cent in January
1984 caused an uproar among the public sector unions. Later in the year
they organized their largest-ever postwar strike, only to find out that they
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had become isolated. 1982 is also the start of the unlinking of private and
public sector wages and the development of autonomous labour relations
in the public sector. In 1985 parliament approved new legislation ending
the ‘trend-following’ mechanism in the subsidized sector. In principle,
employers and unions were free to negotiate wages, as in the private sector,
but within limits set by the Cabinet. In the next ten years labour relations in
the government sector were normalized: while civil servants lost most of
their special privileges with respect to pensions and dismissal protection,
civil servants’ unions gained the right to strike and to collective bargaining.
The conclusion is that the private sector can no longer be taken hostage
and that the government has gained more authority if it wants to cast a
‘shadow of hierarchy’ over private-sector wage bargaining. 
The Wassenaar Accord inaugurated an uninterrupted period of wage
restraint up until the late 1990s. All agreements since 1982 have recon-
firmed the need for wage restraint. Nominal wage increases have fallen to
zero and since the 1980s the anticipated increase in inflation has been the
basis for sectoral negotiations. Only in 1992 and 1993 did the average
negotiated wage increase exceed the inflation rate by half a percentage
point. Estimations are that over 40 per cent of job creation in the last
decade must be attributed to prolonged wage moderation. The return to
wage moderation contributed to job-intensive job growth in three ways. First
by helping to restore profitability of business it created a necessary condition
for investment and job growth. Initially, employers tend to recapture profits
in order to improve corporate balance sheets rather than to step up
investment strategies. The pattern of Dutch recovery shows an early growth
in exports, with a more gradual increase in employment, investment and
consumption. Second, wage moderation contributed to the sale of manu-
factured goods and tradable services in foreign markets, raising net exports
and growth in the exposed sectors of the economy. Third, it helped to keep
more people on the payroll. As a corollary, labour productivity per hour,
although very high by European and American standards, increased less
than in other countries. Wage restraint has had a favourable effect on
employment in sectors that produce mainly for the domestic market,
making low-wage, labour-intensive production more profitable. 
While wage restraint in itself helps to preserve and create jobs, an
additional pay-off was required to make corporatist adjustment tangible for
trade union rank and file. Over the last decade the average working week
has been brought down from 40 to 37.5 hours. In those sectoral
agreements in which a reduction of the working week was negotiated wage
increases have been smallest. The process of across-the-board labour time
reduction has now come to a halt as concertation shifted gradually towards
part-time work as the main tool for redistributing work. In 1990s there a
shift in issue-linkage at the macro-level, whereby wage restraint was
increasingly compensated by reductions in taxes and social security
premiums, made possible by improved public finances and a broader tax
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base through the creation of more jobs in domestic services. This allowed
real net incomes to rise, even in the absence of gross wage increases, and
thus helped to maintain spending power and boosted domestic demand. 
Although the appreciation of the guilder (pegged to the German mark
since 1983) has made exports more expensive, the overall decline in wage
costs has been capable of compensating for competitive losses due to
changes in the exchange rate. The strict exchange rate policy seem to have
had some additional disciplinary influence on wage developments. On the
other hand, moderate wage developments have enabled the Dutch central
bank to stick credibly to its policy target. 
Institutionally, the corporatist agreements have evolved from compre-
hensive package deals to so-called central framework agreements that
generally voice non-binding recommendations to be filled out in more
detail at the sectoral level. The accords therefore embrace the freedom of
sectoral collective bargaining and the primacy of self-regulation in
industrial relations. These new principles have been politically recognized.
Since the Wassenaar Accord there has been no political intervention in
wage setting. The role of the peak organizations of capital and labour is
now basically confined to redirecting sectoral contracting parties towards
tacit, economy-wide wage restraint. Central consultation in the Foundation
of Labour – the central bipartite corporatist institution (Stichting van de
Arbeid) – allows the centrally bargained deals to be passed on to sectoral
negotiators. The higher the level of consensus at the central level, the
smoother bargaining takes place at the meso-level (Heertum-Lemmen and
Wilthagen 1996). The inclusion of sectoral bargaining in the central
agreements is an example of ‘organized decentralization’, which stresses
sectoral bargaining with an effective input from the central level (Traxler
1995). Although the state plays a considerably less dominant role in
collective bargaining, there is still extensive political power. Based on pre-
war laws, the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment has the authority
to declare collective bargaining agreements legally binding for all workers
and employers in a certain branch of industry, whether they are unionized
or not. This provision remains a treasured policy instrument and is crucial
for securing economy-wide wage restraint. Employing a so-called ‘shadow
of hierarchy’ (Scharpf 1993), governments have been effective in encour-
aging labour and capital to reach agreements that concur with their central
policy goals.
So far, the regained practice of corporatist adjustment in the Netherlands
has proven to be robust, but not entirely without conflict. In 1993,
consensus was under pressure, as economic conditions rapidly deteriorated
and unemployment increased. And it was not until the government
threatened to intervene directly in the process of wage-setting that a new
accord was reached. Again the success of this accord was contingent on a
large measure of decentralized commitment to the central recommendation
and the politically strategic use of the shadow of hierarchy.
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Reversing the spiral of ‘welfare without work’
Organized capital and labour, under the shadow of hierarchy, managed to
find a responsible and mutually rewarding solution to problems of eco-
nomic adjustment during the 1980s. However, prolonged wage moderation
and industrial reconstruction were perversely compensated for through the
welfare state, via a generous labour exit route for less productive, mainly
elderly workers. 
The Dutch postwar compromise in social security revolved around an
implicit political exchange between the state and the social partners, whereby
the state was granted primary control over wage policy for the reconstruction
of the Dutch economy in exchange for a bipartite execution and administr-
ation of the system of social security. This has had major consequences for
Dutch social security reform. In terms of policy design, the Dutch social
security system has both universalistic schemes (e.g. the flat-rate public
pension) and social insurances (e.g. for unemployment, sickness and dis-
ability). The universalistic schemes are solidaristic, financed via general
taxation, and geared towards supporting non-working citizens with a
minimum income. Social insurance provides earnings-related benefits to
workers and employees, financed through compulsory payroll taxes, and
eligibility depends on contribution years. They are administered by Industrial
Boards (Bedrijfsverenigingen), which consist of the representatives of the
unions and the employers’ organizations. The Boards collect contributions
and decide on benefits. Because of their quasi-monopoly in social security
the bipartite Industrial Boards have a high degree of institutional power,
independent of the state, over social policy in general. The third tier, public
assistance, provides the public safety-net for those whose benefits under the
other tiers have expired. Public assistance is tax-funded and administered by
local authorities. Until the 1960s the expansion of social protection in the
Netherlands lagged behind most advanced European countries. In the 1970s
and 1980s the take-up of social security in the Netherlands bypassed the level
of the majority of the European welfare states, except Sweden (Flora 1986).
The political crisis of the Dutch welfare state revolved around the dis-
ability scheme that increasingly became an instrument for early retirement
and industrial restructuring. Four features established the idiosyncrasy of
this scheme (Aarts and De Jong 1996). First, the scheme did not make a
distinction between different causes of disability. The risk of disability was
defined as a social rather than solely an occupational risk. Second, the so-
called ‘labour market consideration’ provision stipulated that in assessing
the degree of disability the diminished labour market opportunities of
partially disabled persons should be taken into account. As a consequence,
disability as the basis for entitlement was redefined as a worker’s particular
incapacity to find a job similar to his former job. If the probability of not
finding an ‘appropriate’ or ‘fitting’ job was evaluated to be high then the
degree of disability would also be determined as high. Third, disability and
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sickness benefits were closely related, to the extent that a person would first
receive sickness benefits during the first full year and then would qualify for
the disability scheme. The funding of the schemes, however, is dissimilar.
Sickness pay is primarily financed by employers, while disability benefits
were entirely financed by the contributions of employees. Workers’
contributions were set at uniform nation-wide rates and were unrelated to
the particular risk factors in different industrial branches. Most firms
supplemented sickness benefits up to 100 per cent of former earnings and
many even supplemented disability benefits to a comparable level for a
year or longer.
The broad definition of disability, the incorporation of labour market
opportunities into the calculation of the degree of disability, and the high
replacement rates are not per se unique features of the system. The most
distinctive property of the Dutch programme concerned the institutional
organization of responsibilities and control. Sickness pay and disability
benefits were administered by the Industrial Boards. These were largely
responsible for examining the health of employees for whom their
employers pay sickness contributions directly to the appropriate Industrial
Board. However, there arose a remarkable deficiency in the transparency of
medical assessments as well as economic incentives for employers to use the
sickness and disability schemes as a convenient procedure for ‘firing’
redundant, particularly older workers and to avoid social friction at the
same time. Paying a sickness benefit for one year and then letting the
disability scheme take over was calculated as in many ways a much cheaper
option than maintaining a redundant worker on the regular payroll.
Medical doctors could interpret the labour market clause of the scheme
generously, employees and the unions appreciated that the disability
scheme guaranteed generous benefits until retirement and the government
had found an additional early exit instrument. In fact, the combination of
the low threshold for entitlement, the blurring of social and occupational
risks, and the generous level and duration of benefits explains why the
disability scheme became a major method for reducing the supply of
labour.
The unanticipated yet inevitable result was, however, that a steep rise in
the number of recipients would exhaust the scheme’s financial resources. A
scheme that was originally meant to support no more than 200,000 people
was paying over 900,000 benefits in 1990. By 1986 among the age group
55–64 those who received a disability benefit already outnumbered those
with a job. Estimates indicate that between 30 and 50 per cent of those
receiving disability benefits should be considered unemployed. To the
generous disability scheme early retirement facilities were added and these
also rapidly became popular labour market exit routes. 
The loss of jobs for manual (elderly) workers in industry, which occurred
rapidly and massively, encouraged the use of sickness and disability
legislation and early retirement in order to shed older, low-skilled males
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from the labour market before the normal age of retirement. The explicit
objective of disability legislation to encourage revalidation and labour
market reintegration was almost entirely discarded. Instead, the scheme
became a harsh welfare trap: once officially recognized as partially disabled
a worker acquired a permanent labour market handicap. The labour market
consideration was interpreted by the relatively independent Industrial
Boards in such a way that, if productivity was below the wage level, a worker
would be considered fully incapable to work. It was assumed that discrimin-
ation in the labour market would prevent such a person from finding
another job.
Political attempts were made to reduce the demand on the schemes.
Stricter measures were introduced to curtail misuse and to cut back social
spending. In 1984 the statutory minimum wage was reduced. Replacement
rates were cut and nominal benefits were ‘frozen’ between 1984 and 1990. In
1987 the second centre-right Lubbers government enacted a structural
reorganization of the system of social security. Replacement rates were cut
down from 80 to 70 per cent, entitlements were restricted, indexation was
cancelled, and the duration of disability and unemployment benefits was
shortened. Moreover, the labour market consideration of the disability
scheme was repealed. However, these and similar measures had little effect
on spending because the number of social security beneficiaries continued to
rise. One of the reasons for the failure of the reform is that the weak
prominence of the state in the social security system prevented the mobiliz-
ation of sufficient power to override the incentives to misuse the disability
scheme for labour market reasons. As a result, policy adjustment stalled.
By 1989 the number of people receiving disability benefits was rapidly
approaching one million and costs were exploding. Continuing the labour
market exit strategy would necessarily end in disaster. This added to an
already growing sense of emergency among most social and political actors,
notably among social democrats who had entered a coalition with the
Christian democrats. In a dramatic cri de cœur, Prime Minister Lubbers
proclaimed that the Netherlands had become a ‘sick country’ and that
‘tough medication’ was required. In this context of predicament, the
government proposed introducing a radical reform in order to discourage
the misuse of sickness and disability benefits and to close off other labour
market exit routes. In spite of the emergency and the widespread convic-
tion that radical changes had to be made, the proposal was highly
controversial, politically risky and met with stiff resistance. In 1991 nearly a
million people demonstrated in The Hague against the reform in what was
probably the largest protest demonstration ever. The Labour Party was
internally divided, its party leader almost fell over this issue, and its
members of parliament ambiguously defended the proposed changes. The
costs were high for the Social Democrats as the party experienced a
haemorrhage of its membership and of electoral support. The Social
Democrats were largely held responsible for what the electorate saw as an
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attack on established rights. The party did not recover in time and at the
1994 elections it was punished with a historic defeat.
Notwithstanding popular resistance and obstruction by the trade unions,
the reforms were enacted. The Act on the Reduction of the Number of
Disablement Benefit Claimants (TAV, 1993) introduced a so-called ‘bonus-
malus’ system for employers. A bonus will be received by an employer who
hires partially disabled workers, while a financial penalty (malus) was to be
paid into to the sickness scheme if an employee became disabled. However,
political pressure from the employers has already forced the withdrawal of
the measure. The reform of the disability programme included an age-
related reduction of replacement rates, which left older workers largely
unaffected (TBA, 1993). The duration of the benefit was substantially
shortened. This especially affects employees with an income substantially
above the statutory minimum wage. Benefits for persons aged under 50 at
the time of the enactment of the new legislation were reduced and these
now decline gradually over time to 70 per cent of the statutory minimum
wage plus an additional age-related allowance. Finally, medical re-examin-
ations of beneficiaries were undertaken on the basis of more stringent rules
and the legal requirement for partially disabled employees to accept
alternative employment was tightened. A new definition of disability serves
to coerce beneficiaries to accept all ‘normal’ jobs. In 1993, the re-examin-
ation concerned 43,300 beneficiaries younger than 35 years of age. Little
over 50 per cent maintained their benefit, 18 per cent had their benefit
reduced, and nearly 30 per cent lost their benefit, while 2 per cent saw
their benefit actually increased.
Under the new sickness leave scheme of 1994 (TZ, 1994) the first two
weeks (for enterprises with fewer than sixteen employees) or six weeks (for
all other enterprises) of sickness benefits were directly charged to the
employer. By way of making employers bear part of the costs the measure
attempted to stimulate employers and employees to reduce absenteeism.
Employers were compensated by an average reduction of sickness benefit
contributions of 4 per cent of gross wages. In addition, in 1994 the
Amendment to the Working Conditions Act (ARBO, 1994) introduced the
obligation of firms to buy the services of private health organizations for all
their employees and to develop a firm-specific health policy, especially
designed for the reintegration of sick workers.
The reforms encouraged the trade unions to circumvent the effects by
demanding supplementary benefits to be included in the collective agree-
ments. As a result, the costs of sickness and disability have now become part
and parcel of the bargaining process itself. But this tends to reinforce the
incentives to reduce absenteeism at the level of companies and industrial
sectors where collective bargaining takes place as the relation between costs
and benefits is more directly visible.
The reform endeavours of the coalition between Social and Christian
Democrats were greatly enhanced by the results of a series of inquiries into
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the causes of the crisis of social security. These studies essentially revealed
what everybody already knew, namely that social security was being misused
by individuals, employers and firms, the Industrial Boards, the unions and
local governments for purposes of industrial restructuring. In 1992, the
National Audit Office (Algemene Rekenkamer) diagnosed major deficiencies
in the design, administration and implementation of social security. Taking
heed from the National Audit Office, the Social Democrats, despite resis-
tance by the Christian Democrats, successfully promoted a committee of
parliamentary inquiry into the causes of the disability debacle. Such a
committee is the parliament’s strongest instrument of control as it has
extended legal authority in hearing witnesses. Its major recommendation
was that the implementation of social security ought to be monitored by a
government agency that could operate fully independently of the ‘social
partners’ and their bipartite Industrial Boards. The Kok government (social
democrats, progressive democrats and conservative liberals, i.e. the first
government since 1918 without any of the religious parties) has reorgan-
ized social security in this vein and installed an independent body of
control. The parliamentary committee has also advised that the Industrial
Boards be replaced by regional agencies that closely work together with
Public Employment Services in order to link passive and active labour
market policies (see below).
The restructuring of the Dutch system of social security by the ‘purple’
coalition revolved around two dimensions of reform. These are the intro-
duction of financial incentives through the partial privatization of social
risks and the managed liberalization of social policy administration, and a
fundamental redesign in the institutional structure of the administration of
social security. The government has marketed the system of social security
in an attempt to improve incentives and efficiency and to curb problems of
moral hazard. The right to an unemployment benefit is now more condi-
tional upon the willingness to accept a job offer or to participate in training
programmes. The privatization of the sickness scheme became effective in
1996 with the Act on the Enlargement of Wage Payment during Sickness
(WULBZ, 1996). Employers are now legally obliged to continue to pay
their employees for a year, have a direct stake inreducing absenteeism and
seek private insurance against this risk. The institutional change does not
necessarily lead to a deterioration of protection. Replacement rates are 70
per cent of earnings and benefits are commonly upgraded to 100 per cent
in collective agreements. However, the new institutional form of the sick-
ness scheme led to quite a drop in absenteeism, while the anticipated
negative effect of a greater reluctance on the side of employers in hiring
persons with higher health risks is not clear yet. The possibility for
employers to ‘opt out’ of the disability system and seek private insurance
was introduced in 1998 and allowed for differentiation in contributions
between sectors and firms according to occupational risks. Under the Act of
Differentiation of Contributions and Market Compensation in Disability
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Insurance (PEMBA, 1997), employers have two options. They can take full
responsibility for the first five years of occupational disability, which oblige
them to pay publicly guaranteed benefit levels and to ensure occupational
risks with private insurers. Alternatively, they remain in the public
insurance system, in which case they are confronted with a rise of premium
payments dependent on the number of cases of (full or partial) occupa-
tional disability. This last reform which allows for a differentiation of
employers’ contributions was meant to encourage firms to develop respon-
sive policies for health and safety at work, and to constrain the deployment
of disability insurance for laying off less productive workers. As expected,
these measures made employers more cautious in hiring workers with
higher than average sickness and disability risks.
The most path-breaking reforms in the Dutch system of social security
concern the changed status of the social partners in the administration of
social insurance policy. In 1994 the Social Insurance Council (SVR) was
dismantled. It was replaced by an independent control body, the Super-
visory Board for Social Insurance (CTSV). A separate institution was
created for the implementation of social security legislation, the Temporary
Institute for Coordination (TICA), which remained tripartite. In 1997 the
Industrial Insurance Boards were dismantled and the temporary TlCA
board was reorganized into the permanent National Institute for Social
Insurance (LISV) and made responsible for contracting out the
administration of social security to privatized delivery agencies. The trade
unions and employers associations were granted an advisory status in the
LISV. With the establishment of independent supervision and the
introduction of market incentives in the administration of social security,
the government believes that it has laid down the institutional precondi-
tions for more effective social policy implementation in the spheres of
sickness and disability insurance.
From fighting unemployment to increasing participation
Hard-won social security reform, initially opposed by the unions, and
revived confidence in corporatist adjustment, embraced by unions and
employers and supported by the corporatist infrastructure of the Dutch
political economy, slowly but surely concurred with a shift in the problem
definition of the alleged crisis of the Dutch welfare state. In the late 1980s,
policy-makers came to realize that the low level of labour market particip-
ation was the Achilles’ heel of the extensive but passive Dutch system of
social protection. In 1990, the Netherlands’ Scientific Council for Govern-
ment Policy, an academic advisory board with a mandate to carry out future
studies in those areas it sees fit, proposed to break with the past and
advocated a policy of maximizing the rate of labour market participation as
the single most important policy goal of any sustainable welfare state
(WRR, 1990). Gradually, this lesson, though not the specific policy recom-
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mendations voiced by the WRR, which included a lowering of the statutory
minimum wage, were embraced by the government.
When the Social Democrats regained office in the third Lubbers adminis-
tration, policy adjustment took on a different tack. Economic recovery
allowed for a partial restoration of the ‘coupling system’ which linked social
security benefits to wages. Since 1982, Parliament had allowed the suspen-
sion of the application of the 1980s law on coupling (WAM). As a result, the
gap between average earnings of employed workers and people dependent
on welfare benefits increased by 12 per cent between 1983 and 1989. The
restoration of the linkage system was an important precondition for the
PvdA, headed by Wim Kok, to return to government. On the other hand,
Prime Minister Lubbers needed the support of the Social Democrats for
welfare retrenchment. In the meantime, the policy recommendations of the
WRR inspired top civil servants at the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment to design a new contingent system of coupling, which was
enacted in 1992. The new linkage Law (Wet Koppeling met Afwijkingsmo-
gelijkheid (WKA)) made full indexation between increases in the statutory
minimum wage and social security benefits to average wage developments
conditional on two counts. First, the government is no longer obliged to
link benefits and wages if there is ‘excessive’ wage growth, that is, rises
which exceed the anticipated increases in inflation and productivity.
Second, if the number of social security beneficiaries increases to the extent
that a significant increase of the rate of taxes and social security contribu-
tions is needed, the government has another reason not to increase benefits
in correspondence with the rise in wages. In other words, the coupling of
benefits is only guaranteed if the number of people claiming social security
benefits does not increase relative to the working population, that is: if
wage demands do not cause the volume of welfare recipients in whatever
form to rise. For practical purposes, the two grounds for suspension have
been combined in one formula, the so-called I/A or inactive/active ratio,
measuring the number of benefit recipients as a ratio of the employed
population. If the I/A ratio exceeded a predetermined reference level, the
government can suspend the coupling mechanism. However, it must seek
advice from the SER, whose recommendations the government is not
obliged to endorse, as the SER is only an advisory tripartite council. At the
introduction of the new linkage system, the reference level of the maximum
I/A ratio was set at 82.8 per 100 employed workers. This was the level when
the Lubbers/Kok administration took office in 1990. In both 1990 and 1991
minimum wages and social benefits were fully indexed. In 1993, 1994 and
1995 the government again froze the legal minimum wage and social
benefits, because the I/A ratio rose from 81.4 in 1992 to 85.8 in 1994. In
1996 linkage was restored, reflecting a decrease in the I/A ratio under 82.6.
For 1997 and 1998 the new linkage logic was also applied.
Changes in labour market policy, developed and adopted in the 1990s,
cohere with the new policy priority of raising the level of labour force
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participation relative to the number of inactive citizens depending for their
livelihood on the welfare state. Since the early 1990s the public employ-
ment service has been reformed twice. With the adopted of the 1991
Employment Service Act, the former dormant state placement monopoly
was reorganized into a tripartite and regionally decentralized agency,
independent from the government. While the de-monopolization of place-
ment and the tenuous combination of functional and regional decentraliz-
tion represented a major break in Dutch labour market policy, the high
expectations in terms of performance were not met. Output increased, but
the fragile institutional arrangement of the 1991 employment service was
unable to develop a prominent position in Dutch social and economic
policy. The shift from an ‘active’ to an ‘activating’ labour market policy
gained absolute priority. Under the 1996 Employment Service Act the
scope of the employment service was once again limited to a labour market
provision service for weak groups in the labour market. However, there is a
new policy window for issue-linkage. Unemployment benefit recipients are
obliged to register with employment offices and actively seek to re-enter
the labour market. Both the revision of the National Assistance Act (1996)
and the new Social Security Act (2000) are designed to enhance co-
operation between municipalities, industrial insurance associations and the
regional employment offices, but so far the reforms stop short of creating a
one-counter service. 
Since the early 1990s, the Lubbers/Kok administration and the purple
coalition have, in large part independent of the PES, taken steps to redress
the balance between active and passive policies: these include ‘labour
pools’, the ‘Youth Guarantee Plan’ and the so-called ‘Melkert-jobs’, named
after the Minister of Social Affairs and Employment in the first Kok
administration. The overall volume of these additional job programmes,
geared toward the reintegration of the unskilled and low-paid workers, has
been doubled from 1.5 to 3 per cent over the tenure of the purple coali-
tion. Most of these additional employment measures are carried out by
municipalities. Most recently, the government has introduced several kinds
of employment subsidy schemes, which have significantly reduced employers’
wage costs. Through a substantial reductions in taxes and social security
contributions, instigating a decline in the tax wedge for employers who
hire long-term unemployed, employment subsidies can add up to as much
as 25 per cent of the annual wage (Opstal et al. 1998).
The success of negotiated social policy reform
In this chapter I have argued that composite interaction effects shape and
drive the trajectory of policy adjustment. In the process, pressing policy
problems, largely informed by policy failures, are on the whole considered
one at a time. These theoretical considerations have helped me to describe
and understand the sequential-diachronic pattern of policy adjustment in
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the Netherlands over the past twenty-five years. In a rather schematic form
the interplay of macro-economic management, the system of industrial
relations, social security and labour market policy provisions unfolded as
follows.
1 In the wake of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, wage costs
soared, including social security contributions, as did inflation. Monetary
authorities stepped in to contain the growth of domestic prices. In the
early 1980s government had to confront spiralling deficit spending.
The fiscal crisis of the state made budgetary restraint a political imper-
ative for the incoming ‘no-nonsense’ centre-right Lubbers administra-
tion which came to office in 1982. Since 1983 the Dutch guilder has
remained solidly pegged to the German mark, even after the crisis of
the EMS in 1992 and 1993.
2 The basic policy choice for a tight money policy and fiscal constraint
shifted a large part of the burden of adjustment from macro-policy to
the system of industrial relations and the welfare state. The political
conditions of the resurgence of corporatist wage restraints were
provoked by a considerable weakening of the Dutch labour movement
and the development of a more indirect but still persistent patterns of
political intervention in the sphere of collective bargaining. A weak-
ened trade union movement gradually accepted that increased
profitability was a prerequisite for job growth. The stronger organi-
zations of capital were willing to re-enter the existing corporatist
institutions and accepted labour time reduction under the threat of
political intervention by the government. 
The institutional rules of the game, within which the new policy
consensus over external adjustment developed, shifted gradually from
central tripartite encounters, with strong state leverage, toward bipartite
organized decentralization under the shadow of hierarchy. The
ultimate availability of hierarchical intervention and state ratification of
agreements reached among the social partners helps to curb distribu-
tive conflict and limits the options of ‘rent-seeking’ and ‘free riding’
among the bargaining parties.
3 The resurgence of corporatist adjustment in the early 1980s laid a solid
foundation for far-reaching social policy reform in the early 1990s.
Eventually, as the crisis of inactivity spilled over into a general crisis of
governability in the social security system, this prompted path-breaking
policy changes, particularly in the sickness and disability schemes. A
freezing of benefits in 1983 and an overhaul of unemployment
insurance in 1987 could not halt the rise in inactivity. When the number
of people receiving disability benefits was rapidly approaching one
million, the centre-left Lubbers administration was able to introduce
more radical measures to curtail the improper use of benefits and to
close off some of the labour market exit routes of disability insurance
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and sickness leave. In recent years the government, joined by most of
the opposition, has partly succeeded in excluding the social partners
from the administration and supervision of social security programmes,
breaking the century-old corporatist legacy bipartite sovereignty in this
domain. Most recently, the left-liberal government, headed by the
social democrat Wim Kok, introduced far-reaching social policy
reforms, setting the stage for managed liberalization of social security,
while strengthening the role of the state in the supervision of the
welfare state. 
4 Successive changes in macro-policy, industrial relations and social
security legislation and administration coincided in the early 1990s
with a general shift in the problem definition of the crisis of the Dutch
welfare state. The overarching policy objective was no longer to keep
overt unemployment down by channelling people into other pro-
grammes. Instead, the Scandinavian preoccupation with maximizing
the rate of labour force participation has become number one priority.
Instruments like the I/A ratio have translated this priority into a new
norm for wage bargaining and a policy instrument for the government
in its management of minimum wage and benefit adjustments. With
the tripartization of the Public Employment service, the Netherlands
finally broke with the long tradition of passive, or absent, labour
market policies. The Kok administrations have subsequently intro-
duced a number of policy innovations geared towards the reintegration
of unskilled and low-paid workers.
It is often argued that the continental welfare state is particularly depend-
ent on high levels of employment, but is structurally unable to encourage
domestic service sector job growth, because of the high social wage com-
ponent that goes together with job creation. As this is true, the reverse may
also hold. Wage moderation leads to job growth in the sheltered sector and
curtails social wage costs, which eventually encourages more people to
enter the labour market and thus pay into the social security funds. The
Dutch experience represents a significant departure from the scenario of
‘welfare without work’ so typical of the continental welfare state.
The politics of adjustment has remained structured around regular
consultations between consociational government coalitions and the ‘social
partners’ participating in solidly entrenched institutions for corporatist
concertation. The shift to a hard currency and the resurgence of corporatist
wage restraint were part and parcel of a supply-side strategy of external
adjustment to changing conditions in world markets since the early 1970s.
The resurgence of wage restraint has to be credited to the social partners,
although the threat of political intervention by strong coalition government
played an important role. The political responsibility for welfare and
labour market policy reform, geared towards raising the overall level of
labour force participation, was shared all major political parties, from right
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to left. But it should also be noted that welfare reform, considered neces-
sary for reasons of fiscal austerity, would perhaps not have been supported
politically without the parallel increase in employment opportunities since
the mid-1980s that resulted from the Accord of Wassenaar. Notwith-
standing the overall positive appraisal of the sequential dynamic of
negotiated social policy reform, it should be remembered that the Dutch
trajectory of negotiated welfare reform was paved with a number joint-
decision traps in all the four policy domains we have studied.
Note
1 Much of the work of this chapter was done while I was a visiting fellow at the
Max-Planck-Institute for the study of societies in Cologne in 1997 and 1998. I
am thankful to all the participants in the project ‘The Adjustment of National
Employment and Social Policy to Economic Internationalisation’, and especially
to its co-directors, Fritz Scharpf and Vivien Schmidt, and Philip Manow and
Bernhard Ebbinghaus, for the many inspiring and helpful discussions we have
had over these issues over the past year. For the empirical part of the contri-
bution I continue to be grateful to Jelle Visser. Our collaborative endeavour in
rediscovering the fascinating contingencies of Dutch political economy (Visser
and Hemerijk 1997), upon which this contribution heavily relies, has immensely
broadened my insights in understanding policy change.
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The resurgence of Dutch corporatist concertation in the 1990s, described
in detail in the foregoing chapter by Hemerijck, cannot merely be
explained by historical accident or by ‘policy learning’. Why were the Dutch
able to ‘learn’, why did they turn to this organizational strategy for welfare
state reform, while other countries were less able or willing to do so?
A major part of the explanation is that corporatism has had broad and
deep roots in Dutch history, and has in the course of time found expression
in a great variety of institutions as well as in the political culture of the
country. Corporatism may have been ‘away’ for a while, its quick return in
popularity was no doubt facilitated by the strong roots that were still present.
The breadth of Dutch corporatism: its many 
organizational faces
Not only central wage bargaining
The international literature on corporatism has focused mostly only on
macro-level institutions for bi- or tripartite bargaining over wages, working
hours and other working conditions between peak associations of capital
and labour. This holds for most of the economic literature (Calmfors and
Driffill 1988; Soskice 1990a; Soskice 1990b; Layard et al. 1991; Boyer 1997;
Teulings and Hartog 1999) on corporatism as well as for quite a bit of the
political science literature (Schmidt 1982; Czada 1983; Cameron 1984;
Katzenstein 1985). It also holds for the recent book on the Dutch model by
Visser and Hemerijck (Visser and Hemerijck 1997). They explain most of
the recent strong performance of the Dutch economy by wage moderation,
reform of social security programmes, and the flexibility of the labour
market due to the popularity of part-time and temporary work, all
supposedly results of consensual macro-level bargaining between employers,
unions and the state. 
However, this is only one element of a much wider phenomenon. There
has been and is more to Dutch corporatism than just macro-level bi- or
tripartite bargaining. And important in this context is that these broader
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roots in society and the economy facilitated the re-emergence of macro-
corporatist concertation in the 1990s. 
Characteristic of this was the fact that much of the economy was regulated
and organized by ‘corpora’, at all levels of aggregation and in many policy
fields, not just industrial relations. Private associations engaged in various
ways in self-regulation, which was tolerated, accepted, recognized or even
authorized by the state; and/or they participated in the formulation and
implementation of public policy, and to this end were equipped with
statutory powers. The Dutch economy was permeated by institutions in
which capital cooperated with capital; and in which labour cooperated with
capital. In short, it was a coordinated or concerted economy in which
private associations shared in public sovereignty.
Market institutions and regulation
Long before the advent of institutional economics, Dutch economic policy-
makers recognized that markets need institutions in order to function.
Economic transactions are more likely to take place if a number of condi-
tions are present, such as a minimal reduction of uncertainty over property
rights, trustworthiness of the transaction partner, discouragement of oppor-
tunistic behavior, enforceability of contracts, stability of the generalized
means of exchange, quality guarantees for goods, etc. In addition, trans-
action partners, with less information or less economic power, such as
consumers and/or workers need protection, in order for the economic
system to acquire a wider legitimacy. These institutions can be provided by
various principles of coordination and allocation: the market, the state,
clans or communities, firm hierarchies and associations (Williamson 1975;
Ouchi 1980; Streeck and Schmitter 1985). Although all principles of
economic governance are found in the Netherlands, ‘association’ has been
a dominant one, compared to other countries.
Market institutions have been provided both by the state and associ-
ations, and in the case where the state took the initiative, implementation
has often been delegated to associations. The fundamental economic
institutions, property, contract and corporate law, a stable currency, etc.
have of course long been in place, and remained largely a state respons-
ibility. The Christian Democratic and later also the Social Democratic
governments added a whole set of social and economic public law. Much of
the first social regulation dates from the post-First World War revolution
scare. In the 1930s a whole host of economic regulations were initiated:
agricultural crisis measures (later the example for EU agricultural policy,
whose architect Mansholt came from Dutch agricultural circles), product
quality regulations (originally more to support the reputation of export
products than to protect domestic consumers), establishment licensing for
small shopkeepers and artisans, regulation of shop closing hours, statutory
support for collective wage agreements and cartels, price control of basic
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commodities, regulation of specific markets such as inward shipping, bank-
ing and insurance, taxis, the professions, and the introduction of arbitration
schemes. After the Second World War more regulations of labour relations
were added: a ban on lock-outs and on collective dismissals, a statutory
minimum wage, statutory wage and price controls. When the latter were
gradually loosened, they were replaced by institutionalized consultation,
negotiation and concertation over prices and particular wages.
Trade associations and trade unions played a large role in the formul-
ation and implementation of these policies. In addition, many special
institutions were created to organize and channel class cooperation and
market regulation.
Interest associations
The organizational edifice of corporatism consisted first of all out of about
2,000 voluntary employers’ associations and trade associations on the
entrepreneurs side (van Waarden 1992, 1995); and 338 unions on average
in between 1951 and 1960 (Visser and Waddington 1996). Both categories
were integrated in a more or less hierarchic system: associations cooperated
first in peak associations at the sectoral level (e.g. associations for housing
construction, road construction, well drilling, pipe laying, civil engineering,
etc. in a peak association for the construction industry); and these in turn
were integrated in national sector-unspecific peak associations. Up until
the mid-1970s the system of peak associations was differentiated by pillar.
On the trade union side there were three major peak associations: a
Protestant (CNV), a Catholic (NKV) and a socialist one (NVV). In addition
there were three smaller peak associations of white collar workers and/or
civil servants. These did gain however in size and importance from the
1970s on. On the entrepreneurs’ side there were many more. The larger
firms were organized in four peak associations: protestant (VPCW), Catholic
(AKWV) and two general-liberal ones: one that organized ‘social’ interests,
i.e. the peak employers’ association (VNW), and one that represented the
economic, commercial and technical interests, i.e. the peak trade associa-
tion (CSWV). Then there were also three peak associations – Catholic,
Protestant and liberal – for small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) and three
for farmers. Altogether hence six peak associations on the trade union side
and ten peak associations for entrepreneurs. Of these however, two were
clearly dominant: the NVV on the union side, and the VNW on the
employers’ side. In the last two decades they merged to two peak trade
unions (FNV and CNV) and two peak employers’ associations (VNO-NCW
and MKB, the latter for small and medium business). 
Institutions of cross-class cooperation
Second, there were the institutions for cross-class cooperation in which
trade unions and employers’ associations cooperated. Predecessors had
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already been founded in the early decades of the twentieth century. Thus
the revolution scare shortly at the end of the First World War led to the
creation of the High Council of Labour in 1919. The most important ones
in the postwar period were the Foundation of Labour (Stichting van de
Arbeid (STAR)) and the Social Economic Council (Sociaal Economische
Raad (SER)). 
The STAR was an organization under private law, founded at the end of
the Second World War by the leaders of the former peak unions and
employers’ associations, who were together taken hostage by the German
occupants in a camp in St Michielsgestel. It remained during the whole
postwar period the place where the peak trade unions and employers’
associations could and did meet amongst themselves, that is, in the absence
of the government.
The STAR was joined in 1950 by the Social Economic Council (SER). It
was created by the government – and got a position under public law – as
the official advisory council for the government on social economic policy,
and had a statutory right to be consulted on all such policy issues, before
the government could take any measures. In addition, it became the peak
organization and supervisor of the system of statutory trade associations
(see below, p. 76). The SER was originally made up of forty-five members:
fifteen representatives of the different peak trade unions (originally the
white collar peak unions were, however, not represented; they had to stage
a long fight for official recognition); fifteen members appointed by the
various peak associations of business and agriculture; and fifteen members
appointed by the state. The latter, the so-called ‘crown members’, were
appointed for their expertise, and they were not supposed to represent the
interests of the state.
Thus the SER embodied the two different principles of corporatism and
technocracy. The underlying idea was to bring together the social partners
with economic experts, so that the first could be confronted with the
economic consequences/external costs of policy choices and wage demands,
in the rightful expectation that this would moderate demands and policies.
This worked well indeed. The political influence of economic expertise in
policy-making in the Netherlands has been remarkable. Notwithstanding
the fact that corporatism is basically a structure of representation of more
or less particularistic interests, more or less interest-neutral ideas and
knowledge have been important in the system. The judgement of economic
experts was taken seriously and had to be countered with economic
arguments by the social partners. In time this led them also to create their
own economic expertise departments.
The STAR and SER were and are the major formal institutions for
centralized bargaining between the social partners. In the first fifteen years
after the war their influence was still rather limited, because wages, working
hour, and working conditions were mostly fixed by the state in the person of
the state-appointed College of State Intermediators. The increasing shortage
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on the labour market and the upward pressure on wages which this brought
about (increasing distance between regulated wages and actual paid wages,
wildcat strikes; the year 1964 saw a wage explosion) forced first a delegation
to the level of the STAR (1958–63), and subsequently a ‘decentralization’ to
the institutions at the sectoral level. Over time the influence of the state on
wage formation decreased, although the Dutch social partners never had
anything like the constitutionally guaranteed Tarifautonomie that their
German counterparts had. And the government kept repeatedly interfering
with wage bargaining through statutory measures. 
The STAR and SER were only the peak organizations of a whole edifice
of institutions of class cooperation. ‘Below’ them, at the sectoral level, there
were similar institutions of class cooperation. Sectoral wage bargaining
took place in the vakraden (trade councils), bedrijfsverenigingen (lit. trade
associations) implemented workmen’s compensation plans, and bedrijfscom-
missies (lit. trade commissions) supervised the implementation of the law on
works councils. The works councils themselves embodied class cooperation
at the firm level. 
The STAR and SER were only concerned with general socio-economic
policy. There were however more peak-level consultation, advisory and
bargaining councils for other, more specific policy areas, in which unions
and employers’ associations participated. Many of these had, just like the
SER, a statutory status and were official advisory councils to the government
on specific policy fields. They existed for social security (Sociale Verzekering-
sraad), for health and health insurance (Ziekenfondsraad), industrial policy,
health and safety at work, product quality regulation, technical standardiz-
ation, vocational training, environmental policy, health policy, public
housing, transport and infrastructure, development aid, and even military
procurement. All these institutions were ever so many channels in which the
social partner leadership met, got to know each other well, and which also
allowed for generalized exchange (Marin 1990) and complicated trade-offs. 
Institutions of competitive cooperation: trade associations and cartels
In addition to institutions for class cooperation, there were also organiz-
ations that channelled and decreased the intensity of the competitive
struggle. This was done first of all through the many trade associations.
Many of these are quite well-developed, command large resources in terms
of capital, staff and expertise, have privileged access to state agencies, form
coalitions and joint ventures with other associations of customers, suppliers
or workers, exert some control over members’ behaviour, and furnish a
multitude of activities. In addition to the usual activities such as providing
services to members (information, advice) or negotiating agreements with
associations of suppliers, they provide collective goods such as training for
workers and entrepreneurs, organize and finance generic research and
development, make collective propaganda for Dutch products at home or
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abroad (especially where it concerns bulk products without brand names,
such as dairy products, horticulture, fruits and vegetables, civil engineering
works, cement, sand, asphalt, bituminous roofing). They organized one
annual exhibition and forbade their members to partake in any other in an
effort to prevent competition from forcing up advertising costs. Associations
of retailers have their own brand products and engage in collective purchas-
ing and advertising. Other associations handle and implement decisions on
investments in machinery on behalf of their members. In the cooperative
sector associations used to control the books of the industry on behalf of the
members of the cooperatives, the farmers. They have binding rules as to the
behaviour of member firms during conflicts with unions, prohibit poaching
of workers and have occasionally organized supply boycotts.
Prototypical for the Dutch ‘concerted economy’, however, were the many
cartels, trade associations with the specific aim to mitigate competition. The
country has been called a ‘cartel paradise’ (de Jong 1990) and the OECD
still spoke in 1993 of ‘the unusual Dutch case’: ‘Many sectors of the
economy are enmeshed in a web of restrictive agreements, regulations and
barriers to entry’ (OECD 1993: 57). In 1992 the secret cartel registry still
contained 245 market-sharing agreements, 267 price and tendering agree-
ments, 202 distribution agreements, and 45 collective exclusive dealing
agreements, the latter mostly of professional organizations which limit
market entry. These were all agreements which would be illegal in most
other OECD countries (OECD 1993: 60). Hence it is no accident that this
European ‘cartel paradise’ has been a main target of interventions by the
European Commission and Court of Justice. In the period 1970–90, of all
Article 85 decisions of the ECJ rejecting nation-wide cartels, Dutch firms
were involved in 40 per cent of them (de Jong 1990).
Neo-liberalism has changed this to some extent. Among the more
important measures is the change in competition policy in 1998. A new law
replaced the ‘abuse’ by the ‘prohibition’ principle, shifting the burden of
proof from the state to business: business has to prove from now on that a
specific cartel is beneficial to society, rather than government having to
prove that it is harmful. Several cartel-types, such as horizontal price and
quota cartels, have become outright illegal. For some other forms excep-
tions can still be allowed, e.g. when it can be proven that important non-
economic interests are at stake, as in the case of the vertical price cartel for
books. A new, semi-autonomous cartel office has been created to imple-
ment the new law.
State support: extension and statutory trade associations
For a long time the state provided support for this form of economic gover-
nance through associations: by tolerating them, providing access, extending
private agreements and turning them into public law, and by even provid-
ing certain associations with statutory powers.
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State support for associational governance went further than mere passive
tolerance. It could also adopt private regulations, turn them into public law,
and impose them upon the sector, including on the non-organized business
firms, who were not bound by the agreements of associations, a procedure
which is usually called ‘contract extension’. In 1935 a law was enacted that
allowed the state to do so with cartels, and in 1937 this possibility was also
introduced for collective wage agreements. The procedure has only rarely
been used for cartels, but many sector-wide collective wage agreements are
usually extended to the whole sector. 
The state went still further by not only giving regulations and agree-
ments of associations public status, but by doing so for some associations
themselves. The Dutch economy knows in addition to the many voluntary
associations also a number of compulsory statutory trade associations.
About a quarter of Dutch industry (notably agro-industry and artisan-like
sectors) is organized in sectoral statutory trade associations (STAs), which
were created at the same time as the SER, in 1950. The SER is the peak
body of the STAs, and supervises them. Their creation was inspired by the
comprehensive system of compulsory trade associations which the Nazi
occupants introduced to organize the economy for the war effort. They
differ however in a number of important respects. They are not imposed
on industry. A sector who wants so can apply to have an STA. Some sectors
have done so, others not. Furthermore, while the wartime associations were
authoritarian, top-down, according to the ‘Führer’ principle, the STAs are
in principle democratic.
These are comparable in legal status to provinces and municipalities.
Whereas the latter embody territorial decentralization of the state, the
STAs embody what is called in the Dutch constitution ‘functional
decentralization’: decentralization of state power to bodies with specific
functions. Their creation may have been facilitated by the presence of a
precedent: the centuries-old hydraulic boards are also such statutory bodies
of functional decentralization. Just as the inhabitants of a municipality are
‘members’ by virtue of their living in its territory, so ‘inhabitants’ of an
industrial sector are members of an STA. They have similar duties and
rights. Both kinds of inhabitants have to pay taxes to their municipality
and/or STA. And in both cases there is ‘no taxation without representation’.
Citizens are represented in the city council through direct elections. In the
case of STAs firms and their workers are indirectly represented through
their voluntary trade associations and trade unions, which appoint the
board members. Direct representation – as in the case of the Austrian
Kammern which have a similar status – was considered back in 1950, but
met with strong resistance from the established interest associations. The
boards can decide to tax the firms in their sector. Just as with municipalities
the income is used for collective goods, but now they are specific to the
sector, such as vocational training, health services, collective research and
development, quality control, generic advertising, buying-out of over-
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capacity, subsidy for continuity of work during winter months (in some
construction sectors), etc. Furthermore, they implement government policy,
such as EU agricultural policy, and distribute agricultural subsidies.
In addition to the STAs there are still the Chambers of Commerce and
Industry, originally created by Napoleon, but changed in status and tasks
since. They too have a public law status, membership is compulsory, and
some ‘taxes’ are levied. They cover all firms, but have a rather limited task:
register incorporation and represent regional business interests.
Thus Dutch corporatism has found expression in a large variety of formal
organizations and at all levels of aggregation, macro, meso and micro.
Typical is the formal character, also and in particular at the top. This
distinguishes it from, for instance, the Austrian version. The Austrians may
have also very elaborate formal and bureaucratic organizations such as the
Wirtschafts-, Landwirtschafts-, Handwerk- and Arbeiterkammern; however,
at the very top it is rather informal. The Paritätische Kommission is
nothing like the Social Economic Council in terms of formal structure.
Typical of all these forms of market ordering is that they are rather
moderate. In no sense do they eliminate markets and competition, they
merely regulate markets and channel and lessen competition. In that sense,
the Dutch institutions of the ‘concerted economy’ are an eclectic combin-
ation of the allocation and coordination principles ‘market’, ‘state’ and
‘association’.
Administrative regulatory style
The same holds for state regulations. It may seem that the Dutch economy
was encapsulated in a myriad of regulations; they were however flexibly
applied. The Dutch public administration developed a regulatory style in line
with corporatism and consensualism. The typical Dutch administrative style
of policy implementation is flexible, pragmatic and tolerant, as in Britain,
but unlike in Germany, France, or, for that matter, the US, which have a
much stricter, more legalistic and more adversarial style of implementation
(Vogel 1986; van Waarden 1999). Dutch inspectors are more willing to take
account of specific circumstances and problems of the subjects of regulation,
and they may enter into negotiations, offering to overlook certain trans-
gressions in exchange for certain concessions. Feasibility and practicality are
important criteria, and many regulatory agencies and inspectors have con-
siderable discretionary authority to use them. Sanctions are rarely imposed
and cases are not frequently brought to court. 
Many rules allow citizens and businesses to apply for exemptions. A
study of the National Accounts Office of 80,000 applications for exemp-
tions on a diversity of rules showed that in only 2 per cent of the cases were
such exemptions refused. Other rules have loopholes, which make them
more acceptable to society. Since 1945 the country has had a legal ban on
collective dismissals. Employers who want to lay off workers have to apply
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for permission from the director of the regional labour bureau. This rule is
often quoted as a labour market ‘rigidity’, hindering flexibility and innova-
tion. But does it really? For one, the procedure for the labour bureau is
much less formal and time-consuming than a similar procedure in court
would be (employees could challenge the decision in court, as they do
elsewhere, e.g. in the US). Furthermore, permissions are easily granted.
Blankenburg and Bruinsma (1994) showed that 95 per cent of 90,000
annual applications are granted. The legal requirement allows, however, for
a phase of deliberation, in which employers might think over their decision
once more. It is often feared that a strict ban on dismissals would make
employers wary of hiring new people. The Dutch economy has, however,
created a loophole. Employers may put people temporary to work who are
formally employed by commercial temporary work agencies (uitzendbureaus).
Dutch law allowed for this, while other European countries, such as
Germany, did not. The practice of gedogen (see below) is of course another
form of flexible, tolerant and pragmatic policy style.
Underlying general characteristics
These organizational forms of Dutch corporatism express four more
fundamental characteristics typical of Dutch political, administrative and
economic institutions: the importance of associations, subsidiarity, col-
legiate government and consensualism.
Associability
The Netherlands is still a real ‘civil society’ in the meaning of De Tocqueville:
a society organized in a plurality of associations. The Dutch themselves call
this maatschappelijk middenveld which means something like ‘intermediary
societal field’, intermediary, that is, between the individual and the state.
The percentage of the population which is organized in one or more
associations is, after the Swedes and Danes, the highest in Europe (Table
3.1), and that holds also for the specific subcategory of political and social
organizations. In the past, membership of unions, political parties and
church organizations was very high. This has decreased with the
depillarization of society, but in return the membership of public interest
associations (such as Amnesty, Greenpeace) is the highest in Europe, as can
also be seen in Table 3.1. The density ratio of trade unions may lie below
the European average (in part a reflection of the fact that only 18 per cent
of the Dutch still earn a living in industry); however, the public trust in
trade unions is the highest in Europe.
Compared to, for instance, the British, the Dutch have a strong
inclination to formalize such ‘associational relations’. It has been said,
mockingly, that wherever three Dutchmen meet, they found an association,
and one becomes chairman, the second secretary and the third treasurer.
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Thus we find still many trade unions, employers’ associations, trade associ-
ations, artisan guilds, health care and social welfare associations, housing
corporations, broadcasting associations, school associations, literary
societies, playground-, aquarium-, soccer-, judo-, painting-, bicycle-, hiking
associations, environmental and other public interest associations, and not
to forget of course political parties. Three changes have taken place
however since the heyday of pillarization and consociationalism:
1 The formerly separate Catholic, Protestant, socialist, and/or liberal associ-
ations have disappeared, usually through a merger.
2 This has enhanced more general trends of increase of scale and size of
associations, and with that of professionalization of staff and leader-
ship. A typical trade union leader is no longer a former factory worker,
but a trained sociologist or welfare worker, who has been hired on
to the staff of the union and has subsequently made a career of a
leadership position in the organization.
3 This in turn has enhanced a more distant relation between members
and their association. The latter plays a less dominant role in the life of
citizens than before.
Subsidiarity
Many of these associations have still an autonomous sphere of ‘jurisdiction’,
accepted if not guaranteed by the state. They can structure and regulate
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Table 3.1 Dutch associability compared to other European countries
NL B D A UK F I S DK
Pct. of population member of 
one or more associations 
(> 15 yrs; 1998) 79 48 53 55 53 40 36 85 84
Pct. of population member of 
one or more  social or 
political associations (1990) 74 54 57 – 61 42 38 – 86
Pct. of population member  
of a new public interest 
association  (Amnesty, 
Greenpeace, WWF, 
Red Cross) 16.0 3.7 7.1 – 1.2 1.3 0.9 – 3.2
Density ratio of unions 
(1998) 30 54 28 42 38 9 39 97 89
Pct. population with trust  
in trade unions (>15 yrs;
1999) 62 39 37 – 41 36 30 – 51
Source: SCP 2000: 132-44; based on data from Eurobarometer, ILO, UEFA.
social life in their task and/or member domain. Often they are also involved
in the preparation and implementation of public policy. They help formul-
ate, administer and even enforce state regulations. This holds for many
policy fields: the economy, social security, health, education, welfare, public
housing, broadcasting, the environment, infrastructure and spatial planning,
etc. Of course there have been changes here too. The most important is the
increase in importance of many of these policy areas, an increase in the
amounts of money and workers involved, and linked to that an increase in
the involvement of the state in funding and regulating measures and
provisions in these policy fields. This has in some cases reduced the
autonomy of private associations somewhat, e.g. in social security. Periodic-
ally voiced political concerns over ‘the primacy of politics’ have once in a
while led to a reassertion of the role of the state in some of these policy
areas. However, often these changes were merely temporarily. They have
not really reduced the importance of private associations in self-regulation
and in the formulation and implementation of public policy.
Collegiate government
The Netherlands is still very much ruled by collegiate government, as
distinct from monocratic government. Politics and society are permeated
with councils, chambers, committees, boards, estates, colleges, commis-
sioners. The formal state institutions are all collective bodies. So are
advisors to the government, the executives of many state and semi-state
agencies, the executive boards of private foundations, associations and
corporations, of cultural institutions, and not to forget of the church. It can
be no coincidence that the protestant church, the former official ‘state
church’, is led – decentrally – by church councils, rather than by an
individual, as is the case with the Catholic church. These councils do more
than provide ‘counsel’, i.e. investigate, discuss, consider, advise: they do
make the decisions themselves. Decision-making in the Netherlands is
typically group decision-making. 
Of course nowadays councils and boards are found in many societies and
polities. What is, however, typical for the Netherlands is that these councils
rarely have individual leaders. They do have chairmen or chairwomen, to
be sure. But these are usually merely primus inter pares, first among equals.
Typical is the role of the Dutch Prime Minister. He has much less authority
in the Cabinet than, for instance, the American President, the British Prime
Minister, or the German Bundeskanzler. The latter, for instance, has a
formal Richtlinienkompetenz and can give instructions to his Cabinet
ministers. Not so the Dutch Prime Minister. What holds for the Cabinet
holds also for most other councils or boards. They are rarely dominated by
strong leaders. The country is not known for charismatic political leaders
such as Churchill or Bismarck. Its economy has no ‘captains of industry’,
like Carnegie, Rockefeller, Krupp or Iacocca. If at all, dominant leaders in
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the economy have been entrepreneurial families, such as Van Heek,
Ledeboer, Fentener van Vlissingen, Van Beuningen, Wilton, Van der Valk.
That is, again groups, inter-generational groups. Companies led by these
families were not driven by individualism, by the incentive to amass profit
for the individual contemporary owner, but by what has been called
‘familism’ (van Heek 1945; van Schelven 1984), the temporary stewardship
of family property to be passed on the new generations. Dutchmen seem to
be always in groups. Even the country itself is in the plural: The Kingdom
of the Netherlands. And thus it is known abroad: the lowlands, les Pays Bas,
los Paises Bajos, Die Niederlande. And it is ruled in the plural, in councils.
In a way, the country is a real ‘soviet union’, perhaps more so than the
country that ever went officially by that name. 
Consensualism
Collective decision-making has consequences for the style of decision-
making. It requires usually consultation, discussion, negotiation, concerta-
tion, compromise and, if possible, consensus. This has been characteristic
of the old consociationalism. With depillarization consensualism had to
make way for more adversarial politics. However, this did not last.
Adversarial politics declined again. The change must be situated between
1977 (the end of the Den Uyl Cabinet) and 1982 (the last great political
strike, the start of the ‘no-nonsense’ business-like politics of the Lubbers
Cabinet, and the by now almost mythical Treaty of Wassenaar between the
social partners). Now politics is again practised largely according to the
rules of consensual politics.
Conflict is avoided, in all walks of life. The American sociologist at the
University of Amsterdam and keen observer of Dutch social life Derek
Phillips wrote:
Rather than risk a conflict with others in the group, someone whose
ideas do not agree with the point of view of the group will tone down
his own opinion and make it known in a mild and quiet manner. And
in extreme cases may turn away from the group. Open conflict, opinions
presented with much conviction, a high level of verbal aggression and
emotional scenes are much less common in Dutch society than in the
US.
(Phillips 1985: 29) 
The complement of compromise and consensus, proportionality, is still
very much in place, whether in allocating positions for mayor or provincial
governor, in allocating funds for broadcasting associations, or seats on
advisory boards. There is a strong sense of distributional fairness. Municipal
governments are again more and more proportionally composed, after
majority governments had been popular for a while.
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Secrecy may be less common than in the past, and is certainly less
formal. However, much politicking does de facto take place in less visible
arenas and depoliticization is frequently practised to allow for more flexi-
bility in negotiations and consultations. It may be that there is more control
now on policy-makers. However, much of it comes from consultants and
policy evaluation researchers and is often more pragmatic and unpolitical
(‘what can we learn from past experiences, how do our policies work?’) than
adversarial and political. Most of the political institutions that ‘condemn’
politicians to consensualism have remained firmly in place. The old
practices are introduced in new policy fields, such as environmental policy.
Pragmatic tolerance, closely linked to consensualism, finds expression in
the persistent tradition of tolerant rule application, if that is considered to
increase the effectiveness of reaching the policy goals. The Dutch use the
term gedogen, a term difficult to translate in English. It is a kind of ‘policy of
the lesser evil’. A less serious transgression is tolerated in order to combat a
more serious one more effectively. It is not an informal policy, not one only
of de facto tolerating, as is also done in many other countries. No, in the
Netherlands this is official policy, with institutional backing. The Dutch legal
system knows the ‘expediency principle’, laid down in the Code of Criminal
Procedure. It makes a distinction between that which the law formally
requires, and what the directives of the public prosecutor in fact prescribe.
In other words, the public prosecutor has some discretion to prosecute a
case or not. He is empowered to refrain from bringing criminal proceedings
if there are weighty public interests to be considered. This is quite different
from, for example, the ‘legalist’ principle in German law, which obliges
prosecutors to prosecute all cases known to them, and allows only the judge
freedom to decide whether or not to penalize specific behaviour. 
The famous example of gedogen is soft drugs. They are tolerated and
regulated and can be sold in registered ‘coffee shops’ – which curiously
enough do not sell coffee – in order to fight hard drug abuse more
effectively. Prostitutes work in recognized brothels, checked by health
inspectors, in order to fight AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases
more effectively. But it is also found in many other fields: the long-time
tolerance of cartels, for example, or in environmental politics. A study of a
few thousand violations of environmental law in 1986 found that only half
of these had been checked by the municipal authorities, and of this half
only 36 per cent were penalized. 
In order to have an interlocutor and partner in regulating and fighting
abuses, the authorities have recognized or even actively encouraged the
formation of associations by the relevant ‘industries’. Thus there are official
business associations of brothels and of ‘coffee shops’. Such associations try
to control and prevent excesses, which could threaten their hard-won
recognition or could precipitate state intervention. Thus the Coffeeshop
Association forbids and tries to control the sale of hard drugs in the coffee
shops or the sale of soft drugs to minors. And the Brothel Association has
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instituted a trademark for ‘recognized’ brothels which practise only safe
sex, complete with ‘recognized’ signs to be posted on the door.
Typical of the persistent importance of consensualism and conflict avoid-
ance are also some major characteristics of the Dutch legal system. This has
always been, like most other continental ones, an inquisitorial one, rather
than an adversarial (Damaska 1986). The search for ‘truth’ in the courthouse
takes place still more through investigation and evaluation than through
contestation between opponents, as in the Anglo-Saxon system. The judge
does more than preside over the proceedings. He investigates and decides,
whereas the latter is done elsewhere by a jury. What distinguishes the Dutch
system from other continental European countries is the very low litigation
rate and the average short duration of court cases. Many conflicts are
handled out of court. That holds both for civil law and criminal law cases.
People try to settle conflicts informally or through arbitration – there are
many specialized arbitration bodies. When cases do come in court, they are
handled flexibly. The Dutch judge has a relatively large discretion. In
substantive civil law cases, the judge can circumvent a legalistic outcome by
means of a general escape clause based on the principles of ‘fairness and
reasonableness’.
There is not yet anything even approaching what Kagan has called
‘adversarial legalism’ and which is so prevalent in the US. The contrast
with the US is especially great, but also with neighbouring Germany. One
example out of many: Kagan (1990: 10) compared the handling of
damaged cargo from trans-Atlantic shipments in the ports of Rotterdam
and New York and found that ‘lawyers’ bills are far higher if a legal
dispute is processed in New York rather than in Rotterdam, even though
the relevant substantive law in the two countries is essentially identical’.
The differences in density of lawyers and in the costs of tort litigation as
percentage of GNP is indicative. In the US the lawyer density was in the
early 1990s ten times as high as in the Netherlands; in Germany it was
five times as high (data about 1988; Lipset 1996: 50). Holland had ten
judges and 1,550 court cases per 100,000 inhabitants; Germany 29
judges and 3,120 cases (data 1992: Blankenburg and Bruinsma 1994).
Things are changing here as well. Thus the density of lawyers is
increasing in the Netherlands, from 35 per 100,000 inhabitants in 1987
to 70 in 1999. But this is still well below that in most other capitalist-
industrialized nations.
Historical roots
These underlying principles of associability, subsidiarity, collegiate govern-
ment and consensualism seem to have all been with the Dutch since the
inception of their state. As with so many other countries, early political
values found expression in the first state institutions, including legal tradi-
tions, and these in turn have fostered and maintained a related political
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culture. The mutual influence and support between culture and institutions
may explain their persistence over long periods of time.
Associability
The Dutch Republic, which existed between 1581 and 1795, was a well-
organized civil society. The Republic was in fact a loose confederation of
city republics, located on the trading city belt that has extended since the
late Middle Ages, from the middle of England to the middle of Italy, and
which still forms the economic heartland of Europe (also called the ‘blue
banana’, after the blue glow visible at night from a satellite). It was one of
the two axes which Stein Rokkan (1981) distinguished to categorize
different European societies (the other axis was the distance to Rome, the
centre of catholicism). These trading cities developed as the first in Europe
a bourgeois society organized in many formal horizontal organizations:
militias, corporations and limited liability companies (compagnieschappen
and rederijen), guilds, charitable institutions, etc. 
This republican tradition seemed to have come to an end with the
Napoleonic wars and occupation. The edicts of 1798 and 1811, following
similar measures in France, banned those guilds and other corps intermédiaires
which had still survived the economic decline of the eighteenth century
(Wiskerke 1938). A ‘liberal intermezzo’ (Maier 1981) followed, in between
the French period and the onset of industrialization – which in the
Netherlands was also a ‘near absolutist intermezzo’ – in which relatively few
associations existed, albeit that they did not completely disappear. Immedi-
ately following the coalition ban, the Napoleonic state formed its own
‘bridgeheads’ in the economy, the regional Chambers of Commerce, which
have persisted until this day. These were originally state agencies. Affiliation
was compulsory and the executive board members were appointed by the
state. But in 1848 this changed, and henceforth the board members were
elected by the affiliated entrepreneurs. The Chambers kept however their
public law status. Voluntary associations did not completely disappear in
the ‘liberal interlude’. Several still existing trade associations trace their
origin to the beginning of the nineteenth century. A prominent example is
the ‘Association for the Promotion of the Interests of Bookstores’. 
The old republican tradition of a well-organized civil society was
reinvigorated by the bourgeois revolution and the liberal constitution of
1848, and the industrialization which took off after about 1870. These
facilitated and/or sparked off several emancipation movements of dis-
advantaged social groups: Catholics, socialists and a new Calvinist revival
movement among the lower middle class, the kleine luyden. Their
emancipation required the development and consolidation of separate
identities and the conquest of societal and political power. These in turn
required: (a) the external distinction vis-à-vis the dominant strata of society,
the liberals and Dutch reformed church; and (b) the internal organization
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and regulation of the group, including the provision of group-specific
services, such as health care. Formal organization in associations was a
major instrument of internal consolidation and regulation as well as the
external conquest of power. In a relatively short time this led to a prolif-
eration of associations, differentiated by class, religion, region, function
and economic sector. Often, formal associations were created immediately.
In other cases they developed stepwise out of more informal and ad hoc
proto-organizations. Such was, for instance, the case with employers’ and
trade associations (van Waarden 1992: 474). Depillarization may have
reduced their numbers, but has not broken the tradition of a well-organized
civil society.
Subsidiarity
The societal organizations created in the Dutch Republic organized and
regulated their own specific sector of society, and often performed tasks
that sooner or later came to be considered state tasks in many countries.
Whatever there was in terms of an embryonic state in the Republic did not
only recognize the autonomy of these associations, but also delegated or
rather left tasks to them. Citizens’ militias provided internal order and
security, guilds took care of economic ordering, charitable institutions
provided some measure of social security. Even those most central state
tasks, external security, defence and diplomacy, were in part ‘privatized’
under the Republic: the Dutch East India Company, one of the earliest
limited liability companies, had the authority to engage in war and to
conclude peace treaties on behalf of the Republic. 
These are all indications that there was no real separation between state
and society/economy and to some extent this is still characteristic of the
Netherlands. The country may have inherited the distinction between
public and private law from the French and the Romans; it is somewhat at a
loss as to how to handle it. Therefore there are too many organizations and
regulations at the interface of both. This was so at the times of the
Republic; it has been reinforced by pillarization; and it is still the case.
Private associations have under certain conditions been entrusted with state
power and have sometimes even acquired statutory powers, including the
basic rights of taxation, enactment of binding regulations, and enforcement
and sanctioning. Conversely, public state bodies are formed out of organiz-
ations of civil societies. It is symbolic that the latter function as important
recruitment areas for top civil servants, mayors, ministers, MPs, and even
higher: where else on earth are prime ministers recruited from among
trade union leaders (the former PM, Kok) or employers’ associations (his
predecessor, Lubbers)?
In so far as there is a primacy of one over the other in the relation
between state and society/economy, the latter dominates over the former,
certainly in the days of the Republic. This was quite unusual in those days.
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Whereas in French mercantilism the economy was a means to increase state
power, the political elite of the Republic formed out of merchant families
considered state power an instrument to increase their economic power,
something which has become a bit more common since. 
The primacy of organizations of civil society reflected a distrust of a
strong central state, akin to that found in the United States. It can be no
coincidence that both countries had a similar history of state formation.
Both emerged out of a revolt against a centralizing state power. The Dutch
against the Spanish Habsburg King Philip II starting in 1579, the
Americans against the British Tudor kings about two centuries later. This
prompted the American revolutionaries to include a lot of checks and
balances in their constitution, using the experience of the Dutch, and the
teachings of the French political philosophers of the Enlightenment, like
Montesquieu. The Dutch had to do without this experience and theory; but
they also introduced federalism as well as a primacy of organizations of civil
society to keep the central state power in check.
Collegiate government
For the same reason they preferred collegiate government over monocratic
government. State sovereignty in the Dutch Republic was placed with
councils, the provincial Estates, and not with ‘the people’ – as became later
custom – or a monarch – as was the custom at that time – or even whatever
there was of a ‘central’ state, the Estates-General. This may have been
facilitated by the absence of a strong landed aristocracy. It was nevertheless
unique for its time. Almost all organizations of the state and of civil society
were governed by collectives: the municipal governments, the hydraulic
boards (heemraadschappen, see next section), the church, the guilds, the
militias, the philanthropic foundations for the poor, the elderly, the orphans,
or the homeless, and the private corporations, up to and including the very
first large ‘multinational’ companies, such as the Dutch East India
Company (governed by the Heren Zeventien, the ‘Lords Seventeen’), or the
West India Company (the Heren Negentien). It is typical that the leading
Dutchmen of those days did not have themselves portrayed as individuals,
but in groups. The portrait galleries of the Rijksmuseum, the Amsterdam
Historical Museum or the Frans Hals museum are full of them. How
different the Prado or the Louvre. There we find individual kings, princes,
emperors or royal families on the wall.
Consensualism
Collegiate government, together with the weak central state and the
sovereignty of provincial, municipal and private agencies, implied a high
dispersal of political power, pluralism and factionalism in the Republic.
Particularistic interests came to be considered legitimate, but since no
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faction of the oligarchic elite dominated, practical cooperation between the
various factions became a necessity. The earlier experience with religious
strife up to the threat of civil war (between ‘hoeksen and kabeljauwen’,
‘remonstranten and contra-remonstranten’) may have added to the awareness of
the need for consultation, cooperation and compromise. Such conflicts
fostered the development of institutions and cultural values which could
prevent conflict escalation. ‘The need to adjust conflicting interests fostered
a tradition of compromise and an acceptance of disagreement and diver-
sity’ wrote Daalder (1966: 189). He continued: ‘Effective political power at
the center depended on the ability to balance carefully widely varied
particularist interests. . . . A climate of constant reciprocal opposition
fostered a habit of seeking accommodation through slow negotiations and
mutual concessions’ (ibid.: 192). This was possible in the Dutch Republic
thanks to the relative small size and cultural homogeneity of the oligarchy
of politicians involved. Frequent personal contact made it easier to come to
compromises and reduced the threat of free riders in the production of
public goods. 
An essential part of this early consociationalism was the acceptance of
differences instead of attempts to win the battle or to smooth down such
distinctions. This presupposed tolerance of dissidents, and in the long run
their recognition and integration, if not cooptation. And just as the
established merchant family elites integrated in time newcomers and
adapted to new circumstances (Daalder 1966: 217; 1977: 360), so does the
present political elite again try to integrate new dissidents, such as the
environmentalists, in the political institutions. This flexibility of the elite
provided for its continuity and broad influence, and also for its consensual
culture. 
Roots in early hydraulic society
It is not unimaginable that the tradition of self-organization, cooperation,
consultation and search for consensus is still older. The Netherlands is, in
the words of the historian Huizinga, a ‘hydraulic society’ and many of its
characteristics – in trade, industry, society, polity and culture – derive from
that. The early and permanent need to organize dyke maintenance and
continuous drainage of low-lying land made cooperation, collective action
and regulation of mutual obligations of utmost importance, and these
values and phenomena are still very much present in political and eco-
nomic life, as will be seen later. One could say that the physical conditions
of survival condemned the Dutch from the very beginning to cooperation,
consensus, compromise and the orderly settlement of conflict. But whereas
in Asia hydraulic problems led to the formation of hierarchic, authoritarian
state organizations (Wittfogel 1957), in Holland these hydraulic problems
fostered the development of horizontal political organization. In the
absence of an aristocracy who could have enforced such cooperation
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(especially in the areas lacking a nobility, West Friesland, Friesland,
Groningen), such cooperation had to emerge on a voluntary and horizontal
base. 
Already in the eleventh and twelfth centuries the landholders in a pro-
spective polder formed horizontal, more or less ‘democratic’ forms of
organization to construct, guard and maintain dyke systems. They were
called heemraden and heemraadschappen. Many of these still exist, although
they too have merged lately. Dykes are prototypical collective goods, and
dyke construction and maintenance is consequently fraught with the typical
Olsonian problems of collective action. Informal organization did not
suffice here. Formalization of the mutual obligations was a life necessity.
Everyone had to contribute, and others had to be able to rely on that.
Formal corporations were created, with compulsory membership for all
those who owned or exploited land within the relevant territory. They had
duties, but also rights. The regulations stipulated that they had to provide
services in kind (in modern times, this has been changed into a tax, used to
pay professionals to carry out the drainage work). In return they had the
right to vote for board membership. These boards had a typically collegiate
leadership. The agreements were enforced by active mutual social control,
and only incidentally also by aristocratic authority where that existed, and
then only in the background.
Horizontal collective action may have been facilitated by a combination
of the seriousness of the threat, and the small scale of early ‘polders’
(territory surrounded by dykes). However, of equal importance was
certainly the absence of a landed aristocracy, which could have provided
monocratic leadership of hydraulic boards. Feudalism has never really
existed in the country, at least in its political and economic centre, the
western part. Again this seems to have been related to the ‘water’. The
threat of flooding and the high water table made arable farming difficult,
and hence large land-holdings impossible or unattractive. At the time that
it became possible, the classes of small independent farmers and merchants
were so well-established that the development of a feudal aristocracy was no
longer possible. This absence of an aristocracy has contributed in turn to
the importance of values of collegiate government, equality, achievement
and universalism.
The need to keep feet dry may be co-responsible for that curious typical
Dutch combination of formalization and improvisation. Formalization of
obligations of participation in collective action was necessary to ensure that
everyone contributed his or her part for the sake of collective security. For
the same reason, the implementation of regulations was strictly formalized.
However, emergencies required sometimes also improvisation and hence a
considerable degree of discretionary authority by those implementing
regulations. These imperatives, already present in the fight against the
water, have been carried over into political and administrative culture, and
are characteristics of the Dutch policy style, both in public and in private
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bureaucracies, which is characterized by pragmatism, formalism, flexibility
and search for consensus. 
The same imperatives also made for a combination of individualism and
collectivism. Tradition holds that rugged individualism developed out of
dependence on nature, on water and wind, in keeping feet dry, in fishing,
in trade. But it was always tempered, mitigated by the need to cooperate,
first in the fight against the water, later in that against societal ills. It finds
expression in the Dutch willingness to associate, and to be bound by the
self-imposed regulations of one’s own associations; but not in the form of
an unquestioning acceptance of authority and of regulations and com-
mands for their own sake. On the contrary: the early experience with
successful horizontal cooperation has led to an absence of respect for
authority and hierarchy for their own sake, quite unlike that, for instance,
in Germany and Austria. This tradition was reinforced by Calvinism, which
held individual conscience to be the ultimate authority, not some external
agency. The obedience to authority of the Dutch under pillarization was
only a temporary interlude, typical of a phase of emancipation. The quiet
revolution of the 1960s, which undermined such authority again, can hence
in retrospect be considered merely a return to an old tradition.
Roots in consociational ideologies
Dutch corporatism may trace its institutional and cultural roots to the early
phases of state formation of the country: the period when the first
hydraulic boards were established around 1100, and subsequently the
period of the decentralized Dutch Republic (1581–1795). However, the
principles were again revived and reconfirmed in the various ideologies of
the societal pillars that emerged from the second half of the nineteenth
century onwards. These fostered an ideology of a corporatist organization
of the economy. Another distinguishing characteristic of Dutch corporatism
is hence that it was explicitly and intentionally created out of two
ideologies, Social Catholicism and Calvinist teaching, of which Catholicism
was the earliest and the most dominant one. This was not so in Scandinavia
and much less in Germany and Austria.
Catholic social teaching was particularly strong in the Netherlands. This
Social Catholicism developed from the mid-nineteenth century onwards,
starting with the work of von Ketteler in 1848 (Defourny 1942; Kothen
1945). It was codified in two papal encyclicals, Rerum Novarum of 1891
and Quadragesimo Anno of 1931. The encyclicals intended to develop a
‘third way’ in between socialism and capitalism. The Pope tried to prevent
the defection of Catholic workers to socialism and socialist trade unions by
criticizing the ‘chaos’ and ‘social desintegration’ of unregulated capitalism,
by stressing that property brought not only rights but also social respons-
ibilities to its owners (it was merely a temporary loan from God), by
developing the idea of ‘ordered’ or regulated and organized markets, and
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by instigating Catholic leaders to create separate organizations for Catholic
labour and capital (preferably in one organization, otherwise at least
separate from non-Catholics). These should provide a home for Catholic
workers, should be the institutional bases for class cooperation and consult-
ation, and should organize and regulate labour and product markets.
Catholic social thinking combined a reactionary nostalgia for the passing
of the medieval guild system with a forward-looking attempt to seek class
harmony in the industrializing society. To this end, Catholic thinkers
developed and popularized an organic theory of society which was
borrowed from early nineteenth-century conservative Restoration thinking.
This explains also the term ‘corporatism’. It stems from the Latin root
‘corpus’ or corpse, body. As many nineteenth-century social conceptions, the
ideology made an analogy between society and the biological organism (see
for an elaborated example Hollenberg 1941). The individuals in society
were considered to be the cells of the organism. Just as the cells are first
organized in functionally specific organs – like the skin, the nervous system,
the blood-circulation system, the kidneys – which give life to the organism
as a whole as well as the constituent cells through their division of labour
and the coordination between them, so the individuals should also be
organized in functionally specific organizations, allowing both society at
large and individuals to live and thrive. These corps intermédiaires should
bring together individuals engaged in the same productive activity.
Historical models were the family, the army and especially the medieval
guild, organizing artisans of the same trade. Such intermediary organiz-
ations should keep society integrated and prevent presumed social ills such
as disorder, political chaos, revolution, secularization, and individual ills
such as alienation and anomie (see also Durkheim 1960). Just as the
various organs have their own functions which they can perform best, so
the ‘head’ of the societal body, the state, should delegate specific functions
to the corps intermédiares who can perform these best, and be itself only
responsible for overall coordination and representation. 
Structural conflict in capitalism, both the competitive and the class
struggle, was seen as destructive and dehumanizing and had to be mitig-
ated by organizations which would bring order through internal regulation
and external bargaining and concertation with other associations. The
competitive struggle should be reduced by organizations of industries and
market-ordering rules like the medieval guilds used to have. How the class
struggle was best contained was a subject of debate. The dominant view was
that associations should bridge class distinctions, i.e. should include both
capitalists and workers. By bringing together labour and capital in one
association, it was hoped that class conflict would be replaced by a new
loyalty to the function or profession, as it had been in the old guild system.
In the end, however, most Catholic ideologists had to adjust to the reality
that this was hardly feasible and that separate trade unions and employers’
associations emerged. Class conflict would then be reduced through
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cooperation and bargaining between the associations of the different
classes.
Social Catholicism has been particularly influential in the Netherlands
(van Waarden 1980). When he celebrated the fortieth anniversary of Rerum
Novarum with Quadragesimo Anno, the Pope actually complimented the
Dutch Catholics for having developed the ideas of the 1891 encyclical to
their strongest expression in their country. Dutch Catholics were, between
1860 and 1960, some of the most zealous Catholics around (Rogier and de
Nooy 1953). There were several reasons for this. Two had to do with their
status as minority group in a predominantly Protestant nation. First, being
close to Protestants, they were infected with their puritanism and
fundamentalism. As a matter of fact, the most ‘puritan’ Catholics were
found in the northern part of the country, where they often lived in small
enclaves in a predominantly Protestant region (in the south the Catholics
were in the majority). Second, the Catholics had been secondary citizens
since the days of the Dutch Republic. The liberal bourgeois revolution of
1848, which brought a constitution, constitutional rights and liberal
governments, together with the formal equality of religions (including the
reinstatement of the Catholic church hierarchy in the Netherlands) gave
them the opportunity to embark on an emancipation drive, to improve
their social and political status. This required the organization of a Catholic
civil society in separate organizations. Social Catholic teaching provided an
ideological support for this. This factor, minority emancipation, was
lacking in predominantly Catholic countries such as France, Spain or Italy
and in the predominantly Lutheran Scandinavian countries. This may
explain why corporatism never caught on so much there (with the
exception of Franco’s Spain), or why it lacked this specific Catholic touch
(Nordic countries). In the Netherlands, the papal teachings fell on fertile
soil. The more so, a third reason, as the Dutch had a long tradition of a
well-organized civil society, as has been mentioned before. The Catholics
revived this tradition.
Dutch Catholic intellectuals spend a lot of effort in further developing
Catholic social teaching. Many studies were written on ‘economic ordering’
and ‘corporatism’. Doctoral theses were devoted to it, including studies that
admired ‘corporatism’ as it was practised in Mussolini’s fascist Italy since
1922, Salazar’s Estado Novo in Portugal since 1933, Franco’s Spain, and
Austria under Dolfuss (e.g. Anema 1934; Koenraadt 1934; Romme 1935;
Brongersma 1940). Up until the 1950s Catholic ‘Handbooks of Sociology’
appeared which were not what their title suggested, but were introductions
in corporatist thinking (see Aengenent 1909 for a early one). This adoption
of ‘sociology’ by Catholic social teaching explains, by the way, why the early
real sociological chairs were called chairs in ‘empirical sociology’ in order
to distinguish them from ‘normative sociology’, being the Catholic variety.
Political pamphlets, church meetings and conferences of the Dutch society
of economists, all were devoted to this topic. Up until the Second World
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War, the word corporatism was frequently used. After the war the associ-
ation of corporatism with fascism made the term unpopular and suspect,
but not the ideas behind it. Instead, the Dutch began to use the term
overlegeconomie (concerted economy), not unlike the euphemism of the
Austrians, Sozialpartnerschaft.
The Protestants followed suit. Social Catholicism was influential in
protestant circles. The Calvinist leader and ideologist Abraham Kuijper
(prime minister at the beginning of the century) borrowed heavily from it
when he developed his own Calvinist social philosophy. Catholic and
Calvinist social ideology had much in common – which in fact subsequently
facilitated cooperation in government. Both shared the ideal of a
decentralized society. The Catholic principle of subsidiarity and the Calvinist
one of sovereignty in own circle gave preference to self-organization of civil
society (that is, themselves: Catholic and Protestant organizations). What
civil society could do itself, the state should not do. However, in this the
Calvinists were more extreme than the Catholics. In Catholic thinking,
producer associations should, under the doctrine of subsidiarity, be licensed
by the state to perform specific functions, like price and wage regulation,
which would bring order to the competitive and class struggle. However,
the state as licence-holder had the right to intervene when these regulatory
functions were not performed well, or when other interests, especially those
of the state itself, were at stake. The Calvinists stressed much more, the
autonomy of sub-national units as church, family, charity, business firm and
association, and were much more hesitant in allowing the state the right to
interfere in these. This is what the term ‘sovereignty’ in ‘own circle’
(meaning: the Calvinists own organizations), referred to.
In this ideological environment, and in the context of consociational
concertation, the social democrats developed their own variation of a
corporatist philosophy, called functional decentralization. They too wanted to
harness capitalism, but unlike their religious co-pillars they saw a much
larger role for the state, as social democrats did also elsewhere. However,
they found the other pillars squarely in their way in their attempts at state
regulation of the economy. A case in point was the development of the
Dutch welfare state. The Netherlands was relatively late with this, much
later than, for example, Germany and Britain (Alber 1982; Flora and
Heidenheimer 1982). The edifice got its boost only in 1957 with the
general pension plan and 1967 with the disability plan. This was not
because the Dutch attached less importance to social security – on the
contrary. The Dutch have a high preference for reduction of risk and
uncertainty in life, and attach also great importance to egalitarian values,
i.e. more or less equal life chances for the unemployed, disabled, retarded
or retired. Social security provisions were delayed because of disagreement
over their implementation: by state organizations or by corporatist bodies.
The first social security law, on disability, failed in parliament in 1899
because of disagreement on what kind of organizations were to implement
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it. And the first sickness compensation plan already passed parliament in
1913, but was not implemented until 1930 for similar reasons. Confronted
with this resistance of the religious pillars against a large role of the state in
the economy, the social democrats developed, in a typical pragmatic
way, their own variation of corporatism: the state could delegate and/or
decentralize specific functions to private or semi-public organizations. Thus
in the end the old Dutch corporatism got three different ideological
underpinnings, from three different pillars; ideologies that were developed
within each of these pillars in the context of consociationalism: that is, the
presence of neighbouring pillars with different ideas, and the need to find
compromises. 
These ideologies led, from the last quarter of the nineteenth century, to
a virtual explosion of associational activity, first at the local level, and
subsequently nationally. Hundreds if not thousands of trade associations,
unions, or farmers’ organizations were created as part of the emancipation
movements and the so-called ‘social question’.
Important for the development of the Dutch variety of corporatism was
hence in a way the geographic location of the country: at the crossroads of
Western Europe, at the heart of the two axes of Stein Rokkan’s geo-political
map of Europe (Rokkan 1981): right on the city belt, which had stretched,
since the late Middle Ages, from the North Sea and the Baltic over the Alps
to the Mediterranean; and just distant enough from Rome to be at the
boundary between protestant Northern Europe and Catholic Southern
Europe. The city belt provided the tradition of a well-organized civil society.
The distance to Rome explained the mixed Protestant–Catholic population.
Conclusion
Dutch corporatism has both broad and deep roots in society. Broad in the
sense that socio-economic concertation at the macro-level is but one
manifestation of a much broader phenomenon, whose basic elements are:
associability, subsidiarity, collegiate government and consensualism. These
elements find expression in a multitude of phenomena:
• at different levels: from macro-level socio-economic policy formulation
to meso-level industrial self-regulation in both voluntary and com-
pulsory trade associations; 
• in a diversity of policy fields: labour relations and wage policy, social
security, health, education, welfare, public housing, environmental
protection;
• and in different state institutions, including in the legal system and the
policy styles in public administration.
Deep roots it has too. They can be traced back to different historical
periods: to the period of industrialization and emancipation of Catholic
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and Protestant minorities and the ideologies they developed; to the Dutch
Republic with its associational self-governance and consensualism; and
perhaps even to the emergence of the first embryonic elements of the
Dutch state, the early hydraulic boards that emerged in the eleventh
century.
Hence it comes as no surprise, that the Dutch reverted back to corpor-
atist institutions for the reform of the welfare state, notwithstanding the fact
that these socio-economic institutions were themselves blamed by many for
some of the problems and excesses of the welfare state. The broader
societal and historical embeddedness of these institutions provided condi-
tions for their successful application. 
One implication may of course be that such corporatist solutions to
welfare state reform, as chosen by the Dutch, are less easily transferable to
other countries, which want to imitate apparently successful models, but
lack the appropriate institutional, cultural and historical bases. Let us see
in the other chapters how some of them have fared.
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4 Austrian social partnership 
Just a midlife crisis?1
Brigitte Unger
Introduction
Since the late 1970s considerable changes have affected the economic,
political and social conditions of social partnership action. Growing uncer-
tainties related to an ever-greater intertwined world economy, the end of
high growth rates, increased unemployment and the erosion of homo-
geneous interests have given new fuel to the question as to the decline of
corporatism for some time now. Most recently, external incisive changes in
social partnership are being underscored along with watchwords such as
neoliberalism and globalization. Together with internal undermining
tendencies of the system such as a new coalition government without social
democrats, a calling into question the existence of chambers and the
declining degree of the organization of labour unions, the question arises as
to what survival potential and what future social partnership will have.
Forecasts as to the future potentials of social partnership have become
relatively pessimistic, lately. Many sociologists, political scientists and
economists, though for different reasons, all predict its decline. Crepaz
(1995), for example, used the metaphor of the ‘end of a dinosaur’ in order
to express the inability of social partnership to meet the sociological needs
of post-modern time. According to his view the dinosaur called social
partnership will die out because young people want a transparent system of
decision making, a democratic way of making these decisions and equal
and fair access possibilities for men and women, to give some examples. No
more closed-door compromises by some old boys sitting around a green
table, no more paternalistic decisions over people’s heads would, indeed,
mean, the end of social partnership, because non-transparency is one of its
main characteristics and an important pillar for it to function. Divergent
interests can only be harmonized into some sort of compromise between
capital and labour if they are filtered internally within the associations.
More democracy within the organization makes this filter process much
more difficult. 
Political scientists stress the fact that social partnership is designed for a
system consisting of two large parties, which is progressively undermined
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by a third party or by more and more small parties. Consociationalism
(Proporz) is easy when posts and jobs have to be shared among two parties
and compromises have to be found between two groups, but it is no longer
possible when there are many rival parties. And it is no coincidence that
especially the third large party in Austria – the populist Austrian Freedom
Party (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ) – had already attacked social
partnership most heavily before it came into power in April 2000,
when the two conservative parties ÖVP and FPÖ formed a coalition
government.
Economists, after all, claim the primacy of economics over politics.
Economic forces such as the mobility of capital and the competition for the
influx of foreign direct investment and multinational enterprises would
force national governments and labour associations to give in to the
demands of capital. No room for manœuvre would be left for national
economic policy-making, according to this view. Neither for government
nor for associations. The most prominent hypothesis of this kind of view is
the neoclassical convergence theory (see Unger 1997). If the main
economic variables, such as growth rates, interest rates, profits, wages and
prices are forced to become alike, there is not much left for which to
bargain and negotiate.
Even if it is not without a certain irony, when I as a woman endorse an
institution set-up hardly accessible to women (to put it lightly), such as
Austrian social partnership, I will claim in the following that social
partnership is both economically and socially desirable, still exists and is
worth maintaining.
Austrian social partnership was founded after the war (with, for
example, the wage-price agreement in 1947, the Joint Commission in
1957) and is now some fifty years old. Though I agree with Crepaz (1995)
that there is pressure from post-modern society, I want to stress the fact that
dinosaurs took a while to die out. Rather than facing death like a dinosaur,
Austria´s social partnership is undergoing a sort of midlife crisis which can
be characterized in the following way:
1 the best times are over (one boasts of the past);
2 fears of faltering potency (in view of progressing internationalization
one perceives one’s own impotence);
3 these fears are glossed over by a flight forward (leaving the family and
finding someone younger and more attractive in Brussels);
4 regretful comeback to the old partner if the rejuvenation kick failed.
The best times are over: changed conditions of action based on
social partnership
I have reported in depth on the changed economic, social and political
conditions of action based on social partnership in Hinrichs and Unger
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(1990). The most important factors which we listed as contributing to a
weakening of the side of the employees included:
1 Growing internationalization.
2 Greater uncertainty given the increased tempo of transactions.
3 Instability in the structure of branches, which makes collective bargain-
ing agreements more difficult.
4 The ‘end of mass production’ making the markets more susceptible to
fluctuations and increased flexibility demands directed to the employees.
5 New, quickly changing technologies, which makes plans of qualification
demands and adequate formal training patterns ever more difficult.
6 Heterogenous manpower, which makes a (unified) labour union lobby
and orientation to an ‘abstract’ employee (without professional and
company identity) ever more difficult.
7 Weakening of the labour associations. Since business associations have
always had a more heterogenous composition than labours associations
and in many countries the entrepreneur associations only assume a
consulting function in the development of collective wage agreements,
the former are less affected than the latter.
8 Markedly lower growth rates which aggregate distribution conflicts, for
which status quo oriented arrangements of partnership are less suited.
9 The departure from Keynesian economic policy – in part due to the
emerging structural weaknesses of a purely demand-oriented policy
represents a clear paradigm shift in the economic political scene.
Monetarism and neoliberalism opt for a withdrawal of state and
association interventions.
10 The departure from an offensive employment policy and the resulting
growing unemployment implies a weakening of the position of
employees in the corporatist negotiation processes.
11 The ‘dissolution of the socio-moral milieu’ and the ‘individualization of
life states and life stories’.
12 The growing split of the labour market in a ‘core’ of employees sitting
on ‘secure’ labour and an increasing number of working persons whose
employment stability and continuity is seriously endangered, has
significantly contributed to a ‘tighter’ definition of collective interest.
For Austria the following items should be added to the list compiled at
this time:
13 The decrease in employment in nationalized industry with companies
that traditionally had strong labour unions has contributed to a lower
degree of organization in labour unions. Furthermore, dismissed and
frustrated workers from the nationalized industries were the optimal
clientele for the FPÖ. (The last election’s panel showed that 45 per
cent of workers had voted for the FPÖ.)
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14 The weakening of the two large parties and the emergence of a third
large party which managed to come into power in 2000 in Austria can
be interpreted as an institutional shock ‘from within’. Social partner-
ship was traditionally conceived for two parties – a big coalition – with
strong ties of party members to their camp. Through the dissolution of
ties to a particular political camp and the emergence of a third large
party, such traditional patterns of negotiation are being rocked. It is no
coincidence that precisely this third party tried to saw away at the
columns of social partnership, as the abolition of obligatory member-
ship in Austria’s chambers, demanded by the FPÖ, in 1997 showed. 
15 The new coalition government between the two conservative parties
ÖVP and FPÖ tries to govern without social partners. Latest efforts to
drain the chamber of labour financially, and efforts to pass bills without
consultation with the social partners in parliament reflect the fact that
labour is weakened both at an international and national level.
Fears of faltering potency: institutional shocks – the new
challenges of the 1990s
In the 1990s the type of shocks with which systems based on social partner-
ship are confronted has significantly changed. Whereas in the 1970s and
1980s, mainly the demand shocks (e.g. fluctuations in demand due to
fluctuations in purchasing power) and the supply shocks (e.g. oil shocks)
dominated, the social partners today are confronted with structural, organi-
zational and institutional shocks. The creation of a European single market,
the fall of the Berlin Wall, along with the opening up of Eastern Europe,
the restructuring of companies from national to international firms and
corporations, the liberalization of the capital markets which has resulted in
greater speculation in the financial markets, are only a few examples. The
growing importance of such new kinds of shocks represents a great
challenge for existing institutional arrangements. Arrangements of social
partnership are traditionally geared to absorbing demand shocks and have
reluctantly gone from ‘demand corporatism’ to ‘supply corporatism’ (see
Traxler 1996: 25). In this sense they have already ensured great adjust-
ments. As Prisching (1996: 212) put it aptly, the legend of a ‘political deficit
of associations’ is thus a legend ‘since it borders on the inconceivable’ of
what social partnership has performed in the past decades. Recently, social
partnership in Austria has been mainly confronted with two institutional
shocks, one ‘from without’ and one ‘from within’. The institutional threat
‘from without’ can be grasped with the watchword ‘globalization’, the
institutional threat ‘from within’ is to be illustrated with the ‘change in
government’ and ‘the existence of the chambers’.
The spillover of conservative ideology has not just hit Austria but also
many other European countries. In this sense no country can evade ‘globaliz-
ation’ through the media and international policy. Nevertheless, the way
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problems are perceived in and the unanimous reaction of associations is
unique in Austria. 
The fact that given internationalization and globalization (almost)
nothing can be done any more on a national level seems to be undisputed.
Almost every interview with a politician, expert or journalist contains, in
numerous ways, the explanation that under the sway of internationalization
nothing can be done. Regardless from which party he or she (more rarely)
being questioned comes, regardless of chamber he or she (which almost
borders on the inconceivable) comes from, the arguments are almost
identical. It is a sense of impotence among fifty-year-old men which
becomes so clear in the Austrian debate.
Since non-transparency prevails in social partnership arrangements, a
certain autonomy for the leadership of the association from the members
must exist to be able to negotiate autonomously, that is to say, also few
democratic base elements are included, since little experience with dis-
course and no willingness to enter into conflict exist, the institutional shock
of the debate of the EU-membership and internationalization had to be
processed as inconspicuously as possible. The fact that in Austria there was
no counter-position to the EU on the part of labour, no fear of real wages
being reduced or of traditional collective bargaining areas being dissolved,
that the population was not informed of potential disadvantages of the EU,
that is to say, there was a perfect EU-monologue of the large parties and
associations, is unique in an international comparison.
This is to be explained on the one hand by the fact that when a line has
been decided on this has to be doggedly adhered to. Why social partner-
ship, and in particular labour, decided for the uncompromising recognition
of the conditions of capital can be explained by the ‘midlife crisis’ sense of
impotence. The ‘constraints’ accepted thus were presented to scientists,
heads of staff councils, members, media, etc.: We are a small country that
does not want to remain behind Hungary. Provide us with arguments in
favour of the EU. Alternative positions will not be taken note of, reports on
the social consequences will be locked up, EU-opponents will no longer be
invited to discuss. Scientists can only think within the given framework of
pro-EU, pro-budget consolidation, etc. Of course, the scope of action is
very limited under such premisses. It is also not very stimulating intel-
lectually when the results of thinking are already pre-given. But it is still
proof of the fact that Austria ranks top as a corporatist nation in inter-
national comparison. The institutional shock resulting from the preparation
for the consequences of joining the EU had been assimilated in an exemplary
way: unanimity and agreement among the social partners, stability, almost
no conflict, just as if nothing had happened.
Globalization was seen as a given constraint. It was probably not analysed
how much globalization and internationalization were now different from
earlier years. That with the unanimous agreement to join the EU and the
currency union, basic changes would take place in the balance of powers,
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was however, not acknowledged or addressed. With the issue of inter-
nationalization and globalization, the language of capital was also imported
to Austria: efficiency instead of solidarity, economic site instead of welfare
state, inefficiency of the public sector instead of important businesses and
ancillary suppliers for the private sector, to elaborate a savings package
instead of fighting unemployment. It was thus an ideology and not
constraints that became rampant in the 1990s. 
As a result of the perception nurtured by a sense of impotence (’there is
nothing we can do about it anyway’) the representatives of the employees
anticipatingly and obediently defined away alternatives, which finally
confirmed the thesis of globalization in a way of self-fulfilling prophecy.
Flight forward: the path to Brussels
If the best times are over and nothing can be done about it anyway, why not
give up home and try to rejuvenate somewhere else? The speed and elan
with which Austrian politicians, trade unions and other associations built
their offices in Brussels was unique. In many countries ‘Brussels’ was used
and still is abused as an excuse for domestic political impotence and
failures. In Austria the EU-phoria was amazing, especially on the part of
social democrats and labour associations.
For a very appropriate account of the view of the Austrian social partners,
in particular of the position of the labour associations which differs
substantially compared to other European countries, see Chaloupek (1995).
The discussion in Norway and the opposition of Norwegian labour unions
in comparison to the EU-monologue being conducted in Austria demon-
strate various discourse options that exist even in social partnership
arrangements. For a critique of Austria’s EU-phemism see Weissel (1996).
The Austrian argumentation can be formulated as follows in exaggerated
terms. Here the ‘we’ stands for ‘Austria’ in compliance with the Austrian
diction which reflected a desire for consensus.
1 We became a member of the EU because we were actually already part
of it. On the one hand, we have for a long time followed EU-guide-
lines, now we are able to help design them. On the other hand, inter-
national competition limits us this way or the other (Chaloupek 1995:
26).
2 We will join the European monetary union, since we are already part of
it anyway. And since the European monetary union means really only
two changes: it excludes high state deficits and devaluation of currency,
that is, options the Austrian government and social partners never
considered to begin with. It would thus make no sense to speak of a
‘loss of autonomy’ through joining the EU and the monetary union
(ibid.). Sometimes this point was also legitimized in a different way.
Through the monetary union nothing changes, since we already have
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something like a monetary union through the hard currency policy
with Germany. Note this false confusion of a fixed exchange currency
system with a monetary union – a confusion which seems to exist only
in Austria and even among economists and professors of international
economics such as Breuss (1992). In a monetary union there is no
possibility of using the exchange rate or the fear of devaluation as a
disciplinary instrument. Even if Austria has not used this instrument
for a while, it has always been a potential threat, a Damocles sword
hanging above the heads of the social partners during negotiations.
The shared fear of a devaluation of the currency imposed self-
discipline both on capital (in particular export-oriented industries) and
on labour in negotiations.
From the perspective of social partnership, there was unanimity with
regard to the inventory and outline of its future prospects.
3 The future of Austrian social partnership lies in Brussels. Even if the
social partners underscore their reduced influence on a national level,
on an international or supranational level they seemed to feel stronger.
In a more ‘modest’ vein, the social partners are envisioned ‘as an
extended arm of Austria, as an interest group representative of Austria
in Brussels’ (Nowotny 1994). In a more ‘bold’ vein, it is hoped that
participating in the ‘social dialogue’ will allow Austria to influence the
rest of the world in the direction of solutions based on social
partnership (Chaloupek 1995: 27). Austria’s social partnership as an
emissary of the welfare state. In an ‘omnipotent’ form, some even toyed
with the idea of a ‘Eurocorporatism’, that is an application of the
Austrian model of social partnership to the rest of Europe (Marterbauer,
no year). The future assessment of the Austrian social partners thus
seemed to have something in common with what Sigmund Freud
referred to as the Austrian psyche: a fluctuation between a minority
complex and megalomania.
Such argumentation remained weak when it came to explaining how
this strong influence of the social partners, weakened within the
country, was to be exerted on an EU-level. Handler and Hochreiter
(1996: 16), for instance, argued that a sort of adjusted model of social
partnership could be deployed on EU-level based on the Austrian
version, if adequate institutional conditions could be found for this.
Authors such as Chaloupek (1995: 27) placed their trust in the
likelihood of a ‘development of the presently existing particularistic
lobbyism at least in the direction of a certain centralization’. 
Why Brussels was the false bride 
The fact that corporatism needs some structural features which cannot be
found in Brussels made it the false bride for Austrian social partnership, in
particular for labour. To refer to a supranational level of a large scale and
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to hope to implement the low-scale political institutions there was doomed
to fail.
The opening of borders within the EU gave capital much greater power
than labour. Since neo-corporatism is a compromise between three actors
(Schmitter 1985: 27) – the state which actually wants to regulate in an
authoritarian way, the representatives of the enterprise who really prefer an
allocation through the market, and the representatives of the employees
who really want a redistribution of wealth – a certain balance of power is
needed between them.
Labor and capital must mutually back each other, each strong enough
to uphold the other, through organized collective action, from
asserting one’s own interests directly through social control and/or
economic exploitation and each too weak to assert his own interests
indirectly through the state through one-sided manipulation of state
authorities.
(Ibid.: 36)
In Austria, in particular, the axis of state employee associations had
become much weaker over time. This did not only happen during the new
ÖVP–FPÖ coalition government, but started already during the big
coalition government between the SPÖ and ÖVP. For instance, SPÖ chan-
cellor Franz Vranitzky made declarations without consulting the labour
unions, an act that would have been inconceivable in the Kreisky era. Also
the ties between the SPÖ and labour unions were less intense than in the
past. The compromise, however, was still possible, as the joint tying of the
‘savings package’ on budget consolidation showed. This package which
involved great financial losses for the employees above all would have
hardly been possible without the social partners.
Labour had been weakened already before the new conservative coalition
government. The Austrian labour unions have had to accept a marked
reduction in the degree of organization over the last decades. Whereas in
1970 (adjusted in terms of retirement) around 62 per cent of the workers
were organized in labour unions, in 1990 it was only 46 per cent. In 1996,
the degree of organization in labour unions was 49.5 per cent, which still
ranked Austria in a top position of strong labour associations (see ÖGB
1996). But even today, despite further above-average losses in membership
in international comparison, the Austrian labour unions show a high
degree of organization and centralization. On a European level, a strong
organization of the heterogeneous labour wage agreements is considerably
less probable (Keller 1995).
While labour got weaker, capital gained power. In Austria the
historically conditioned lack of large capital and the related weak capital
side was a significant reason for organizing small and large companies in
associations and for the willingness of the entrepreneurs to negotiate
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(Traxler 1988). Management is considerably stronger elsewhere in Europe
given the existing larger capital than in Austria. Big corporations regulate
their work relationships themselves. At the European level, labour unions
often lack management for negotiations (Traxler and Schmitter 1995). In
Austria there are two organizations representing capital. On the one hand
the economic chamber, where all entrepreneurs are obligatory members
(Wirtschaftskammer Österreichs) and the association of industry (Öster-
reichische Industriellenvereinigung). While artisans and small firms are
represented by the former, only big firms are organized in the second. 
In Austria, collective bargaining takes place between the economic
chamber and the individual trade unions. At a European level, however,
chambers with their compulsory touch are not recognized. Opposite views
between the economic chamber and the association of industry with regard
to regulations, the need to negotiate, etc., have become more open in recent
years. The association of industry, for instance, wanted to do away with
compulsory membership by suggesting that entrepreneurs should be able
to opt either for membership of the economic chamber or of the associ-
ation of industry. This statement was, however, retracted due to the protest
of the economic chamber.
Altogether, the conditions for social partnership have worsened through
the opening of borders. The chamber system came under attack, the
balance of power shifted from the nation state and labour towards capital,
and the feeling of ‘being in the same boat’, which was so important for
Austria’s compromises, got lost. Capital got the idea of escaping from the
common boat and taking refuge in Brussels and international markets.
The new function of the social partners – compromise 
on the ‘savings package’
Though paying much verbal attention to the false bride by expressing the
will to implement social partnership arrangements at an EU-level, Austria’s
social partnership has, nevertheless, fulfilled enormous tasks of restructur-
ing and adjusting at a national level. As Lehmbruch (1996) and Scharpf
and Schmidt (2000) stressed, an important new function of social partners
is to renegotiate the welfare state. Since the Keynesian welfare state broke
down under the neoliberal wave of the 1980s and 1990s it had either to be
sacrificed or to be renegotiated. Corporatist institutions have an important
asset: they help to renegotiate the welfare state. The ‘Dutch miracle’
consisted of renegotiating the welfare state quite drastically, by regulating
part-time jobs and pensions at a social partner level. The Austrian social
partnership chose a much slower and more fossilizing, though also more
stable and stabilizing, way of renegotiating the welfare state (see Hemerijck
et al. 2000). 
Though internationalization affected many countries in the same way,
the Austrian response to it was unique. In Austria and in other countries as
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well the economic political goals have experienced a clear shift in recent
years. The departure from Keynesian economic policy was accompanied by
a pronounced shift of the political objectives. Whereas in the 1970s the
primary goal was ‘full employment’, this goal became diluted to ‘high
employment’ in the 1980s and to an ‘increase in employment’ in the 1990s.
Whereas in the 1970s ‘solidarity’ was an important slogan, in the 1990s it
was completely replaced by the notion of ‘efficiency’. Whereas in the 1970s,
in a time of full employment, one preferred to accept a budgetary deficit
which was a few billion schillings higher rather than having sleepless nights
because of greater unemployment, the generally accepted goal in economic
policy has become ‘budget consolidation’.
Labour and capital both agreed on a new social pact for reducing the
welfare state without much public debate, strikes or excitement. How
difficult this was for labour and for social democrats can be seen in the way
in which this clear change in course taken by Austria’s social partners was
legitimized. If one reads the report (Bundesministerium fuer Finanzen
1995) compiled by the social partners on the consolidation of the budget
from September 1995 (first version of the so-called ‘savings package’, the
Sparpaket), one only learns that now is the right moment for consolidating
budget because later is still later. We also learn a number of economic
advantages of consolidation. Here there is the dilemma that all Keynesian
arguments presented in the 1970s, for expanding the budget deficit had
suddenly to be forgotten. Even if the conditions had changed, and
Keynesian demand policy had become more difficult, the Keynesian theory
still provided explanations for macro-relationships. Instead, arguments
against high budget deficits had be presented. Hence, monetarist and neo-
classical arguments of the 1960s had to be applied (also) by the (former
Keynesian) social democrats.
They were suddenly arguing for economic liberalism, showed scepticism
vis-à-vis the state machinery, much concern for efficiency and less concern
for social issues. These arguments had been put forward by conservatives
since the beginning of the ‘Crowding-out’ debate in the 1950s and 1960s.
The left had countered with a ‘Crowding-in’ debate, arguing that in an
open economy an increase in interest rates resulting from budgetary
deficits was not possible because of sufficiently high liquidity from abroad,
or that higher interests would even lead to desirable capital influx and
pressure for revaluation. Furthermore, it was argued that inflation only
appears when full employment is given. And last not least, Lorenz von
Stein’s century-old statement was cited to the effect that a state without
state debt is either not doing enough for its future (when it does not build
an infrastructure) or is demanding too much from today (if it makes the
present generation pay the full tab, even if it is only the next generation
which will benefit). The left also warned against consolidating the budget
with the ‘savings paradoxon’ which one can find in any textbook on
economics. If the state tries to cut expenditures, it depresses the economy,
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unemployment rises, state revenue declines and thus the state’s tax income
also shrinks. Paradoxically, because of tax losses in the wake of savings
measures it can have a higher deficit than before (Kratena et al. 1988).
Instead, the report called for lower taxes so as to allow Austria to hold its
ground in tax competition between the states for industries willing to settle
in a given country. The list of advantages of budget consolidation culmin-
ated with the sentence ‘a quickly and efficiently consolidated budget would
ensure that Austria remains a promising future international ‘enterprise’
(Report: 11). Austria’s social partners thus defined themselves as managers
in a company! This, too, was part of a conservative turn in politics: the
economization of all realms. Politicians now become managers.
With the savings package the social partners proved that they were able
to perform their function of ‘easing the burden of the state’ in a very
thorough way. No government had been able to legitimize and enforce
such unpopular measures (such as a cut in the net income of some uni-
versity professors by about one-third) without the backing of the social
partners.
However, we have to ask ourselves, whether labour unions and social
democrats are needed to opt for tax heavens, real wage cuts and re-
distribution of income from labour to capital. Is there anything left of social
partnership which fights workers’ interests? Is the Sparpaket a demon-
stration of the (continued) existence of corporatist arrangements or a
demonstration of the failure of trade unions?
What became clear from the savings package was that the gate-keeper
function had changed. It was the government who set the targets and the
social partners who worked them out. While these new targets were
welcomed by capital, they were definitely much less in line with labour
interests.
Regret: Austrian social partnership lately
Already during the SPÖ–ÖVP coalition and more so since the new govern-
ment coalition, capital has become stronger in Austria. Austrian entrepreneurs
are suddenly toying with international capital. The fear of workers
becoming radicalized has decreased since the fall of the Berlin Wall and
opening of the East. Business is making more massive demands. For
instance, entrepreneurs have demanded an extension of weekly working
hours to 45 hours.
Hairdressers refused to close collective agreements between 1996 and
1998 (Interview, Legner 1996 and Interview, Kovarik 1998). Negotiations
were also becoming increasingly difficult among metal workers. Metal
workers are wage leaders in Austria. Usually, the metal industry workers
start the collective wage negotiations, followed by the metal handicraft
sector. Wage increases are the same in both sectors. In 1997 the business
representative of the metal handicraft sector refused a collective agreement
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with the same wage increases as for the metal industry, claiming that they
had lower productivity increases than the former. A joint strike of metal
industry and craft workers finally resulted in the same wage increases. Since
the new government has been in power, labour conflicts have increased.
But even before, there was a trend towards increased labour conflicts. The
number of court cases has increased by 40 per cent within the last ten years
(Interview, Kovarik 2000). 
The transition to monetary union also meant severe institutional
changes in Austria. The exchange rate is no longer available as a potential
instrument for averting crises. Even if none of the social partners in Austria
ever wished devaluation, the exchange rate still served as a potential threat
and a fill-in for crises. A threatening devaluation is a disciplinary instru-
ment both for labour with its fear of inflation and real wage losses and for
business with its fear of profit losses. In an economic and monetary union
the exchange rate policy is no longer necessary. The budget consolidation
demanded by Maastricht paralysed a second instrument for warding off
crises: fiscal policy. Thus there only remained a third instrument for
absorbing shocks: wage policy. The entire burden of adjustment was placed
on wage policy.
A further ‘debilitating element’ of labour was the increase in illegal
workers. Precarious and illegal employment conditions evaded collective
bargaining agreements and increased the danger of wage dumping. 
Since the new government has been in office, the already rough inter-
national wind for labour has been reinforced by domestic changes. First,
the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs was split into separate
parts. Among other things, the inspector of labour was transferred from
the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs to the Economic Ministry.
This seems unique in Europe: business associations checking whether firms
fulfil working conditions properly! 
Collective agreements are undermined. The Oesterreichischer Gewerk-
schaftsbund (ÖGB), which had originally refused to regulate working
time arrangements collectively, has delegated this at a sectoral level. We
now see a new trend towards including part-time arrangements in the
collective arrangements of employees, for jobs of the ‘new economy’.
However, reality has overtaken trade unions. Precarious employment has
increased in the last years, wages paid below the collectively agreed one
have been arranged for firms in crisis, service sector jobs outside the
traditional domain of trade unions have made the Austrian labour market
much more flexible than is perceived from abroad (see Pichelmann and
Hofer 1999). 
The new government openly bypasses the social partners by setting
important issues, such as the budget-accompanying law (Budgetbeg-
leitgesetz, 2000), very late on the agenda. The social partners had only two
days left to check on this proposal before it became a bill and found,
anyway, the parliamentary majority of the two coalition partners. The fact
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that the social partners were not invited to consult on the latest pension
reform was certainly the biggest affront.
While the economic chamber is more relaxed about this, since the
proposals are in its favour, the trade unions are often completely left out. 
Drastic changes in personnel to the disadvantage of SPÖ members take
place in all institutions. Even the prominent former SPÖ Minister of Trade,
Staribacher, had to quit the ÖIAG Aufsichtsrat. The ÖIAG, Austria’s
Industry Holding, is responsible for the privatization of the nationalized
industries. Also in the Verbundgesellschaft, the electricity company, pers-
onnel changes took place, and government designated the new members.
In television, in social security, in leading functions in the ministries, major
personnel changes take place at high speed. 
Austria’s trade unions have started to regret the Europeanization that
has reduced their influence significantly and has shrunk their clientele.
However, the road down started with the breakdown of the nationalized
industries. The elections of 2000, with 41 per cent of former social democrat
workers voting for the (then not Europe-friendly) FPÖ showed that Europe
might have been the wrong route for the Alpine status quo-oriented social
partnership regime.
Social partnership is robust
It is difficult to foresee the near future. The sudden and undiscussed sales
of public enterprises, and overnight reforms in social policy areas without
consultation with the social partners, give rise to the idea that the end of
social partnership has come. However, the author claims that this is only
the deepest dip of the ‘midlife crisis’. The new government, so far, has not
really attacked the fundamentals of social partnership but only put it on
ice. While Margaret Thatcher destroyed the trade unions the new
government only plays with the old emotional hatred against the socialists,
dating back to the civil war in 1934. This gives sometimes the impression
that the old camps still exist. The Lager mentality between conservatives
and social democrats, Austria’s historical cleavage line, re-emerges in the
public debate, in suspicions, in fears of being overheard by phone, etc. But,
unlike 1934 the camps do not exist any longer, but the emotional feelings
associated with them linger on.
One of the major institutions of social partnership are the chambers, for
the Austrian chamber system is a central piece of social partnership and
without obligatory membership there are no chambers. Every worker is a
member of the chamber of labour, every self-employed person is a member
of the economic chamber. To abolish this would amount to the end of the
Austrian model of finding consensus. This existential threat to both systems
came mainly from the FPÖ. Then FPÖ leader Haider questioned the
legitimacy of the chambers so persistently, that in spring 1996 the members
of the economic chamber and the chamber of labour were asked whether
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they support the maintenance of their respective chamber. The results clearly
showed that the foundations of Austrian social partnership are not so easily
shaken. In February 1996, 82 per cent of the members of the economic
chamber voted in favour of the maintenance of the economic chambers with
their guilds, committees, trade groups and professional associations as a
common legal interest group for all entrepreneurs. The participation in the
poll was 36 per cent, the same as at normal chamber elections. 
In May and June of 1996 the members of the chamber of labour were
asked: ‘Are you in favour of the chamber of labour continuing to exist as a
legal lobby for all workers?’ The poll was a considerably more delicate
matter, since the work done by the experts of this chamber for the
members is less transparent. Eighty-seven per cent voted in favour of the
maintenance of the chamber of labour. The participation on the part of the
workers’ chamber was clearly above normal. The participation in the vote
of the chamber of labour was 29 per cent in 1994, whereas in the poll in
1996 it was almost twice as high, at 57.7 per cent (see Press Information of
the Economic Chamber).
The realization of the poll in the chamber of labour shows that con-
siderable forces were mobilized for it. In comparison to the chamber of
labour elections it is striking that a large part of this poll was conducted in
companies. This could also be proof that business was also interested in a
high participation in the poll. Business, above all smaller companies,
know that they need the chamber of labour for their concerns. Without the
chamber of labour there is also no chamber of business. Business must
have thus been interested in a positive outcome of the chamber of labour
poll.
The new government tried to make the chambers again an issue. But
this time more subtle. The government proposal foresees a 40 per cent cut
in the compulsory chamber contribution (Kammerumlage). The chamber
contributions are ear-marked pay-roll taxes. A 40 per cent cut would mean
a loss of one billion schillings to the Chamber of Labour and, thus, reduce
its financial means by almost one half. The Economic Chamber proposed a
voluntary reform and to charge fees for services in order to support this
government proposal. This indicates a big shift of the Economic Chamber’s
policy strategy under the new government. 
The future of Austrian social partnership
Many of the latest changes towards neoliberalism started under the social
democrats’ umbrella in the large coalition government. The result was that
the renegotiation of the welfare state took place much more slowly and
much less radically than, for example, in the Netherlands. The budget cuts
– though partly much more radical than in France and Germany – have
passed without heavy strikes, since they were under the umbrella of the
social partners.
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The way in which the institutional shocks of the 1990s were handled by
social partners shows thus that social peace is still the main asset provided
by Austrian institutions. Lately, it has been recognized that the future of
Austrian social partnership is not to be found in Brussels but only in
Austria. Social partnership is a national arrangement and national realms
of action will be used more in the future. On a supranational level, the
disequilibrium of forces is too large for social partnership arrangements. As
an ‘emissary of the welfare state’ they certainly have an important moral
function in Brussels, but their political function is limited.
On the macro level the demands have become greater. In particular with
regard to internationalization, the status quo-maintaining and fossilizing
effects of social partnership, however, take on a new meaning for a small
country. An upward movement in the wave of internationalization means
growing uncertainty, greater fluctuations in output and employment,
quicker reactions and more intense overreactions of the economic subjects
given the greater mobility of financial capital, real capital and labour. This,
however, also means that crises can appear too quickly and too drastically,
which results in particularly high social costs. Social partnership can have a
buffer effect on these excessively high and too quick fluctuations.
Social partnership structures thus become all the more important for a
small country in the face of growing internationalization as they can protect
it against extreme external shocks.
As the chamber polls showed, institutions prove to be considerably more
stable than economic processes or governments in power. This means that
at least on a mid-term basis the macro-economic, crisis-absorbing, stabili-
zing function of social partnership will be maintained. As compared to less
corporatist countries, or those which have no corporatist culture at all, at
least Austria’s relatively advantageous position remains, in terms of a stable
climate. 
It is unlikely that trade unions will act in a more radicalized way or that
trade unions will be able to organize their members. This seems to be less a
problem for the workers than it is for the trade unions’ organizations
themselves, who have had no experience in organizing strikes in the post-
war era.
It is more likely that business, in particular small business, will realize
that negotiations can be cheaper than disorganized labour relations.
Tensions within the ÖVP, tensions between the Economic Chamber and the
association for industry, tensions even within the latter, indicate that not all
business is willing to follow the aggressive neoliberal strategies of the FPÖ.
The latest privatizations, which mainly resulted in mergers with German
property (e.g. selling Austrian Banks and insurance companies to Germans),
have split business.
From other countries we know that the abandoning of social partnership
can be quite costly. The Agreement of Wassenaar in 1982 in the Netherlands
is only one example of both labour and business recognizing the need for
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negotiations and compromise. Newly emerging social partnership arrange-
ments in Ireland or in Denmark show that there is no clear trend towards
abandoning compromise solutions.
Austria, might once again be a laggard. The consensual climate was
certainly never as challenged in the postwar period as it is now, but there
might also be some new learning on the part of the actors. What one can
see from other countries is, however, that social partnership can change its
function. The Dutch example showed that social partners eased the way to
a more liberal road. The Austrian social partners might be forced to do the
same.
Note
1 For valuable references and assistance I would like to thank Wilfried Altzinger
Daniel Eckert, Georg Kovarik, Reinhard Pirker, Joseph Schmee, Berta
Schreckeneder and Franz Traxler along with the friendly staff of the
Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund (ÖGB) archives, Ms Scher and Mr
Novotny.
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5 Nordic corporatism and 
welfare state reforms
Denmark and Sweden compared
Sven Jochem
Introduction
This chapter compares welfare politics and policies in Denmark and
Sweden and attempts to provide an explanation for the diverging pathways
and fates of corporatism in these countries from the 1980s until the mid-
1990s. Why has it been possible to rebuild corporatist consensus in Denmark
(Due et al. 1994; Albæck et al. 1998), and why has it withered away in that
best-known example of Nordic corporatism, Sweden (Lewin 1994)? And
what have been the consequences for the development of both welfare
states?
The concept of corporatism has had a variety of different meanings.
Here is meant the concertation of economic and social policies amongst
interest associations and state actors. Three conditions for successful
concertation have been distinguished. First, interest organizations involved
should have some degree of representational monopoly, internal decision
making should be centralized or at least coordinated, and they should have
some disciplinary capacity in order to assure rank and file quiescence.
Second, state institutions should enhance and ensure the integration of the
interest organizations into the process of policy formation and imple-
mentation. Third, the strategies and actions of the collective actors should
be directed towards coordination. A social partnership ideology and/or
repeated experience of success with concertation by the actors involved is
conducive to such strategies. 
Theoretically, at least three possible causes of erosion or of challenges to
corporatism can be distinguished (Garrett 1995; Schwartz 1998; Wallerstein
and Golden 1997). First, globalization might undermine concertation in
two ways. On the one hand, deregulated capital markets and rising exports
and imports might diminish the capacity of governments to apply Keynesian
policies, which has been seen as one specific condition for viable concert-
ation. On the other hand globalization might change the strategies of the
employers in the export-oriented sectors. The transaction costs of investing
abroad have diminished and this could cause rising outflows of investment
capital. Additionally, employers regard themselves increasingly as global
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players, and therefore the national systems of interest mediation might no
longer be their main focus of interest. 
Second, it is argued that modernization and socio-economic change are
challenges to corporatism. A growing service sector and an expanding wel-
fare state has brought new actors to the stage: white collar unions and unions
which mainly operate in the public sector. These have undermined the
hegemony of the traditionally dominant blue collar unions. This relationship
between actors in the public and the private sector seems to have become a
source of conflict, which has not been confined to wage bargaining (Shalev
1992).
Third, changing power resources and relations might undermine corpor-
atism. Declining power of labour and – partly induced by globalization –
rising power of capital might be conducive to breaking up the corporatist
consensus and opening a struggle for a renegotiation of the institutional
framework. Globalization, modernization and changing power relations
pose challenges to the dominant institutions of the post-war era. Hence, a
capacity to adopt the institutional framework consensually may be an
important precondition for continued viable corporatism. 
Which of the hypotheses might explain the diverging pathways of
corporatism in the Nordic countries? Why has there been a corporatist
renaissance in Denmark and, why, by contrast, failed concertation in
Sweden? In order to answer these questions this chapter will proceed as
follows. In the next three sections the historical foundations and the main
characteristics of corporatism in Denmark and Sweden are presented and
an overview of the comparative performance of both countries is given.
The two subsequent sections examine the process of welfare state renego-
tiation in the 1980s. The last section concludes. 
My main argument is that successful concertation and adaptation in
Scandinavia rests not only on the different patterns of party competition,
but also and mainly on the crucially important behaviour of the employers’
associations. The Swedish Employers’ Association, the SAF vehemently
opposed concertation in the 1980s, whereas its Danish counterpart, the
DA, successfully changed its own organisation and tried to rebuild effective
cooperation between capital and labour. One reason for this divergent
development, it is argued, is related to the differences in funding between
these welfare states. As employers in Sweden bore most expenses of the
welfare state, whereas in Denmark this is done mainly by the employees,
the employers were less willing to compromise, and this undercut
concertation and cooperation in Sweden.
Historical roots of Nordic corporatism
The Nordic countries, and especially Sweden and Denmark, rank high on
several rank-orderings of corporatism (cf. the summarizing attempt of
Lijphart and Crepaz 1991). Furthermore, it has been stated that there is a
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specifically Nordic variant of corporatism. In contrast to, for example,
Switzerland (Armingeon, this volume), Nordic polities have a lack of
political institutions which contain majority rule. There is no federalism.
Central banks were – at least until the early 1980s – obliged to support the
economic polices of the various governments, and from the 1960s to the
1990s there have been no cross-class coalition governments in Denmark
and Sweden. In the absence of constraints on majority rule party competi-
tion prevails in the parliamentary arena (see the overview in Schmidt
1996). Hence, the broadly held view of the Scandinavian model is that it
expresses compromise politics ‘while at the same time the overall consti-
tutional frame is of the Westminster type’ (Lane and Ersson 1995: 255). 
The foundations of Nordic corporatism were laid at the end of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. On the labour market, powerful
organizations gained momentum and signed various accords regulating
national labour relations. Denmark paved the way in 1899, when the
labour market organizations signed the ‘Septemberforliget’ (September
Compromise). This was the first such agreement in the world. In this accord
the employers recognized the trade union confederation (DSF, later LO) as
an equal partner in wage bargaining. Both confederations agreed to follow
a consensual route in solving conflicts on the labour market. Although this
was at times not easy, especially when in the 1920s labour market conflicts
escalated (Elvander 1980: 68–71). Additionally, both peak confederations
committed themselves to ensuring that agreements concluded were observed
by their member constituencies. Thus, the compromise opened the road to
consensual relations between both confederations and it strengthened the
centralization of the trade unions and employers’ associations. In Sweden,
a similar development took place, but later. Only in 1938 could the treaty
of Saltsjöbaden finally be agreed upon, with similar contents and functions
as the September Compromise in Denmark. The lagging behind of Sweden
had to do with the disastrous consequences of the great labour market
conflict of 1909, which destroyed first attempts at consensual conflict
regulation (Schiller 1967).
It is important to note that the major driving force behind these agree-
ments in both countries were the employers’ organizations. They repeatedly
used multi-sectoral ‘offensive’ lockouts to force dissenting unions to follow
the guidelines of the central trade union associations, and they took harsh
action towards dissenting employers as well (Swenson 1992). Their main
aim was to minimize wage competition between the domestic sectors –
mainly the building industry – and the export-oriented sectors. This could
only be achieved by centralizing both interest organizations and minimizing
rank and file discontent. ‘In alliance with labour interests, employers forced
those reluctant unions to delegate authority upward to confederation
leaders, primarily over the initiation and financing of strikes’ (Swenson
1991: 517). At the same time they effectively centralized their own interest
organizations.
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This development was further strengthened by the political compro-
mises negotiated between social democratic and agrarian parties in the
1930s (Castles 1978; Katzenstein 1985). In Denmark, the Kanslergade
Agreement of 1933 initiated the position of the Social Democratic Party as
the ‘natural’ party of government. The Agrarian Party backed the Social
Democratic Party in its struggle against an employers’ lockout, which tried
to enforce a 20 per cent wage cut throughout the economy. The govern-
ment, however, launched a job creation programme, large-scale agricultural
subsidies and compensated the employers with a 10 per cent devaluation of
the Danish crown (Esping-Andersen 1985: 74–5). In Sweden the Social
Democrats became the major party in parliament after the 1932 elections
and they could also rely on the backing of the Agrarian Party, which joined
the government in 1936. As in Denmark, the red-green alliance in Sweden
was based on a compromise of agrarian subsidies, deficit-financed employ-
ment programmes, and a devaluation of the national currency (Notermans
1993: 154–5). In both countries, left-centre governments intervened
directly in the labour market to support the employers’ goal of centralised
labour relations and to prevent conflicts on the labour market. Additionally,
labour market parties were increasingly incorporated into the process of
policy formulation and implementation (Meijer 1967; Rothstein 1996).
Additionally, unemployment funds in both countries were and still are
managed by trade unions, which helps to explain their high density ratios
(Rothstein 1992).                                                                                       
After the Second World War the welfare state in Denmark and Sweden
expanded and the ‘Scandinavian model’ gradually emerged (Esping-
Andersen 1985; Milner 1996). The first steps towards universalism were
taken with the pension reforms of 1948 (Sweden) and 1956 (Denmark).
Universal coverage and flat-rate benefits without means-testing were the
cornerstones of these reforms. In 1959 Sweden added earnings-related
benefits to the universalistic model of social security. The ATP pension
plan, mainly designed by the LO, was the most controversial policy reform
until the introduction of the wage earner funds in 1983 (see below, p. 123).
Corporatist policy formulation crashed as the employers fiercely opposed
the principle of collectively controlled pension funds. However, with the
backing of a public referendum and because one Liberal Party member was
persuaded to abstain from the final vote on the bill, the reform was finally
ratified (Esping-Andersen 1985: 161–3). In the 1960s, the Danish LO
proposed the introduction of a Swedish-style public superannuation scheme.
However, it failed because the Danish Social Democrats lacked a political
majority and were internally divided on this issue. The government then
introduced generous tax provisions to encourage, in particular, salaried
employees to invest in private arrangements. Indeed, from a Nordic
perspective, the Danes actually spend most on private pensions (Kangas
and Palme 1989; Overbye 1996). But in all Nordic countries, even in
Denmark, this two-fold principle of social policy was extended to most
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other programmes such as sick pay, unemployment and accident insurance
(Esping-Andersen 1985: 164). Hence, the main pillars of the Nordic
welfare state – flat-rate security for all without means testing and on top of
that earnings-graduated benefits – were erected in the 1960s. 
Performance
In the 1970s, the ‘dream of never-ending prosperity’ ended nevertheless.
Danish and Swedish governments tried – as governments in other
countries did too – to bridge the crisis. However, at the beginning of the
1980s, governments in both countries decided to change their major
policies. What they decided to do, how they tried to realize their goals and
whether and how corporatist politics was able to adapt, is discussed on pp.
123–34. First an overview of the economic and political performance of
both countries is provided. 
The overall economic performance of both countries contains similar-
ities as well as differences (Table 5.1). First, in respect of economic growth,
both countries remain in the low-growth group of OECD countries, and
until the early 1990s both countries had to struggle with low growth rates.
However, in the 1990s, Denmark managed to improve its performance and
is now in the upper half of the OECD-countries, whereas Sweden still
suffers from low economic growth. In both countries, inflation was rather
high in the period from 1960 until the late 1980s. In Denmark, the shift
towards low inflation and – one should add – a hard-currency policy, was
successfully achieved in the 1990s. In contrast, inflation in Sweden remains
high, as significant wage increases fuel inflation despite high unemploy-
ment and the most severe economic crisis since the 1930s (for the reasons,
see below). As to investments, both countries perform poorly throughout
the whole period and Denmark especially  suffered from low domestic
investment in the 1990s: it recorded the lowest investment rate throughout
the OECD. But in contrast to Sweden, Denmark did not have to tackle
huge outflows of investment capital in the 1980s. The outflow of
investment capital from Sweden was only exceeded by the Netherlands.
Hence, taken as a whole, economic performance in both countries has not
been impressive. Until the late 1980s, both countries combined low
economic growth with comparatively high inflation and weak investment.
In the 1990s, Denmark managed to significantly improve its performance
on at least the first two indicators. 
As can be seen further from Table 5.2, government consumption is high
in both countries. In the early 1990s Sweden and Denmark had the highest
government final consumption in relation to economic output among the
OECD countries. On social security expenditures as a percentage of GDP
Sweden is only surpassed by Belgium and the Netherlands in the 1990s.
However, the trend in the Nordic countries had been upward in the
decades before. 
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As regards the funding of the welfare state both countries differ, especially
in the importance of employers’ contributions. In Denmark the financial
burden placed on the employers is rather light. It has been the lowest in
comparison to twenty-one OECD countries in the 1990s. In Sweden on the
other hand the employers’ share has increased significantly since the late
1970s and ranks in 1990 at the top of all OECD countries. In Denmark the
greatest share has to be borne by the employees or is funded by taxes. 
Performance on the labour market reveals a somewhat different picture.
In respect of unemployment, Sweden performed well until 1990, whereas
in Denmark unemployment had already begun to rise to a comparatively
high level in the 1970s. But if we take the development of employment into
consideration, the pictures changes. Here, Denmark’s performance is very
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Table 5.1 Economic performance in Denmark and Sweden (in percentages) 
Denmark Ranka Sweden Ranka
GDP–Growth
1960–1972 4.4 15 4.1 19
1973–1982 1.7 21 1.8 20
1983–1989 2.4 18 2.5 16
1990–1995 2.1 10 0.4 22
Inflation (cpi)
1960–1972 5.6 21 4.5 14
1973–1982 10.8 12 10.0 11
1983–1989 5.0 10 6.4 15
1990–1995 2.1 2 5.3 19
Domestic investments 
(as % of GDP)
1965–1972 24.6 16 24.4 17
1973–1982 21.0 20 20.4 21
1983–1989 18.7 20 19.0 19
1990–1994 15.6 23 16.7 20
Investment flows (as % 
of GDP)
Capital inflows
1982–1993 0.5 14 0.8 8
Capital outflows
1982–1993 0.9 8 2.7 19
Sources: OECD, Historical Statistics, various issues; IMF 1995; OECD 1995.
Notes
a Rank of the two countries in comparison to 20 to 23 OECD countries for which data is
available. Rank No. 1 is for highest GDP growth, lowest inflation rate, highest domestic
investment, highest investment capital inflows and lowest investment capital outflows.
good, and indeed, the high unemployment performance in Denmark was
not caused by sharply shrinking employment, but by an increase in the
labour supply in the 1970s and 1980s (Jochem 2000). In contrast,
employment in Sweden decreased dramatically in the early 1990s, and the
decline of employment was higher only in Finland. With these qualifica-
tions, Sweden performed better on the labour market until 1993.
Thereafter the situations reverse. Unemployment decreased sharply in
Denmark whereas in Sweden unemployment rates increased and seem to
persist, and even now, employment is increasing slightly in Denmark and
stagnating in Sweden. 
Public sector employment has been high in both countries as has been
spending on active labour market policies, but in Sweden, government
employment decreased in the early 1990s – as a consequence of the policies
implemented by the centre-right government – but remained fairly stable
in Denmark even under centre-right governments. Taken together, it seems
as if Denmark was able to accomplish a major transition on the labour
market whereas Sweden lost its nimbus as the main model for the social
democratic way to full employment. 
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Table 5.2 Public finances and the welfare state in Denmark and Sweden
Denmark Ranka Sweden Ranka
Government final 
consumption (% of GDP)
1960–1972 17.3 3 19.1 1
1973–1982 24.9 2 26.8 1
1983–1989 25.6 2 27.1 1
1990–1995 25.4 2 27.2 1
Social security spending 
(% of GDP)
1960–1972 9.3 9 9.8 8
1973–1982 14.7 9 16.3 7
1983–1989 16.9 7 18.5 5
1990–1995 20.2 7 22.9 3
Employers’ social security 
contributions (% of GDP)
1965 0.5 20 3.1 9
1970 0.4 20 4.7 8
1975 0.3 21 8.0 5
1980 0.3 21 13.5 1
1985 0.9 20 11.9 2
1990 0.3 21 14.5 1
Sources: OECD, Historical Statistics, various issues; OECD, Revenue Statistics, various issues.
Notes
a Rank of the two countries in comparison to 20 or 23 OECD countries for which data was
available. Rank No. 1 is for highest government final consumption, highest social security
transfers and highest share of employers’ social security contributions. 
Political relations and resources in the 1980s and 1990s
Finally, a short overview of the development of the distribution of political
power resources and external challenges will be given (cf. for details
Jochem 1998). As mentioned, conservative parties were in the position, for
the first time since the Second World War, to lead coalition governments in
both countries: between 1982 and 1993 in Denmark and between 1991 and
1994 in Sweden. However, the absolute decline of the social democratic
parties was only modest in the 1990s, and they were again able to increase
their share of the vote and form governments in Denmark after 1993 and
in Sweden after 1994. 
Trade union density ratios are exceptionally high in both countries. In
Denmark, the density ratio declined somewhat in the 1980s but remained
nevertheless at a high level. In Sweden, density ratios increased in the
1980s and even in the 1990s (SCB 1997: 335). Hence, the labour move-
ments in both countries have not experienced a significant decline of their
power resources. However, the labour movement has become more hetero-
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Table 5.3 Labour market performance in Denmark and Sweden 
Denmark Ranka Sweden Ranka
Unemployment 
rates
1960–1972 1.7 8 1.6 7
1973–1982 6.5 16 2.1 7
1983–1989 7.5 12 2.4 4
1990–1995 8.7 14 5.4 6
Employment rates 
1960–1972 72.5 3 72.4 4
1973–1982 73.2 4 77.5 1
1983–1989 75.9 4 79.9 1
1990–1995 74.9 4 75.4 3
Government employment/total 
employment)
1982–1995 30.4 2 32.1 1
Expenditure active labour 
market policies(/% of GDP)
1985–1995 1.5 2 2.3 1
Sources: OECD, Employment Outlook, various issues, OECD, Historical Statistics, various issues.
Notes
a Rank of the two countries in comparison to 20 or 23 OECD countries for which data was
available. Rank No. 1 is for lowest unemployment rates in commonly used definitions,
highest employment share in % of population between 15 and 64 years, highest share of
government employment in relation to total employment and highest spending for active
labour market policies in relation to GDP.
geneous. The main blue collar confederations have lost their monopoly in
the trade union movement (Lange et al. 1995), while white collar unions
and professional associations have gradually been able to increase their
share of organized labour since the 1970s. As a result, an internal shift of
resources in the labour movement has occurred in both countries. The
traditionally dominant blue collar unions had to tackle declining represent-
ation on the labour market. However, overall the labour movement still
commanded large power resources, despite increasing globalization. As
Swank (1998) shows, in all four Scandinavian countries the trend towards
globalization – measured by capital mobility and international financial
integration – increased in the 1980s and the Nordic countries in fact
followed the international trend. 
Changes in government marked the beginning of new political eras in
both countries. In Denmark, a conservative Prime Minister – the first since
1920 – was elected in 1982. In total, Poul Schlüter led five bourgeois
coalitions up to 1993, all of which, however, lacked a parliamentary majority.
Following this, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen formed – for the first time since the
early 1960s – a cross-class coalition covering the Social Democrats and
three centre parties. However, the Kristelig Folkeparti left the government
in 1994, as did the Centrum Democraterne in 1996. Since then, and after
the election in 1998, the Social Democrats govern together with the liberal
Radiakale Venstre without a parliamentary majority. In Sweden, the Social
Democrats were able to regain power in 1982 after six years of bourgeois
governance. Olof Palme – and after his assassination in 1986 Ingvar
Carlsson – governed until 1991, and the conservative Prime Minister Carl
Bildt led a coalition government until 1994, which was replaced by a Social
Democratic minority government, led by Ingvar Carlsson and after 1996 by
Göran Persson.
Nonetheless, both countries started from different points of departure
and policy inheritance was in reality quite different. In Denmark high and
persistent unemployment in combination with high inflation, high and
rising public debt and a serious deterioration in the balance of payments in
the 1970s created a sense of crisis. The attempts of the various Social
Democratic governments to strengthen policy coordination failed and wage
growth accelerated by up to 20 per cent per annum. As a consequence and
in order to regain competitiveness for the Danish export industry, Danish
governments resorted to a series of devaluations. Between 1976 and 1979,
the Danish currency was depreciated in total by around 26 per cent in
relation to the German mark (Nannestad 1998). Hence, the centre-right
government which came into power in 1982 announced its intention to
break up the vicious cycle of economic failures. However, Prime Minister
Schlüter did not try to achieve the major goals ‘tutto et subito’ but he adopted
the catch phrase of ‘the long, thorough haul’ (cited by Nannestad 1998). 
In Sweden, the centre-right coalitions of the 1970s and early 1980s did
not even try to retrench the welfare state or implement major deviations
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from the Social Democratic policy inheritance. Quite the opposite, welfare
policies followed the Social Democratic mould: to manage the economic
crisis of the late 1970s, the centre-right governments implemented
counter-cyclical fiscal policies, increased active labour market policies,
depreciated the Swedish currency several times, and did nothing to cut
back public employment or social spending. The result was low unemploy-
ment but high inflation and rise in public debt, as the governments refused
to increase taxes in order to finance the rising public spending (Esping-
Andersen 1985; Scharpf 1991; Milner 1989). 
Swedish corporatism in crisis
Wage bargaining
The incoming Swedish government in 1982 launched a policy of the ‘third
way’ (Feldt 1991; Pontusson 1992b) which stood between the reflationary
experiences of France in the early 1980s and the deflationary strategy in
Great Britain at the same time. This policy of the ‘third way’ was introduced
with a major devaluation in 1982. This measure was intended to improve
the profitability of the export industry which in turn was dependent on
continual wage moderation.
However, already by 1980 the fragility of the hitherto consensual wage
bargaining system was demonstrated, as a great labour market conflict
paralysed the economy. The competition between public and private sector
unions undermined the role of LO and SAF as pace setters in the wage
bargaining process (Elvander 1988: 50–4). To assure labour quiescence, the
Social Democratic government implemented wage earner funds – despite
opposition within the party – with the backing of the Left Party (Pontusson
1992a: 186–219). These funds initiated the collapse of corporatist policy
making – for the first time since the pension reform of 1959 (Fulcher 1991:
281). SAF opposed the wage earner funds, seeing them as the first step
towards socialization of the private economy (De Geer 1992: 174). The
increasing tensions culminated in the break-down of centralized wage
bargaining in 1983. For the first time since 1956, no central wage
agreement could be reached. Actors in the manufacturing industry accepted
moderate wage growth, but this was undermined by high wage increases in
the public sector. In 1985, the government cut back its efforts to coordinate
wage bargaining, as the so-called ‘Rosenbad Agreements’ had proven to be
ineffective in curbing wage growth. 
As can be seen from Figure 5.1, annual wage growth accelerated after
1985, and in the late 1980s wages rose by more than 10 per cent per
annum. Indeed, the gains from the devaluation in 1982 melted away, and
the LO clamoured for a further depreciation of the national currency in the
late 1980s, but in contrast to 1982, the government refused to correct
excessive wage growth this way (Mjøset 1996: 23). In globalized financial
markets the leeway for using the national currency as a policy instrument
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has been reduced, and hence, large wage increases of the 1980s were one
major cause of the sharp decline of employment in the early 1990s (Jochem
2000).
Partly as a consequence of this, Swedish employers vehemently opposed
centralized wage bargaining in the late 1980s. In 1990, SAF shut down its
bargaining and statistics unit, which made it impossible to coordinate wage
bargaining on the employers’ side, and withdrew its representatives from
the corporatist bodies of policy formulation and implementation (Iversen
1996a: 422; Pontusson and Swenson 1996: 229). Rothstein (1994), however,
was rather optimistic that this step would not have been the final death
blow to corporatism in Sweden, as representatives of the employers were
still engaged in corporatist bodies, albeit not as representatives of the SAF.
In fact, in 1997, an attempt to minimize labour market conflicts was made
(EIRO Observer 2/1997: 8), but wages are still highly volatile. Annual wage
growth in the mid-1990s was high from a comparative point of view and
wage drift remained a major problem (SAF 1997a: 29–37; OECD 1996:
35). This, despite the most serious economic crisis and the highest unemploy-
ment records since the 1930s, and in spite of a pronounced decentraliz-
ation of wage bargaining (Figure 5.1)
As a result, the powerful SAF (van Waarden 1995) managed successfully to




































Figure 5.1 Wage growth and centralization of the wage bargaining system in
Sweden, 1984–93.
Sources: Iversen 1996b; SAF 1996, own calculations.
Note: The degree of wage bargaining centralization is adapted from Iversen (1996b), who
provides data only until 1993.
ation. It has been trying further to achieve its goal of a radically de-
institutionalized labour market (SAF 1997b), which in turn provoked fierce
opposition from the labour movement. At the time of writing, only a few
attempts to reach a new modus vivendi between labour and capital can be
discerned (Wallerstein and Golden 1997; Iversen 1996a). On the labour
market, SAF could successfully dismantle corporatist consensus. 
Welfare state reform
Social policies in the 1980s followed the main trajectories of the Swedish
welfare state but welfare spending was consolidated at a high level. Public
employment stagnated until 1990, and social spending increased only
slightly (Table 5.2). There was an agreement between the Social Democratic
government and the LO that the welfare state had reached its limits in the
1980s and that no further expansion would be aimed at (Stephens 1996:
44). However, in the light of the economic crisis that followed, things
changed dramatically. In the first half of the 1990s many reforms were
implemented. 
Table 5.4 lists the most important social policy changes in Sweden
between 1982 and 1997. Most changes occurred in the early 1990s in
connection with the currency crisis. The centre-right government and the
Social Democratic opposition agreed on several crisis packages in order to
relax tensions on the capital markets. The overall direction was to cut
benefits, introduce waiting days – as in the field of sickness and unemploy-
ment insurance – and to increase the share of employees in the funding of
welfare state programmes. Both centre-right and Social Democratic
governments cut social spending in most branches. However, after 1994 the
Social Democrats increased spending on higher education – partly in order
to take the pressure off the labour market – and they extended unemploy-
ment benefits despite criticism by the employers and the opposition. The
overall amount of welfare state reforms is quite impressive. Lindbeck states
that the ‘Swedish Model has been in a state of great flux during the last
decade’. He reports that over 300 rules of the social insurance system were
changed between 1991 and 1996 (Lindbeck 1997: 1314). Can we conclude
from this that the Swedish welfare state showed a high capacity to adapt,
and have these reforms been made through concertation? As I will argue
below, the many reforms of the Swedish welfare state have been the product
of stop-and-go policies, and of increased party competition without effec-
tive corporatism.
The pension reform was the most impressive change in the Swedish
welfare state initiated in the 1990s. The Social Democratic government had
already appointed an Official Commission to investigate possible policy
reforms in 1984. The final report was published in 1990 and identified
various problems, for example the weak link between contributions and
benefits which undermined popular acceptance. However, it could not
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Table 5.4 Major welfare state reforms in Sweden
Year Reform
Pensions 1991 Abolishment of early retirement for labour
market reasons by Social Democrats
1992 Reduction of base amount and as a
consequence reduced pension transfers
1993 Reduction of employers’ contribution by 4.5
percentage points
1994–1999 Major pension reform of supplementary old-
age pension (ATP), many new dimensions (cf.
text below)
Unemployment 1991–1994 Reduction of unemployment benefits (from
90% to finally 75%), introduction of five
waiting days by centre-right government
1994 The centre-right government introduced
obligatory unemployment insurance which was
to be administered by the state and not by the
trade unions – the Social Democratic
Government reversed this reform the same
year
1994 Employees have to contribute to the financing
of unemployment insurance
1995 Changed funding of unemployment funds, the
state covers nearly 100% of total costs
1997 General and unified unemployment insurance
(enhanced integration for those who are not
members of the unemployment insurance
funds); trade unions still administer the
unemployment insurance funds; upgrading of
unemployment benefits to 80%
Sickness/health 1990 Reduction of sickness benefits by Social
care Democratic government
1992 Introduction of one waiting day and significant
reduction of transfers (throughout the 1990s);
the employers have to bear the costs of the first
fourteen days of sickness which is compensated
for by a significant reduction in employers’
social contributions
1993 Employees have to contribute to the financing
of the National Health Service (expanded in
1996 and 1997)
1993 Introduction of family doctors
1997 The employers have to cover the costs of the
first four weeks of sickness, only partial
compensation by reduced contributions
present any concrete policy proposals. The Bildt government set up a new
committee in 1991, made up only of representatives from parties in
parliament. Labour market organizations were explicitly excluded from the
negotiations (Andersen 1998: 19). The major economic crisis forced the
Social Democratic opposition – despite internal pressures to defect from
the committee – to participate and finally to support the reform. This
introduced four major changes. First, ATP benefits would be based on
lifetime earnings instead of the best fifteen years. Second, pension con-
tributions would be split evenly between employers and employees, Third,
benefits were to be linked to economic growth instead of inflation. Fourth,
pension rights would be shared by spouses and pension points could be
earned for military service, care of small children and higher education.
The reform was approved by the Riksdag in 1994 but implementation was
delayed until 1999. The trade unions opposed the reform, mainly because
of the principle of life-time earnings, which, as was argued, discriminated
against women who took time off to care for children and against white
collar workers with longer education periods. Employers were more or less
satisfied, but demanded that employees should contribute more to their
pensions and complained that the reform might fuel wage growth, as the
reform proposal stated that employees should be compensated for their
contributions by increased wages. As the pension contributions should be in
total 18.5 per cent, the employers would be expected to raise wages by 9
per cent, which was forcefully opposed by the SAF (Anderson 1998; Gould
1997; Stephens 1997; Swank 1998). Taken together, the Swedish pension
reform was a departure from the Swedish Model. Party competition and
fragile cross-class alliances, not corporatism, enabled such a reform. The
window for reform was opened up by the economic crisis, and by the
strategy of the Social Democratic Party, which backed the reform in the face
of criticism from the trade unions. Hence, politics was rooted in party
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Table 5.4 (continued )
Year Reform
Education early 1990s The Social Democratic as well as the centre-
right governments extended the leeway for
private schools
early 1990s The centre-right government reduced the
efforts for adult education, existing schemes
to be targeted to the labour market
1994 The Social Democratic government introduced
a significant extension of higher education,
huge increase of transfers to universities after
1994
Sources: Edelbalk et al. 1998; NOSOSCO, various issues; Ploug and Kvist 1996; Schludi
1997; SOU 2000.
competition and could prove to be rather volatile – as can also be seen
from the reforms of unemployment insurance.
Until the recession in the early 1990s unemployment insurance had not
been a target for reform. Unemployment was quite low and the unemploy-
ment funds – administered by the trade unions – were financially sound.
However, with the rise in unemployment the financial situation of the funds
deteriorated. The bourgeois government reacted with benefits cuts, the
introduction of waiting days and delayed adjustments of benefits. Against
the opposition of the trade unions, the centre-right government relied on
the backing of the Social Democratic party to cut benefits. However, the
Bildt government also wanted to diminish union power and therefore tried
to end union monopoly over unemployment insurance funds. A com-
mission – without the participation of interest groups – prepared the
dismantling of this major pillar of trade union strength in Sweden. With
some modifications parliament passed the reform bill in 1994 with the
support of the populist New Democracy. Trade unions and the Social
Democratic Party forcefully opposed the reform and SAP promised to
reverse this legislation if returned to office, which it actually did in 1994,
immediately after the change in government. Concurrent with the reform
bill in 1994, the centre-right government restricted the possibility of re-
qualification for benefits through participation in active labour market
schemes. In collaboration with the Left Party the new Social Democratic
government returned to the ‘old system’ even in this perspective – true to
the ‘never-ending carousel’.
Despite all this, a reform of unemployment insurance was still on the
political agenda. In 1995 coordination between the government and the
Left Party broke down in a dispute over restrictions of benefits for young
people. Subsequently the Social Democratic government collaborated with
the Centre Party, the first cross-class collaboration since the 1970s. This
created room for further reforms. In 1995, the labour market fund was
abolished, unemployment benefits are now nearly totally financed out of
tax revenues, and the SAP has declared that unemployment insurance
should be a ‘temporary adjustment insurance’, i.e. benefits should not be
paid indefinitely. SAP formed an Official Commission of Inquiry – the
ABROM commission, which was in fact a one-person operation, headed by
Birgitta Isaksson-Perez – which was to evaluate options for reform. In
October 1996 the report was published. LO opposed the limitation of
benefits to 600 days, and TCO opposed stricter qualifying rules and
restricted benefits for university students. Consequently, the government
created a new commission, now with both LO and Centre Party represent-
atives – but without those of TCO or SACO, the white collar unions. This
new commission came up with a half-hearted compromise: benefits were to
be upgraded to 80 per cent of qualifying income and the time limit would
in principle remain, but would not be implemented until another com-
mission worked out specific proposals. This could first occur after the year
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2000. Thus, cooperation between SAP and LO was far from being intact, as
LO was able to block a major policy reform successfully and SAP only
agreed to postpone the reform, hoping that an improvement in the labour
market might reduce the saliency of that issue (Anderson 1998).
Taken together, the re-regulation of the unemployment and pension
insurance systems have both been major issues in the 1990s. Several
changes have occurred, but as exemplified in 1994, party competition is
the major determinant of policy formulation and implementation. Interest
organisations are in most cases excluded from policy communities, and if
this is not the case, the governments are very selective about who gets
access to the process of policy formulation. The centre-right governments
relied mainly on the employers, the Social Democratic government mainly
on the LO. Hence policy reform is a matter of power mobilisation within
the various political camps. There have been only a few attempts to
include interest organizations from both labour and capital. Given the
Westminster type of the Swedish state, party competition is the major
game in town and the outcome may be volatile policies. On the labour
market, interest organizations from capital as well as labour could not
successfully rebuild a peaceful modus vivendi. The employers still oppose
coordinated wage bargaining and the funding system of the Swedish
welfare state. Hence the welfare state itself has become a major cause of
declining concertation, and SAF is a driving force in attempts to retrench
the Swedish welfare state.
Danish corporatism – from crisis to success
Denmark entered the 1980s with huge problems: unemployment was
over 10 per cent, public debt had soared and the current account of
balance of payments was in the red. To counter these, the incoming
centre-right government announced major policy changes. In the first
place the government pegged the Danish crown to the German mark and
announced that the government would not implement further devalu-
ations in order to correct for wage increases. Second, in order to contain
inflation, the government first suspended and then abolished automatic
cost of living adjustments for wages and for some social security transfers
in 1986 (Table 5.5, below). In doing this, the government followed the
Danish employers’ federation’s (DA) line, drawing harsh criticism from
the trade unions. Third, to contain public debt, the government launched
several initiatives to cut public spending. However, in this case, only
modest reductions were achieved and after 1986 public spending
increased again slightly. Fourth, the government began to deregulate the
Danish capital market. As a member state of the EU, several steps had
already been undertaken in the 1970s, but in the 1980s it became a major
goal of the government to actively abolish restrictions on the capital
market (Mjøset 1996). 
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Wage bargaining and incomes policy
By far the most controversial issue was incomes policy. The suspension of
the indexing clauses and the overall uncertainty about the future of the
Danish welfare state instigated the trade unions to protest against the
centre-right government. Several strikes were organized by private and
public sector unions. In 1985 the most comprehensive strike since the
Second World War blocked the whole economy. The LO tried to reach a
central agreement which the DA rejected. Eventually the government
intervened and imposed minor wage increases by law on the whole
economy until 1987. As a supplementary bonus the working week was
reduced to 39 hours. Trade unions reacted again with fierce strikes as they
now saw their bargaining autonomy challenged. However, this could not
prevent state intervention and in the end the trade unions stepped back.
This conflict can be considered a watershed in the history of the Danish
labour market. In the second half of the 1980s the wage bargaining system
was gradually decentralized and, thus, the DA could finally reach its goal.
As can be seen from Figure 5.2, wages declined significantly after 1986 and
the wage bargaining system was decentralized step by step.
The interventionist incomes policy coincided with a downturn in the






























Figure 5.2 Wage growth and centralization of the wage bargaining system in
Denmark, 1984–93.
Sources: Iversen 1996b; SAF 1996, own calculations.
Note: The degree of wage bargaining centralization is adapted from Iversen (1996b), who
provides data only until 1993.
away and the government reacted with contractive measures, the so-called
‘potato-cure’ (Nannestad 1998). The government introduced green taxes,
reduced the lending leeway for private banks, and implemented a
comprehensive personal income tax reform which was passed with the
consent of the Social Democrats in 1987. In this reform package the
government reduced marginal tax rates, broadened the tax base and
reduced the tax-deductibility of interest on private loans and mortgages.
The last measure caused severe problems on the housing market, as the
owners of new buildings were confronted with higher interest payments.
However, the government was able to stop the ‘financial bonanza’ (Mjøset
1996: 21) – caused by the deregulation of the Danish capital market and
the upswing in the international economy in the early 1980s – at an early
stage. Hence the Danish government successfully changed the fundamental
policy targets early in the 1980s. A hard-currency policy, a low inflation
policy and a tight fiscal policy were the corner-stones of a so-called ‘norm
based’ economic policy in Denmark. 
Despite the upsurge in conflicts in 1985, the politics of compromise
came to be rebuilt and – perhaps surprisingly – the employers took the first
step. The Danish employers interpreted wage drift as the main problem in
wage bargaining. In order to minimize such wage drift the employers in the
metal industry supported more internal coordination in their camp. After a
power struggle the Metal Industry Employers and the Industrial Trades
Association merged and formed the Industrial Employers (IA). This new
association represented nearly 50 per cent of the wage sum of DA’s member
organizations, which caused a ‘major shift in the balance of power in DA’
(Due et al. 1994: 204). The organizational system was further centralized
when in 1991 the IA merged with the Industrirådet, which represented the
economic interests of Danish employers. This centralization of the
associational system of employers in the early 1990s went hand in hand
with an increase in the density ratio of employers (Jochem 1998). Indeed,
the Danish employers followed a strategy of ‘Centralized Decentralization’
(Due et al. 1994) or ‘Organized Decentralization’ (Traxler 1995; Schmitter
and Grote, this volume). A decentralization of the wage bargaining system
was combined with internal centralization, which enhanced the capacity of
employers to bind their member-associations and member-firms to
agreements. This desire was the driving force behind centralization; as one
actor stated: ‘The parties [on the labour market] must not only be capable
of concluding collective agreements; they must also be capable of ensuring
that the agreements are duly observed’ (cited in Due et al. 1994: 210). 
With some delay the trade unions reacted in a similar vein. In the late
1980s and early 1990s a major restructuring occurred in the trade union
movement. The unions in the export-oriented sector took the first steps.
Several unions amalgamated and the bargaining units were reorganized.
Bargaining was henceforth divided over several cartels. This enabled
viable coordination despite an official decentralization of wage bargaining
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(Due et al. 1994: 211–21). Thus the strategies of employers and trade
unions helped to minimize wage drift and paved the way for moderate
wage increases (OECD 1997a: 25).
Welfare state reforms
The centre-right government avoided open conflicts after 1985. Instead, it
launched several programmes to re-strengthen consensus on the labour
market (Amin and Thomas 1996). Furthermore it implemented a major
reform of the public sector (Mjøset 1996: 21) and expanded public spend-
ing moderately after 1986. Only minor cut-backs in social programmes were
made beyond the changed indexations (Table 5.5, below). The most drastic
change, the abolition of the automatic cost-of-living adjustments, already
occurred in the early 1980s. In later years the government followed again an
expansionary policy. It extended early retirement schemes in the late 1980s
to dampen the pressure on the labour market. And it began to invest more
in education and training, which further reduced labour supply. 
In the late 1980s the Social Democratic opposition set up several
commissions with participants from both capital and labour (Amin and
Thomas 1996). Their main goal was to find ways to strengthen Danish
industry and to enhance investment. Hence, when the Social Democratic
Party regained power after 1993 in coalition with othere centre parties, the
new government could build on wide experiences in trying to combine
divergent goals and strategies of trade unions and employers’ organizations.
One of the first measures was an encompassing labour market reform in
1994 (Lind 1994; Loftager and Madsen 1997). This covered four aspects:
First, employees and – with a minor share – employers had henceforth to
contribute to funding labour market policies. Second, active labour market
schemes were expanded and mainly targeted at long-term unemployed.
Third, the benefit period was initially limited to seven and after 1996 to
five years (OECD 1997b: 31). It was divided into a so-called ‘benefit period’
– originally the first two years, which was stepwise reduced in the next years
– and an ‘activation period’, in which the unemployed had the right to get
and the obligation to take further training and education. Fourth, the
reform introduced three paid leave schemes, which were extensively used
after 1994: child care leave, educational leave and sabbatical leave. Danish
women lengthened their maternity leave with child care leave, and,
consequently, many women left the labour market after 1994. From 1996
on, the government reduced financial transfers from 80 per cent to 60 per
cent of unemployment benefits, partly as a consequence of the success of
the paid leave schemes. Hence, until the end of the 1990s, participation in
these schemes declined gradually (OECD 1999: 29). Overall, the labour
market reform was a major reform project, coming out of the work of the
‘welfare commissions’ in 1993 and 1995, which reached a broad consensus
to – as it is called – ‘activate’ social policy.
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Table 5.5 Major welfare state reforms in Denmark
Year Reform
Pensions 1984 Expansion of early retirement schemes
1984 Introduction of means testing in pension
schemes for those aged between 67 and 70
1986 Further expansion of early retirement scheme
(part-time retirement)
1988 Regulation of transfers in accordance with wage
developments for workers
1994 Old age-pension became dependent on other
income (introduction of means-testing for all
pensioners)
Unemployment 1982–1986 Adjustment of transfers to cost of living
developments suspended and finally abolished 
1988 Regulation of transfers in accordance with wage
developments for workers
1989/1993 Employers have to bear the costs for the first
day/the first two days of unemployment
1993 Encompassing labour market reform and
introduction of three leave schemes (cf.
detailed description in the text)
Sickness/health 1982–1986 Adjustment of transfers to cost of living
care developments suspended and finally abolished 
1988 Regulation of transfers in accordance with wage
developments for workers
1990 Employers have to finance first two weeks of
illness alone, reduction of benefit period,
expansion of rehabilitation measures
Education 1989 Upgrading of adult education and training,
extension of grants to compensate for earnings
losses 
1993 ‘Education for all’ – strategy introduced which
focuses mainly on vocational training for the
youth
1994 Enhanced expansion of universities and further
upgrading of student grant system
1996 Compulsory education for unemployed youths
without vocational education
Sources: Albæck et al. (1998); Andersen (2000); NOSOSCO (various issues); Ploug and
Kvist (1996). 
A second pillar of this activation policy was an extension of educational
opportunities. First steps had already been undertaken in 1989, when the
centre-right government expanded adult education and training. However,
after 1993, the ‘education for all’ strategy (Uddannelse Til Alle) was
launched. Vocational training was expanded and in 1994 so was university
education. The centre-left government increased direct transfers towards
the universities and upgraded the grant system. Denmark now has one of
the most extensive grant systems in the OECD area, in which roughly 70
per cent of all students receive government loans (OECD 1997a: 88). As a
consequence, between 1985 and 1995, the number of students enrolled
increased by 79 per cent. These measures reduced the pressure on the
labour market via an impressive reduction in the labour supply. In
addition, the agreement of the social partners on such an active strategy
might in the long run help to increase labour market chances for the
participants. Indeed, Denmark has – in a comparative perspective – gone a
long way on the ‘social investment strategy’ road (Esping-Andersen 1996:
14). 
Taken together, the Danish reforms represent a clear case of consensual
adaptation of institutions and policies. Changes on the labour market have
been quite impressive. Decentralization of wage bargaining was coupled
with increasing coordination within the capital and labour camps, which
diminished wage competition. After 1993, major labour market reforms
successfully reduced unemployment – to a great extent by a reduction of
the labour force supply. However, the welfare state remained relatively
unchanged. Neither the centre-right nor the centre-left government
introduced major cutbacks of welfare state programmes. On the contrary,
after 1985 programmes were even expanded. And as Scharpf (1996: 135)
points out, in contrast to other Continental European countries, Denmark
has not had a Standortdebatte. How can this be explained? Why has there
been no major welfare state retrenchment in Denmark? 
One reason could be that party competition in Denmark did not exclude
cross-class coalitions, which may have induced rather consensual reforms
(cf. Green-Pedersen 1999). Further, employers in Denmark bear only a
minor share of welfare state funding and so their willingness to cooperate
in welfare state reforms may have been higher than in Sweden. In other
words, unlike in Sweden, employers did not see the Danish welfare state
and its funding system as obstacles to minimizing wage growth or to a
reorganization of the wage bargaining process. That might explain why the
welfare state did not become a target for retrenchment in Denmark. 
Conclusion
What happened to Nordic corporatism and welfare state programmes in
the 1980s and 1990s? Denmark and Sweden followed different paths. In
Sweden, policy concertation between capital, labour, and the state decreased,
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whereas Denmark experienced a corporatist renaissance. Apart from the
fact that cross-class alliances in Denmark were promoted through minority
coalitions in the 1980s, which had to rely on collaboration with the major
opposition party (the Social Democratic Party), the difference between both
countries may be further explained by the different strategies of the
employers’ associations. Danish employers reorganised their associations
and were able to increase internal coordination, which might well be a
decisive precondition for cross-class concertation. By contrast, Swedish
employers not only dismantled corporatist institutions, but also suffered
from declining internal cohesion. This manifested itself in 1990 as the SAF
closed down the wage bargaining unit and moved towards becoming a
powerful pressure group, which no longer saw itself as an organization for
disciplining employers. Hence, seen over a longer period of time, the
employers’ strategies have been decisive both in the early and in the late
twentieth century.
The origins as well as the adaptations of concertation in both countries
were initiated by reforms of the labour market. In Denmark the centre-
right government successfully changed economic policy after 1982. It was
able to modify some of the fundamentals and sources of conflict in the
Danish welfare state, such as the cost of living adjustments for wages and
social transfers. This policy was strongly opposed by labour, and, hence,
these reforms were carried through only after major social conflicts. After
1985 no further social policy retrenchment occurred and the centre-right
government actively tried to re-affirm cross-class collaboration. In
accordance with the employers’ strategies several proposals and reform
projects were prepared. These changed relations allowed the subsequent
Social Democratic government to introduce and expand a social policy of
labour market ‘activation’. The labour market reform of 1994 and the
growth of education are the most prominent examples of this strategy. 
Thus, the Danish case has indeed been like a ‘bumblebee’: The ‘Danish
welfare state is a theoretical impossibility that nevertheless does fly’ (Albæck
et al. 1998: 1). Despite the international trend of welfare state retrench-
ment, the Danish welfare state has changed only little and is still rather
comprehensive – and expensive. Actually, the reforms of the 1990s have
even expanded welfare state programmes. As argued in this contribution,
the system of welfare state funding may have been of crucial importance. In
Denmark employers bear only a moderate share of the costs of welfare state
programmes – quite unlike Swedish employers, who from a comparative
point of view bear the highest share. Hence, Danish employers opposed
not so much the welfare state as they did the wage bargaining system,
because of its inflationary performance. After the change to the founda-
tions of the wage bargaining system the employers mounted no major
opposition to welfare state programmes. However, discontent might come
from the electorate and from the increasingly influential right-wing
populist parties which attack the huge tax burden of Danish citizens. 
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In Sweden the reverse happened. The employers’ social contributions
and wage bargaining were major issues throughout the 1980s. Swedish
employers not only wanted to deregulate the wage bargaining system –
here they were successful – but also to retrench welfare state programmes,
in order to minimize unit labour costs. The more so as the Social Demo-
cratic governments did not accept a change in the funding system in the
1980s – the employers’ share increased even. This different funding system
thus became a major source of opposition for Swedish employers.
In contrast to Denmark, in Sweden, major aspects of the welfare state
changed after 1992, but cross-class collaboration has come to an all-time
low. The reforms have not been subject to corporatist concertation. On the
contrary, Swedish social policy has been determined largely by conflicting
party competition. Given the frequent changes in government composition
this has made for high volatility in social policy. The pension reform of
1994 might have been an exception but, as argued, even this reform was
the outcome of party competition. It could only be carried through because
of the major economic crisis in the early 1990s, which – for a short period
of time – enabled cross-class cooperation between the Social Democratic
and the Conservative Party. Interest organizations were not integrated in
policy formulation. 
What have been the causes for the shifting strategies of employers, and
which one of the three possible explanations mentioned in the introduction
might explain the developments in both countries? Globalization may have
had some impact. The deregulation of the capital markets, a new hard-
currency policy, increasing competition on world markets, and changing
management philosophies may have induced employers to change their
strategies. Given that large, export-oriented firms dominate the Swedish
economy, this had a greater impact in Sweden than in Denmark, where
small firms shape the industrial structure. However, as currency deval-
uations were no longer options for enhancing cost-competitiveness of
export industries, employers in both countries tried to reduce the growth of
unit labour costs. In Sweden this meant both wages and social security
contributions, in Denmark, however, it meant only wages. Hence, Danish
employers did not challenge the welfare state as much in order to adapt to
the new incentives arising from increased globalization, whereas in Sweden
employers challenged both centralized wage bargaining and the welfare
state programmes. Because the Social Democratic governments of the
1980s refused to take action on these issues, corporatist concertation was
undermined. 
Globalization as a common trend for both countries was mediated by
changing actor constellations and by the forms of party competition (Green-
Pedersen 1999). The cleavage between public and private sector actors in
Denmark was blocked by government interventions already in the early
1980s, whereas in Sweden this cleavage was a source of conflicts throughout
the 1980s and 1990s. Additionally, the forms of party competition help to
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explain the divergent adaptations. While the bourgeois government in
Denmark – because of its minority status – had to rely on collaboration with
the Social Democratic Party, Swedish politics was shaped until the end of
the 1990s by intense conflicts between the two political camps. Hence,
taken together, the common challenges of globalization were differently
tackled in Denmark and Sweden. Because of governmental interventions,
cross-class party collaboration and the specific nature of funding the
Danish welfare state, actors could more easily adapt and renegotiate the
pillars of corporatism. It was a success story, which was much more difficult
to imitate for Swedish actors. In fact, from the perspective of corporatist
politics, Sweden seems to have moved towards politics and policies more
common in countries belonging to the Westminster model, albeit with a
still powerful labour movement. 
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6 Welfare state adjustment 
between consensual and 
adversarial politics
The institutional context of 
reform in Germany
Gerhard Lehmbruch
The trajectory of German welfare state reform looks paradoxical. When
Helmut Kohl came to power in 1982, the programme of the conservative-
liberal coalition led by him ostensibly emulated the neo-conservative
agenda of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. But – notwithstanding
initial successes in consolidating public finance – the U-turn (Wende)
proclaimed by the new majority did not really happen. Some minor
deregulation of the labour market took place, the monopoly of the public
service radio was abolished, and some steps toward privatization and
deregulation of the public telecommunications monopoly were taken.
Later, the process of Europeanization triggered more far-reaching
deregulation and privatization of public services, which was largely decided
with opposition support. But the core of the welfare state was left intact.
Restrictions in social security benefits had already been initiated during the
years since 1975, under the social-liberal government of Helmut Schmidt,
and neither these nor further cuts after 1982 amounted to dismantling the
traditional German Sozialstaat. The reform of the old age pensions law,
passed in 1989 with the support of the social-democratic opposition, did
not fundamentally affect the basic elements of the system. Still more, the
launch in 1993 of nursing care insurance, pushed through after difficult
bargaining processes with the opposition and considered as one of the
major achievements in social policy in the early 1990s, was clearly indebted
to the tradition of the Bismarckian welfare state. And warnings that it
would eventually run funding risks comparable to those that might be
faced by the old age pensions system were disregarded by most political
actors.
The mood, however, changed at the end of the 1980s, and controversies
about an institutional crisis of the German welfare state became
conspicuous around 1990. But this incipient discussion was for some time
eclipsed by the unexpected and dramatic process of German unification. It
was not until the mid-1990s that core institutions of the German welfare
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state such as the institutional framework of the labour market and the
systems of social security were widely regarded as being in jeopardy, and
the complex system of public finance also became a critical issue. On 26
April 1997, seizing a rather odd opportunity, the inauguration of a new
luxury hotel in Berlin (the Adlon), Federal President Roman Herzog in a
carefully staged speech deplored ‘the loss of economic dynamics, the
inflexibility of society, an incredible mental depression’, and pathetically
called for a reform effort to overcome the ‘congestion of modernization’
(Modernisierungsstau).1 This eloquent compilation of well-known topics of
the new crisis rhetoric met an amazing resonance in public opinion. And a
particularly significant aspect of this rhetoric was that Germany now
appeared as a reform laggard compared to other, more advanced OECD
countries.
To be sure, the controversies of the 1990s about a crisis of the German
welfare state came not out of the blue. Since the second half of the 1970s,
after the breakdown of the ‘Keynesian consensus’, the West German welfare
state was viewed with a critical eye by the proponents of supply-side
oriented policy change. But although the Kohl government itself defined
its mission in similar terms, this debate did not result in radically
transforming the political agenda. The conviction that the ‘German model’
(Markovits 1982) had successfully mastered the crises of the 1970s was still
widely shared. Modell Deutschland was originally an electoral slogan
invented under the chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt and claiming that
Germany was distinguished by its exemplary economic and social achieve-
ments. And even after Schmidt’s fall this confidence remained fairly robust.
Most political actors apparently still considered the welfare state as solidly
entrenched and were reluctant to seriously discuss the new challenges.
Admittedly, such confidence was somewhat shaken by the substantial rise of
the unemployment rate, from about 4 per cent in 1980, to about 7 to 9 per
cent in the period 1985 to 1990. But this increase was not perceived as a
serious political threat since structural unemployment hit peripheral
groups in society rather than the traditional qualified core of the workforce.
Moreover, the ‘social net’ appeared solid enough to cushion such job losses.
Since 1982 the Kohl government had been quite successful in consolidating
public finance and reducing the public debt, and at the end of the decade
the social security systems were in relatively good shape. Hence the chances
of the ‘old’ Federal Republic coping with the much discussed challenges of
globalization seemed quite propitious (Czada 1998). How do we then
explain the stereotype of institutional deadlock and crisis becoming so
popular in the 1990s? Quite obviously the exogenous pressures which
confronted the political economy of ‘old’ Federal Republic were magnified
by the unexpected shock of German unification. This was a challenge
which finally overtaxed the adaptive capacity of the traditional ‘German
model’. The original euphoria over German unification gave way to
concern about the resulting strains on public finance and to the systems of
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welfare. And the further increase of the unemployment rate to 12 per cent
and even more – largely resulting from the massive layoffs in East Germany
– did much to heighten the sense of crisis. It was against this background
that the failure of the conservative-liberal majority to tackle new and more
radical reforms was widely seen as symptom of political exhaustion, and
that the defeat of Helmut Kohl in the federal election of 27 September
1998 appeared as a logical outcome.
The costs of German unification
One of the consequences of German unity was a critical impairment of
the resources of the welfare state. West Germany’s leaders chose to grossly
underestimate the redistributive challenge of integrating East Germany.
According to an assessment of the EU Commission in February 1990,
preventing large-scale westward migration would have required a transfer
of the order of (initially) about 10 per cent of West German incomes to
raise East German incomes to about two-thirds of the West German
level.2 Among the West German public, however, such a direct redistribu-
tive intervention would probably have been so unpopular as to endanger
the legitimacy of German unity altogether. Hence West German leaders
preferred a mixed strategy for financing unification: on the one hand,
they set up an extra-budgetary fund for the reconstruction of East
Germany (Aufbau Ost) which was refinanced by borrowing on the inter-
national capital markets, and on the other, a straight extension of the
West German social security systems to East Germany permitted to de
facto pay health, unemployment, or old age-benefits out of the contribu-
tions of the West German members of these systems instead from taxes.
But since the optimistic projections of an economic upswing in East
Germany proved utterly unrealistic the strategy chosen for the financing
of German unity – together with the unexpected net loss from the
privatization of the East German industries – inevitably resulted in a
massive increase of the public debt. On the other hand, the massive social
transfers endangered the reserves of the social security systems, exacer-
bating the worries about the old age pension system which (in Germany
as elsewhere in Europe) was already threatened by demographic trends.
The ensuing rise of contributions had the additional effect of raising the
labour costs to employers. 
Moreover, the unification strategy consisted in the wholesale transfer of
West German institutions to East Germany. And since that was based upon
the supposition of their undeniable superiority the discussion of welfare
reform was shelved for several years. Those in West Germany who regarded
the process of unification as a ‘window of opportunity’ for reform and
wanted, for example, to preserve the state-run public health system of the
former GDR, were soon silenced in order not to endanger the West
German consensus on uniting Germany.
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The first Bündnis für Arbeit and its fiasco
A corporatist strategy for coping with the crisis in the labour market was
first put on the agenda on 1 November 1995 by Klaus Zwickel, leader of
the metal workers’ union (Industriegewerkschaft Metall) in a speech at the
congress of his union. He offered to abandon the traditional high wage
strategy of the unions in an ‘alliance for jobs’ (Bündnis für Arbeit), exchang-
ing wage moderation for the guarantee of new employment. At that time
his proposal had a considerable echo, and Bündnis für Arbeit remained a key
reference in political semantics, competing for public attention right away
with Wirtschaftsstandort Deutschland, a slogan which stood for the supply-side
platform of Kohl’s conservative-liberal coalition government.3 The public
appeal of this formula was indicative of widespread normative expectations
favouring a strategy of corporatist consensus building between labour and
business. One central element of this proposal (dubbed Bündnis für Arbeit,
as mentioned above) was a decisive reduction of overtime work in favour of
new jobs. From the outset the initiative got strong public acclaim –
including from the government which did not hesitate to usurp the slogan
Bündnis für Arbeit for its own strategic purposes.
The chancellor could not but welcome Zwickel’s offer of a labour
strategy of wage moderation, and for the first time openly blamed business
leaders for their reticence. But the government had its own agenda on
which the rising costs of the social security system had begun to rank very
high. One of the most controversial aspects of the social policy of the last
two decades was the increasing trend to solve employment problems by
increasing use of early retirement and so shifting the loads from labour
market policy to the old age pension system. Large firms, in particular, had
turned to rejuvenate their workforce at the expense of the old age pension
system in close co-operation with labour representatives. When demo-
graphic projections led to increasing concern over the future financing of
the public pension system it became more and more clear that this practice
could not be continued. But since it had become extremely popular with
industrial workers the co-operation of labour unions for any change was
indispensable. In a Kanzlergespräch of 12 February 1996 (with no more than
thirteen participants) business and labour leaders finally agreed on the
gradual phasing-out of the established practice. Two days later, this extra-
parliamentary agreement was ratified by the cabinet, and soon after by
parliament. This extraordinary pre-emption of the legislative channel
constituted the temporary climax of a corporatist strategy where the
government took the initiative.
Meanwhile, however, negotiations over the Bündnis für Arbeit proposal
had stalled. Zwickel apparently had not sufficiently pondered the premise
of this approach, namely, sufficient authority of employers’ associations to
make their member firms comply with an agreement about additional jobs.
In particular the union’s demand for strong limits to the use of overtime by
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employers who might wish to avoid new hirings met staunch opposition:
many employers regarded overtime as an essential element of flexible
management, and the employer associations dragged their feet. The
political basis for an eventual corporatist reform strategy shrunk still more
after the liberals achieved an unexpected comeback in several state
elections. The liberal opposition FDP now successfully urged the chancellor
to modify his course of striking deals with organized labour in favour of
greater concessions to business demands. The breakdown of the negoti-
ations followed when Kohl, in an apparently ill-considered U-turn, sided
with the employers’ quest for strong cuts in sickness pay. For organized
labour this issue was of high symbolic importance: until the mid-1950s,
blue-collar workers had been subject to a three days waiting period before
receiving statutory sickness pay whereas by tradition white-collar employees
continued to receive their full salary. This unequal treatment was
successfully abolished in 1956, when the metal workers union in Schleswig-
Holstein won a breakthrough after a strike which, lasting 114 days, was the
longest in German post-war history. The settlement that was finally
achieved, full payment of salaries by employers in the first six weeks of
sickness, had not only been enshrined in many collective agreements but
also in a federal law on sickness pay introduced in 1970 by the social-liberal
coalition. Because of this history, in the eyes of labour the sickness pay rules
had a high symbolic value. And when a 20 per cent cut in sickness wages
was included in a government bill as part of a packet of budgetary
economies (Sparpaket), the unions exited from Kohl’s bargaining table.
In a first phase, this turn appeared to strengthen the position of the
‘anti-corporatists’ on the employers’ side. Representatives of traditional
bargaining were increasingly on the defensive, and the new president of the
Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (BDI, Federation of German
Industries), Hans-Olaf Henkel, became the most prominent advocate of a
fundamental change in labour relations. He vigorously pleaded for the
abandonment of traditional centralized collective bargaining (Flächentarif-
vertrag) in favour of company-level bargaining, something which employers’
associations had long regarded with strong reservations. The zenith of the
conflict was reached when the metal employers association (Gesamtmetall)
advised its members to cut sickness pay in line with the legal changes
recently introduced with the Sparpaket. This recommendation violated –
according to most legal experts – existing collective agreements,4 and in
the eyes of unions it ran contrary to the tradition of Tarifautonomie where
social partners are expected to resolve their differences by way of contract
without state interference. When the management of Daimler-Benz, one of
the largest firms in the industry, announced its intention to implement
immediately the association’s recommendation it had obviously not
expected the strong emotional reaction of its workforce. The union, on the
one hand, accused the management of abandoning a long and successful
tradition of social partnership, but on the other hand it was able to
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organize a series of work stoppages that in the end cost Daimler-Benz
about DM200 million worth of lost production volume. This conflict spread
to many other firms in the industry, and its mobilizing impact among
workers was so immense that it overwhelmed even the union leadership.
The Daimler-Benz management finally capitulated, and employers were
left in profound disarray. Many were extremely disturbed by the quite
unanticipated extent and intensity of workers’ protest, and the desire to
preserve the system of Tarifautonomie and peaceful labour relations led
them into new reflections about their strategy.
Before the outbreak of this conflict, some important business leaders
believed that under present labour market conditions corporatism was no
longer needed for industrial peace. This was reconsidered after the unions
demonstrated their power to mobilize workers even in periods of rising
unemployment. However, much damage had already been done since the
confrontation resulted in a stiffening of the position of labour leaders who
found their space of manœuvre reduced by the strong mobilizing effects of
the conflict. The ultimate reason, however, for the breakdown of this first
attempt of negotiated retrenchment of the welfare state was the dominance
of the electoral calculus in the chancellor’s strategy. Until then, Kohl had
most of the time taken care not to alienate important social groups such as
organized labour. Now, however, the continuation of Kohl’s majority
depended on the electoral survival of his small liberal coalition partner the
FDP, which wanted to demonstrate to its clientele that it was the indispens-
able guardian of free-market principles. Cutting sickness pay was one of the
victories which the FDP might claim in their quest for staying alive. Com-
petitive party politics, guided by a majoritarian logic, thus won the upper
hand over the corporatist strategy of adjusting the welfare state. 
The ‘reform gridlock’ as a political issue
Kohl’s leadership style, guided above all by the quest for maintaining power
in a bipolar party system, proved too inflexible to cope with the new
problems of welfare reform, and the conflicts arising from this strategy did
much to fuel the debate on a ‘reform congestion’ (Reformstau) which com-
mentators and political orators liked to deplore in the 1990s. In 1990 the
social democratic opposition had won a majority in the Federal Council
(Bundesrat), the representation of the member states of the federation, and
thus was able to veto important government bills. Kohl’s dependence upon
the small liberal coalition partner, however, prevented him from negoti-
ating the compromises that would have been necessary for governing in
such a situation of ‘divided government’. Hence ‘institutional gridlock’
became another topic in the crisis rhetoric, alongside the ostensible rigidities
of the labour market. To be sure, President Herzog – himself formerly an
experienced negotiator as state representative in the Federal Council – had
been careful not to join such reproaches in his 1997 ‘Adlon’ speech. Much
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more outspoken, however, was BDI chairman Hans-Olaf Henkel in blaming
an ostensible deficit in institutional reform and in demanding sweeping
changes. He denounced the institutions of the German Verhandlungs-
demokratie, a system based on continuous and complex negotiations both in
the federalist and corporatist arenas, and the traditional political culture
with its ‘consensus sauce’ for thwarting vital radical innovations. This
amounted to the plea for extending deregulation to the traditional core
institutions of the German welfare state, to labour relations with their
strong corporatist elements, and to the systems of social security.
There was an evident bias in similar stereotypes of persistent institu-
tional rigidities, attributed either to the veto power of organized special
interests or to mechanisms of institutional gridlock. Indeed, at the end of
the 1980s public opinion had begun to take the globalization issue
seriously, and traditional elements of the political-economic framework
were successfully challenged. Among others, a fairly broad consensus
developed about the privatization and deregulation of public services,
especially telecommunications and the railways. Although telecom deregul-
ation was of course strongly encouraged by the initiatives of the European
Union, the moves toward privatization of public services had important
domestic sources. To keep the telecommunications and the railway system
competitive in a changing international environment, more entrepre-
neurial flexibility was obviously needed, and the considerable investments
that were required could no longer be shouldered by the state budget. So
even the social democrats co-operated in these moves, in spite of persistent
protests from the postal workers’ union. Today the deregulation of the
telecommunications sector is more advanced in Germany than in most
other European countries, and the deregulation of the electric utilities is
well under way. Similar changes contradict the notion of an immobile
German society and politics nurtured by some commentators and polemi-
cists und suggest that the capacity of this system for adapting to the
challenges of globalization is much larger than pessimistic scenarios would
make us believe. 
Schröder’s corporatist strategy 
The electoral victory in 1998 of Gerhard Schröder gave a new turn to this
discussion. The social democratic chancellor proclaimed the fight against
unemployment as the central issue of his platform. As key strategy for
achieving this purpose he relaunched the idea of a Bündnis für Arbeit.
However, widening the label into Bündnis für Arbeit, Ausbildung und Wettbe-
werbsfähigkeit, i.e. ‘alliance for jobs, (professional) training, and competitive-
ness’ he indicated his intention to transcend the narrow focus on a labour
market policy bent upon redistributing work. The accent put on competitive-
ness introduced a supply-side element which was meant to increase the
attractiveness of a corporatist strategy for the business community.
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Schröder’s Bündnis für Arbeit aimed at a variant of corporatist ‘concert-
ation’ familiar from the ‘social pacts’ as they had been concluded in the
1990s in some smaller European countries. Whereas in the 1970s consult-
ations involving government and the peak associations of business and
labour aimed at supporting Keynesian macro-economic policy by a
bargained incomes policy oriented toward stabilization, this time wage
policy and conditions of work should be tied together, in a series of
sequential negotiations, with consensus-building on reforms of the systems
of social security. Such a linkage of issues would differ considerably from
those earlier instances of ‘political exchange’ where wage concessions on
the part of organized labour might eventually be rewarded with compens-
ations in social policy. What was at stake this time was a far-reaching and
eventually painful re-adjustment of the welfare state under conditions of
shrinking resources and pressures emanating from global competition. On
the agenda was no longer corporatist demand management but corporatist
supply-side policy (cf. Traxler 1995: 210). In Germany such a strategy is
subject to peculiar institutional constraints which we will explore in this
chapter. 
The architecture of the second Bündnis für Arbeit
Schröder’s Bündnis für Arbeit, though in constitutional terms no more than
an informal discussion between government and the labour market peak
associations, has a highly formalized architecture. Its apex is formed by the
Spitzengespräche (peak talks) where the chancellor and the ministers of
finance, economy, labour and health have so far met about every three
months with the presidents of the four peak associations of business and of
the German Federation of Trade Unions and the four most important
industrial unions. These meetings are prepared by a ‘steering group’
(Steuerungsgruppe) composed of parliamentary secretaries and top civil
servants from the chancellor’s office and the four ministries together with
the general secretaries of the peak associations. The steering group, for its
part, is assisted by a ‘benchmarking group’ (to which I will return), and the
details are prepared and elaborated in eight working parties (Arbeits-
gruppen) and expert groups covering policy areas such as tax policy, old age
and unemployment insurance, the reform of public health insurance,
working time, early pensions or professional formation. These working
parties again include top civil servants from the ministries concerned and
experts from the peak associations.
Three aspects of this architecture are noteworthy. First, it sets the
Bündnis für Arbeit off from its predecessors, the Konzertierte Aktion of
1967–74, and the Kanzlergespräche undertaken by chancellor Kohl since
1990. The initiator of the Konzertierte Aktion, Karl Schiller, Minister of the
Economy from 1966 to 1972, conceived of it not so much as a place for
bargaining but rather as forum for a rational dialogue with the ‘autonomous
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groups’ (as the Council of Economic Experts called them at that time).
Insight into the interdependence of macro-economic aggregates and of the
resulting economic constraints (Sachzwänge) should lead the economic
actors to voluntarily co-ordinated rational economic behaviour after
information about the essential macro-economic parameters had been
exchanged (Lehmbruch 1977). Since the professed aim of the talks was
mutual information and moral suasion it made sense to invite a broad
spectrum of organized interests to take part. Hence the number of
participants continuously grew from about 50 up to 200. In retrospect, it
has often been said that these proportions of the Konzertierte Aktion
contributed to its relative inefficiency. Moreover, being a forum in the
exclusive responsibility of the Minister of the Economy and hence not
involving the chancellor, the commitment of the government could not be
taken for granted.
When Helmut Kohl started the Kanzlergespräche, he had drawn his
lessons from the weaknesses of the Konzertierte Aktion: from the very
beginning the head of government maintained the initiative and the
leadership of the talks, and he took increasingly care to restrict
participation to the leaders of the most powerful associations of business
and labour. The aim was not mere exchange of information to encourage
the judicious action of the associations, but to commit the most powerful
corporate actors in German society. Schröder’s Bündnis für Arbeit follows
this example, but differs from the predecessor’s Kanzlergespräche in its
high degree of formalization.5 Quite obviously this is meant to underline
the commitment of the government to the success of the talks and at the
same time to put subtle pressure on the invited participants to reciprocate
this commitment.
The second – and new – aspect of Schröder’s Bündnis which is note-
worthy is the ‘benchmarking’ approach borrowed from the techniques of
business administration. On the suggestion of BDI president Henkel,
Schröder established a ‘benchmarking group’ consisting of a handful of
experts from the research institutes of business and labour and some high-
ranking officials of the Chancellor’s Office. Its aim is an ‘unambiguous
stocktaking of the Wirtschafts- und Sozialstandort Deutschland in international
comparison’. This semantic reference to the Standort Deutschland varies a
standard topic of supply-side policies by including the ‘social’ character-
istics of Germany as a location for investments. But at the same time it is
also a far cry from Modell Deutschland, that well-known slogan from the
chancellorship of Helmut Schmidt. Henceforth Germany is no longer
considered as distinguished by its exemplary economic and social
achievements – it rather looks for inspiration from abroad. In recent years
particular attention was directed to the Modell Holland, considered as the
most conspicuous example of re-dimensioning an over-extended welfare
state by building consensus between the large groups in society.6 (Another
model frequently referred to was ‘New Labour’, but not always did social
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democratic ‘reformers’ keep in mind that these two references symbolized
rather different political strategies.)
Among the lessons drawn from these foreign models – and this is another
important difference from the Konzertierte Aktion – is the ambition to cover a
very broad range of issues and policy domains. ‘Renewed emergence of
tripartite concertation is due to the need to co-ordinate policies across
policy fields’ (Ebbinghaus and Hassel 1999). Elsewhere negotiated reforms
of the welfare state quite often included labour relations and wage policy as
well as taxes, unemployment insurance, health costs and old age pensions,
because all these systems are both interdependent and under pressure to
adapt. Hence the architecture of the Bündnis attempts to integrate them by
a series of tripartite negotiations between government, organized business
and labour differentiated according to sectors. The tripartite approach is of
course the logical conclusion of an implicitly shared analysis according to
which high labour costs play an important role in explaining the rise of
unemployment. Labour costs, to be sure, not only include wages, but also
the indirect wage costs resulting from social security contributions (Lohn-
nebenkosten). And since part of these are borne by employers, in the
tradition inaugurated under Bismarck, employer representatives participate
in the self-administration of most social security systems and thus share the
responsibility for, and an interest in, their financial viability. Hence an
integrated bargaining approach to welfare state reform should a priori be
highly attractive to employers’ representatives. Remarkably, however, the
tripartite approach of the Bündnis is so pervasive that other, functionally
specialized peak associations within the respective policy domains are
tacitly left out. Thus not even the medical associations and the public
health insurance funds are included in the working party for the reform of
health insurance (Arbeitsgruppe ‘Reform der Gesetzlichen Krankenversicherung
und der Pflegeversicherung’).
Indeed, the experience of small neighbouring corporatist countries
seems to indicate that a consensus achieved by the peak associations of the
‘social partners’ can be decisive for the enactment of reforms in all these
fields of the welfare state. It is doubtful, however, whether such experiences
can serve as model. Austria’s Sozialpartnerschaft after the Second World War
– to take but this example – was traditionally distinguished by the clear
dominance of two peak associations who were also closely linked with the
two largest parties, the socialists and the conservative ‘People’s Party’, that
have so long dominated the Austrian party system. Organized interests and
political parties thus formed a rather tight network linked at one central
nodal point, and therefore bargaining processes over key policy decisions
were facilitated by the small number of powerful participants (Lehmbruch
1985). These structures formed a strong contrast to the German case. First,
historically the German welfare state was characterized by considerable
institutional segmentation of the welfare policy networks. To be sure, today
the interdependence between the system of collective bargaining, the
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mechanisms of labour market and unemployment policy, public health
insurance and the old age pensions system is obvious and considerable. But
since the growth of the welfare state was rather an additive process where
sectoral systems were constructed one after the next, in each of these policy
domains we now encounter a specific configuration of actors and their
particular discourses and rules of the game, and often particular conflict
lines have evolved that are not represented by the tripartism of govern-
ment, labour and business. In consequence, these sectoral policy networks
with their long traditions are often only loosely coupled with each other.
Moreover, in some of these networks the power of leaders is limited by
strong internal conflicts of sectional interests and deficits in member
compliance. Finally, quite often in Germany the party system cannot serve
as linkage mechanism between sectoral policy networks as may happen in
Austria and other smaller corporatist countries because the arena of bipolar
party competition may work at cross-purposes with the arena of corporatist
negotiations. Hence, to comprehend the problems with which the Bündnis
für Arbeit is confronted the sectoral variations in the governance of the
German welfare state must be taken into account.
The governance of the labour relations system
It is often stressed that wage moderation on the part of organised labour is
one of the conditions of success for the new social pacts concluded for
negotiated welfare state reform (Visser and Hemerijck 1997; Hassel 1998).
Therefore the role of collective bargaining is one of the focal points of the
present controversies about the future of the German welfare state – the
other being the crisis of the systems of social insurance. It is a matter of
controversy to what degree high unit labour costs are directly attributable
to union wage policy or rather to currency movements of the past years. In
the past, such developments were taken calmly because high wages could
be considered as a ‘rationalization whip’ that contributed to industrial
modernization. In the view of organized labour, the resulting increases in
productivity improved the competitive position of industry and helped it to
grant higher wages and shorter working hours. As I have shown above, this
strategic repertoire became important in the process of unification. But it
lost much of its credit after the failure of the traditional strategies in East
Germany. Also, employment clearly suffered when, reacting to high labour
costs, German employers increasingly endeavoured to maintain their
competitiveness on international markets by labour-saving restructuring.
Moreover, the effective elimination of a low-wage sector is increasingly
regarded as one of the causes of mass unemployment. These considerations
have gradually persuaded labour as well as employers to look for more
flexible approaches to collective bargaining acceptable to both parts of
industry, and informal contacts at the peak level were under way for some
time. Finally, however, these talks ended without tangible results, especially
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in the metal industry. And strong disagreements persist about some central
questions. IG Metall in particular, the massive metal workers’ union,
doggedly stuck to strategies of social partnership practised in the 1980s,
notably to the widespread practice of early retirement as a means to relieve
the pressure on the labour market, which meanwhile resulted in massive
goal conflicts between traditional employment policy and the continued
viability of the old age pensions system. And union leaders strontly resisted
all plans to expand the low-wage sector and thus to relieve the pressure on
the labour market because they feared that this might undermine the
existing system of collective bargaining.
Indeed, some of the most visible dissensions in Schröder’s Bündnis für
Arbeit were due to the reluctance of labour unions, and in particular IG
Metall, to include wage moderation on the agenda of the peak talks. The
ostensible reason given was the tripartite character of the Bündnis: in the
view of labour, commitments made in this arena would amount to involving
government in collective bargaining, and this would violate the principle of
Tarifautonomie (autonomy of collective bargaining), the institutional centre-
piece of German labour relations. Whereas in the systems of social
insurance we observe an increasing intervention of government at the
expense of the traditional paritary-based self-administration, the other
component of the German welfare state, the system of labour relations,
remains characterized by bipartite relationships from which government is
largely left out. Tarifautonomie would indeed be incompatible with govern-
ment interference in the form of compulsory arbitration as it existed in the
Weimar Republic, or with its legal authority to declare collective agreements
void (as in the Netherlands), but one may doubt that this would rule out
informal understandings in a tripartite forum. Yet union reticence was
certainly increased by the anticipation of internal tensions which any open
commitment of labour to government-sponsored wage restraint might
trigger. In Germany, where the German Confederation of Labour (DGB)
has no jurisdiction over collective bargaining, industrial unions are the key
actors in wage negotiations, and on this level disagreements about strategy
are not uncommon. While some of the industrial unions (e.g. in the chemical
industry and mining) favour an accommodative ‘social partnership’ approach
of settling disputes with employers, others, and primarily the metalworkers’
union (IG Metall), have traditionally preferred a more militant stance
(Swenson 1989). And IG Metall, to be sure, has not forgotten how mis-
calculated wage concessions made in the context of the original Konzertierte
Aktion led to the spectacular wildcat strikes of 1969 and 1973 (Bergmann et
al. 1975). 
On the other hand, the importance of such strategic dissensions
should not be overestimated. Indeed, the apparent decentralization of
collective bargaining on the national level which some researchers found
in West Germany (Cameron 1984) is to a considerable degree compensated
for by techniques of informal co-ordination between industrial unions
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(Soskice 1999), and on the industry level either outright centralization
or strict harmonization of collective agreements is the rule. Also,
Tarifautonomie has not prevented German unions from taking the impact
of wage policy on economic growth and competitiveness into account.
The corporatist character of Tarifautonomie became fully apparent in the
1960s when West German labour unions adopted Keynesian macro-
economic views (Lehmbruch 1977) but did not pass with the decline of
Keynesianism. Although the Konzertierte Aktion as an attempt at tripartite
concertation collapsed after some years, de facto corporatist practices con-
tinued, and this not only in collective bargaining (such as ‘productivity-
oriented’ bargaining). Moreover, they gained increasing importance in
‘meso-corporatist’ industrial restructuring. The basic rationale of this
corporatist orientation can be defined as a large consensus over industrial
modernization, where high wages and shorter working hours were
considered as perfectly compatible with a competitive position on world
markets, assured by a peaceful social climate and a highly qualified
workforce. In recent years, however, unions have increasingly voiced their
doubts about the expected employment effects of wage moderation, and
also about a sincere commitment of business to the maintenance of high
employment.
This discussion has shifted the focus to the organizational problems
within organized business. The past success of corporatism in West German
labour relations was attributable not only to the structure and the
coordination techniques of labour unions but also to the importance and
power of centralized employers’ associations (Thelen 1991). And the recent
crisis of corporatist labour relations is less due to the tensions within the
labour camp (for these have always existed) than to the increasing
dissensions within organized business. One aspect of these dissensions was
the erosion of the authority of employers’ associations over their rank and
file. Another was the new rivalry between the functionally differentiated
business peak associations, and in particular the sometimes quite vocal
dissensions between the Bundesvereinigung der deutschen Arbeitgeber-
verbände (BDA) and the Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie (BDI).
For a couple of years, the BDI leadership had become attentive to the
gradual erosion of its basis resulting from the ongoing structural changes in
the West German economy. Being the peak association of industry but not
including other sectors of business, its dominant position is in jeopardy
because of the shrinking of its traditional industrial basis and the
corresponding growth of the service sector. Under the chairmanship of
Hans-Olaf Henkel (who as former chief executive of IBM Europe was less
committed to the traditional folkways of German industry) the BDI began
to look for opportunities for diversifying its activities, and one of the
options which Henkel openly discussed was to shift the responsibility for
collective bargaining away from such broad employer associations as
Gesamtmetall (representing all employers of the large and heterogeneous
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metal sector) to the trade associations (which, incidentally, are organized
under the umbrella of the BDI). Henkel linked this with some acid criticism
of the co-operative attitude of BDA and Gesamtmetall. But finally the BDA
leadership under its new president Dieter Hundt reacted vigorously to
successfully affirm the traditional turf of the employers’ associations.
Irrespective of the outcomes of such conflicts, however, it is rather likely
that the traditional type of nation-wide and highly standardized collective
agreements (Flächentarifvertrag) will undergo significant transformations.
But this is not tantamount to a breakdown of the established system of
labour relations. After all, the distinguishing feature of German labour
relations remains the ‘dual system’ coupling co-determination and col-
lective bargaining, and this system has in the past exhibited a remarkable
adaptive capacity (Streeck 1979; Thelen 1991). Both tiers are rule-bound in
a manner adapted to stable corporatist bargaining, co-determination being
closely regulated by law, whereas the rules of collective bargaining have
largely been written by the labour courts. Works councils were first estab-
lished in the early Weimar Republic, but they have definitely taken root in
West Germany in the course of several decades after the Second World War
and have de facto become transmuted into an organizational support of
unions which may even compensate for low organizational density. This
institution provides for orderly plant-level communication structures with
management and serves to defuse the potential antagonism between the
sectional interests and the eventual militancy of shop-floor members and
the larger strategic orientations of union leadership (Streeck 1979, 1982;
Thelen 1991). To be sure, most employers have remained lukewarm as far
as company-level co-determination is concerned. But they have discovered
that plant-level co-determination by works councils offers a scope for
flexibility and decentralization in labour relations, the absence of which
they often deplore in collective bargaining. All in all, this institutional
symbiosis has proved remarkably stable, and the consolidation of co-
determination was confirmed by its successful transfer to East Germany.
Governance mechanisms of the German welfare state: 
the social insurance systems
For our purposes, the institutions that constitute the German welfare state
are, above all, the different but complementary rule systems of labour
relations and the social security systems. Both are historically closely inter-
twined. The different sectoral institutions can all be considered as vari-
ations of the basic model introduced with the social reforms of the 1880s
initiated by Bismarck. He had the social security systems designed
specifically to protect the working class, for purposes of political stabilization,
and therefore the wage nexus was a constitutive element of their institu-
tional architecture. But Bismarck was prevented by parliament from
constructing social security as a state-financed relief system as he originally
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intended. Instead it was conceived according to the insurance model, and
its central institutional features are compulsory membership (within demarc-
ations defined by the legislator), the self-administration (Selbstverwaltung)
of the insured members, modified by the liability of workers and employers
to share the contributions, and the ‘parity’ (Parität) of representation of
both sides of industry in the administration of these systems. 
Parität is a key concept in German corporatism. It originated in a specific
institutional strategy for coping with social cleavages, and one which
distinguished the process of state-building in Germany from that of other
larger European countries (Lehmbruch 2002). The religious peace treaties
of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries introduced the principle of the
‘parity’ of churches, constituted as corporate social groups to which
representational monopolies had early been granted. Through historical
learning processes, this institutional device later developed into a key
element of a strategic repertoire for managing conflicts of interests between
such groups. Parität can serve to regulate conflict between organized
interests that have grown bottom-up over long periods, such as in labour
relations and in the system of industrial co-determination where today it is a
key formula. Here its pre-history dates back to the late nineteenth century
(Feldman 1966; Teuteberg 1961; Rabenschlag-Kräusslich 1983). But the
breakthrough came with the democracy of the Weimar Republic. Parität was
one important element in the development toward corporatist labour
relations that began with the integration, in 1916, of organized labour in the
war effort (Feldman 1966), with the Stinnes-Legien agreement of 1919 over
the establishment of the Zentrale Arbeitsgemeinschaft of employers and
labour unions (ZAG) to cope with the post-war crisis (Feldman 1981;
Feldman and Steinisch 1985), and with the law on works councils in 1920, in
which the strategy of conflict management by Parität was first systematically
extended to the relationship of labour and capital. As Franz Leopold
Neumann (Neumann 1937, 1957) put it persuasively, the Weimar Republic
was based upon a series of social compacts between the large forces of
German society: ‘Hence, the Weimar democracy rested to a decisive degree
on the idea of parity – a parity between social groups, between Reich and
states, and between the various churches’ (Neumann 1957). The ‘old Federal
Republic’ revived this idea, and it became a pivotal element of the
corporatist repertoire of strategies. The programme of a Bündnis für Arbeit is
the most recent manifestation of this strategic tradition.
But Parität can also be established in a top-down strategy by the state, as
was largely the case in the social insurance systems since Bismarck. As will
be shown below, in these systems Parität is employed to delegate the imple-
mentation to representatives of social groups constituted and empowered
by statute, and one may speak of ‘corporatization’ as an administrative
strategy (Döhler and Manow-Borgwardt 1992). Bargaining relationships
between these partners are limited in their scope because essential para-
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meters continue to be controlled by the state, and the state can intervene
strongly in situations of crisis.
Whereas the origins of Parität can be traced back to the sixteenth
century, the concept of ‘self-administration’ had its roots in the historical
compromise struck by the monarchical bureaucratic state with the rising
bourgeoisie in the reform era of the early nineteenth century (Heffter
1969). While the German bourgeoisie accepted the survival of the monarchy
and its rather authoritarian hierarchical power structure, as a counterpart it
was granted the institution of self-administration (Selbstverwaltung) for the
government of cities, under the supervision of government but with
considerable autonomy. This model of state-supervised self-administration
was now transferred to the social security systems with the proviso that
those who contributed to the system, workers and employers, were
represented in the administrative bodies according to their respective share
of these contributions. In practice the representation of these two groups
was soon controlled by their organizations, trade unions on the one hand,
employer associations on the other, and thus corporatism became a
constitutive element of the governance of social security (for the old age
pensions system, see Nullmeier and Rüb 1993: 303ff.). Being based on
another historical compromise between antagonistic interests, this model
acquired a remarkable resilience. However, the powers and duties of the
Selbstverwaltung differ from one system to the other, and the powers of
government – both of the supervisory administration and of the legislator –
are also variable. Since their inception some of these systems had to be co-
financed by the state, and therefore the role of government was by no
means limited to supervising the self-administration. As stated above, top-
down ‘corporatization’ can play an important role, especially in the health
system.7 These peculiarities explain the remarkable variations in the
governance structure of the different sectors of the German welfare state.
Yet one assumption is common to all: since workers and employers share
the burden of contributions to the social security systems they should – at
least in principle – also share an interest in the efficiency of the respective
systems. Obviously this basic assumption does also play an important role
in the tripartite arrangement of Schröder’s Bündnis für Arbeit.
However, the parity-based representation of labour and employers in the
governing bodies does not readily facilitate the coordination of the social
security systems with the system of industrial relations. Labour and employer
representatives are dispatched from the peak associations, the DGB and the
BDA, which are not themselves involved in collective bargaining. The latter is
the domain of industrial unions and industry-wide employer associations.
Hence the policy communities do not really overlap.8 In consequence, if for
example IG Metall comes out in favour of an early retirement scheme, it does
not have to defend such demands directly nor does it get direct feedback
from labour representatives in the old age pension funds.
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The Parität of workers and employers, moreover, does not reflect many
of the conflicts of interests which now accompany the crisis of the social
security systems, particularly the pension system and public health
insurance. The character of the public pension system has undergone
profound changes since its original inception. From a subsidiary old age
insurance intended to supplement other possible means of subsistence, it
has become an earnings-related wage substitute, indexed on the increase of
average salaries. Of the original insurance scheme it has retained the legal
entitlement of the beneficiaries, but capital-based funding gave way to a
‘pay as you go’ system based on levy from the present contributors. This is
often euphemistically described as the ‘contract between generations’, but
the ‘generations’ had of course no organized voice when old age insurance
thus assumed the character of an instrument for intergenerational
redistribution. This is fateful insofar as the German public pension system
is undergoing the same demographic pressures as those of most other
industrial democracies, resulting from the parallelism of declining birth
rates and increasing longevity. With a progressively ageing population, the
‘pay as you go’ system inevitably leads to a latent distribution conflict
between a shrinking population of young wage earners and a growing
population of old beneficiaries. This latent conflict was for some time
disguised by the policy, much favoured by unions and employers, of solving
labour market problems (and at the same time rejuvenating the workforce)
by the large-scale use of early retirement. But while this may in the short
run have ameliorated the labour market chances of young people it
increasingly puts on that same generation an increasing burden for
financing the system. Moreover, the inclusion of new categories of bene-
ficiaries who had not paid adequate contributions (among them, after
German unification, the East German wage earners) aggravated the in-built
tension between the principles of solidarity and of some sort of equivalence
of contributions and benefits. All these changes find no adequate reflection
in the formal governance mechanisms of the system. As in the origins
before the First World War, old age insurance continues to be administered
by decentralized institutions, on regional level for blue-collar workers, on
the federal level for white-collar employees. According to the principle of
self-administration, their managing boards consist of union and employers’
representatives. But the discretionary powers of this self-administration are
rather limited since both the level of benefits and the method of calculating
the rate of contributions are uniform across the country and are deter-
mined by the federal legislator. And in the legislative process the ‘social
partners’ play only a limited role because their parity-based representation
is obviously not suited to mirror the central – namely, intergenerational –
conflict lines by which today the system is distinguished. The position of
labour unions is strongly biased toward the interests of the older gener-
ation of union members who are approaching retirement age and expect to
retain the present level of benefits. There are some quite important
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Sozialverbände that have developed out of former associations of war
veterans and now make efforts to represent the heterogeneous clientele of
social security beneficiaries, but they tend of course to represent the
present generation of beneficiaries and their influence is essentially limited
to lobbying. The interests of the wage-earning contributors are diffuse and
difficult to aggregate through associational action, and the growing anxiety
of younger people who face the perspective of higher contributions (to
finance the benefits of the older generation) but clearly shrinking benefits
in their own old age has no specific advocates in the old age insurance
policy network. Thus it is the parliament, and hence the political parties,
which in the final instance play the decisive role in the decision-making
process of social security. 
This is also true of unemployment insurance. This system is admin-
istered by a central federal authority, the Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (BfA),
and is governed by an Administrative Board (Verwaltungsrat) and a
Directorate (Vorstand) in which labour unions, employers and public
authorities (federal, state and local governments) have each a third of the
seats (Drittelparität). The members of these are not elected but appointed by
the respective organizations. Again this mode of governance is referred to
as self-administration, but the autonomy of the BfA is severely limited: Its
budget, bylaws and directives must be sanctioned by the federal govern-
ment. This means, in practice, that the government can impose cuts in
entitlements even against the opinion of the Verwaltungsrat, and that it is
parliament – and hence political parties – which in the final instance
determine both the level of unemployment benefits and the range of
contributors. Indeed, in the recent past unemployment insurance has been
the object of frequent political interventions.
Multi-tier corporatism in the public health system
Infinitely more complex, moreover, is the governance of the public health
system (Alber 1992; Alber and Bernardi-Schenkluhn 1992; Döhler 1990).
Here, bargaining processes play a much larger role, and because of the
considerable heterogeneity of interests stable exchange relationships are
much more difficult to achieve. Although traditionally self-administration
has a larger scope of autonomy, the intensity of state intervention has very
much increased in the last two decades (Döhler and Manow 1997).
The complexity of this system results from the successive superimpos-
ition of several tiers, the health insurance system in a restricted sense, and
the different providers of medical care. The system of compulsory health
insurance (Gesetzliche Krankenversicherung, GKV) itself, since its introduction
under Bismarck, is extremely decentralized and fragmented. Originally,
only blue-collar workers were insured in the local health funds (Allgemeine
Ortskrankenkassen, AOK), characterized by parity-based self-administration
with elected representatives from workers and employers (similar to the
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public pension system). When white-collar employees were included in the
system they could instead choose to get insured in the Ersatzkassen, which
were equally self-administered, but without employer representation. (In a
recent reform, this differentiation of access according to status has been
rescinded, and all wage earners subject to compulsory insurance are now
free to choose one of the different GKV health funds.)9 The powers of the
GKV self-administration are wider than those of the old age insurance
system: although the benefits are largely determined by law, each AOK or
Ersatzkasse is autonomous in establishing the rates of contributions (half of
which are paid by the members, the other half by employers) and,
eventually, in granting supplementary benefits to its members. Originally
they were also autonomous in contracting with the providers of medical
care; however, this power is now exercised by the associations of GKV
health funds (again, there are separate associations of AOK and of
Ersatzkassen), and it is restricted by the Kassenarztsystem.
The Kassenarztsystem is the second tier of the public health system. Since
the introduction of compulsory health insurance, the medical profession
had increasingly resented the increasing dependency of many doctors on
the Krankenkassen (public health insurance funds). In this system doctors
cannot bill their fee directly to the patient (who otherwise might simply
have been reimbursed by the Krankenkasse) but were originally directly
reimbursed by the health insurance funds. In consequence the latter gained
a strong position in contracting with doctors which the latter resented not
only for economic reasons but also regarded as detrimental to their
professional autonomy. Early in the twentieth century, medical associations
therefore started a campaign patterned after labour union tactics: they
organized a series of doctors’ strikes to substitute collective bargaining for
free contracting of fees. Finally in 1913 the Imperial Office (ministry) of
Interior – then responsible for supervising the system – intervened and
helped to negotiate an agreement (Berliner Abkommen) between health
insurance funds and medical associations. Characteristically, this agreement
fell back on the strategy of conflict settlement by Parität. It introduced
collective bargaining and established joint committees composed of
representatives of health insurance funds and doctors which were respons-
ible for admission to practice in the system and for developing standard
contracts. In the Weimar Republic, this system was further developed by
instituting specialized associations, the Kassenärztliche Vereinigungen (KV)
organized on a regional level. Membership in the KV is compulsory for all
doctors practising with Krankenkassen, and since about 90 per cent of the
adult population are by law included in the GKV, only few doctors in
private practice can afford to stay outside the system.
The Kassenarztsystem thus established as the second tier of the public
health system constitutes another example of a historical compromise for
settling a distributional conflict between organized interests on the basis of
Parität. The KV do not only represent the medical profession in collective
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bargaining with the Krankenkassen but have also the monopoly for settling
doctors’ fees. This is a complex bureaucratic system where individual
doctors settle the services rendered to patients according to a system of
‘points’, the value of which is negotiated between the KV and the
Krankenkassen.10 It is obvious that, combined with compulsory membership,
this gives the associations considerable power over their members, and that
it also entails a considerable conflict potential between different groups of
doctors, such as general practitioners and specialists. For the organized
medical profession, on the other hand, the system involves a mix of
important obligations and privileges in relationship to the state: doctors in
private practice obtained the legal monopoly for ambulatory care – which
excluded hospitals or any institutions established by the Krankenkassen,
from delivering outpatient services. But as counterpart, the Kassenärztliche
Vereinigungen are legally bound to ensure the provision of medical services,
and this is tantamount to renouncing the strike weapon. A central
institutional link with the GKV funds is established by the Bundesausschuss
(originally: Reichsausschuss) der Ärzte und Krankenkassen (Federal Committee
of Doctors and Health Insurance Funds), a parity-based body which has
gradually acquired important functions in defining standards of adequate
and efficient health care which have binding power. However, the
Kassenarztsystem includes only one segment of the providers of medical care,
and the other segments remained long outside this corporatist bargaining
structure. 
Since the 1970s, rapidly rising health costs caused increasing political
concern and led to government intervention. Much of the responsibility for
this Kostenexplosion was attributed to the medical providers, in particular to
doctors as the gatekeepers of the system. In 1977 a first attempt of the
socialist-liberal coalition government to institute some interventionist
controls was blocked by the veto power of the CDU opposition majority in
the Federal Council (Bundesrat), and the Christian Democrats successfully
introduced the counterproposal of establishing the ‘Concerted Action in
the Health System’ (Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen, KAG), modelled
after the ‘Concerted Action’ in economic policy that existed from 1967 to
1974 (Wiesenthal 1981). The KAG was conceived of as a conference of the
representatives of corporate actors in the field of medical care, meeting at
regular intervals to negotiate guidelines which the health funds and KV
were expected to take into consideration, with the aim of containing the
rising health costs. Bargaining in the KAG was very much characterized by
a corporatist ‘logic of exchange’ where the medical profession restrained
demands for higher fees and as a counterpart expected, for example,
measures to check the rising influx of young doctors into practice. Initially,
these negotiations in the KAG had some modest results, but after several
years the tripartite bargaining approach of the KAG proved less and less
effective in checking the further rise of health costs. The establishment, in
1985, of an Experts Council attached to the KAG (Sachverständigenrat für die
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Konzertierte Aktion im Gesundheitswesen) was already a symptom of the crisis
of tripartite bargaining between the health insurance funds, the provider
groups and the administration. Represented among its members were the
most important corporate actors in the health sector, but it was also
composed in such a manner as to specifically bridge the antagonism
between the medical profession and the health economists (Perschke-
Hartmann 1994). The Sachverständigenrat was hence not instituted to
mobilize neutral expertise but to search for solutions fitting as basis for
compromises (Döhler 1990). So, even when the direct bargaining process
was deadlocked, the government might still be in a position to intervene on
the basis of a common denominator of conflicting interests.
Indeed, in the 1980s the institutional logic of the system progressively
made more direct government intervention unavoidable. Notwithstanding
the change of government in 1982 and the profession of beliefs of the new
conservative-liberal majority in the superiority of markets, a fundamental
market-oriented reform of the health system had no chance of serious
consideration (ibid.). To be sure, some measures such as limited co-
payments by patients were introduced to check the ‘moral hazard’ inherent
– according to the liberal diagnosis – in the system. But the effects of co-
payments remained limited, and the primacy of bargaining between health
funds and providers of medical care was upheld. But in its pursuit of cost
containment the government, by hierarchical fiat, attempted to limit the
scope of bargaining within the self-administration to the distribution of
strictly limited increments. To simplify a complex development, it may here
suffice to say that the aggregate sum of doctors’ fees was capped, with the
consequence that the value of ‘points’ earned by doctors could no longer be
freely negotiated by the KV and was bound to decrease. A further
consequence was that the distributive shares of that shrinking cake became
highly controversial within the membership of the KV. Recently, the system
was refined by defining a ‘budget’ for the health system and threatening
doctors with making them financially liable for exceeding the budget limit.
The immediate effect of this system was that an augmentation of services by
individual doctors did not automatically lead to a higher aggregate income
for the medical profession. The indirect effect, however, was an increasing
distributional struggle among different categories of the medical profession
(in particular, between specialists and general practitioners). Yet, given the
impossibility of exit from the system of compulsory membership, this
remained an internal problem of the medical profession and only indirectly
concerned the government and the Krankenkassen. The medical associ-
ations of course strongly opposed this strategy, by which they not only felt
financially trapped but which they also resented as interfering with their
professional autonomy. 
What reinforced the resentment of the medical profession was that other
providers of care, notably the hospital sector, were,  for a long time, left out
of the corporatist system of cost containment.11 As only providers of
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ambulatory care were included in the corporatist system of the GKV
Selbstverwaltung, state-monitored corporatist controls could of course only
be effective in the case of doctors in private practice. But the government
too considered this as a serious deficit and began to extend ‘corporatis-
ation’ (Döhler and Manow-Borgwardt 1992) to other medical providers. It
is remarkable that the strategy failed in dealing with the pharmaceutical
industry but succeeded much better in the hospital sector.
In the first case the premise of the corporatist approach was that the
market-liberal alternative, increasing patients’ co-payments for drugs, had
only modest effects and was also highly controversial and unpopular with
the electorate. However, in the pharmaceutical industry the government
found no associational partner with sufficient authority to effectively commit
its members. Its peak association, the Bundesverband der Pharmazeutischen
Industrie (BPI) remained extremely reluctant to co-operate, not least
because the impact of cost containment would hit the different branches of
the industry in a quite unequal manner. The interests of the big firms
engaged in pharmaceutical research were diametrically opposed to those of
the manufacturers of generic drugs who were bound to profit. The
government tried different approaches (Perschke-Hartmann 1994) – first by
putting pressure on the health insurance funds and the pharmaceutical
industry to negotiate a reduction of the price of drugs. When this failed, it
repeatedly asked the industry to make a ‘solidarity contribution’ to the effort
of cost reduction in the form of rebates for the health insurance funds. This
was likewise to no avail. Hence the government finally choose a different
approach by mobilizing the disciplining effects of the Kassenarztsystem. This
was done by indirectly including the costs of drugs in the capping of
doctors’ fees: if drug prescriptions exceed the aggregate ‘budget’ for drugs
the excess was to be deducted from the capped sum earmarked for fees.
Although this technique could not automatically eliminate the element of
strong ‘moral hazard’ in the practices of prescribing drugs, many doctors
became indeed reluctant to prescribe expensive or unnecessary drugs. As a
further consequence, however, the distributional conflicts within the
pharmaceutical industry have reached such an intensity that the BPI as the
peak organization of the entire industry has fallen apart.
But the federal government succeeded, after negotiations with state
governments, with the ‘corporatisation’ of the hospital sector (Döhler and
Manow-Borgwardt 1992). The legal status of hospital associations, formerly
umbrella organizations with limited service functions, was enhanced to give
them power for collective bargaining on behalf of individual hospitals.
Together with a series of other measures this aimed at the containment of
hospital costs, until now the most dynamic factor in the rise of health
costs. But this did not eliminate the latent domain conflict between
private doctors and hospitals. The steering capacity of parity-based self-
administration as the basis for concertation in health policy remains
limited, and state intervention is on the rise. All in all, the corporatist
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repertoire in the system of public health insurance (including strong
monitoring by government) was thus steadily expanding in the last decade
but it developed into a mode of governance where associations saw their
scope for bargaining progressively restricted and found themselves trans-
formed into reluctant executors of a policy of financial restraint which was
formulated against their protests but which they were nevertheless legally
obliged to implement.
Consensus politics against electoral calculus: 
Schröder’s strategy of reform
In the first year of the new majority the Bündnis für Arbeit produced few
tangible results. The government spent much time and energy upon clarify-
ing its programmatic options, and it was torn between Schröder’s pragma-
tism and the polarizing party chairman Oskar Lafontaine (who also held
the powerful office of minister of finance). When the latter, who had
become increasingly isolated with his belief in Keynesian recipes, spectac-
ularly withdraw from all his functions, this leadership conflict was resolved
in the chancellor’s favour. Yet the collapse of the corporatist approach to
welfare state retrenchment under Kohl’s leadership had left a lot of distrust
among the actors involved, and it needed patient labour to restore the
goodwill required for a renewed attempt. But the slow progress of the new
approach was also due to the specific institutional constraints of negotiated
welfare state reform just described. 
Gerhard Schröder’s strategic situation was still further complicated by
the loss of the majority in the Federal Council after the state elections of
1999. The Social Democrats lost control of the states of Hessen and
Saarland after a polarizing campaign by the Christian Democrats against
the red-green project for facilitating the naturalization of immigrants. This
highlighted the ambivalent impact of the electoral calculus on the politics
of reform. For many decades the party system had been dominated by
‘adversary politics’ (Finer 1975) and so did not play that supportive role
which in other countries was an important condition for the success of
negotiated adjustment of the welfare state.
Reacting to these experiences, Schröder developed a leadership style
fundamentally different from his predecessor’s. Whereas Kohl had finally
deadlocked himself in a polarized party system, Schröder undertook to shift
political decisions from the party arena to extra-parliamentary consensus-
building, employing techniques familiar from smaller European countries.
The Bündnis für Arbeit was the first and most visible of these deliberative
bodies, but several others followed. Expert commissions were established to
submit proposals for old age pensions reform and for reforming the legal
status of foreigners, and care was always taken to include prominent
maverick Christian Democrats who would not subordinate their independ-
ent judgment to the electoral concerns of the party leaders.
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Parallel to this pursuit of expert consensus, Schröder developed a
considerable proficiency in building cross-party coalitions in the Federal
Council. Although the CDU had succeeded in breaking the red-green
preponderance in that body, they lacked a Bundesrat majority of their own
to thwart the legislative agenda of the government. However, the latter
needed the decisive votes of some state coalition governments including
liberals or Christian Democrats together with Social Democrats. Since in
these states the coalition agreements provided for abstention in case of
disagreements, opposition leaders were confident that such abstentions
would be sufficient to stall controversial bills if these required the approval
of a majority (Zustimmungsgesetze) of the members of the Federal Council.12
And after the red-green majority in the Diet had passed a tax reform that
was generally considered as a remarkable step forward, the opposition was
certain that it could bring this bill down in the Bundesrat. But the
chancellor developed hitherto rather unusual log-rolling skills to buy the
decisive votes from some ‘black-red’ governments. The Christian Democrats
in these states could not refuse the favours offered for their local labour
market or budget, and the final vote of the tax reform by an absolute
majority of the Federal Council thus amounted to an embarrassing setback
for the opposition leadership. Half a year later the same scenario was
repeated for old age pension reform after the CDU had left the bargaining
table of consensus negotiations.
Faced with this two-track strategy of expert consensus and ad hoc cross-
party bargaining the opposition felt increasingly vulnerable. CDU leaders
obstinately refused to get caught in Schröder’s ‘consensus trap’ (Konsensfalle).
But this attitude largely condemned them to immobility and contributed
only to undermine their own standing. After all, passed despite their
opposition contained significant departures from established features of the
supposedly rigid German welfare state, and so in the eyes of many
observers the ‘reform gridlock’ regarded as the hallmark of the late Kohl
era was finally overcome. Tax reform, among others, made it easy for banks
to sell their industrial holdings, and this created the conditions for dis-
mantling traditional features of German capitalism that were increasingly
dysfunctional in globalizing financial markets, and it was welcomed by large
parts of the business community. The same was true of an old age pensions
reform that introduced mandatory private insurance (with broad options
for consumer choice) as one future key component of the system.
Indeed, the salience of corporatist bargaining in renegotiating the
welfare state cannot be analysed without regarding the role of the party
system. In Western Europe, the new social pacts have often been struck on
the initiative or with a strong participation of governing majorities. And as
a rule, this presupposed consensus-oriented political coalitions which were
apt to mediate the conflict between business and labour interests. In
Germany, however, traditional adversarial party strategies tend to dis-
courage the formation of such coalitions, and moreover in the legislative
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process divided majorities in parliament and in the Federal Council may
under certain circumstances prove dysfunctional for consensus-building.
Schröder has so far been successful in circumventing the potential
deadlocks arising from the party system. 
Notes
1 Cited from the web page of the Federal President (http://www.bundespraesident.
de/n/nph-b/reden/de/berlin.htm?reden/deutsch1997.map)
2 See Czada (1998) for these details and for the following.
3 Wirtschaftsstandort means the local conditions for investments. The Standort
Deutschland debate focused on maintaining Germany’s competitiveness in a
globalizing economy by the removal of disincentives for foreign and domestic
investors.
4 According to the established jurisprudence, collective agreements have pre-
cedence over legal stipulations if they are more favourable to workers
(Günstigkeitsprinzip).
5 An elaborate organizational chart can indeed be found on the special internet
homepage <http:www.buendnis.de> presented by the Federal Press and
Information Office.
6 Olaf Gersemann and Monika Dunkel ‘Niederlande – Nachbar mit Mumm: Die
Holländer demonstrieren, wie man den erstarrten Wohlfahrtsstaat zurückschraubt
und zukunftstauglich macht’, in Wirtschaftswoche, 20/2 (1997), 22.
7 Some authors however contest the description of the health system as
corporatist (Perschke-Hartmann 1994).
8 On the policy community of old age pensions, see Nullmeier and Rüb (1993).
9 There are still other types of health funds within the GKV system, mostly for
specific groups, such as the health insurance funds established by firms
(Betriebskrankenkassen). Like all other GKV health funds they are now equally
open to all wage earners. Civil servants are exempted from compulsory health
insurance: about half of their health costs are directly reimbursed by the state,
and for the rest they may take private insurance, similar to self-employed
persons.
10 For details, see Alber (1992).
11 Including hospitals in cost containment was for many years difficult because the
Länder (member states of the federation) were concerned about their jurisdic-
tion over the planning of capacities and investments in the hospital sector. The
escalation of costs has finally led them to reconsider their interests (Döhler and
Manow-Borgwardt 1992).
12 This procedure applies to about two-thirds of all federal legislation, including
most major tax laws. In all other cases, the Federal Council has a suspensory
veto (that can in turn be overridden by the Diet), but for such a veto the CDU
could not muster sufficient majorities.
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Corporatism, the institutionalized co-operation of trade unions, employers
and the state, played an important role in the expansion of state inter-
vention and of social security in the 1960s and 1970s in the Netherlands,
Austria and Belgium. In top-level tripartite meetings, important decisions
about fiscal policy and social security programmes were made. In the 1990s
corporatism has played an important role in the adaptation of the Dutch
and Austrian welfare states to new economic and social requirements, an
adaptation which has involved a major remolding of social and economic
policy. In Switzerland, the situation has been different. Expansive fiscal
policy has never been used in a encompassing way to tackle economic
problems. Compared to that of other European countries, the Swiss welfare
state emerged late. Judged by social security expenditures, it remained slim
for a long time. It did not experience a dramatic expansion in the 1960s
and 1970 as most other Western countries did. As a result, the need for
retrenchment has been less felt in the 1990s. In the 1990s, the Dutch
Wassenaar agreement was not matched in Switzerland nor was there a
counterpart to the Austrian budget cuts of the mid-1990’s, which were
approved by employers and trade unions. 
This does not mean that there is no Swiss corporatism. The Swiss state,
trade unions and employers co-operate in various ways, although not by
means of top-level bargains on wages, taxes and public expenditures. Since
1947, the Constitution gives trade unions and employers the right to be
consulted before the passage of any implementing legislation in a field of
concern to these organizations. In the everyday political process, this
means that they are consulted before any economic and social policies are
decided upon. In addition, the Constitution guarantees the development of
the economic interest organizations and stipulates that interest organiz-
ations can be called upon to implement public policy. Due to its weakly
professionalized political system (and in particular its national parliament),
the Swiss government relies heavily on expert commissions for the develop-
ment of policy. About 200–400 expert commissions exist at the federal
level. The members are nominated by the federal government which pays
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special attention to the representation of labour unions and employers’
organizations (Papadopoulos 1997: 69–78; Linder 1999, chapter 9; Kriesi
1982). Interest organizations can take over public functions, particularly in
agricultural policy (Sciarini 1994; Halbherr and Müdesacher 1985), but
also in vocational policy (Farago and Kriesi 1986; Farago and Ruf 1992). In
foreign economic policy, interest organizations participate in both formal
and informal ways (Wildhaber 1992: 137).
Why did this institutionally highly developed corporatism so clearly fail
to bring about the outcomes observed in other small countries like Austria
or the Netherlands? For some authors the answer is obvious: Switzerland is
the case of a liberal capitalist, a liberal corporatist and a liberal welfare
state (Katzenstein 1985; Esping-Andersen 1990). In this country, a liberal
party is particularly strong. The social democratic left and the Catholic
centre are weak, hence state intervention in the economy is limited and a
large welfare state never developed. Since there was no large welfare state,
corporatism could not contribute to its retrenchment. A second answer
points to an institution peculiar to Switzerland, not found in neighbouring
nations: direct democracy. Direct democracy is a major impediment to the
expansion of taxation and state intervention (Kirchgässner et al. 1999;
Obinger and Wagschal 2000; Wagschal 1997; Gilliand 1993; Obinger 1998:
141–2).2 Although neither one of these explanations is incorrect, they are
hardly adequate if taken as mono-causal explanations for the development
of economic and social policy. In what follows, I argue that the unique
impact of corporatism on economic and social policy-making in Switzerland
is to a large extent explained by the interlocking network of bargaining
arenas, of which the corporatist forum is only one. This makes it so different
to some other countries with corporatism, where there is fewer or – in case
of majority democracies – no bargaining between the major parliamentary
parties and/or where there is no need or a reduced level of need to
negotiate between central and state authorities.
The underlying idea has been developed by Lehmbruch (1976). In the
case of decision-making within interlocked political arenas, he argues that
policy development is likely to be stalled, if the decision techniques in these
forums vary. One could add that even if all decisions are made through
bargaining and mutual concessions, for rapid policy-making the dominant
goals or power distributions in these different forums have to be similar.
Since this is probably often not the case and since bargaining in different
arenas has to be co-ordinated with bargains between arenas, reaching
agreement on the final decision is time-consuming. It is also contingent on
‘windows of opportunity’ (Kingdon 1984), when decisions emanating from
one bargaining round are tolerated or even accepted by the other centres
of decision making. Due to the need for compromise, the final policy
programme is often composed of elements from different – and sometimes
even contradictory – policy manifestos. In addition, delayed policy-making
gives rise to functionally equivalent private organizations, which are an
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institutional legacy once a public policy decision has been agreed upon. I
argue that these hypotheses are more consistent with the development of
Swiss social and economic policy-making, compared to mono-causal
explanations relying on direct democracy, the weak left and the strength of
the liberal party. Thus I am extending an argument by Gruner (1964: 63):
according to him, the post-war configuration of the Swiss state and econ-
omy is due to ‘this strange hybrid of state socialism and intervention by
interest organizations, accompanied by a nostalgia for liberalism’ ( jene
seltsame Kreuzung von Staatssozialismus und Verbandsinterventionismus samt dem
mitlaufenden Heimweh nach dem Liberalismus). 
In the next section, the major policy decisions in economic and social
policy-making since the 1970s will be listed. The major questions relate to
the components of these policies. Are they overwhelmingly liberal, as the
hypothesis of liberal capitalism and liberal or decentralized corporatism
suggests? Or do they contain quite different elements which plausibly can
be traced back to concessions in and between bargaining arenas? In the
following chapter, the major forums of economic and social policy-making
will be identified. Examples will illustrate how these forums interact.
Social and economic policy in Switzerland 
since the 1970s3
Economic policy
Even in its heyday, Keynesianism had far fewer supporters in Switzerland
than in other countries (Frey 1993: 17). There were attempts at Keynesian
co-ordination, though. In the early 1970s, when the economy was over-
heated, the federal government levied a tax on exports, to be paid back
later. In 1971, in selected regions tearing down houses was forbidden in
order to limit demand for the construction industry. In 1975–6, when
Switzerland experienced its first major employment crisis – in 1976, the
number of jobs had fallen by 9 per cent compared to 1973 – public sector
demand was increased, amounting to more than 2 per cent of GNP. Even in
the 1990s, when Keynesian techniques had been eliminated from the
government’s policy options in most OECD countries, Switzerland imple-
mented ‘impulse programmes’, intended to stimulate economic activity by
fiscal expansion. However, these programmes only muted the pro-cyclical
development of public budgets (social security expenditures excluded); in
Switzerland, they did not become anti-cyclical (Schwartz and Graf 1986;
Saurer 1996; Frey 1993: 39). The federal government acquired the right to
macro-economic steering – without prejudicing the budgetary rights of the
cantons – in 1978, after a draft Constitutional amendment which would
have reduced cantonal prerogatives had failed in a popular vote in 1975. 
This muted anti-Keynesian stance of policy-making is due to the aversion
of Swiss political elites and the Swiss people — as expressed in popular
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votes – to public debt and deficits. As early as 1958, a Constitutional
amendment required the federal government to pay off its debts (Article
42bis). In 1974, the Swiss people voted in principle for a ‘brake on public
expenditures’. However this did not come into effect due to its linkage to a
tax increase, rejected by the people in the same popular vote. In 1995, a
similar proposal led to a new article in the Constitution (Article 88.2 and
Article 88.3). In 1996, parliament imposed moderation on itself with
regard to expenditures. In 1998 the people voted to accept another
constitutional rule. As soon as the federal public deficit exceeds a certain
threshold, austerity measures have to be taken. In April 1998, an informal
‘round table’ of political and societal elites agreed on a package of policies
intended to reduce the federal debt and deficit. 
Price, agricultural and cartel policy have not been liberal in the past. In
1972 when inflation was rising, price controls were temporarily applied,
lasting until 1978. These controls found broad-based support from the
population, which in 1982 – against the advice of economists and the
wishes of the government and the parliament – constitutionally introduced
price controls. Agricultural policy has strongly protected farmers. It is only
in the 1990s that major reforms have been introduced under domestic and
external pressure (Sciarini 1994). In contrast to EU-Europe, cartels are not
forbidden in Switzerland. However, a new law passed in 1995 (Mach 1998)
stipulates that agreements on prices in cartels are no longer legal. 
Apart from muted Keynesianism and price controls, the business cycle
policy directed towards the secondary and tertiary sector has primarily
been monetary policy (Frey 1993: 17, 20). 
Social policy
Judged by the date of introduction of the major compulsory social insurance
schemes of the European welfare states and by the coverage of those
schemes, Switzerland has been a welfare laggard for a long time (Alber
1987: 152; Schmidt 1998: 180). Social security expenditures have been
below the EU average. In particular, the expenditures were much below
that of countries with comparable wealth. In comparison to Western
European countries, Swiss expenditures in 1993 for pensions and health
are almost as high as one would expect from a regression of security
expenditures on economic wealth. Transfers to families and for mothers,
however, are much lower than the regression estimates predict (Gilliand
and Rossini 1997: 141–55). Health insurance contributions are levied per
capita and not per household or family; for a long time premiums have
been completely independent of income. Since 1998, there has been a
subsidy to smaller groups with very low income. This income-related
feature varies by canton. Judged by these measures, Switzerland was a
welfare laggard. It has not avoided welfare state regulations, though. In
addition, developments since the 1970s have seen the addition of many
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important elements of conservative and social democratic welfare states to
the respective Swiss schemes (Obinger 1998). In the 1990s, the size of the
Swiss welfare state converged towards the average European welfare state.
Partly this is due to increased revenues and expenditures of social security
programmes, partly it can be explained by the different statistical treatment
of certain welfare schemes, previously coded as private and now as public,
and partly this is due to shortcomings of official statistics.4
In historical perspective and apart from the major social security
schemes (pensions, unemployment and health insurance), Switzerland has
been a forerunner in social policy. It belongs to the group of countries
which introduced the right of association and the right to combine already
in the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1877, one of Europe’s most
modern factory laws was introduced, regulating minimum age of workers
(14 years), the normal working day (11 hours), and hygiene and accident
prevention at work. In 1911, Switzerland was one of the first countries – if
not the first – to acknowledge collective agreements (including their
inalienability) as legitimate and binding (Armingeon 1994). The factory law
and the regulations on collective agreements codified at the federal level
were modelled on laws which had been established previously in some
cantons (the factory law of Glarus and the law on collective agreements of
Geneva). 
During the inter-war years, the Swiss welfare state fell behind the
average European nation; after the Second World War, it was catching up.
The people endorsed old age pensions for all residents in 1947; com-
pulsory unemployment insurance in 1976 and obligatory health insurance
in 1994. Although these reforms came late and after several failed attempts
(cf. Immergut 1992), they contained remarkable and innovative elements,
partly due to the legacy of delayed reform and partly due to cross-
concessions in the political process. 
When obligatory old age pensions were introduced, a system of occupa-
tional pensions was already in place. Since these schemes were extensive
and long-standing, the new pension system could not simply dissolve these
older systems but had to co-exist with them. In contrast to Bismarckian
Germany in 1883, reforms were not written on what amounted to a tabula
rasa. In this way, the Swiss three-pillar system of old age pensions (a basic
public pension, occupational pensions and private savings) came into
being. The basic public pension is based on the contributions of the
working population, which are transferred to retired people. Occupational
pensions come from a fund which has been accumulated by the individual
employee while he or she has been in employment. This structure relieves
the Swiss pension system of problems, which occur in other countries due
to the exclusive reliance on a single way of financing the scheme. A second
characteristic of the pension system is the coverage: it is confined to
residents, not just employees. Thus it creates a base line of social security
for all elderly inhabitants. Third, the system is strongly redistributive. The
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ratio of maximum to minimum pensions had been settled at 3:1; in 1969
this was changed to 2:1. Where a pensioner is not entitled to a normal
minimum pension, subject to certain pre-conditions, s/he can claim an
additional pension. Hence the guaranteed income of elderly people cannot
fall below the minimum pension. Fourth, the pensions are intended to
provide a basic minimum standard of living. In comparative perspective,
they are rather generous, particularly since the late 1960s. As of January
1999, the monthly minimum pension amounts to about US$720 (US
$1,080 for a married couple); the maximum pension is $1,440 ($2,160 for
a married couple). In addition to this basic income, from the so-called first
pillar of the pension system, occupational pensions also provide income:
these constitute the second pillar. Taken together, these two sources of
income should correspond to about 60 per cent of the last monthly
paycheck. In addition, citizens can save money, which is tax deductible and
can be received only after retirement or for the redemption of mortgages
(the third pillar). The third pillar is mainly of interest to high income
groups among wage earners, since it enables them to avoid high marginal
tax rates. The fourth characteristic of the Swiss pension system is that the
administration of the basic pension and additional pensions is carried out
by the cantons and municipalities. 
In 1995 the people endorsed a major reform of the pension system. The
retirement age for women was increased from 62 to 64 (the retirement age
for men was and still is 65 years). In return, the pension entitlements of
couples were split, so that both receive the same pensions.5 This means that
the spouse who worked mostly in the household and did the child rearing
(usually the woman) has her own income in her own bank account, which is
the same as that of the other partner. Even more important, now years
spent caring for the children until they reached the age of 16 are
considered equal to years of employment for the purpose of calculating the
pension. 
Hence the Swiss pension system combines an egalitarian and generous
basic pension with a strongly income-dependent system of occupational
pensions and an even more inegalitarian third pillar. In comparative per-
spective, the basic pension is particularly egalitarian with regard to gender,
since years of child rearing are treated on a par with paid employment and
since spouses who have not been wage earners are entitled to 50 per cent of
the couple’s pension.
Disability insurance was introduced in 1959. It was introduced late and
has a modern structure (Tschudi 1986: 17): (1) the basic principle is that
integration into working life is superior to sheer alimentation by way of
paying pensions; (2) mental disability is treated the same as physical
disability; (3) pensions for the disabled are the same as the basic pension
for elderly, i.e. their income rises with the level of wages and inflation. 
In 1911, the federal state took over responsibility for health insurance.6
The law established subsidies to private health insurance companies. At the
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federal level, affiliation to one of these insurance companies had not been
obligatory. Some cantons, however, made it obligatory. By 1990, less than
10 per cent of the population was without health insurance. The insurance
companies are private non-profit making organizations (mutual funds).
Contributions are paid per capita and not per family or household, thus
large families spent considerable sums for health insurance. Insurance
companies could reject the applicants and they could levy premiums
according to risk. Different health insurance companies reimbursed expendi-
tures for different types of medical treatments. There were two major
incentives which prevented the insured from using medical care excessively:
an annual flat rate, and a deductible, equally about 10 per cent of all costs,
both of which have to be paid by the insured party. 
A major problem of this scheme has been its failure to stem the rising
costs of health care. As long as insurance companies could try to avoid
‘bad risks’ and as long as costs could be passed on to the insured via
higher contributions, insurance companies had few opportunities or
incentives to affect the development of health care costs. Fees for medical
services were negotiated collectively between insurance companies and
associations representing providers. In 1994 this scheme was reformed.
The basic idea was to continue with the existing system of private
insurance companies – which could hardly be abolished or changed into
public insurance – but to change how insurers compete for members. The
new law stipulated that each inhabitant has to be covered by the same
basic health insurance, plan which reimburses costs of a broad range of
medical treatments. In addition, insurance companies cannot reject an
application for membership. Premiums for a given level of insurance
coverage must not vary according to age, sex or health. A mechanism for
inter-firm compensation was created, equalizing the competitive position
of insurance companies with different age and sex structures. As a result,
insurance companies now have few opportunities to improve their position
by selecting lower risk members. On the other hand, insurance companies
are allowed to negotiate directly with providers over fees for medical
services. Hence the competitive situation of an insurer is mainly depend-
ent on its ability to negotiate advantageous contracts with providers and to
improve internal administration. In this way, an insurer can offer com-
paratively low premiums and rapid turnaround in reimbursing claims for
medical care. Subsidies to low income groups have been another element
of this reform. Below a particular and rather low threshold of income,
citizens can claim a subsidy, intended to reduce the costs of their insurance
premium. 
The reform of 1994 retained many of the liberal principles of the former
system. Premiums have to be paid per capita. They are not income-
dependent (except for low income groups). The insured have to pay a
deductible and the insurance companies are still private organizations. By
allowing companies to negotiate directly with providers, market elements
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have even been emphasized. On the other hand, egalitarian and redis-
tributive elements have been added. In the selection of members, the
market has been abolished, since insurance companies can no longer reject
applicants. Low income groups receive a means-tested subsidy. There is a
equalization between companies to compensate for differences in the age
and gender structures of their membership. Finally, since the reform,
insurance has become formally compulsory in the whole federal state,
although de facto there was hardly change, since nearly all citizens already
belonged to a insurance plan. 
Up until 1976 unemployment insurance was not obligatory.7 Since the
late 1930s, Switzerland experienced uninterrupted full employment and
little need was felt to establish such a scheme. Voluntary insurance was run
by associations and companies, which received limited federal subsidies. In
the early 1970s about 20 per cent of wage earners were members of such
schemes. In the 1960s and early 1970s, the federal administration had
already developed plans to introduce obligatory insurance with particular
emphasis on active labour market policy (Freiburghaus 1987). The major
employment crisis of 1974–9 triggered the introduction of obligatory
insurance. It was approved by the people in a popular vote in 1976. A 1977
preliminary law implemented that decision. In 1984, it was replaced by the
permanent law on unemployment insurance. In international comparison,
Swiss unemployment insurance combines generous rates (70–80 per cent of
previous earnings) with tight controls on the unemployed (Schmidt 1995)
and a short duration of benefits. A major reform was brought about in
1995. It introduced active labour market measures, which the OECD
labelled revolutionary, ambitious and matchless in comparative perspective
(OECD 1996: 124, 132). Activation of the unemployed is the basic idea.
After 150 days (30 weeks) of receiving unemployment benefits, the un-
employed have to attend courses offered by the cantons. Only if they
participate in such measures of active labour market policies are they
entitled to further payments from the unemployment insurance. After a
total of two years of receiving unemployment benefits, the benefits run out.
If the unemployed accept part-time jobs or jobs with much lower wage than
their last job, they are entitled to wage subsidies from the insurance
scheme. The unemployed have to accept any reasonable job offer; a
reasonable job is defined as a job with a wage amounting to at least 70 per
cent of previous earnings. 
Hence Swiss labour market policy combines different elements. With
regard to the late introduction of obligatory unemployment insurance, the
tight control of the unemployed, the strict rules on participation in
programmes of active labour market policy and the definition of
reasonableness of a new job, it is reminiscent of a model liberal welfare
state. On the other hand, the introduction of active labour market policies
in the 1990s and the generosity of unemployment benefits are features of
social policy regimes labelled social democratic (Janoski 1994). 
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Three interconnected rounds of negotiation
This review of major economic and social policies in Switzerland casts
doubt on Switzerland’s unequivocal classification as a liberal welfare state.
Although the major elements point in that direction, certain rules are
redistributive and interventionist, which are familiar from social-democratic
or Christian-conservative regimes of social policy. Neither does the term
liberal corporatism seem completely adequate (Katzenstein 1984, 1985).
Although central tripartite concertation of wage and public economic
policies has not been achieved or even attempted, massive state interven-
tion occurs in economic regulatory policy. This does not correspond to the
assumption of a largely autonomous partnership between labour and
capital, which leaves the state in a marginal role. 
How can this mixture of a liberal, social-democratic and conservative
welfare state with an interventionist but non-Keynesian state be explained?
I argue that these seemingly incoherent policy patterns are the result of
complex processes of compromise building in three interconnected rounds
of negotiations. In their policy formulation these rounds of negotiation are
constrained by popular votes – decisions by majority rule – and also the
policies of the Swiss Central Bank, which favours price stability.
Two limits
Direct democracy is frequently accused of being a major impediment to
reform and adaptation (cf. Borner et al. 1994). The numerous rejections of
social policy reforms in popular votes can explain some of the lateness and
the liberal character of the Swiss welfare state (Obinger 1998; Obinger and
Wagschal 2000; Kirchgässner et al. 1999). In principle, such rejections are
quite likely. Whenever a federal policy is proposed, the federal state must
obtain the constitutional right to legislate in this area. Constitutional
changes must be approved by popular vote. Once the federal state has the
competence to legislate in a certain area, the relevant implementing
legislation may be put to a popular vote. Hence there are two veto points
for opposing groups (cf. Bonoli 1998; Bonoli and Mach 1998). If they fail
in the first round (approving the constitutional amendment), they have a
second chance when the implementing legislation is drafted. The first veto
point, approval of constitutional change, is unavoidable. The second point,
a referendum against a specific law, is optional. Since the requirements for
a referendum are low (50,000 citizens or eight cantons have to support a
referendum), major laws are frequently submitted to a popular vote. Hence
expansion and retrenchment of the welfare state could be institutionally
strongly impeded. This only applies however, if the group which success-
fully petitions for a referendum is relatively large. Once a compromise of all
major societal groups has been achieved and the opposing groups are
marginalized, direct democracy loses its braking effect in most cases.8
Renegotiating the Swiss welfare state 177
Usually the people accept decisions based on broad elite agreement
(Sciarini and Trechsel 1996). On the other hand, political elites are forced
to compromise if they want to avoid the rejection of an intended reform by
a successful popular vote against it (Neidhart 1970). 
A second institutional limitation on social and economic policy-making
is the Swiss Central Bank. In its day-to-day operation it is independent of
government, political parties and interest groups in its policies.9 The law of
the bank stipulates that government and bank inform each other before
decisions on major monetary or business cycle policy are made. Govern-
ment and bank should co-ordinate their policies. Since the 1973, the bank
has considered price stability as its ultimate goal and restrictive monetary
policy as the appropriate means to achieve this aim. As a consequence, any
encompassing counter-cyclical fiscal policy is, in all likelihood, doomed to
failure since the bank will probably react with restrictive measures in order
to avoid inflation and thereby offset the additional demand created by
fiscal policy measures. 
Both of these limits on economic and social policy imply that any reform
has to be based on broad agreement between the major political and
societal groups and that the proposed policy has no major inflationary
impact. This does not imply that successful reforms have to be watered
down. Rather, the need to compromise enhances the possibility of policy
packages which represent the outcome of barter deals between the
respective groups. The more complex this bargaining procedure is, the
higher the chance of non-decision. In addition, once agreement is reached,
the probability is great that it is composed of very different elements,
emanating from multiple deals. 
Three forums of negotiation
The Swiss bargaining process is complex, since it consists of three different
and interconnected arenas or forums, each of which has a major say in
economic and social policy-making: the corporatist, consociational and
federal arenas. The corporatist arena is made up of trade unions, employers’
organizations and representatives of the federal administration. Political
parties and representatives of cultural-linguistic groups bargain in the
consociational forum. In the federal arena bargains occur between federal
and cantonal authorities and between cantonal authorities themselves.10
These rounds are interconnected with regard to the problems to be solved
and the policies to be designed and implemented. In addition, loose
coupling occurs on the level of the actors: due to the small size of the Swiss
economic and political elite, the actors know each other, meet frequently in
different settings and some individual actors in the various rounds are the
same: they are for example representatives of a canton in the federal arena
and representatives of a political party in the consociational arena (cf.
Kriesi 1980, 1982).
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Apart from the ability to trigger a successful referendum against a given
economic or social policy, the power of the actors in these forums lies in
their strategic position in these policy fields. 
The corporatist forum
In terms of resources and personnel, the Swiss central state is a weak
state. It even lacks its own direct tax resources. The present federal tax is
only a transitory measure. To fulfil its functions, the federal state has
needed the co-operation of private organizations and the voluntary and
part-time participation of citizens. This resulted in a large number of
extra-parliamentary commissions. These 200–400 extra-parliamentary,
federal commissions (October 1998) are overwhelmingly staffed by
private experts and representatives of interest organizations, and a few
representatives of parliament and the federal administration. Some are of
marginal importance, such as the former commission for awarding prices
for the best billy-goat. Others, like the commissions for the social security
system or economic policy, however, are the place where far-reaching
plans are developed. Frequently laws are drafted in these commissions,
which are sometimes simply ratified later by Parliament. 
Constitutional changes in 1947 incorporated interest organizations
into the state by guaranteeing their development (Federal Constitution
Art 31bis.5) and by stating that the organizations of the economy have to
be heard before the passage of any implementing legislation of some
concern to them. In addition the federal state has the right to call upon
interest organizations for the implementation of public law (Gruner
1959).
These rules and the tradition of formal and informal consultation
(Kriesi 1980) give interest organizations – in particular employers’ organ-
izations – a position that can hardly be circumvented in economic and
social policy.
The consociational forum
Parliamentary political parties are by no means of marginal importance in
the Swiss direct democracy. Most laws are not submitted to a popular vote.
Between 1947 and 1995 parliament voted on 1,271 pieces of legislation
which could be have been put to a popular vote. Of these, only 6 per cent
(75 cases) went to a popular vote and only 3 per cent of the laws (32 cases)
were rejected by the people. Hence for most policies, political parties in
parliament have the final say (Sciarini and Trechsel 1996). Due to historical
and cultural reasons (Lehmbruch 1967, 1996) as well as the institutional
threat of a referendum, the four major parties are used to seeking com-
promise and making policies in such a way that none of them attempts to
trigger a referendum (Neidhart 1970). One consequence of this is a
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government made up of the same four parties since 1959. It acts as a
collegial and coalition government, i.e. as a administration based on many
political parties and without a coherent programme based on a party
manifesto or an ideology. The parties of government account for about 80
per cent of members of the house of representatives (Nationalrat). Another
implication is the need for lengthy processes of compromise building in
government and major political parties. Any policy is dependent on agree-
ment between four different parties of comparable power. Hence in contrast
to most other Western countries, trade unions and employers cannot strike
a deal with one or two major political parties in government and
parliament. Whenever interest organizations want to accommodate their
policies with the state, this presupposes difficult processes of policy decision
making between numerous actors in the legislative and executive branches
of the state. 
The cantonal–federal forum
The third forum of economic and social policy-making is composed of
representatives of the cantonal and federal authorities. The power of cantons
in a given policy field derives from three institutional rules.
1 Since the federal government has no administrative apparatus for
implementation, it is dependent on the cantonal and municipal organiz-
ations for carrying out the federal laws. In implementing a seemingly
specific federal law, there is often an astonishing room for manœuvre.
(Linder 1988, 1999). 
2 In addition, some economic and social policy prerogatives lie with the
cantons and municipalities. This has an impact on the extent to which
they can modify a federal rule. In active labour market policy, cantons
decide how they structure their employment agencies and they can
even chose to create fewer jobs in employment programmes; although
they have to pay for that. Subsidies for the cost of health insurance
depend on cantonal decisions. Some cantons rarely implement these
subsidies, other are very active and generous, benefiting every third
person in the cantonal population. Some economic and social policies
are decided upon solely by the canton or municipality. This is true of
social assistance after social security benefits have run out. For example,
an unemployed person gets unemployment benefits for about two
years. After that time he/she is entitled to unemployment support from
the canton. This varies considerably. After cantonal unemployment
support has run out, there is cantonal social support. In some cantons
this is a certain percentage of the previous unemployment benefits; in
other cantons – like Geneva – it is cantonal minimum income scheme. 
3 Judged by total resources, the tax burden in Switzerland is low and
most taxes go directly or indirectly to the cantons and municipalities.
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The federal budget is small, measured as a percentage of total GDP.
This has a crucial implication for policies of demand management.
Scharpf has coined the term ‘ the degree of difficulty in pursuing fiscal
demand management’, which is the increase in the central government
budget which corresponds to a rise of 1 per cent in total GDP (Scharpf
1987: 261–9). Performing this calculation for Switzerland reveals that
Switzerland is the country in the OECD world which has to increase
central budget much more than any other.
The implication for the federal government is that it can hardly
administer Keynesian demand management on its own. The solution has
been co-operation between the federal state, cantons and municipalities.
In the typical Keynesian designs of the 1970s and 1990s, the federal
government announced that it was willing to pay a certain amount of the
costs of cantonal or municipal investment, mostly in the field of building
construction. Hence the local or cantonal authorities had an incentive to
make investments, since part of the cost would be paid by the federal
government. In this way, federal demand management triggered a local or
cantonal demand management, which taken together, amounted to
considerable sums. 
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Table 7.1 Degree of difficulty in macro-economic steering and centralization of
public finances, 1995
Country Degree of difficulty Centralization (receipts of central 





















Sources: OECD 1997, National Accounts, Paris: OECD.
Examples
There is hardly an economic and social policy which is not of relevance to
each of these three forums. As a result, policy reform happens only if the
results of negotiation in one forum are not opposed by the outcome in any
other forum. At least tacit approval is needed. If a reform takes place, it is
likely to be composed of different elements which are quid-pro-quos for
concessions made. 
This interpretation can explain why Swiss social and economic policy-
making is composed of different, incoherent elements. Some examples of
major policy developments which support this explanation follow. 
In 1975 a new constitutional article was discussed, giving the federal
government the right to intervene in the business cycle by Keynesian means.
This reform was supported by employers’ organizations, trade unions and
the major political parties. However, it was opposed in the federal forum.
The representatives of the cantons feared that the federal government
would limit the regional politicians’ room for manœuvre. It was argued that
the new constitutional article was an attack on cantonal sovereignty. In
contrast to the national parties, about half of all cantonal factions of the
federal political parties advocated rejection of the article. In the ensuing
popular vote, representatives of the cantonal interests won by a slim
majority. Three years later, the article in question was accepted after
reducing the federal influence on cantonal budgets to co-operation of the
federal state with cantons and representatives of the economy in the draft. 
In the 1994–5 the reform of the unemployment insurance was debated.
There was a discussion between federal and cantonal representatives with
regard to the number of jobs cantons have to provide in programmes for
active labour market policy. Due to the opposition of the cantons, the
chamber of cantons in the strictly bi-cameral parliament did not accept the
draft which was developed by the chamber of representatives in co-
operation with employers and trade unions. The deadlock was solved in a
common meeting of representatives of the cantons, the chamber of
cantons, the chamber of representatives, employers and trade unions (‘The
Compromise of Solothurn’). Trade unions accepted some retrenchment in
passive unemployment insurance in exchange for active labour market
policy. Cantons accepted that they were to provide a large number of jobs
in the context of the active policy, in return for reduced contributions to an
unemployment insurance fund and for more flexibility with regard to the
absolute number of jobs. 
In 1995 the reform of the system of basic pensions combined egalitarian
gender policies with an increase in the age of retirement for women. The
latter had been opposed by trade unions and the Social Democratic Party.
Trade unions called successfully for a referendum on the law. In the event
of its rejection in a popular vote, gender equalization in basic pensions
would have been eliminated too. The Social Democratic Party considered
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equalization superior to avoiding the increase in retirement age and hence
proposed to accept the law. In the end, 61 per cent of participants in the
popular vote voted ‘yes’.11
The interconnectedness of the three bargaining forums and the ensuing
vulnerability of policy changes is obvious in the case of the 1996 labour law
reform. In the corporatist arena, an agreement was reached for a new
labour statute. It would abolish the former prohibition of night-work for
women, as well as facilitating work on Sundays. On the other hand, night-
work should be compensated by a reduction in total working hours. Parlia-
ment changed this compromise in favour of employers by not accepting the
compensation for night-work. Thereafter the members of the four major
parties in the Federal government could not agree on a common position.
In addition, the introduction of more work on Sundays would have been
dependent on supporting legislation in the cantons, subject to cantonal
popular votes. The trade unions and Social Democrats successfully called
for a referendum against this law, which led to its rejection. The corporatist
and consociational bargaining rounds did not arrive at the same result,
making the law an easy victim of the organizations on the left.
A good example of successful co-ordination of negotiation rounds is the
attempt at improving the federal budget deficit in April 1998. The federal
Minister of Finance invited representatives of the cantons, the four major
parties, the trade unions and employers’ organizations to a common
meeting. The federal Ministers for Justice and for Domestic Affairs
participated as well. Working through the night of 6 April 1998, they
decided that in order to reduce the federal budget:
• transfers from the Federation to the cantons would be cut by 300–350
million Swiss Francs per annum;
• the indexation of basic pensions to prices and wages would be delayed
for one year. Previously pensions were indexed every two years, in
future this would happen each third year; 
• a temporary special tax for unemployment insurance would be
continued;
• defence expenditures would be cut by about 12 per cent within three
years;
• subsides to railways would be cut;
• federal expenditures (amounting to 3 per cent of expenses) would be
cut or delayed;
• opportunities for legal tax evasion would be reduced;
• the participants would abstain from certain demands which increase
federal expenditures or decrease federal receipts.
These items represent concessions made by the various actors. Reports
from the meeting emphasize that the representatives of federal and cantonal
administrations, political parties and interest organizations insisted on a
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balanced distribution of costs among their respective clienteles. Once
again, the corporatist arena has not been the most important, nor was it co-
operating with a few governing parties. Rather, negotiations occurred in
and between bargaining rounds. 
Conclusion
The expansion of the welfare state in Switzerland has been delayed; hence
there is less need for its consolidation or retrenchment. Direct democracy is
a major cause of the delayed development. An important reason for the
rather small welfare state expenditures in the past is the distribution of
political power: a weak left and a strong liberal party. However this
explains only a part of the Swiss welfare state and government economic
intervention. Elements of the respective policies and policy changes are not
purely liberal: they represent conservative and social democratic goals as
well. This seemingly incoherent combination of different policy elements
can be traced back to negotiations in federal–cantonal and consociational
as well as corporatist arenas.12 Each of these arenas is important for
economic and social policy making. Without at least tacit acceptance in one
arena of the negotiation results in the other two, failure of policy- making
is likely. In comparison with other corporatist countries, consociational
democracy and state autonomy in a federal system are probably most
pronounced in Switzerland. This applies in particular to the combination
of both political institutions. No European corporatism is faced with both a
strong federalism and a strong consociationalism. In contrast to other
countries, the corporatist negotiations do not produce results, which – on
the part of the state – will be implemented by a governing coalition of one
or two large political parties. Rather, the results of the corporatist bargains
have to be accommodated to the results of governmental and parliamen-
tary decisions of at least four large parties and the decisions of twenty-six
autonomous cantons and their populations. This explains why Swiss
corporatist institutions could never attain such a dominant position in
economic and social policy-making as those in other countries did.
Notes
1 This chapter was written in the context of a research project on the room for
manœuvre of nation states in the period of economic internationalization. It was
supported by a grant from the Swiss National Science Foundation. I am grateful
to Guliano Bonoli, Herbert Obinger and Juerg Steiner for comments.
2 Another explanation points to the absence of centralization in Swiss collective
bargaining. Under these conditions, the prerequisites of macro-economic
steering are not in place. Thus, it is even questionable whether Switzerland can
be labelled a corporatist country (cf. the review of literature by Kriesi 1995:
338–42). Even if one accepts the idea of a corporatism sui generis, this might
explain the lack of a Keynesian past; it does not, however, explain why a strong
corporatism did not affect social policy as it did in other European countries
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apart from the explicit bargains between wage restraint and social policy
compensation.
3 For the development of social policy I rely in particular on the accounts by
Gilliand 1993, Bonoli 1997, 1998 and Bonoli and Mach 1998. The description
of economic policy is based on Linder 1983, Frey 1993 and Armingeon 1999.
4 For an analysis of the expansion – at least in statistical terms – of the Swiss
welfare state in the 1990s, see Armingeon 2001.
5 Hence, technically, it is not the pension that is split between spouses, but the
contributions paid by either of them while married. It can make a difference in
the case of divorcees and people who marry late. This is even more egalitarian,
because it is a de facto recognition of the value of the unpaid work performed in
the household. One implication of this splitting is the right of the spouse to get
her own pension on her own bank account.
6 This section is concerned with basic health insurance, which covers all the cost
of usual medical care. Supplementary insurance exists for special treatments, for
dentists, etc.
7 For labour market policies see in particular OECD 1996.
8 There are, however, instances when major actors have been in support of a
policy and the people rejected it. This applies in particular to decisions on
foreign policy and European integration. 
9 There is, however, a council, composed of representatives of political parties and
interest organizations which supervises the conduct of business by the bank and
which proposes the members of the board of directors to be elected by the
federal government. 
10 The deals between cantons and municipal authorities represent another level of
negotiation which for the sake of simplicity will not be dealt with here. An
informative description of the two- stage accommodation between federal,
cantonal and municipal level in Keynesian policies is given in Saurer (1996).
11 In a second attempt trade unions tried to cancel the decision in 1998. They
failed again.
12 This explanation refers exclusively to economic and social policy making. A
precondition for such deals in and between rounds of negotiations is the ability
of actors gradually to make concessions or to sacrifice less important policies for
more important ones. In the case of strongly polarized or ‘ideological’ issues,
barter deals are less likely and hence deadlock is probable. The innovative Swiss
economic and social policies and the immobility in foreign policy support this
hypothesis.
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8 ‘Bargaining Celtic style’





The political legacy of a decade or more of Thatcherism, Reaganism and
Kohlism has for many, it seems, irreparably tarnished the image of
institutionalised interest intermediation. It is not simply that this form of
bargaining has fallen out of fashion rather, the argument runs, it is no
longer compatible with the prevailing structures of global capitalism. In
many ways this is reflected in the current lexicon of political science and
public administration, replete as it is with concepts apparently antithetical
to the machinations of macro-political bargaining: flexible labour markets,
polyvalent work structures and competitive international markets. Add to
this the mobility of trans-national capital and a purported ‘hollowing out of
the state’ and it is hardly surprising that pessimism should envelop any
future role for macro-political bargaining in the new global economic order.
The problem for those who casually dismiss a role for macro-political
bargaining in the new global economy is not just that they tend to over-
emphasize the level of rigidity within these institutionalized agreements but
in so doing they appear to have been seduced by neo-conservative inter-
pretations of alleged administrative failure; that the real problem facing
west European capitalism has been an explosion in the institutional
impediments to economic growth (Taylor 1996).
Not surprisingly, the central feature of this neo-conservative critique has
been the call for a reduction in state intervention and a corresponding
increase in the role of the free market (Habermas 1989). And yet, in
Ireland, macro-political bargaining has formed the cornerstone of govern-
ment policy for over a decade. Indeed, if the public pronouncements of EU
officials are anything to go by then ‘bargaining Celtic style’ is viewed in the
political corridors of Brussels as an exemplary form of economic develop-
ment. While many Irish politicians were perhaps initially sceptical, few
would now be willing to publicly decry the role performed by national level
agreements in revitalizing the Irish economy. And what a transformation it
has been. Economic growth has been so startling and prolonged as to
border on the surreal. Like Christmas, give-away budgets now appear to
come around quicker each time. 
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This chapter seeks to challenge, therefore, a political orthodoxy which
rejects a role for national level agreements in the new global economic
order. In particular, it cautions against the inclination to portray sectoral or
decentralized forms of negotiation in a more favourable light, as if there is
a natural complementarity between such forms of negotiation and the new,
emerging structures of capitalism. It is also an approach which assumes a
priori that such forms of negotiation are somehow better suited to the
current ‘needs’ of capital. This problem is compounded by the failure to
consider fully the complexity of the managerial function where there is a
tendency to conflate the interests of individual businesses with business in
general or, alternatively, to restrict the parameters of the managerial
function simply to the issue of pay.
Debate has also been hamstrung by the tendency to associate national
level agreements with demand management strategies, a passive welfare
state and/or a social democratic project to reduce unemployment and
poverty through state intervention. It is a limited focus, one which has
precluded consideration of the contribution which national level agree-
ments may make in restructuring the supply side of the economy. Indeed,
what remains novel (and perhaps appealing) to bargaining ‘Celtic style’ is
that it has been formed around an attempt to construct a new form of
governance, one capable of delivering a ‘world class economy’, which
retains a modicum of commitment to avoid social dislocation.
To those of a social democratic disposition the national agreements are
viewed as little more than a ‘sheep in wolf ’s clothing’, Thatcherism without
the accompanying rhetorical garbage of ‘trickle-down economics’. To
others, it appears quite the opposite; excessive state intervention, rescued
only by the influx of American multi-national capital. It is this apparent
paradox, the restructuring of the supply side of the Irish economy within
an ambit largely framed by macro-political bargaining, which has so
perplexed Irish political scientists and economists and which forms the
basis for this chapter. 
In order to explore these themes this chapter is divided into three
sections. The first examines issues which relate to the role of macro-
political bargaining in the new global economic order. As a prelude to a
discussion of macro-political bargaining in Ireland, the second section
examines a number of critical views on the impact of such agreements on
public policy and labour markets. The final section draws together
empirical data which highlight the principal arguments presented in this
chapter.
National level bargaining in the global economy
Among contemporary political scientists it has become increasingly fashion-
able to question the efficacy of macro-political forms of bargaining. Streeck
(1992), Lash and Urry (1987) and Gobeyn (1993), to name but a few, have
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all expressed reservations about the compatibility of macro-political bargain-
ing arrangements and the prevailing global structures of capitalism. It is a
view which has also found favour among those of a more conservative
political persuasion where macro-political bargaining is regarded as an
anathema to an entrepreneurially driven economy. National level agree-
ments, they contend, generate rigidities in the labour market because of
the excessive influence of trade unions in a style of decision-making
associated with ‘old fashioned corporatism’. 
Appraisals from a wide variety of political commentators, then, have
argued that capitalism has moved into a new, dynamic phase in which the
flexibility of productive systems, personnel and organizational strategy is
paramount. Business, it is argued, can no longer sustain the level of
economic growth upon which both the welfare state and trade union
influence upon public policy were predicated. The explosion in social and
political rights which accompanied such bargaining both increased
rigidities in the labour market and imposed institutional impediments to
economic growth. Put simply, macro-political bargaining procedures are
viewed as increasingly anachronistic structures within an era of flexible
specialization (Taylor 1996).1
This is a theme explored in the work of Streeck (1992), who has
questioned the viability of macro-political bargaining in the new, emerg-
ing global economic order. For Streeck, the decay of national corporatisms
can be attributed to a qualitative change in an economic and social
structure which served to undermine the structural and cultural
foundations of corporatism (Streeck 1992: 212). The simple dichotomy
between capital and labour, the central pivot on which neo-corporatist
negotiations were secured, has become increasingly untenable in the new
global economy. Volatile international markets, advances made in tech-
nology and new political cleavages have usurped the basis upon which the
alliance between social democracy and the trade unions had been forged
(ibid.: 213).
Such themes also resonate in the work of Lash and Urry who view
corporatism largely as ‘a matter for compromise between social classes in
very much a national context of resource distribution’ (Lash and Urry
1987: 233). In their view, the penetration of global capital has dislocated
national economies, making an assessment of what is an ‘appropriate
sacrifice’ in the national interest a precarious exercise (ibid.: 233–4). The
internationalization of capital markets and a corresponding shift towards
‘disorganized capitalism’ has manifests itself in a widespread decline in
national level collective agreements and a corresponding increase in
company and plant level bargaining (ibid.: 5). The transformation in produc-
tion techniques, the growth of the service sector and the internationaliz-
ation of production have all impacted detrimentally upon those areas of
the economy which formed the basis for the centralized bargain of neo-
corporatism (ibid.: 234). 
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For Gobeyn, it is possible to identify at least four domestic and inter-
national economic factors which demand a more ‘capitalist oriented’
explanation of the decline of macro-political bargaining structures: the
entrenchment of high levels of structural unemployment in those sectors of
the economy which had high levels of trade union density; the increased
mobility of capital; reductions in tariffs and international barriers and,
finally, the expansion of capitalist investment opportunities. For Gobeyn,
corporatism is being ‘rendered obsolete’ by interrelated trends which have
weakened the bargaining powers of trade unions and, therefore, question
the efficacy of ‘extensive nationally based concertative linkages’ (Gobeyn
1993). 
There are clearly discernible similarities between the respective positions
of Streeck, Lash and Urry and Gobeyn. All emphasize the importance to
management of being released from the constraints imposed by macro-
political bargaining structures, the deregulation of national and inter-
national labour markets, the internationalization of capital and the
corresponding shift in the composition of workforces. However, this
chapter remains more cautious, particularly with regard to the premise
that decentralized forms of bargaining offer a more flexible response to
the rigidities imposed by corporatist tendencies.
The central problem lies in the way rigidity as a concept is used. More
often than not it is applied only to corporatist tendencies and presumably,
therefore, denotes problems which are not experienced in a market-based
response to crisis. As such, the term becomes laden with negative connota-
tions. A more useful distinction, one, which does not carry the assumptions
of efficiency implicit within the metaphors of rigidity/flexibility, would be to
argue that both corporatist and a market-based response to crisis offer
opportunities and constraints. Formulated in such a manner, the framework
does not assume a priori that a market response is more flexible than a
corporatist response to crisis.
In this vein it is more preferable to see market-based approaches as
offering both opportunities and constraints. It may well be the case that a
reduction in the size of the public sector offers the state an opportunity to
depoliticize any programme of restructuring and avoid undue conflict in
vulnerable areas. However, we need to acknowledge that, in the process of
relinquishing responsibility, the state may also lose strategic control in
certain key sectors. This may be compounded by a reduction in the state’s
capacity to provide collective goods which are in the long-term interest of
the economy but which may not emerge from the rational decisions of
individual firms in a free market (Taylor 1996).
A further problem implicit in the work of Streeck, Gobeyn, Lash and
Urry is the tendency to assume that decentralized forms of wage bargain-
ing are necessarily more efficient in responding to the needs of business. It
is a difficulty exacerbated by the fact that such authors not only perceive
this form of bargaining to be inherently more beneficial but that it is
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somehow recognized uniformly as such by management. There is, needless
to say, little evidence in the UK to support such a sweeping conclusion (see
Black 1994; Black 1993; Brown and Walsh 1991).
In managerial parlance such moves are often justified on the grounds
that gains can be made from the flexible deployment of manpower, enabling
management to establish a closer link between pay, performance and the
local labour market (Purcell 1991). However, as Walsh’s research shows,
decentralized forms of bargaining agreements present management with
alternative problems and any tendency to see them as inherently more
‘efficient’ should be resisted. In particular, she argues that decentralized
wage bargaining procedures may actually generate intra-firm bargaining
pressures, thereby reducing the possibility of securing productivity gains.
Moreover, where productivity is determined by interdependent technolo-
gies, as opposed to employee performance, management may encounter
obstacles to the introduction of individual incentive schemes (Walsh 1993:
416).
A further area of controversy often raised in debates about macro-
political bargaining is associated with its alleged propensity to promote rigid-
ities in the economy. Here, neo-liberal economists have been particularly
vociferous in their condemnation of macro-level interest intermediation,
attributing to it a number of fatal flaws. The first relates to ‘obligations’,
which tend to accompany national level agreements. Here, they present a
stark contrast between, on the one hand, governments who face pressure
from trade unions to defend jobs and, on the other hand, managers who
need to be released from their political masters to make ‘tough economic
decisions’ in order to restructure companies.
In a subtle and far more persuasive fashion neo-liberal economists have
also argued that it is not just that public sector industries suffered from
poor management/union relations, but that the state imposes a series of
institutional rigidities which are a burden upon any industry operating
within an internationally competitive environment. Such a difficulty is
compounded by the demands of a new global economic order where
management are required to enact decisions in a shorter time frame, a
function which cannot be performed within the straitjacket of political
dialogue. A further theme, one mentioned only occasionally in the accom-
panying political rhetoric, was that involvement in macro-level negotiations
allowed unions to secure wage increases above the market level, a situation
which reinforced a ‘rates for the job’ consciousness and prevented
management from reducing job demarcations (Dore 1988: 400).2
A second flaw identified by the neo-liberal critique of state intervention
relates to the changing nature of citizenship in the post-war period. Here,
objection centres on the increase of citizenship rights, which have altered
the level of security assumed under the auspices of an expanded welfare
state (Hayek 1960). It is not simply a question of the level of entitlements,
although this in itself tends to raise the hackles of any committed neo-
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liberal economist, rather it is the very structure of those entitlements. From
a neo-liberal perspective welfare benefits increase wage rigidities in the
economy, creating a culture of dependency, which inhibits the emergence
of an enterprise spirit. In short, it represents a fundamental threat to the
underlying efficiency of the economy.3 It is an argument which critics of the
New Right have found difficult to resolve.
Dore’s response has been to concede that the presence of such schemes
has an inevitable impact on the take-up of low-paid jobs (Dore 1988). There
is, in his opinion, a complex relationship between equity (the redistribution
of productive resources) and efficiency in periods of high unemployment.
This, he believes, can be resolved only through some form of macro-
political bargaining which ensures specific levels of employment, thereby
reducing the impact of ‘unproductive rigidities’ (income maintenance
schemes) (ibid.).
On this issue Streeck remains far more circumspect. He has argued that
in the absence of any internationally agreed form of self-restraint and/or
Keynesian employment-creation scheme the institutions which once served
the weak have become defences for those who are employed. Governments
throughout Western Europe have manifestly failed to reduce the division
between the employed and the unemployed (Streeck 1988: 415). 
However, the existence of some forms of rigidity need not present an
insurmountable problem, providing that there is a reduction in productive
rigidities. As Streeck observes, in countries like the United States and
Britain, for example, they have had a trade-off between the flexible access
to the external labour market (hiring and firing workers to change the size
and composition of their workforce) – and strong ‘rigidities’ with respect to
internal deployment, redeployment and retraining (ibid.: 417). It is a
position which contrasts sharply with that of Germany and Sweden, where
unions have managed to secure rigid entitlements to long-term employ-
ment in exchange for high levels of internal shop-floor flexibility (ibid.:
419). Moreover, as Dore notes, measures which seek to improve employ-
ment security (a significant source of labour market rigidity) may actually
motivate firms to adapt to market change through intra-company diversific-
ation. In addition, they may also serve to stimulate employers to pursue
retraining programmes. Within such working environs, Dore believes that
employees may be more receptive to the introduction of new technology
and changing work practices (see Dore 1988: 401).4
These are issues which have attracted the attention of Rhodes who has
also questioned the purported ‘benefits’ of a neo-liberal approach to labour
market regulation. While conceding that the UK has been successful in its
move away from a ‘cluster of Southern European States with rigid labour
markets’, Rhodes is unwilling to accept that this has transformed the
productive fortunes of the British economy (Rhodes 1998). It is certainly
plausible to suggest that greater external flexibility (the hiring and firing of
workers) has been achieved and that the breakdown of union control over
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the workplace may have induced more internal flexibility. However, he
warns that such gains have been achieved without a corresponding increase
in ‘levels of trust (except in inward investing Japanese firms which, in some
sectors, have revolutionised work organisation)’ (ibid.: 8). Neither, has the
associated fragmentation of employers and trade unions assisted in the
‘provision of collective goods such as an effective training system’,
hampering any concerted move away from a ‘low skill equilibrium’. The
consequence is that while the relationship between external flexibility and
internal flexibility has altered, the UK’s regime is still a ‘price-based’ rather
than ‘quality-based’ productive structure (ibid.). A pattern of high wages
and rigid job entitlements is, however, unlikely to result from the
enlightening forces of the free market. In such circumstances, social peace,
worker commitment and high and flexible qualifications tend to be under-
supplied if left to the rational decisions of individual firms. In other words,
certain rigidities (collective goods which are in the long-term interest of the
economy) are important prerequisites to the development of an arena in
which enterprising firms are able to respond and diversify in quality
competitive markets. Here, Streeck suggests that a system of wage deter-
mination which keeps wages higher than the market would otherwise
dictate may actually encourage firms to diversify and invest in training and
retraining. Similarly, employment protection appears to enhance individual
firms’ awareness of the need to invest in training programmes to retain
expensive skills (Streeck 1988, 1992).
There are two themes within this set of arguments, which are of particular
relevance to this chapter. First, it presents a challenge to the dominant neo-
liberal interpretation of what constitutes an enterprising firm. Second, it
raises the crucial question of why certain rigidities imposed upon
management ‘force’ innovation and others not? Why, for example, do the
(alleged) rigidities imposed by macro-political bargaining arrangements
not provide a stimulus towards innovation? There can be little doubt that
Streeck is in agreement on the beneficial impact of certain forms of political
regulation when he states that: ‘political regulation not only need not be
detrimental to economic success, but may constitute a central precondition
for it’ (Streeck 1988: 419). This is reiterated in his opposition to the neo-
liberal perspective when he suggests that rigidities may well stimulate
managerial innovation:
A polyvalent organisation whose subunits are capable of flexibly cross-
ing the boundaries of their assigned functions is expensive, and the
return on investment in polyvalence is difficult to establish. This is why
the de-Taylorisation of work organisation, profitable as it undoubtedly
is for firms pressed for higher product quality and diversity, seems to
proceed faster where there is an additional independent pressure for
reorganisation of work, for other than economic reasons. In the same
way in which institutionally imposed obligations to train improve firms’
Negotiated governance in Ireland 197
skill base, legislation or industrial agreements mandating employers to
enlarge and enrich job definition may contribute to operational
flexibility. In both cases competitiveness increases as a result of adjustments
individual firms would or could not voluntarily have made.
(Streeck and Schmitter 1991: 19; my emphasis) 
It is a view which sits comfortably with his original stance that rigidity
and flexibility are not mutually exclusive. However, on closer inspection
‘beneficial political regulation’ does not extend to macro-political bargaining.
This apparent discrepancy is intelligible only when we realize that for
Streeck, political regulation is beneficial only if it is directed toward the
supply side of the economy, a role he feels macro-political bargaining
cannot perform because it remains circumscribed by its function as a tool
for demand-side change. Streeck’s principal point, and for many it is a
persuasive one, is that:
Some sort of effective Keynesian expansionist capacity seems indis-
pensable for the kind of corporatist concertation and social contract
bargaining that was to stabilise non-American capitalisms of the 1970s.
As much as these systems may otherwise have differed, under the rules
of corporatist bargaining a state that cannot with any reasonable
prospect of success promise to apply its fiscal and monetary tools to
alleviate unemployment cannot possibly hope to gain concessions from
unions or to influence settlements between unions and employers by,
for example, offering to improve the terms of the bargain through
corresponding economic policy.
(Streeck 1992: 211)
In more general political terms, the rejection of macro-political bargain-
ing (and a partial acceptance of the neo-liberal critique of the welfare state)
is also (re)presented by reconstructed social democratic thinking as a
dichotomy between passive and active policy paradigms. The politics of the
‘third way’ finds its leitmotif in the persistent call for the overhaul of an
archaic, passive, universal welfare regime with which macro-political
bargaining is often assimilated.
In a subtle, but nonetheless crucial, fashion the view of reconstructed
social democracy distinguishes itself from the neo-liberal critique of welfare
in the fact that we are no longer exclusively concerned with the role of
individual self-responsibility. A policy paradigm which attributes the cause
of unemployment to the failings of individuals (and subsequently constructs
a neo-liberal safety net) has been supplanted with one which creates
‘opportunities’ and generates ‘incentives’ for individuals who ‘possess’ the
capacity to actively respond to their predicament. This is a policy paradigm
populated not by individuals per se, but by ‘categories of individuals’ whose
membership is defined by their ‘particular circumstance’ and experience of
unemployment (lone parents, the young unemployed or absent fathers).
198 George Taylor
We no longer have a ‘catch all’ experience of unemployment (or receipt of
welfare) and consequently the policy response can no longer be diffuse.
Rather, we have a series of ‘unemployment experiences’ where policy is
tailored to ‘categories of individuals’. Unemployment is no longer ascribed
to the failure of individuals, neither does responsibility lie at the doorstep
of the state. The active dimension to this welfare regime resides in the
tension which exists between state support and individual responsibility.
The state functions to create opportunities from which to assist those
categories of individuals who ‘wish’ to respond to their predicament (this is
the positive/possessive dimension). 
That Streeck’s work sits comfortably within reconstructed social demo-
cracy can be deduced from his use of the term ‘beneficial political
regulation’. Where political regulation is beneficial (employment protection
and training) his vocabulary is infused with terms such as ‘stimulate’,
‘encourage’ or ‘innovate’. These are positive, ‘possessive’ categories and, as
such, are suited to an active policy paradigm. Where political regulation is
not beneficial it is usually associated with income maintenance schemes or
welfare benefits (demand management). The problem for Streeck is that
this tends to assume that macro-political bargaining is synonymous with a
passive welfare state. Again, I remain rather more cautious.
The intention has not been to reduce many of Streeck’s succinct
observations to a discussion of semantics, rather it is to highlight the fact
that macro-political bargaining tends to be (mistakenly) equated with
economic demand management strategies (and/or a passive welfare state).
Neitherhas the objective been to downplay the importance of pressures
emanating from the global economy, which pose significant problems for
Ireland’s form of negotiated governance. Clearly, the increasing penetration
of multi-national companies in the Irish economy, and their capacity to
rapidly relocate production in periods of volatile market conditions, raise
difficulties for successful macro-level concertation (and any co-ordination of
policy response). It would also be naive to assume that in such circum-
stances international capital will not seek more flexibility in the search for
an optimal balance in labour market regulation. This chapter does,
however, caution against the current tendency to view a neo-liberal approach
to labour market regulation as necessarily ‘better suited’ to the prevailing
conditions of global capitalism. In the short term it may deliver greater
external flexibility, but this may fall short of providing the collective goods
(training and education) or the political and economic stability from which
to pursue that most elusive prize; a high tech, high wage economy. 
The general thrust of this argument would appear to find support in
Rhodes’ recent work when he argues that ‘successful economic adjustment,
including greater flexibility in labour markets and the organisation of wel-
fare states, may require, in turn, a flexible form of “market” or “competitive”
corporatism rather than attempted moves in a neo-liberal direction’
(Rhodes 1998: 1).
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While I am generally sympathetic to this position I feel he fails to ‘hit
the nail on the head’. The principal source of our difference rests on
Rhodes’ belief that the success of recent negotiated forms of governance
can be attributed simply to the introduction of pay flexibility at the local
level. Thus, he states that
in sum there are pressures for both a decentralisation and a centralis-
ation (or in some cases a recentralisation) of industrial relations
systems.5 An ‘optimal’ solution would combine some form of incomes
policy or national wage co-ordination with pay flexibility within certain
margins at the level of the firm’.
(Ibid.: 3; my emphasis)
As the discussion of local pay bargaining below indicates, flexibility in
pay negotiations has been an important contributory factor in the success
of macro-political bargaining in Ireland. However, I also want to suggest
that the success of macro-political bargaining should not be attributed
solely to the issue of pay flexibility. I am more than willing to concede, for
example, that the existence of local clauses in macro-level negotiations
allows consideration for the plight of individual companies during periods
of volatile market conditions. It may also establish a closer tie between pay,
performance and the local labour market. However, it should be recognized
that such clauses also provide a focal point for both management and
unions to negotiate changes in work practices and the introduction of new
technology. In other words, the type of issues involved in national level
agreements (and those include local clauses) extend beyond the parameters
of pay (increases) to embrace a discussion about changes in the supply side
of the economy. If they were simply about adding an element of flexibility
to pay negotiations (without removing productive rigidities, as Streeck so
usefully points out) then presumably they would increase wage rigidity over
time (given the constant desire to seek competitive international advantage).
Above all, we need to recognize that the success of national level
agreements is due not simply to the introduction of pay flexibility (Rhodes),
and neither to whether they are exclusively concerned with economic
demand management and/or a passive welfare state (Streeck).
The case study below returns to these themes at an empirical level. It
addresses at least three key arguments. First, that the rigidities normally
attributed to macro-political bargaining agreements are not necessarily
inherent and that, far from being a constraint upon management, macro-
political bargaining agreements in Ireland have been invaluable in the
restructuring of the supply side of the economy. A second argument is that
analyses to date have focused predominantly upon the role of macro-
political bargaining upon setting wage rates in both the public and private
sectors. As such, they ignore the fact that in the Irish case, particularly
with regard to the latest agreement, Partnership 2000, macro-political
200 George Taylor
bargaining has not only assisted management in the restructuring of the
supply side of the economy (both private and public sector industry) but is
at the forefront of moves to introduce flexibility into public sector service
provision.6 The final section examines recent attempts to expand the
experience of partnership and the role this performs in the construction of
a new form of governance in Ireland. 
Macro-political bargaining in Ireland: from the Programme 
for National Economic Recovery to Partnership 2000 
The origins of Ireland’s experience with macro-political bargaining are to
be found in the negotiated institutional arrangements first mooted as a
response to industrial conflict in the late 1960s. To many inside govern-
ment the debilitating experiences of such industrial strife could be
attributed to the particularities of Irish trade union organization, multi-
union representation and a relatively weak level of centralization. In a
concerted attempt to restore stability to wage negotiations, and subsequently
reduce the incidence of strikes, the government prompted a series of
national level wage agreements (NWA) and ‘national understandings’ (NU)
with employers and trade unions during the 1970s. These agreements,
which lasted between 1970 and 1980, involved negotiations over pay
between employers and unions and a series of non-pay negotiations
between unions and government (Hardiman 1988: 53). 
During the 1970s the national wage agreements assumed an increasingly
more structured format. Largely at the behest of the SIPTU (Services,
Industrial Professional and Technical Union), one of the largest trade
unions, attempts were made to develop a structure in which future negoti-
ations would pursue social and economic policies in a more integrated
fashion. The unions were fully cognizant of the fact that any wage increases
secured in national agreements could easily be lost in budgetary policies
which placed an unfair burden upon employees. Although greater success
on this issue was achieved in later agreements, the strategy was severely
hampered in the early 1980s as the combination of political instability and
economic crisis led governments to abandon negotiations with the trade
union movement.
Management had also become disenchanted with national level agree-
ments, apparent in its concerted campaign to decentralize wage negotiations
and tie pay increases to either local labour market conditions or the
profitability of individual firms. However, the emergence of the Programme
for National Recovery (PNER) in 1987 and the Programme for Economic
and Social Progress (PESP, 1990) signalled a renewed enthusiasm for
national level negotiations. 
The PNER had been negotiated amid a crisis in public finances, with
government debt peaking at 117 per cent of GDP. As such, a large part of
its remit was directed toward reducing the debt/GDP ratio to 96.5 per cent
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by 1990 (O’Riordan 1996). However, the programme also delivered higher
living standards for employees as modest wage increases were coupled with
tax reforms. Not surprisingly, its success led to negotiations for a successor,
the Programme for Economic and Social Progress.
As Table 8.1 illustrates, by 1992 the success of these programmes had
ensured that national level wage negotiations, particularly in the manual
and clerical sectors were, by now, the norm.
A crucial part of the success of PESP was based around its focus on
‘restructuring’ the supply side of the economy.7 Here, the most important
innovation was the introduction of a local bargaining clause (clause 3)
which allowed management to tie negotiations to local labour market
conditions, achieve changes in productive rigidities and yet retain
moderation in wage demands at a macro-level. As Table 8.2 shows, clause 3
of PESP allowed management to secure concessions in a wide range of
operating areas, a fact highlighted in research undertaken by the Industrial
Relations News (IRN) which showed that management was successful in
gaining significant concessions in almost half (48 per cent) of the ninety-six
local bargaining deals recorded at the beginning of 1991 (IRN, 37, 1992).8
The IRN study also made an important distinction between items such as
‘agreements to cooperate with on-going change or the tightening up on tea
breaks’ with agreements on cashless pay, increased productivity or major re-
organization/rationalization. What is significant is that when both of these
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Table 8.1 At what level is basic pay determined?
Managerial Professional Clerical Manual
National/industry
collective bargaining 33.3 39.9 55.1 71.0
Regional collective
bargaining 0 2.2 6.5 8.0
Company/division 27.5 23.9 24.6 18.1
Establishment/site 15.2 17.4 17.4 13.0
Individual 39.9 31.2 16.7 5.8
Source: Industrial Relations News (IRN) 38, 1992.
Table 8.2 Breakdown of clause 3 agreements
3% with ‘significant’ trade-offs 48.0
3% with ‘minor’ trade-offs 25.0
3% without trade-offs 14.6
3% plus/radical change 6.2
Less than 3% 4.1
Other 2.0
Total 100.0
Source: IRN, 37, 1 October 1992.
broad categories (significant and minor trade-offs) are put together, the
overall figure for companies where concessions were agreed in return for
clause 3 came to a total of 79 per cent (ibid.). 
The type of changes agreed by unions in a trade-off for payment of
clause 3 included productivity improvements, rationalization/reorganiz-
ation, regrading, cooperation with new technology/new machinery, the
introduction of ‘just in time’ working practices (JIT) and, of course, the all-
encompassing ‘co-operation with on-going change’ (IRN, 36, 1992). Clause
3 was not simply a local pay bargaining clause. Although it introduced an
element of flexibility into macro-level negotiations (allowing management
some latitude on pay), it also realigned discussions toward the issues of new
technology, changing work practices and job demarcations. In other words,
it engineered a situation which demanded consultation, negotiation and
compromise.
In a more novel fashion, PESP also allowed clause 3 payments to be paid
in phases, ensuring that delays could be sought in ‘periods of financial
stricture’. This latter element to the agreement, subject to approval from
both the Labour Court and the Labour Relations Commission on the
financial state of an individual firm, was particularly interesting since it
allowed a ‘breathing space’ to emerge during volatile market conditions or
a currency crisis. Although the data here is more limited, Table 8.3
indicates that while the majority of companies (55.5 per cent) paid clause 3
in a single phase, a phased payment was made in 27 per cent of cases, a
process which became more prevalent as 1992 progressed.
More revealing perhaps is the breakdown of changes provided in Table
8.4. This table highlights two important themes. First, that despite the pre-
dominance of macro-political bargaining structures, Irish management was
extremely successful in altering working practices among core employees.
Second, that many of the changes which took place relate specifically to the
status of employees. As column 1 of Table 8.4 shows, the type of responses
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Table 8.3 How the 3 per cent was applied
Full 3% 
(starting date, phase II of PESP 53 (55.5%)
Full 3% on a phased basis 
(starting date, phase II of PESP) 26 (27%)
Full 3%
(starting date before phase II) 5 (5.2%)
Full 3% 
(starting date after phase II) 3 (3.0%)
Deals in excess of 3% 6 (6.2%)
Interim deals 3 (3.0%)
Total 96 (100%)
associated with flexible strategies designed to increase an organization’s
ability to adapt to volatile market conditions altered radically. The use of
part-time employees, temporary or casual workers, fixed-term contracts
and sub-contractors have all shown significant increases (Taylor 1996).9
Clearly, the incidence of such change reveals a significant disparity
between the rhetoric of national level employer organizations, which often
allude to the restrictive nature of macro-political bargaining agreements,
and the experience of such negotiations.
An additional (but nevertheless crucial), component to the success of
macro-political bargaining in Ireland has been the institutional apparatus
designed to resolve disputes between management and unions. As Tables
8.5–8.8 show, there has been a substantial reduction in both the incidence
of strikes, the level of unofficial strike activity and the number of days lost
in disputes. Indeed, a comparison between the period 1982–7 and 1988–93
provides stark evidence of the success of PNER and PESP in reducing the
level of strike activity in the economy. 
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Table 8.4 Has there been a change in the use of the following working
arrangements over the last three years (percentages)?
More Same Less Not Don’t 
used know
Weekend work 14.5 50.7 14.5 14.5 5.8
Shift work 15.2 54.3 8.0 15.9 6.5
Overtime 23.2 34.1 34.1 2.9 5.8
Annual hrs contract 4.3 17.4 9.4 50.0 1.4
Part-time work 31.2 26.8 4.3 26.1 11.6
Temporary 37.7 36.2 8.7 6.5 0.7
Fixed-term contract 37.7 29.0 4.3 19.6 0.7
Home-based work 1.4 4.3 – 70.3 0.7
Govt training scheme 13.0 29.0 – 36.2 2.2
Sub-contracting 36.2 29.7 3.6 20.3 0.7
Source: IRN, 38 October 1992.
Table 8.5 Number of strikes and work days lost during a six-year period of









Average number of days lost per annum 355,000
While the data confirms the success of macro-political bargaining in
reducing industrial conflict it is worth noting that industrial strife has not
simply disappeared. Any success in macro-level concertation demands a
conciliation service (accepted as legitimate by all parties) which provides an
institutional setting in which antagonism may be resolved. Here, as Table
8.9 indicates, the combination of the Labour Court and the Labour
Relations Commission has proved remarkably successful in resolving
disputes between management and unions. Clearly, while national level
agreements have contributed significantly to a period of sustained political
consensus we have also witnessed an impressively high ratio of settlements
through the institutional mechanisms designed to alleviate antagonism.
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Average number of days lost per annum 126,000
Source: Central Statistics Office/*Department of Enterprise and Employment.
Table 8.7 Number of strikes which commenced in the period 1987–91
Year Total Official Unofficial
1987 76 54 (71%) 22 (29%)
1988 72 46 (64%) 26 (36%)
1989 41 28 (68%) 13 (32%)
1990 51 35 (69%) 16 (31%)
1991 52 39 (75%) 13 (25%)
Source: Department of Labour Annual Report, 1991.
Table 8.8 Days lost due to strikes in the period 1987–91
Year Total Official Unofficial
1987 260,000 235,000 (90%) 25,000 (10%)
1988 130,000 123,500 (95%) 6,500 (5%)
1989 41,400 29,800 (72%) 11,600 (28%)
1990 203,700 196,000 (97%) 6,800 (3%)
1991 82,900 73,600 (89%) 9,300 (11%)
Source: Department of Labour Annual Report 1991.
Although most commentators were of the opinion that PESP had been an
outstanding success, the latter stages of this agreement coincided with a
particularly unstable European economic climate and a national interest rate
crisis during 1992–3. While growth rates in the economy were significantly
less than those achieved during the late 1980s and early 1990s the picture
was far from disastrous since the levels attained were still above the European
average and, in contrast to other EU states, Ireland achieved modest growth
in employment. However, the legacy of high rates of long-term unemploy-
ment coupled with an above average rate of expansion in the labour force
meant that it continued to struggle with the seemingly interminable problem
of long-term structural unemployment. It was against this backdrop of
uncertainty that the social partners embarked upon negotiations for a third
agreement; the Programme for Competitiveness and Work (PCW). 
In contrast to its predecessor, the PCW did not have the provision for
local bargaining. The debilitating experience of currency instability in
1992–3 had a profound influence on the parameters struck for the PCW. As
a result of the slow-down in economic growth employers were reluctant to
concede wage negotiation at a local level over and above that agreed for
the national level. (O’Riordan 1996). Thus, in terms of the basic pay
negotiations, the PCW involved a series of staged payments to be made
over a three-year period from 1994–6. Basic pay increases of 2 per cent in
1994, 2.5 per cent in 1995 and a 2.5 per cent in the first six months of
1996 were agreed. An additional 1 per cent would be made in the remain-
ing six months of 1996. 
From the outset the main objectives of the PCW were alleviating the
burden of taxation on workers with low incomes and raising the income
threshold at which higher rates of taxation would come into play. With
regard to the first priority, the increase in the level of income exempt from
tax as a result of the government’s 1996 budget did give a real relative
improvement to the very low paid. However, it did so only after an inade-
quate increase in the exemption limit in the previous budget. Not surpris-
ingly, from the trade unions’ perspective the overall experience of the PCW
was disappointing. Little real progress had been achieved in reducing the
burden of taxation on the low paid (ibid.: 6). 
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Table 8.9 Settlement of industrial disputes in the public and private sector
Year No. of  referrals Meetings Settled
1990 1474 2074 73%
1991 1880 2385 85%
1992 1935 2450 75%
1993 1844 2379 71%
1994 1551 2055 66%
1995 1692 2072 70%
1996 1487 1999 81%
The principal reason for the Irish government’s failure to meet its tax
reform commitments resulted from its decision to over-fulfil the PCW’s
agreed fiscal policy objective. All parties to the PCW had supported a policy
of maintaining the government deficit within the Maastricht ceiling of 3
per cent of GDP and by staying at 2.2 per cent the Irish deficit met that
condition by a wide margin. In addition, all parties to the PCW were in
agreement with meeting the other Maastricht guideline in respect of fiscal
policy, namely that of making satisfactory progress towards a Debt/GDP
ratio of 60 per cent (ibid.). And yet, during the period of the PCW the Irish
economy experienced an unprecedented level of economic growth
averaging 6.5 per cent between 1994 and 1996. The period of the PCW
also witnessed a particularly low level of industrial strife and a record low of
industrial disputes in 1994 with just 25,550 working days lost (see Table
8.10). 
That pay should be considered as only one of a number of issues which
are important to relations between management and unions is confirmed
by the Labour Relations Commission’s findings that pay and conditions
were no longer the primary source of industrial strife in Ireland (LRC
1997). Rather, issues such as poor human relations between shopfloor and
line managers, the absence of communications/consultation and the intro-
duction of major change were now the most significant issues of contention.
Indeed, the Commission was moved to remark that ‘significant and
constant change is the order of the day’ reflecting the impact of new
technology, deregulation in state industries, international competition and
the changing nature of the workplace. Accordingly, its conciliation service
was now increasingly concerned with disputes about new management/
production techniques and changes in work practices, particularly in the
public sector (LRC 1994). What is more, the Commission also noted that
while a relatively low level of disputes had been recorded on the disclosure
of information and union recognition they had shown a ‘notable increase’
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Table 8.10 Industrial disputes: 1993–8
Year Number of Number of Workers Total days 
disputes firms involved involved lost
1993 48 48 12,789 61,312
1994 29 238 5,007 25,550
1995 34 34 31,653 130,300
1996 32 30 13,339 114,584
1997 28 28 5,364 74,508a
1998 34 62 8,060 37,374
Source: Central Statistics Office 
Note
a This period falls under the Partnership 2000. A significant element of this figure is
attributed to the Irish Life insurance company dispute, which accounted for 10,080 days. 
(LRC 1997: 18). For the unions, it is an important issue, one likely to
assume greater political visibility in the future. 
What remains patently clear is that under the terms of the PCW (which
had been far more narrow than PESP) management was able to pursue with
continued vigour the restructuring of the supply side of the economy.
Management’s success in this regard has been confirmed in a recent study
which shows that during the 1990s 75 per cent of firms introduced new
plant and technology and over 60 per cent secured changes to working
time arrangements, working practices and new employee involvement
initiatives. In addition, payment systems and promotional criteria were
revised or altered in nearly half of all workplaces. As the authors note,
‘while it is difficult to estimate the depth of such change from these data,
the level of workplace change and the range of issues addressed appear
very significant. Evidently workplaces in the Celtic Tiger are indeed highly
dynamic’ (Roche and Geary 1998). 
There can be little doubt that the conditions of political and economic
stability fostered under PESP continued throughout the duration of the
PCW. While unions were seeking better terms for their members, they were
also acutely aware of the need to pursue a strategy which endorsed invest-
ment in new technology and capital. Keen to avoid the experience of unions
in the UK, who had found themselves isolated from the wider decision-
making agenda of public policy, the trade unions have been willing partners
in the search for new investment and the introduction of new technology.
This is confirmed in recent research undertaken by D’Art and Turner
(1999), which shows that while a ‘them and us’ attitude to management/
union relations may not have disappeared, there have been important
developments in the 1990s. 
For D’Art and Turner, the intensity of a ‘them and us’ attitude in
management/union relations is significantly related to ‘employee awareness
of the need for firm survival, greater discretion in work, satisfaction with
industrial relations procedures and a cohesive union organisation’ (D’Art
and Turner 1999: 112). Their research suggests that the presence of a
strong and functioning union at firm level has the potential to address
problems such as ‘lack of trust between workers and management or the
lack of institutional support from upper management’. In addition, they
argue that collective bargaining allows workers to participate and negotiate
for a share in the surplus of the firm, and increase worker confidence in
dealing with management (ibid.: 113). These are certainly themes which
attracted the attention of Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) in the
early 1990s as it sought to actively encourage firm level participation
(ICTU 1991, 1993). 
Almost all parties to the macro-level negotiations concur that in the area
of employment expansion the PCW was a qualified success. What remains
in doubt is the adequacy of this achievement, given the inherited unemploy-
ment problem and the level of resources being used to tackle long-term
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unemployment (O’Riordan 1996: 7). Under the terms of the PCW the
government was committed to establish a new community employment
(CE) venture which would enable the unemployed to undertake work of
public or social value while providing them with work experience and
development training. In order to reduce any ‘disincentive’ to take up such
opportunities the government agreed that secondary welfare benefits would
be retained. As such, the government was committed to provide 40,000
places on a voluntary basis by 1994. 
The PCW also required the government to have regard to the findings of
the National Economic and Social Forum (NESF), a consultative body
which embraced diverse interests such as the unemployed and women’s
groups. In June 1994, NESF issued a report on Ireland’s long-term
unemployed, which called for the development of an employment service,
targeted at those registered as unemployed for more than six months. In
January 1996, the government finally responded with four initiatives:
30,000 or 75 per cent of CE places would be allocated to those over 21 and
unemployed for at least twelve months; 10,000 CE places (25 per cent)
would be reserved for those over 35 and unemployed for three years or
more; an additional 1,000 places would be provided on a pilot basis for
those over 35 who had been unemployed for more than five years; and
finally, the government would introduce a new scheme aimed at those who
had been unemployed for six months who it felt were likely to become
long-term unemployed. The attractiveness and subsequent success of this
initiative resulted in a conflict between the government and unions. Although
participation averaged 31,800 the figure of 40,000 had been surpassed by
the end of the year, encouraging calls from some quarters for cutbacks. As
far as the unions were concerned such programmes had been jeopardized
by an over-zealous pursuit of fiscal rectitude (O’Riordan 1996).
In many ways the trajectory of the PCW reflected the dilemmas facing
the Irish state as it sought to balance the political demands of the trade
unions to increase the living standards of its members, and government’s
intention of creating an environment in which global capital would seek to
reside. As such, the main tenets of the programme (as its title so eloquently
reveals) were designed to engineer a consensus around the need to embrace
more fully the ‘realistic economic strictures of the global market’. In this
sense, it represented a subtle, but nonetheless crucial, shift towards a more
conservative economic outlook, one which had effectively abandoned any
pretension to the social democratic ethos which may have permeated
elements of earlier agreements. 
If we avoid being seduced by the political rhetoric which surrounded
the PCW, it remains patently clear that while it may have embraced the
language of inclusion it did little to alleviate the vast inequalities which
persist in Ireland. Neither did it contribute in any meaningful sense to
addressing fundamental questions about industrial democracy. This latter
issue, which has attracted the sobriquet of ‘plant level partnership’, was the
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subject of negotiations, which formed the basis of Partnership 2000 and is
likely to figure in discussions for a successor agreement.
The issue of firm level participation is a crucial one. As Regini has
succinctly observed, concertative efforts during the 1970s were charac-
terized by political exchange and a compensatory role for the state. Whereas
such relationships offered immediate and tangible rewards for the state
(stability, legitimation and self-restraint), the ‘reverse was almost never the
case’ (Regini 1996: 17). In other words, a tension emerges between, on the
one hand, the insulation from rank and file pressures offered by the mono-
poly of representation and on, the other hand, the risk of a crisis of
representation as union leaderships become distanced from their member-
ships. As Regini points out, contrary to the assumption of neo-corporatist
theory, the recent Italian situation shows that ‘concertation without explicit
political exchange may succeed precisely when interest organizations
become less centralized and insulated from rank and file pressures; and
especially, when workplace representation acquires a greater role vis-a-vis
the union bureaucracy (ibid.: 19). 
Representation rooted in the workplace (and enhanced participation)
may overcome a crisis of representation because it reaffirms the ‘relevance
of trade union activity’ to the rank and file. In this context it seems
plausible to suggest that local level bargaining clauses, such as clause 3,
may have (unintentionally) resurrected the role of plant level union activity,
providing a focal point for management union discussions and thereby
reaffirming the relevance, value and (partial) success of a trade union
presence. 
Such developments provide tangible reasons for caution against those
who see macro-political bargaining in terms of rigid, static structures,
populated by actors implacable to the changing circumstances of the global
economy. Negotiated forms of governance should therefore be seen in
more dynamic terms, recognizing its capacity to change over time and in
response to influences emanating from outside national borders.
The latest two agreements have more firmly embedded national agree-
ments and ‘partnership’ within the Irish political psyche. Indeed, they have
confidently proclaimed the basis for a new political architecture in Irish
politics. They are no longer simply about compensatory state action or
simply crisis management but, more crucially, involve the construction of a
new form of social and political regulation. They do not remain circum-
scribed as incomes policies or pay agreements (although these remain
integral) but are about providing the basis for new forms of policy-making.
This was a shift from a concern with the exchange of resources, in order to
secure political acquiescence (redistribution), to an allocation of economic
policy authority (regulation) (ibid.: 17).
On this matter, O’Donnell has noted that while bargaining as a concept
distinguishes social partnership from more liberal and pluralist approaches
in which consultation is more prominent, it ‘does not entirely capture the
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partnership process’ (O’Donnell 1998: 102). For O’Donnell, partnership
entails the ‘players in a process of deliberation that has the potential to
shape and reshape their understanding, identity and preferences’. This is
an important theme, since it recognizes that identity (and presumably
interests and strategy) ‘can be shaped through interaction’. As such, he
suggests that one of the more notable features of the partnership experi-
ments has been the reluctance to engage on ‘ultimate social visions’. Under
such circumstances the social partners are more concerned with a problem-
solving approach where consensus is no longer a ‘pre-condition’ as much as
an ‘ outcome’ (ibid.). 
A further element of innovation, as far as O’Donnell is concerned, has
been the shift away from Partnership being the exclusive preserve of the
peak organizations. Social partners are no longer concerned purely with
their role as representatives of given occupational groups but are now
actively engaged in ‘mobilising citizens who have problems that need to be
dealt with’. Fixed functional roles have been supplanted by the need to co-
ordinate between groups and extend the functions of public advocacy
(ibid.: 103).
These new forms of social partnership have induced changes in the
relationship between policy-making, implementation and monitoring in
ways which place monitoring at the centre of policy (ibid.: 104). It is a set of
arguments with which I have a good deal of sympathy, not least because
it reinforces the view that macro-political bargaining structures are
not necessarily rigid and static structures, but involve the dynamic
(re-)construction of relationships aimed at forging political and economic
stability.
Bargaining and the (re-)construction of the Irish welfare state
Any discussion of the manner in which the Irish state has forged political
and economic stability demands an examination of the changing nature of
its welfare state. In Ireland it is an area of debate where there remains a
good deal of confusion. To those of a social democratic disposition there
appears to have been a discernible reorientation in the priorities of the Irish
welfare state, a shift away from a concern with the redistribution of wealth as
the Irish polity embraces the strictures of neo-liberal economic policies.
Indeed for some, it is reflected in the changing lexicon of Irish politics
which appears increasingly redolent of the Conservative administrations of
Mrs Thatcher: the handbag may be missing, but the metaphor of ‘all boats
rising with the new tide’ has simply supplanted that of trickle-down
economics.10 And yet it is difficult to avoid the feeling that in this attempt to
ward off the neo-liberal ‘bogeyman’ debate has all too often tended to
excessively eulogize the period in which the KWS was in the ascendant. 
To others, it appears quite the opposite; obtrusive state intervention and
excessive welfare benefits have proved an increasingly onerous burden
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upon the Celtic Tiger.11 It is an argument which, more often than not,
revels in a ‘straw man’ account of the welfare state, that its labyrinthine
bureaucratic structure has crowded out investment, created a culture of
dependency and undermined the emergence of an entrepreneurial spirit.
Yet, such political arguments have undeniably assumed greater prominence
as the Irish polity confronts the ‘novel’ (almost incomprehensible) prospect
of a tightening labour market while many remain in the category of the
long-term unemployed. Of course, there is little mention of the nature of
the ‘available’ work, its rates of pay or conditions. Needless to say it is an
environment in which the clichés of tabloid journalism prosper. The
incessant calls for more stringent eligibility to certain welfare entitlements
simply echo the rhetoric, which often accompanied the policies of the
Conservative governments in the UK during the 1980s.
To a large extent the sterility of this debate can be located in the fact
that it has often been reduced to little more than discussions about the
benefits (or not) of reductions in taxation or increases in welfare provision.
Yet, the central issues remain more complex and deep-rooted, as the Irish
state has occupied itself with an altogether more important political
project. Indeed, what remains novel (and perhaps appealing) to bargaining
‘celtic style’ is that it has been formed around an attempt to construct a new
form of governance, one capable of delivering a ‘world class economy’,
which retains a modicum of commitment to avoid social dislocation.
It is by no means a simple task, as is evidenced by the fact that policies
have been ad hoc and in many instances experimental. Confusion stems
from the fact that if there has been a social democratic element to certain
policies designed to ease the passage into the labour market (medical cards
and area-based employment schemes spring to mind) there has also been a
distinct neo-liberal tinge to the preference for more stringent criteria for
eligibility to welfare entitlements, a predisposition to increase the use of
fraud squads and the determination to resist increases in welfare payments
above the rate of inflation. What remains patently clear, however, is that
even where reform has been marginally inclusive its principal motivation
rests firmly upon enhancing the flexibility of the labour market.
If we are to grasp more fully the nature of this political project it is
essential we avoid the tendency to associate national level agreements with
demand management strategies and/or a passive welfare state. What is
more, if we are to understand the relationship between macro-political
bargaining and welfare policies we need to avoid assuming that macro-
political bargaining becomes ossified into a rigid political landscape. The
trajectory of policy (as well as its attendant political discourse) is clearly
shaped by the pervasive influence of the global economy and the changing
political complexion of coalition governments (in the Irish case there has
been a discernible shift to a conservative/neo-liberal position in the latter
part of the 1990s). This chapter argues therefore that these negotiations
have not been preoccupied simply with the issue of either pay or a social
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democratic vision to reduce inequality. Rather, they form part of a wider
strategy concerned with constructing a political discourse which champions
greater flexibility in the labour market, the construction of a more active
welfare regime and redefining the relationship between the public and
private sector.
It would be churlish to suggest that the growth in employment attained
so spectacularly during the 1990s has not been beneficial to many
elements of Irish society. However, it would also be misleading to deny
that those who have gained most have been those in employment and
those that have gained inordinately have been those on higher wages. It
may well be the case that a prolonged period of unprecedented economic
growth and an improvement in public finances has ensured that the type
of calculated assault upon the welfare state witnessed in the UK during
the 1980s has been largely absent, but few would brook argument that it
remains incongruous, indeed obscene, that poverty persists in the era of
the Celtic Tiger
While the social security cuts of the late 1980s now appear a distant
memory, the percentage of households below poverty lines, calculated as
proportion of average income, was generally higher in 1997 than in 1994
(Nolan 1999; see also Nolan and Whelan 1999). If, as Nolan observes,
distribution-sensitive measures are taken into account, incomes which fall
below the poverty line rose sharply between 1994 and 1997, having fallen
between 1987 and 1994. However, the numbers below a ‘fixed’ poverty line
set at 60 per cent of average income in 1987 and up, rated in line with
prices rather than average incomes, declined sharply between 1994 and
1997. As Nolan points out, this
reflects the fact that average incomes have risen substantially in real
terms, that is ahead of prices, for those with incomes from work and
those relying on social welfare. The latter, however, have lagged behind
the exceptionally rapid growth in earnings and especially profits over
the period’.
(Nolan 1999: 4) 
There have also been notable changes to those categories ‘at risk’ of
experiencing poverty. For example, from the data gleaned from the 1997
Living in Ireland Survey Nolan points out that between 1994 and 1997
the ‘risk of falling below half average income rose for single-person
households, particularly for those where the head was 65 or over, and
fell for some types of households with children. The risk of households,
which were headed by an unemployed person, remained high, a
situation alleviated only by the increase in employment during this
period’.
(Ibid.) 
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Medical cards and area-based employment schemes
Changes to the eligibility for medical cards and the introduction of area-
based employment schemes are two of the more prominent (active) policy
changes which reveal a concern with the relationship between welfare
policies and the labour market. In Ireland, access to free medical care is
available only to those whose income is below a specific threshold and is a
means tested non-cash benefit. It has long been argued that the cost of
medical care is an important consideration for those unemployed who are
presented with an opportunity to return to the labour market. Defending
the interests of your family can be an uncomfortable and complex juggling
act, where the decision to enter low-paid (and often insecure) work is
countered by the ‘potential threat’ of high medical costs. It was certainly a
view recognized by the Expert Working Group on Integrating Tax and
Social Welfare, which observed that:
The effect of the medical card on the incentive to work is generally
accepted to be significant. This is particularly marked where recipients
perceive that there is a high risk of illness for themselves or their
families . . . recipients can understandably put a contingent value on
the card much in excess of the value imputed from estimates and ... in
these circumstances an unemployed person might be unwilling to take
up a relatively well paid job.
(Cited in Callan and Nolan 1999: 67) 
In its interim report the group recommended that, irrespective of future
income, those registered as long-term unemployed should retain a medical
card on re-entering the labour market. It was a measure implemented in
the 1996 budget with the period of retention being three years as opposed
to the two years recommended by the expert working group. While it
remains too early to ascertain the impact of such measures, Callan and
Nolan (1999) have suggested that the survey material would appear to
indicate that it is a policy measure ‘likely to be important for only a small
minority of the unemployed, but for that minority the impact could be
quite substantial’ (ibid.: 2).12
What remains of interest to the arguments of this chapter is that this is
not simply a case of improving public finances affording an increase in the
threshold for eligibility (a passive policy reaction). Rather, a relaxation in
the rules governing eligibility has introduced a more dynamic element to
policy so that those who are unemployed can now retain their medical card
for a period of three years as they re-enter employment. It is a policy which
clearly attempts to both overcome the vagaries of employment insecurity
associated with low-paid work and increase flexibility in the labour market.
It has also been one of the clearest indicators of a shift towards a concern
with the relationship between (active) welfare policies and their impact
upon the supply side of the economy. 
214 George Taylor
In Irish public policy there are few areas more prominent in debates
about the appropriate role of the state than in rural and urban develop-
ment. It is not that the social dislocation associated with uneven development
is a particularly recent phenomenon. Rather, the problem (in its new
guise), and by definition the character of its political response, is shaped by
debates which surround public policy in both a national and international
setting. 
Since 1991 Ireland has been engaged in an attempt to produce a series
of innovative programmes aimed at alleviating long-term unemployment.
As part of the Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP, 1990)
the government initiated the development of twelve area-based Partner-
ships in urban and rural communities. Few would deny that the stimulus to
such policy developments originated in the failure on the part of successive
central administrations to resolve what appeared to be the intractable
problem of long-term structural unemployment.13 Indeed, for those such
as Sabel these schemes are at the ‘core of the experiment’ to ‘address issues
of social exclusion in a more flexible, decentralised and participative way’
(Sabel 1996: 3). In a similar vein, the National Economic and Social
Council (NESC) has argued that local area-based initiatives which tackle
marginalization and social exclusion should be developed as a ‘potentially
effective strategy’ in promoting greater integration in social and labour
market policies, and that the ‘more closely involved’ are local communities
in the planning and delivery of area-based projects, the more they will
reflect ‘local needs and priorities’.14
While these partnerships remain independent organizations under Irish
company law they consist of representatives of a set of divergent interests:
the unemployed, the social partners (trade unions and business), regional
representatives of social welfare, training and education and farming
organizations (Sabel 1996: 4). Through this structure partnerships have
had an extensive influence over a significant share of the local activities and
resources of the agencies of both local and national government. For both
NESC and the OECD, the novelty (and anticipated success) of these
ventures rests firmly on their capacity to transcend the traditional dicho-
tomies of advanced capitalist economies: the public and private, local and
national and representative and participatory forms of democracy. Thus,
for example, the OECD’s report contends that these partnership initiatives
have served as ‘springboard’ to an exploration of innovative responses to
economic and social problems that may provide a possible channel through
which to circumvent the social dislocation associated with the drive toward
a modern flexible economy.
Within such partnership-based approaches it is possible to delineate at
least two crucial, complementary themes, which are of particular import to
this chapter. First, the forceful assertion that these schemes offer the basis
from which to establish a new set of state civil/society relations in a flexible
economy. Second, that partnership schemes are somehow capable of
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delivering economic regeneration in areas which had proved stubbornly
resistant to the benefits of the Celtic Tiger. 
It is not simply that these experiments offer new avenues through which
the unemployed may participate in mainstream economic activity. Rather,
their supporters anticipate, or at the very least envisage, a remodelling of
the traditional relationship between the state and the unemployed as stake-
holders. A considerable amount of debate has therefore been generated
around the extent to which these schemes offer new participatory structures
or enhance empowerment (see Curtin and Varley, forthcoming). However,
there has also been a discernible shift in these schemes to ‘put enterprise
development high on the agenda of these partnerships’ (Craig 1994: 114). 
In this context, one of the features of the new schemes which has
received considerable attention has been the manner in which they have
encouraged the relaxation of rules governing eligibility for social welfare
payments. For those such as Sabel, such adjustments ‘make participation in
these programmes broadly affordable and attractive’, removing disincen-
tives which may ‘deter the most needy from exploring these possibilities’
(Sabel 1996: 10; see also Craig 1994). The introduction of the Area
Allowance (enterprise) scheme meant that long-term unemployed people
could establish their own business while retaining their welfare benefits for
one year. At the end of 1992, 223 had availed themselves of this benefit. By
1993 it had risen to over 740 (Craig 1994). 
This desire to applaud moves to relax rules governing eligibility stems in
part from the firm belief that such moves mark an important step in
attempts to redefine relations between citizens and state bureaucracies and
encourage enterprise. In a more sceptical light, it is possible to suggest that
the optimism with which these schemes have been endowed needs to be
tempered by the possibility that any short-term success may be simply the
natural by-product of an economy in a period of boom and that at some
future point such schemes may well perform a role in identifying the
difference between the deserving and undeserving unemployed.
The area allowance (enterprise) scheme is but one of series of active
welfare policies designed to introduce flexibility into the labour market and
which find their origins in developments emanating from the EU. Following
the extraordinary meeting of the European Council in November 1997,
Member States have been obliged to introduce National Action Plans (NAPs)
in response to unemployment. In Ireland, the National Action Plan contains
a succession of active welfare policies targeted toward the long-term
unemployed. The back to work allowance scheme (27,000 places), for
example, allows for 100 per cent retention of welfare entitlements for those
taking up self-employment. In a similar vein, the Job Assist scheme offers
those long-term unemployed returning to work a tax allowance of 3,800
euros (plus £IR 1,000 per child) tapered over three years, with a double
deduction for employers who employ them. Similarly, the introduction of
the one-parent family payment in 1997 which enables lone parents to earn
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up to 7,600 euros per annum without affecting their entitlement to payment
form part of an incentive structure being built into welfare entitlements
which are designed to alter the relationship between welfare entitlements
and the labour market.15
And yet, while many of these incentives could be interpreted as active,
inclusive policies they have also been accompanied by more stringent
criteria for eligibility to welfare entitlements and a marked predisposition
to increase the use of fraud squads. The line drawn between a policy aimed
at constructing a more inclusive society (and remains optional), and a
policy which attaches punitive conditions, can often be very thin. In the
Irish case, for example, the evident discord between the Ministers for
Social Welfare and Enterprise and Employment revealed tensions over
whether social welfare payments should be discontinued if a person fails to
take up the offer of a training scheme.
In a period of economic prosperity it is all too easy for such issues to be
marginalized, a feature of Irish politics which may in itself reflect a shift
toward a more dominant neo-liberal political paradigm. As this chapter has
argued, it is by no means inconceivable that in the determination to
construct a new form of governance, one which champions a more flexible
economy, that there will be losers. Political discourse, it seems, is concerned
less with equity, redistribution and efficiency and more with the complic-
ated process of organizing consent around new definitions of poverty and
justifiable entitlement.
Housing 
If the introduction of area-based unemployment schemes and changes to
the eligibility criteria for medical cards is an example of intervention which
display a concern with inclusivity, housing is one which clearly does not. In
many ways this should surprise few, since housing policy in Ireland has
always been predominantly focused toward private ownership. However,
the gap between public authority housing and private sector housing
provision widened considerably during the 1990s as the government opted,
wherever possible, to reduce the role for public authority housing and sub-
sidize an expansion in both private ownership and private sector provision
of rented accommodation. 
Since 1987 public housing construction has remained stubbornly below
10 per cent of all new houses constructed, despite an increase in the
waiting lists and an escalation in the costs of private sector houses. It is also
a figure which contrasts sharply with the norm in decades prior to the
1980s, where public housing occupied a range between 20 and 30 per cent.
The lower level of construction in the 1990s has also been accompanied by
measures designed to encourage the privatization of housing stock through
tenant purchases, a succession of policies which ensured that the overall
size of public housing has remained around 100,000 units (Fahey 1999: 4). 
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As the role of public housing has diminished during the 1990s, govern-
ment policy, through a succession of tax reliefs, has also encouraged further
expansion in private ownership and the private sector provision of rented
accommodation. Despite fears of the type of house price ‘bubble’ which
exploded in the British economy in the late 1980s, government policy has
steadfastly refused to consider public housing as a potential avenue out of
the impasse of escalating house prices. Indeed, the government’s neo-
liberal instincts have been clearly displayed in its preference for a private
sector solution to the ‘housing crisis’. In an attempt to create ‘affordable
housing’, regulations are to be introduced which stipulate that any new
private sector developments will have to have at least 20 per cent of
housing in the ‘affordable category’ (a move likely to be vigorously con-
tested in the courts by property developers).
Bargaining in the new millennium
The backdrop to Partnership 2000 was very different to the PCW. The
unions sought radical tax reform to provide tax relief for public sector
workers, a flexible pay agreement which would benefit the low paid and
new initiatives designed to include profit sharing in companies. Local pay
clauses were reintroduced and linked to productivity gains in the private
sector and modernization programmes in the public sector. This latter
element to the agreement was to prove one of its more novel features. 
It is not that the agreement sought to appease the more conservative
elements of the Irish media or its academe who have voiced continued
opposition to the ‘spiralling’ public sector wage bill. Rather, the agreement
acknowledged the ‘imperative’ to build upon measures, which had induced
change in the public sector (Partnership 2000 1997: 68). With regard to this,
Chapter 10 of the agreement represents the culmination of almost a
decade of concern to reorganize public service provision in which a
succession of policy developments have sought to engineer reform: Deliver-
ing Better Government; Shaping a Healthier Future: A Strategy for
Effective Healthcare in the 1990s; Charting our Educational Future and the
Strategic Management Initiative. 
Reflecting the international trend toward the restructuring of civil services
emphasis has been accorded to improving the ‘quality of service provision,
flexibility in the deployment of resources and the use of performance
measurement’. Here, Partnership 2000 contains a local bargaining element
which links ‘on-going’ discussions about new and more flexible working
arrangements in public sector service provision. Indeed, the agreement
explicitly stipulates that adjustments in pay (at the local level) will ‘be
conditional upon there having been verified progress to a satisfactory level
on implementation of the modernisation programme set out in chapter ten
of the agreement’ (Partnership 2000 1997: 80). 
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Few would doubt that the overhaul of the Irish civil service was long
overdue or that the reform thus far achieved was significantly assisted by
national level negotiations. However, while many of these reforms are well
under way, and a trajectory is well established, there remain important
questions in some quarters over the ‘detail and extent of change’. The
Department of Finance, for example, remains sceptical, convinced that the
reform programme is infused with aspirations but has so far delivered
rather less in terms of tangible change.
Nevertheless, the Department of the Taoiseach’s office remains confident
that significant steps forward have been made, providing the basis for
future change. Negotiations with the unions via the framework provided by
national level agreements ‘institutionalizes’ the accepted need for change,
allowing future revision of public sector working practices. However
tentative these developments may have been they confirm the ability of
national level bargaining to provide a framework from which to establish
change in the supply side of the economy. They are also important in the
government’s capacity to assuage business that gains in efficiency made in
the private sector will not be sacrificed at the ‘altar of public sector
inefficiency’. 
One of the features which distinguished Partnership 2000 from previous
agreements, was the emphasis accorded to increasing the role of plant level
partnership in Ireland. In particular, the agreement implemented a new
body, the National Centre for Partnership, designed to promote workplace
partnership in both the public and private sectors. However as O’Dowd,
joint Director of the Centre has acknowledged, while there is ‘growing
interest’ in these ventures it has been practised only in a minority of cases
(IRN, 31, 20 August 1998). This is confirmed by the study on workplace
change undertaken by Roche and Geary which has argued that the
incidence of partnership at the firm level was only ‘very modest’ in union-
ised companies. At most, 20 per cent have established partnerships, and
fewer have used this as a means for organizing change. Moreover, it is also
generally limited to ‘operational issues’ and rarely forms part of the
strategic decision-making of a business (Roche and Geary 1998: 17). The
reluctance on the part of management to embrace partnership may, in
part, be attributed to risks which are commonly perceived to be carried in
such forms of negotiation such as; the capture of management decision
making, delays in decisions being taken or the dilution of the managerial
prerogative (ibid.: 18). 
A further issue which has caused consternation among trade unionists
about Partnership 2000, has been that of trade union recognition. Through-
out the 1990s trade unions have been alarmed at the tendency (particularly
among multi-national companies) to establish non-union organizations.
However, while the negotiations for Partnership 2000 embraced the idea of
union recognition it has become clear that it has not been resolved to the
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satisfaction of the unions. The Irish Business and Employers Confederation
(IBEC), which has a significant proportion of members for which non-
union HR policies are a core value, could not agree to a legally binding
mechanism for union recognition disputes. As such, the High Level Group
drafted a series of proposals which involve voluntary negotiations, taken in
conjunction with the Labour Relations Commission, which would be
concluded in a non-binding recommendation (see IRN 1998, no. 3). 
Partnership 2000 also sought to widen the nature of partnership. It
established a new partnership body (National Economic and Social Forum),
and set about to explore policy approaches to social exclusion and
inequality (O’Donnell 1998: 87). This was a response to a growing concern
that macro-level agreements between the social partners had failed to
deliver to the marginalized sections of Irish society. However, this attempt
at expanding the number of participants in negotiations to include
elements of the voluntary and community sectors has not been without its
problems. As O’Donnell and Thomas point out, these groups tend to bring
normative arguments to the negotiating table. While this may expand the
range of issues, change the nature of debate and include alternative visions
of economic development, it also produces strains between the ‘old and
new social partners’ (O’Donnell and Thomas 2002: 24).
Some concluding remarks
The arguments presented here suggest that despite the presence of macro-
political bargaining arrangements in Ireland, management has been
proactive (and at least partially successful) in pursuing a programme of
productive restructuring. In stark contrast to neo-liberal criticisms of such
forms of interest intermediation, this chapter has argued that the very
presence of such arrangements may have assisted in engineering an environ-
ment more conducive to constructive negotiations on flexible work practices,
employee status and social organization. 
Initially, at least, this would appear to suggest that the optimism
embedded in Streeck’s view that flexibility and rigidity are not mutually
exclusive, is not misplaced. The problem for Streeck (and he is not alone
on this matter) lies in the failure to appreciate the role macro-political
bargaining can play in restructuring the productive (supply) side of the
economy. It is not simply that management in Ireland has been able to
trade off a particular clause of the wage agreement in exchange for the
introduction of new working practices and technology (although this has
clearly been an important element). Rather, such agreements have con-
tributed positively to the creation of a stable environment in which
management has been encourage to innovate and reduce productive
rigidities. Social peace, worker commitment and the recognition of the
need to encourage long-term investment in new plant and technology are
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all a part of the political dimension to managerial strategies, which are
shaped by macro-political bargaining agreements. 
If the sentiments expressed by the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, are any
indication of the likely trajectory of policy, then Ireland will continue to
pursue the type of negotiated agreements which have take place over the
last decade (Irish Times, 15 July 1999). The political storm which accom-
panied a severe currency crisis in the early 1990s was weathered, political
and economic stability maintained and the problem of long-term
unemployment ‘eased’. This is not to suggest that all will be plain sailing.
With an economic boom in full swing the trade unions remain perturbed at
escalating house prices and the failure to redistribute more evenly the
economic gains of the ‘Celtic Tiger’. What is more, the findings from the
United Nations Human Development Report, which showed that Ireland’s
level of poverty was the second worst in the industrialized world, will have
done little to alleviate anxieties ahead of a further round of negotiations
for a successor agreement (Irish Times, 14 July 1999). There are also difficul-
ties surrounding the extent of plant level partnership, the persistence
(indeed expansion) of marginalized groups in Irish society and the thorny
issue of trade union recognition. However, there are few politicians not
willing to subscribe to the view that national level agreements have
contributed significantly to Ireland’s economic regeneration. It seems,
therefore, that considerable though these hurdles may be, they are unlikely
to prove insurmountable.
Notes
1 The term ‘flexible specialization’ has emerged as an umbrella concept
encompassing a wide range of processes within contemporary capitalism. For
those such as Piore and Sabel (1984) the mass production techniques of the long
post-war boom have been replaced by a new paradigm in which flexibility in
production and consumption becomes axiomatic. The concept has become
extremely contentious. In general terms, however, the components of this new
paradigm include changes in both product and labour markets, new forms of
flexibility in the workforce (both numerical and functional), product diversific-
ation and the emergence of smaller production units operating for niche
markets. For alternative views on what are the main features of this new,
emerging era see Hirst and Zeitlin (1991), Jessop (1990).
2 This is not to suggest that wage rigidities do not lead to higher levels of
unemployment, rather it is to argue that the issue of wage rigidities is more
complicated than most neo-liberal economists are willing to concede.
3 An interesting comparative analysis of some of the complex themes associated
with this type of argument has been undertaken by Pfaller and Gough (1991).
They suggest that their findings do not prove that welfare statism is linked to
diminishing economic performance.
4 Rowthorn (1992) argues that such wage-efficiency considerations have an
important bearing upon the issue of centralization and decentralization of
bargaining. Moreover, the issue is perhaps a little more complex that either
Dore or Streeck acknowledge. For example, Calmfors notes that there are at
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least two types of firm which would prefer decentralized forms of negotiation to
decentralized forms of negotiation: strong wage-effort-profit firms, which require
relative wages and those with a weak such link which want low wage relativities
(Calmfors 1993). 
5 This is similar to the position held by Calmfors and Driffill (1994) who accord a
priority to either a centralized or decentralized approach.
6 It is plausible to suggest that Ireland is simply an exceptional case. However,
there are a number of features of this case study which make it a good example
to analyse the allegedly inherent rigidities of macro-political bargaining struc-
tures. As a small, open economy located on the periphery of western Europe the
need to respond quickly to changes in international markets is particularly
pressing. Rigidities which emerge as a result of such bargaining would pre-
sumably compound the perceived economic costs of peripheral location and
relative underdevelopment.
7 Under the terms of PESP increases in pay at national level were divided into
three years. Year one (4 per cent), year two (3 per cent) and year three (3.75 per
cent) In addition clause 3 allowed local negotiations up to a ceiling of 3 per cent
of basic pay.
8 The SIPTU report was based on 187 cases covering 749 companies. See IRN,
37, 1992. 
9 It is important to add a note of caution here. While recent figures suggest that
part-time work is common, it is only for a relatively small proportion of organiz-
ations who responded to the Price Waterhouse Cranfield Project. However, as an
emerging feature it is common across organizational ownership (Irish, UK and
US) see Gunnigle et al. (1994).
10 The metaphor was used by the Minister of Finance, Charlie McCreevy, to
defend his decision to reduce the ‘tax burden’ on higher income earners with
the budget, 2000. 
11 The political furore surrounding the strike by Dublin Bus workers (March 2000)
is an example of the clamour to celebrate the alleged virtues of the free market.
It was a dispute about the low level of basic pay for drivers in Dublin. Alarmed
by the ability of the unions to bring Dublin to a standstill, elements of the
business community found in this situation an opportunity to vent their
opposition to the public sector and endorse the need to privatize all that moves. 
12 Callan and Nolan have cautioned against reading ‘too much’ into these early
findings since the data may not ‘fully capture the extent to which the medical
card cover affects willingess to take up jobs’. This may occur either because
some respondents felt there was no available work or because later discussions
with family members may alter their perception of its import or because the
reservation wage some people consider to be acceptable may alter in practice.
For more detail see Callan and Nolan 1999. 
13 This tentative governmental commitment toward local development schemes
was extended in the National Development Plans (1994–9) and the Programme
for Competitiveness and Work (1993–6).
14 See the National Development Plans of 1988–93, 1994–9 and the Programme
for Competitiveness and Work for declarations on the fundamental role for
local communities in realizing economic growth through political participation.
15 I would like to thank John Canavan for his insights on these issues. 
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Wage centralization and wage 
flexibility: a comparison of 




In the United States, wage differentials have for many years been much
larger than in most European countries. How can this be? Both world
regions are highly developed and utilize similar technologies. Both regions
have a highly educated labour force. Based on the usual theories of supply
and demand, one would expect that the market mechanism would result in
a comparable wage distribution in both regions. If no explanation can be
found in supply and demand, the obvious step is to seek a solution in the
sphere of institutions.
The institutions for wage formation in the United States and Europe are
completely different. Despite the great variety within Europe, one difference
dominates: in the United States wage negotiations are decentralized, often
to the point where the individual employee must take on his employer
directly, while in Europe, as well as individual negotiations, there exists a
negotiation circuit on a sectoral, and sometimes even national, level. This
double system of wage formation is known as ‘corporatism’. 
Empirical research demonstrates that the existence of these institutions
goes a long way towards explaining the difference in wage dispersion
between Europe and the United States (Teulings and Hartog 1998:
Chapter 1). This chapter presents a theoretical explanation of the role of
these institutions. 
Popular opinion holds that in Europe everyone’s salary is determined in
central negotiations. The unions’ role is to compress wage differentials,
reducing them to less than is justified on the basis of supply and demand.
However, this view is not without problems. After all, salary level is not just
the result of agreements between unions and employers’ organizations.
Wages are also negotiated in other circumstances, such as during job
interviews, on promotion and on the allocation of increments. Why should
all those taking decisions on a micro level concern themselves with what
takes place on a central level?
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A good theory of corporatism should therefore be able to explain the
working of a system in which decision making on the same matters takes
place on several different levels. Such a theory will be set out in this chapter.
The attraction of this theory lies in the fact that it is based on an image of
labour relations which applies to both Europe and the United States.
However, labour relations seem to be handled slightly differently in corpor-
atist countries than on the other side of the Atlantic.
In order to set out this theoretical model, the following five ‘misunder-
standings’ will be discussed in the course of this chapter:
• institutions are the opposite of markets;
• the model of the American company union is a good point of reference
for a theory on European corporatism;
• wage contracts and collective labour agreements are primarily enforced
by legal means;
• corporatism is the opposite of competition and flexibility;
• wage negotiations deal with the level of wages instead of the annual
wage increase.
The chapter will end with an analysis of the political economy of corpor-
atism. Why do the administrators of corporatist organizations behave as
they do in practice?
Misunderstanding I: institutions are the opposite of markets
There is enormous confusion surrounding the precise definition of the
term institution. It is sometimes taken to refer to bureaucracies (‘the march
through the institutions’), sometimes to laws (employment protection laws),
and sometimes to something more elusive altogether (’the family’ or ‘the
labour contract’ as institutions).
One important school of thought regards all allocation mechanisms
other than that of the market mechanism as being institutions. Barter trade
on markets comes into existence in freedom, without interference from any
parties other than those actually trading. All other transactions are in one
way or another steered, regulated or restricted by ‘institutions’. A striking
example of this vision is the definition of Lazear (1994: 73):
I define institutions as those constraints, either formal or informal, that
operate outside the price system.
This is how institutions are thought of from a simple neo-classical perspec-
tive. Welfare economics teaches us that a market economy left to its own
devices leads to efficient allocation. Every control, regulation or restriction
results in sub-optimality. We are familiar with the ‘institutional explanation’
of unemployment which arises from this perspective: social security,
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employment protection and collective labour agreements are all institutions
which undermine the smooth operation of the market mechanism and
therefore lead to unemployment. A consequence of this vision is that
institutions can only be maintained by means of force. According to welfare
economics, at least one of the two parties benefits from a market relation.
Only force can prevent the changeover to barter trade. 
The vision of institutions at work here ties up with the ideas of North
(1990) and with developments in modern game theory. In the world view
emerging from the simple neo-classical model, everyone can trade goods
or labour with an anonymous trade partner, to their own satisfaction.
However, the very least that agents in an economy must know is where the
trade in certain goods takes place, and how to make it known that you wish
to buy or sell. If not everyone goes to the same marketplace, trade cannot
take place, or only takes place with great difficulty. The common knowledge
of all agents that transactions in an economy take place in a specific
manner is therefore a crucial precondition for the functioning of a market
economy. This type of common knowledge is what we refer to as
institutions.
A characteristic of this interpretation of institutions is that they are only
enforced to a very limited extent. The institution is self-enforcing. This
clause, self-enforcing, is crucial: it is in no one’s individual interest to
behave in a way other than that prescribed by the institution. One person’s
behaviour depends on his convictions or norms regarding the behaviour of
others. Norms and convictions taken as a whole can also be termed culture.
At heart, institutions are shared, self-enforcing convictions on the way in
which business is done in a certain country. Understood in this way, they
are in no sense the opposites of markets.
Misunderstanding II: the American company union
as point of reference
The analysis of the role of unions has a long tradition in economic science.
The theory is based on a union which operates on a company level. This
point of reference is particularly suitable for an analysis of the American
situation. The model is often indiscriminately applied to the European
system of consultation, where union federations and employers’ organiz-
ations negotiate on contracts which apply to several companies collectively,
as in the well-known analysis of Calmfors and Driffill (1988). At first glance,
this analogy is obvious. However, it requires an assumption as to the power
of corporatist organizations which greatly exaggerates their impact.
The standard model holds the union to be a monopoly of employees. By
uniting, employees can increase their wages above the market level. The
negotiating power of the union is limited by two forces: the negotiating
power of the employee, and the loss of employment resulting from exces-
sive wage demands. Such unions are hazardous to the efficiency of an
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economy. Imagine that the union succeeds in increasing wages to 15 per
cent above the market wage, as is usual in the United States and Canada.
The employer will then only retain an employee if his value added is 15
per cent above the market wage. An employee who is dismissed from a
company as a result of these higher (union) wages and must work elsewhere
for the market wage then has a drop in productivity of 15 per cent. In
Europe, this union effect is generally considerably lower, an order of
magnitude of 5 per cent (Blanchflower and Freeman 1990).
In order for this model to be applied to Europe, one crucial assumption
must be made. Unions can only lift wages above the market wage by
uniting the forces of all the insiders. These insiders have an interest in this,
because it will lead to their receiving higher wages, for example, the 15 per
cent wage surplus mentioned earlier. Outsiders, on the other hand, have an
interest in breaking through this cartel. By closing a deal with the employer
in which they agree to accept a lower wage surplus of 5 per cent, both the
employer and the outsider are better off. To unite forces effectively requires
the rigorous exclusion of outsiders, to the detriment of their interests. The
outsiders will do their best to break this cartel. The larger the wage surplus,
the more they will want to do this. 
A company union can maintain the cartel quite easily. It knows where to
find the company, and members within the company will be prepared to
get rid of ‘blacklegs’ by gentle, and often not-so-gentle, means. The
structure of American and British unions is specifically aimed at solving
this problem. They have a strong organization, with union officials in the
company to enforce the correct application of the collective labour agree-
ment. These officials have a large influence in the actual operation of the
company.
In European relations with collective labour agreements on an industry
level, it is hopeless to enforce collective labour agreement in this way.
Enforcement is only possible if it is based in part on the conviction of
employers and employees that it is in everyone’s long-term interest. New
companies are constantly being established, particularly in the services
sector. In many of these companies, no one is a union member. How can
the union possibly know whether the collective labour agreement is being
adhered to?
The union lacks information about what is taking place within each
individual company. Naturally, they will attempt to enforce compliance with
the collective labour agreement, but if none of the company’s employees
consider it worthwhile, they do not have a leg to stand on. As former out-
siders, these employees may have very good reasons not to attach any
importance to union pressure groups.
This problem will become more important when various job types exist
within a company. The union must then have a precise insight into the job
classification of each employee. After all, it is easy for the employer to
classify a lathe operator as an assistant lathe operator in order to pay him
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lower wages. Complaints arise in union companies in the United States
regarding suffocating job classification systems for precisely this reason.
These systems prescribe exactly what a person must do or not do. This is an
essential tool for the company union to enforce compliance with the
American type of collective labour agreement. Naturally, this type of system
removes all flexibility from the operation of the company.
The application of this model to European relations, where a union
federation negotiates for a number of companies at once, assumes that this
system functions because strict compliance with the collective labour
agreement is enforced by the union federation. Every single wage contract
and promotion requires, as it were, central approval. This requires enormous
assumptions about the availability of information to the union. In short:
the American union model simply cannot be applied to European labour
relations. 
Interlude: specific investments, market boundaries 
and flexibility
In a market with full competition, price is determined at the crossroads of
supply and demand. With the exception of an auctioneer, no negotiator
enters into the market. This is different in an employment relation between
company and employee. Both parties have made specific investments in the
relationship. There are many different aspects to these investments, from
knowledge about the company’s production process and moving house to
be closer to your current employer, to knowing where the photocopier is
and the friends you make in your new working environment. All these
investments lose their value as soon as you leave the job.
This is illustrated in Figure 9.1. The lowest line indicates the minimum the
employee should earn. If he gets less, then he can find a more attractive job
elsewhere on the labour market. The line at the top reflects the maximum
the company will pay. For more money, the company is better off recruiting
someone else from the labour market. The continuation of the relation is
viable as long as the maximum acceptable wage for the company is higher
than the minimum acceptable wage for the employee. If the salary falls
outside these boundaries, then continuation no longer makes sense for one
of the two parties, and the relation will be terminated. These boundaries will
therefore subsequently be referred to as the market boundaries of the
employment relation.
In a market with full competition, the two market boundaries coincide so
that the wage is completely fixed. This is one of the blessings of com-
petition. In an employment relation, however, the competition is some
distance away, because they must first make the specific investments before
they can compete on an equal footing. The distance between the two
market boundaries is therefore a measure of the extent of the specific
investments. As long as the wage lies between the two market boundaries,
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the two parties are stuck with each other. If they do not reach agreement,
then their specific investments will be lost. Neither party will want to break
the relationship. Both have an interest in continuing the relationship.
Precisely at what level wages will be fixed, then, is a matter of the
bargaining power of each party. 
In practice, it transpires that the partners in an employment relation
will do anything possible to avoid negotiating with one another. This can
be seen in the following example. In the Netherlands, an individual
employee’s wage rise can be divided up into three components. The initial
component is periodically determined in consultations between unions
and employers’ organizations. The second component, annual increments,
is laid down in the collective labour agreement for a longer period, on the
basis of fixed pay scales. These two components are laid down in a
contract for the individual employee. The third component is the
incidental wage increases which may be granted to an employee.
Negotiations on an individual basis only take place with respect to the
incidental component. Table 9.1 reflects the distribution of incidental
components in the Netherlands. In two out of three cases it equals zero.
The wage increase of this group is therefore completely determined by
fixed pay scales and the so-called initial wage increase. No negotiator is


















This is no different in the United States. Baker et al. (1994) drew up a
similar table for an American company. Card and Hysop (1996) make
similar calculations for the entire economy. There too, a large proportion
of employees turn out not to receive any increase in wages, albeit to a lesser
extent than in the Netherlands. Because the United States does not have a
system of initial wage increase, and practically no fixed incremental
increases, a large proportion of employees will receive the same sum this
year as they did last year. This means a nominally equal sum, not a real
equal sum. It follows, then, that in years of inflation a large proportion of
employees is worse off. Evidently, there is a kind of unwritten law that
wages should not be lowered. Because of the unwritten nature of this law, it
is sometimes referred to as an implicit contract. It is not a contract in any
legal sense, but woe betide anyone who departs from it. 
Why do the company and the employee use this type of contract? A recent
explanation offered by MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) centres on the hold
up problem. When an employer takes on an employee, he will be cautious
about making specific investments. After all, by making these investments he
renders himself vulnerable. The employee is handed a powerful tool, because
the employer’s specific investments will be lost if he leaves. With this tool, he
is in a position to rob the employer of part of the profits of that investment,
in future wage negotiations, by threatening to leave. An employer can, of
course, anticipate this problem. So his reaction is to postpone part of his
investments. Less investment is made in specific training than is socially
desirable. This problem also exists the other way round: an employee is
sensible not to buy a house near his current employer, because it weakens his
position in future wage negotiations. The company and the employee have a
mutual interest in solving this problem. After all, by arranging matters in
such a way that the employment relation functions as efficiently as possible,
the total expected profit from the employment relation increases. If the pie is
bigger, there are more slices to go round. Both parties ultimately benefit. The
solution to the hold up problem is obvious. By fixing the future wage level at
the start of the employment relation, prior to specific investments being
made, the necessity for future negotiation is removed. 
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Table 9.1 The distribution of incidental wage increases in the Netherlands, 1991–2







Source: Author’s calculations on the basis of data from the Wage Administration Service
(LTD).
Figure 9.1 also offers some insight into the complex relationship between
wage rigidity and flexibility. As long as the contract establishes the wage
between the market boundaries of the employment relation, there is no
problem. Wages are rigid in that case, as is often found in Europe as well as
in the United States: see Table 9.1 and the figures of Card and Hysop
(1996). Both parties have an interest in continuing the employment
relation. The long-term contract, then, protects them for the hold up
problem. However, as soon as one of the two market boundaries is pushed
across the contract wage as a result of some unexpected event, continuation
of the employment relation against the prevailing wage will no longer be
rewarding for one of the two parties. If the contract is not adjusted, that
party will wish to break the relation, even if it is still profitable. After all, the
maximum acceptable wage for the company is higher than the minimum
acceptable wage for the employee.
MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) show that in such situations the con-
tract is renegotiated. The contract is adapted to the new conditions. One
example is an impending bankruptcy. The employees accept wage
reductions in order to keep the company operating, as occurred in the
impending closure of aircraft manufacturer Fokker. Another example is the
bonuses offered to information technology staff as a result of the shortage
in this sector. One disadvantage of such renegotiation is that protection
against the hold up problem disappears. However, this disadvantage does
not outweigh the alternative, which is terminating the relationship. Some-
thing is better than nothing.
We arrive, then, at a paradoxical conclusion. If all is well, the long-term
contract leads to wage rigidity: wages do not react at all to movements in
the market boundaries of the employment relation. In that way the hold up
problem is solved. However, if the movements become too large, adjust-
ment will have to take place to prevent termination of the employment
relation. The more rigidity is possible, the better the specific investments
are protected against the hold up problem. However, this kind of rigidity
does not mean no flexibility at all. The contract can always be adjusted by
way of renegotiation if that is necessary to prevent termination of the
relation. Flexibility here is not the ideal, it is an emergency measure. 
Misunderstanding III: contracts, legal force or norms
The question now is why the company and the employer would stick to this
contract. The traditional answer is that these contracts are enforced by
legislation. Should one of the two parties breach the contract, the other will
respond through the courts to enforce compliance. 
This idea has little to do with actual practice. Going to court is an
expensive and ineffective solution. The court lacks the knowledge on affairs
within the company necessary to make a ruling. Furthermore, contracts
often only stipulate the wage level. They do not prohibit an employee from
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leaving, any more than they offer the employee employment protection.
One of the two parties can always threaten departure, a threat which the
court cannot undo. Such a threat can be so credible that it forces adjust-
ment of contract. The renegotiations discussed earlier, when the original
wage contract meets the market boundaries of the employment relation,
are based on that principle. 
The question, then, is why the threat of leaving or dismissal is not
continuously used to break open existing contracts. What is the force that
precludes permanent renegotiation? The only difference from normal
negotiations is that during these renegotiations there is a piece of paper on
the table with a simple text reading: ‘salaryX’. A piece of paper, no
dissolution conditions; after all, that is all a wage contract is. Why would a
party who could normally receive more than X by means of negotiation,
allow himself to be fobbed off with such a document, without any further
negotiation? MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) present an argument for this
game full of theoretical subtleties. A practical approach, however, gives a
reasonable feel for the essential nature of their argument. 
Negotiations can be considered a kind of two-way hostage situation. The
two parties have a common interest in agreement being reached. The two
parties have a conflicting interest when it comes to dividing up the pie. Each
dollar more for one party means a guilder less for the other. The outcome
depends on nerves of steel. As a negotiator you should show as long as
possible that you are willing to go for all or nothing. If the other party
receives even the slightest hint of willingness to compromise you are finished.
A small slip of the tongue is sufficient. Much depends on the credibility of
the negotiator and, in particular, the credibility of his threats. It is for this
reason that the outcome of negotiations is so sensitive to small details.
At precisely this point lies the role of that piece of paper which is sitting
somewhere on the negotiating table, the wage contract. Assume that the
employee has just made an offer. Without that piece of paper, the company
now has two alternatives: it can accept the offer so that work can begin, or
turn down the offer and propose a counter-offer so that negotiations drag
on, and the work remains undone, in anticipation of agreement on the
wage level. With that piece of paper, a third alternative comes into exis-
tence: the company can stick to the contract, and say that work must
continue in the meantime. Now the ball is in the employee’s court: either
he refuses to continue working in anticipation of agreement on a new wage
level, or he continues working and tries to renegotiate in the meantime.
The crucial point is that the piece of paper undermines the credibility of
the threat of stoppage. Now that the alternative of following the agreement
on that piece of paper is available, the short-term temptation will always be
not to lose out on anything by interrupting the work. The temptation of
continuity outweighs the threat of stoppage. This effect reinforces itself. If
people work out that their threats are not credible, the threats will not be
made. And where one party knows that the other party does not consider
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his own threat to be credible, the conclusion will be drawn that those threats
will not be carried out. Etc., etc., ad infinitum. How a small piece of paper
can have far-reaching consequences.
Negotiators, then, are constantly trying to calculate their optimum
response. The outcome of that calculation, however, depends on the reaction
expected from the other party. If everyone is aware that threats fall on deaf
ears, they will not be made, because they are simply ineffective. Further-
more, because they are not made, they are also not complied with. This is
precisely what is meant by social norms. They let people know three things:
first, what they should do, second, what others will do if they don’t do it,
and finally, what they should do if others do not behave as they should.
Ultimately citizens behave according to norms not because of their moral
sense or because some union chairman or economist enforces these norms,
but because they know that a breach will be punished by their fellow
citizens. Norms are self-enforcing. They are maintained out of pure calcul-
ation, just like everything else in economic theory.
Such norms have come into existence over many generations as a tool
for coordinating our behaviour. In wage negotiations in particular, there is
good cause for this: as we are able to better estimate the value of the other
party’s negotiating stake, we are better able to prevent expensive conflicts,
such as strikes. This is precisely what is meant by the well-known expression
‘vested interests’. The norm prescribes that a party cannot unilaterally
change a right. This norm is usually interpreted as a sign of rigidity.
However, it serves a useful purpose. It contributes to upholding the wage
contract. This in turn limits the hold up problem. 
From here, it is a small step to the implicit contract (and therefore the
implicit wage rigidity) seen in the United States. Why do you need a piece
of paper anyway? Is it not sufficient to settle on an hourly wage at the start
of the employment relation? The implicit contract is that this hourly wage
is not changed unilaterally, but only with mutual agreement. That contract
is implicit, because it is never even discussed. It is simply standard practice
that things are done this way. The entire argument on the role of the
written wage contract applies just as much to an implicit agreement. 
This thought is confirmed by a nice piece of empirical research by
Kahneman et al. (1986) into the meaning of norms in the economic process
in Canada and the United States. They asked a group of citizens whether
they found a certain course of action to be fair or unfair. Citizens have well-
defined and broadly shared opinions on this. To an economist, those
opinions appear completely irrational at first sight. They suffer from
money illusion. Compare, for example, the following two scenarios:
1 There is high unemployment but no inflation. The company lowers
nominal wages by 10 per cent.
2 There is high unemployment and 10 per cent inflation; the company
leaves nominal wages unchanged.
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In both cases, purchasing power drops by 10 per cent. In the first case,
norms prohibit the cut in wages, but in the second case they do not require
the increase in wages. The same applies for the car dealer who gives a
standard discount of 5,000 dollars on his catalogue price of 25,000 dollars.
If the demand for cars temporarily increases, this dealer can, according to
the norms, eliminate his discount. The dealer who thinks all the song and
dance with discounts is unnecessary, and immediately lists the standard
price of 20,000 dollars in his catalogue, however, may not raise his price in
times of shortage.
With the hold up model in hand, this type of strange result can be easily
understood. Norms regulate distribution conflicts. The prescription how to
behave when confronted with a distribution conflict prevents a situation in
which citizens start to protect themselves by decreasing their specific
investments. The norms which give least cause for confusion are based on
money illusion: an hourly wage of three dollars remains an hourly wage of
three dollars, no matter what happens. Agreements based on the real wage
lead to enormous confusion: When do adjustments take place? How high
should the adjustments be? Which inflation figure should be used? 
The need for wage rigidity, therefore, is not typically European, but
rather universal. What if we would have to renegotiate our wages every day?
We would have no time left to work. In America, this need is given shape by
making an implicit agreement on nominal rigidity: what is three dollars
will in principle remain three dollars. In Europe, that need has, over the
years, taken the form of a collective labour agreement. In both cases, the
rigidities are self-enforcing: for the most part, the courts are never
involved. It is now time to draw up the balance: which is the more flexible
rigidity? That in America, or that in Europe? 
Misunderstanding IV: corporatism is at the cost of flexibility 
The model which has been discussed so far applies to both the United
States and to Europe. Both types of economy have a need to prevent
negotiation on wage level. The solution is the same in both cases: the
company and the employee close a long-term wage contract, explicitly, as
in Europe, or implicitly as in the United States.
In order to be able to understand the difference between Europe and
the United States, it is necessary to distinguish two components in the
unexpected shocks which force companies and their employees to adapt
their contract to the market boundaries from time to time. The first
component is aggregate shocks. These shocks influence the market boundaries
of all employment relations in the same way. The second component is
firm-specific shocks. These shocks only hit the market boundaries of one
specific labour organization.
As the market boundaries are influenced by more and more extensive
shocks, the chance that the contract wage which was established in advance
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is situated between the two market boundaries is obviously reduced. The
chance of the contract needing to be renegotiated afterwards, therefore
increases, as can be seen in Figure 9.2. In the top figure, a number of firm-
specific shocks are depicted in the top market boundary without
aggregated shocks; renegotiation is only necessary in instance 2. In the
middle figure, an aggregate shock is placed on top of the specific shock.
Now renegotiations afterwards are necessary in instance 5 as well as
instance 2. And that was exactly what the market parties tried to prevent
through the contract.
It would be profitable if contracts could be adjusted afterwards to the
aggregate shocks. This part of the shocks could then be, as it were, filtered
out. Consequently, the remaining shocks would be smaller, and there would
be less chance of hitting the market boundary: see the bottom part of
Figure 9.2. Renegotiations are only required in instance 2. However,
adjustment of contracts after they have been made obviously requires a
different form of negotiations. Here we can see the fundamental dilemma
taking place:
The wage contract serves to prevent future wage negotiations as far as
is possible. If adjustment of the contract can only take place through
negotiation, then the advantages of the contract are again lost.
The prospect of future renegotiations on the adjustment of the contract
forces the employer and the employee to attend very carefully to their
bargaining position. Once again, the hold up problem arises.
This is where the role of corporatist organizations enters into the picture.
By delegating the task of negotiation on contract adjustment to higher level
organizations at the start of their employment relation, an individual
employee and his employer are able to avoid the hold up problem. After all,
they cannot influence the outcome of such negotiations by postponing their
specific investments. The wage negotiations are decoupled from the
everyday situation.
In a corporatist economy, then, there are two types of renegotiation. The
first type is renegotiation by corporatist organizations. These renegotiations
remove the effect of aggregate shocks. The outcome of these negotiations
cannot be influenced by individual companies or employees. This type has
no equivalent in the United States. The second type is individual renegoti-
ation, in those cases where ‘corporatist’ renegotiations do not have the
desired result due to firm-specific shocks. These renegotiations in essence
take place in the same manner in the United States.
The two types of renegotiation are expressed in the subdivision of the
wage increase into the three components mentioned earlier: fixed incre-
ments are determined in advance, and are therefore not the result of
renegotiation; the initial wage increase reflects the outcome of the corporatist
consultation, and the incidental wage increase is the mirror image of
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individual negotiations. Table 9.2 shows the extent of the various compo-
nents under both systems. In the United States there are no corporatist
organizations to take over the renegotiation of wage contracts. Initial wage
increase does therefore not take place there. As a result, they have to rely
on nominal rigidity there, but that is an inferior substitute. In Europe
initial wage increase is a common phenomenon. Incidental wage increase
takes place in the United States as well as Europe, but is more common in
the United States. The reason for this difference is simple: aggregate
shocks are absorbed by initial wage increase in Europe so it occurs less
frequently that the remaining shocks exceed the market boundaries of the
employment relation: see Figure 9.2. 
The central idea, therefore, is that parties have an interest in decoupling
wage negotiation from the everyday work situation. A good gauge is to find
out how companies view the role of the works council in negotiations on
primary labour conditions. The outcome of a number of interviews is
remarkable in that respect. In only one of ten in companies interviewed did
management negotiate with the works council on labour conditions. In all
other instances, negotiation took place with the unions. Even though the
Federation of Netherlands Industry (VNO) and the Netherlands Christian
Employers’ Union (NCW) sometimes suggest allocating to the works council
a larger role in negotiations on the collective labour agreement, that
opinion was only supported by one of the other nine companies. The rest
of the companies were strongly opposed to this. An objection which was
often mentioned was the fact that the works council was ‘too directly
involved’ in the outcome of the negotiations.
A good example of this is the interview with a medium-sized business in
the metal sector. Responding to the question about expectations for the
future, the management answered that they had concluded from the
newspaper that a further decentralization of wage negotiations would take
place. In their opinion, this would lead to higher wages. To the question of
whether the management found this decentralization desirable, they
answered: ‘As I said, our speciality is pipe-fitting. We don’t know the first
thing about wage negotiation.’
The model suggests that employers and employees will depart from the
collective labour agreement when it is in both their interests to do so.
Corporatist organizations, after all, lack the information to enforce com-
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Table 9.2 Different forms of wage adjustment in economies with various institutions
Corporatist Decentralized
(Europe) (the United States)
Only initial Very often Never
Nominally rigid Never Often
Incidental Now and then Regular
pliance with the collective labour agreement. This was only supported to a
limited extent in the interviews. A number of quotes illustrate the employers’
motives for not paying higher wages when an individual worker gets a
better outside offer:
When someone comes in saying that he can make more money else-
where, I congratulate him.
I only do that in exceptional circumstances. In practice it invariably
means that after a while you have to give all his colleagues the same
wage increase.
If you do give someone a little bit extra, he or she will leave after a
while anyway.
I can’t always see what happens in one branch or another, but if I do
find out, that supervisor has to come up with a very good reason.
Companies turn out to have a large number of reasons to be very
reserved in granting higher wage increases than those prescribed by the
collective labour agreement, even if important employees threaten to quit.
None of the companies, however, gave as a reason that the collective labour
agreement did not permit it. Where employers do not follow the strict neo-
classical model, it is not because the collective labour agreement prohibits
this, but because they do not think that strict neo-classical behaviour is in
their interest. A large number of more strategical reasons prevent them
from breaking through their wage structure to keep an individual employee
within the company. 
This brings us to the fourth misunderstanding. Wages in the Unites
States are more sensitive to firm-specific shocks; see Holmlund and
Zetterberg (1991) and Teulings and Hartog (1998: Chapter 5). This is not
a sign of flexibility, however. It is in fact precisely the opposite. While in
Europe wages can be adjusted to aggregate shocks within the market
boundaries of the employment relation, in the United States there is only
a choice between wage rigidity and firm-specific adjustments. For this
reason, the chance of firm-specific renegotiations being necessary as a
result of these shocks increases.
A casual observer could easily jump to the wrong conclusion on the basis
of this statistical information. He would see that wages in the United States
are more sensitive to firm-specific shocks and would take this as a sign of
greater flexibility. In actual fact, this is a sign of rigidity, because wages in
the United States cannot be adjusted separately to aggregate shocks. The
greater sensitivity of wages to specific shocks in the United States, is
accompanied by a smaller sensitivity to aggregate shocks. This conclusion is
confirmed by empirical research (ibid: Chapter 5).
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Misunderstanding V: negotiations on the collective 
labour agreement are about the wage level 
An important implication of all this is that corporatist organisations do not
negotiate about wage level, as in the American union model discussed on
pp. 227–8, but about the wage increase. Wage level is determined by the
grading at the moment the employment relation starts. This grading is a
matter of negotiation between employer and employee on a micro level.
Negotiations on a macro level between corporatist organisations are
concerned with the annual adjustment of wage contracts in percentage
terms to the state of the economy, referred as the initial wage increase.
This implication links up with what takes place in practice. Many indus-
trial collective labour agreement take the form of a minimum collective
labour agreement, leaving companies the freedom to pay higher wages. As
well as maintaining an individual pay scale within the company, there is the
possibility of variation within that compensation system, by means of
grading new staff. This grading also depends in part on the situation in the
labour market. An important tool here is the entry wage of new staff,
‘because they haven’t settled in yet’. The room for this kind of policy is
larger for graduates than for low-skilled staff. In addition, there is the
possibility of some variation in job descriptions: a laboratory technician
becomes a trainee laboratory technician.
Fluctuations in the relationship between supply and demand affect the
payment of new staff through this channel. In case of excess supply of
labour, employers will utilize entry wages to a larger extent than in a tight
labour market. This shows the importance of this mechanism to flexibility
in the labour market: it ensures that recruiting extra employees is more
attractive in bad times and it ensures adjustment of the compensation
structure to relative shortages on the market.
No matter how the actual wage level differs from that prescribed by the
collective labour agreement, the initial wage increase is in all cases
determined at the negotiating table of the collective labour agreement.
This explains the misunderstanding. Negotiations on a collective labour
agreement relate to the increase in wages in percentage terms, and not to
wage level.
The political economy of corporatism
The average union official undoubtedly chose union work for idealistic
reasons: elevating the working class or promoting the interests of your
colleagues are honourable motives and excellent reasons for pursuing a
career in union work. Even union officials, however, are only human. If you
are up to your neck in problems, and it’s either you or someone else, then
idealism goes out the window. If the model described above is to function,
then it must be resistant to this kind of self-interest. Just as applies to the
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power of every magistrate, the power of the union leader must be restricted,
in order that he successfully fulfils his role in the social process. For
politicians, of course, there is the threat of the coming election. Is there a
similar process when it comes to union leaders? Trusting purely in their
idealism seems to be asking a bit much.
The positive side of the corporatist system as it has started to function
over the last decades is that it provides for the counter-forces which restrict
the power of the union official. In a corporatist system, the power to adapt
the collective labour agreements in the country to changed economic
conditions is delegated to the unions. Unions can abuse that power in
many different ways. At the start of an employment relation before the
employer and the employee are bound by specific investments, both parties
must decide whether they will indeed delegate the adjustment of their
collective labour agreement.1 The union will then undoubtedly promise to
carry out that adjustment in good conscience. They will do this in such a
way that the interests of both parties (the employer and the employee) are
respected and that the mutual welfare of both parties is maximized. You
could call this the welfare maximizing strategy or the cooperative strategy.
Contracts are then adjusted with a view to having the production process
take place as smoothly as possible. The cooperative strategy in fact maxi-
mizes the interest of outsiders beyond a level which would be feasible
without corporatist organisations, because these organizations offer a
solution to the hold up problem.
Once the union holds the power to adapt contracts, they can change
their strategy without any objections. Instead of maximizing common
welfare, they could, for example, pursue the objective of getting as many
members as possible within the company. This can be achieved by negotiat-
ing as high a salary as possible for the employees within the company. In
this case, the strategy changes from the surplus maximizing strategy to the
share maximizing strategy or the antagonistic strategy. The contract is only
adapted with the intention of maximizing the wages of current staff. Union
members also appreciate this strategy. The employer, meanwhile, has
committed himself, via specific investment, to the relation and it is difficult
for him to dispose of the employee. Additional wage demands are almost
certain to lead to higher wages. This is attractive for the union because
satisfied members are prepared to make prompter and higher contribu-
tions. Despite all the promises to pursue the welfare maximising strategy,
employers will always retain a fear that the union will be unable to resist
pressure from its members (the insiders), and will switch to the share
maximising strategy after they have bound themselves to the employees by
way of specific investments.
The union, therefore, has a commitment problem or a credibility problem:
they would like to rise above all suspicions so that all employers and
employees trust the union and delegate the adjustment of the contract to
it. However, the employer remains suspicious, and suspicion is a bad
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foundation for the delegation of authorities. Abuse of power must therefore
be prevented. What guarantees does the employer have? On what can he
base his confidence in a corporatist union?
The Dutch trade unions – fortunately – have a relatively small number of
members. The trade unions organise only one in four employees, and
negotiate the annual contract wage increase for one in four employees. The
membership base is not only small, it is also highly dispersed. It is obvious
that the trade union movement has a stronger position in some companies
than in others. However, union members are to be found everywhere. For
example, 6 per cent of employees in the retail trade are union members.
Strangely enough, this dispersed membership provides considerable advant-
ages to the union.
First, this dispersion provides the employer with a certain peace of mind.
He knows that the power base of the union within his company is limited.
Should the union ever consider shifting to the antagonistic strategy, then
the employer can, if necessary, push the union out the door. The union will
try to prevent such a confrontation out of fear of a negative outcome. This
situation makes it easier for the union as a whole to maintain its market
share in the ‘contract renegotiations’ industry. This is a paradoxical
conclusion: the dispersed power base of the Dutch trade union movement
increases its credibility as a cooperative bargaining partner. Because of this,
the trade union movement has recently been able to improve its position in
the banking sector, and steps forward also seem to have been made in the
retail trade, information technology and temporary employment sectors.
That this is an important consideration is evident from the situation in
the United States. After the war, the trade union movement there was in a
very strong position. However, since that time, the unionization rate has
steadily decreased to a mere 11 per cent of those currently in employment.
The reason is not so much that the unions were thrown out of the existing
companies. That is almost impossible, because in those companies for
which the trade union movement conducts the wage negotiations, they
reach a unionization rate of almost 100 per cent due to the antagonistic
strategy. Such a power base is almost impregnable. The reason for the
decrease in unionization rate lies primarily in the fact that some companies
go bankrupt and other companies take their place. A union which loses
members as a result of company closures, but gains no new members in
newly  established companies will obviously suffer in the long run.
Because they are known for their antagonistic strategy, however, the
American trade union movement is unable to find new companies. New
employees have little reason to delegate contract adjustment to the trade
union movement. Prior to the specific investments they will have little need
to put their fate in the hands of an antagonistic trade union movement.
The antagonistic strategy maximizes the interest of insiders, and at present
they are not insiders. If employees within a company wish to appeal to the
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union, the company will go to any length to ensure that they do not. Heavy
pressure is exerted on both staff and middle management to prevent this
(‘union busting’). In those circumstances, it is extremely difficult for the
trade union movement to get a foot in the door. For this reason, the
antagonistic strategy is difficult to maintain in the long term. 
Dispersed membership also helps the trade union movement in its
relationship with its members. After all, members experience the same
problem as the trade union movement itself. At the start of the employ-
ment relation it is in their interest to agree with their future employer that
the trade union movement will negotiate on their behalf on adjustments to
their wage contract, with the cooperative strategy as a point of departure.
After the specific investments have been made, the employees, who have in
the meantime been promoted to insiders, have an interest in exerting
pressure on their union to shift to the antagonistic strategy, particularly
when the company is doing well and they can demand higher wages as a
result. A trade union organization which wants to pursue the cooperative
strategy will have great difficulty in restraining its own members, particu-
larly those in profitable companies.
Traces of this inherent tension between a union and its members can be
found in the words of union executives:
The first negotiations are those with your own members.
This tension between central (union) and decentral (company level) repeats
itself within the union, as an opposition between a district executive and a
union executive: 
A weak district executive is one of the type: you ask, we work.
As one union chairman stated:
It is not acceptable to me that if we all agree on 2 per cent, some
executive comes back having asked for 4 per cent.
Or, in a situation where insiders made higher demands:
That was a case where a district executive did not have his union
members under control.
One does not have to look far to find more of the same. Klandermans
and Visser (1995) demonstrate that ideas like this can be traced back to the
membership base of the trade union movement. A number of members are
of the opinion that the trade union movement does not try hard enough to
obtain the best deal in their specific situation.
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Another indication of the cooperative attitude of the trade union move-
ment is the state of affairs in the annual round of negotiations. The Dutch
trade union movement formulates the bargaining position for the wage
negotiations each year, and employers play only a passive role. Ideologic-
ally, the whole idea of coordination is not favourably thought of by
employers. This suggests that employers’ organizations have reasonable
trust in the attitude of the trade union movement. If they did not, they
would undoubtedly have formulated a stake themselves. Now that in most
cases the stake of the trade union movement forms an acceptable point of
departure, there is generally little need to formulate a stake, all the more so
because this would in fact force the trade union movement to adopt a more
radical standpoint.
Dispersed membership not only forced union executives to control insider
power, but also provided them with the opportunity to do so. The employees
of that single well-running company were always in the minority. As a result
of the widely dispersed membership, there were also numerous companies in
which business was not going so well, and in a minority things were going
very badly indeed. The radical advocates for higher wage demands, mostly
from the well-running companies, were buried amongst the large number of
members from companies which were less successful. That large group had
an interest in continuing the cooperative strategy and was therefore happy to
support the officials in their goal of limiting insider power. 
From the previous analysis roughly three possible equilibria of unioniz-
ation and wage formation can be derived. The first equilibrium is
observed in the United States and the United Kingdom. The trade union
movement takes an antagonistic stand. The union therefore has great
difficulties in finding new firms for which it gets delegated the task of
bargaining on behalf of the workers. The market share of the union
shrinks gradually.2
The second equilibrium is observed in the Netherlands, Austria, Germany
and maybe France. There, trade unions with a relatively small membership
bargain for a large majority of the workers. They can do so because they
follow the cooperative strategy. The most important weakness of this equil-
ibrium is the free rider problem of the workers: where the union bargains
for all the workers anyway, individual workers have little incentive to pay
their membership fees. In the Dutch case, there is special solution for this
problem: a separate collective agreement stipulates that employers must
pay a non-trivial amount of money to the unions. This money accounts for
a large share of the total union budget. The government supports this
agreement by mandatory extension of this contract, so that employers
cannot evade their duties.
The final equilibrium is observed in most Scandinavian countries and
Belgium, where the free rider problem is solved by giving the union a stake
in social security. Where union membership is almost a condition for
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eligibility for social security, unionization will obviously be high. The
danger of this system is that the union movement becomes too powerful,
which threatens the stability of system. This might very well be what
happened to Sweden.
In the theoretical model laid out in the previous sections, there was
hardly any role for the government. As long as there exists a credible organiz-
ation outside the firm the government does not need to enforce corporatist
agreements. Employers and their employees will decide themselves that it
is a good thing to delegate the task of renegotiating contracts.3 However,
the final analysis suggests that a corporatist/centralized system can only
exist with some support from the government in solving the free rider
problem, by giving trade unions a stake in social security, or by some other
means. Solving the free rider problem might well be the most important
role of mandatory extension. The clauses of collective agreement regarding
wages are largely self-enforcing, see pp. 232–5. Extending these clauses is a
largely symbolic act.
Conclusions
In this final section, two issues have to be considered. First, to what extent
is this model able to cover the variation in institutional arrangements and
factual outcomes between various countries, in particular within the cor-
poratist league? Second, to what extent is the model applicable outside the
narrow area of wage formation, in broader areas of economic policy such as
social security, taxation and education?
Regarding the first issue, some remarks have been made in the previous
section. As a first observation, the difference between decentralized econo-
mies (United States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom) on the
one hand and the corporatist and so-called4 centralized economies on the
other hand is far more important than the institutional variation within the
latter group of countries.
Second, though institutions may look different at first sight, they may in
fact play a more or less similar role across these countries. Corporatism has
not been designed on a drawing table. Institutions evolve in sequential
process, where the solution to the one problem sets the institutional stage
for the next problem. The political economy of corporatism gives a perfect
illustration of this mechanism. The system of checks and balances that
keeps the corporatism going is made up of all kind of strange arrange-
ments. Starting from scratch, nobody would have designed the system as it
operates now. All this institutional variation may therefore well reflect
differences in the history of the system merely affecting the way checks and
balances are organized, but less the actual labour market outcome. In
particular, inter-industry wage differentials seem to vary mainly with the
degree of centralization in wage formation.
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Nevertheless, there are some differences in outcome between corporatist
countries that cannot be ignored, that may or may not be temporary. An
important example is the difference in real wage increases across countries.
In recent years real wage increases in the Netherlands has lagged behind
those in surrounding countries. Compared to Germany, the difference since
the beginning of the 1980s amounts to 20 per cent. The increase in the
average wage in the Netherlands is comparable to that in the United States.
This difference is often attributed to the social partners and their willingness
to accept wage moderation. This opinion implies a great trust in the
corporatist model of wage formation. Apparently, it is possible to have the
average wage level lag behind what would have been realised without wage
moderation by a high percentage, for a considerable period of time. 
It seems unlikely that such a large difference in wage increases between
the Netherlands and Germany can be attributed to the willingness amongst
the social partners to accept wage moderation. In the short term (up to a
maximum of five years, see Broersma et al. 1998),5 the willingness to accept
wage moderation could lead to lower real wages. For instance, the
radicalization of the trade union movement in the whole of Europe during
the 1970s undoubtedly contributed to the increase of the labour share in
that period. However, wage moderation cannot push the wage level below
the equilibrium level for long, and certainly not by 20 per cent. The market
mechanism calls up strong forces which quickly put an end to such aims. In
that sense, the meaning of wage moderation is more restricted than is often
thought. In the long term, wage level is determined by market forces and
there is a close connection between labour supply and employment. The
lagging behind of Dutch wages compared to other European countries can
probably be explained by two factors: the sharp reduction in unemploy-
ment benefits and the rapid increase in female labour supply. The former
led to a reduction in reservation wages and therefore in the wage rates
actually paid. Broersma et al.  (1998) estimate this effect to explain 8 per
cent of the 20 per cent lagging behind of Dutch wages. The increase in
female labour supply yields wage reductions in a standard demand and
supply framework.
Simply because the average wage level adjusts reasonably well to the
equilibrium level after some delay, does not necessarily mean that wages in
individual companies and industry do the same. A comparison with countries
which lack any form of coordination in wage formation, such as the United
States and Canada, shows that wages are much higher in those industries
where the negotiating power of insiders is large.6 This leads to an
inefficient allocation of labour: the industries with high wages employ too
few people, and those with low wages too many. In a corporatist system,
this insider power is restricted by placing negotiations on the initial wage
increase outside companies. Pleas for wage moderation are a tool to restrict
insider power. It is the verbal expression of the norms which keep the
system going.
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This interpretation of the pleas for wage moderation as a tool to restrict
the insider power of employees in strong companies links up with the
earlier analysis of the meaning of norms. The frequent use of the terms
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in the Dutch press is an example of this. They
turn up all the time. The interesting thing here is that these terms were
thought up by two European economists, Lindbeck and Snower (1988). In
America these terms are much less popular. The study which most
convincingly shows the effects of insiders on wage formation is that of a
Canadian economist, David Card (1990), and relates to Canada. The
terms ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ do not appear in his article. There is no
reference to the work of Lindbeck and Snower. Most North American
economists follow the same line. While numerous studies suggest that
insider effects are more of an American than a European phenomenon,
people in America keep silent about them, while in Europe we never tire
of talking about them.
This outcome is obvious when considered from the perspective of norm
analysis. In Europe we maintain norms which are aimed at restricting the
power of insiders as much as possible. One aspect of this is that the danger
of abuse of power by insiders is constantly pointed out. This constant
attention should make clear that abuse of power will not be tolerated. In
America, it is standard practice for insiders to use their position of power.
There is not much point in warning them against doing so. The warning
would fall on deaf ears. Pleas for wage moderation therefore serve a useful
function. Wage moderation cannot explain, however, why wages in the
Netherlands remain some 20 per cent behind those in Germany. Other
factors play a role in that.
Following Calmfors and Driffill (1988), who argued against the vague-
ness of the concept of corporatism and centralization, I have restricted the
analysis strictly to the role higher level organizations play in wage form-
ation. It is tempting to extend my analysis to other areas of the economy.
Such approach would relate to the extensive literature on the civil society,
stressing the importance of organizations which occupy an intermediate
position between a government with political legitimation and atomized
citizens at the market place.
However, one should be cautious about hasty generalizations. Most
theories of corporatism do not really address the question as to how cor-
poratist organizations are able to affect the outcome at a highly diverse
micro level. Enforcement is usually taken for granted, regardless of the
objections against this approach put forward earlier. The contribution of
this chapter is that it shows how higher-level institutions can affect behaviour
at the micro level without heroic assumptions about enforcement. The
main impact of corporatist organizations is in the distribution of surpluses
that arise due to the specificity of investment. In that case, the market
mechanism does not operate, because of the absence of competition. Small
institutional details can have large effects on the outcome. 
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The model of corporatism laid out in this chapter describes the way in
which a large measure of discretion on the part of individual agents (firms
and employers) at the micro level goes hand in hand with a large measure
of influence of institutions which are not strictly enforced by the power of
law. The large amount of discretion provides the flexibility needed for an
efficient use of scarce resources in a highly diversified economy. The
institutional alignment of individual behaviour provides a protection
against wasteful distributional conflicts. The nice thing about the model
laid out in the chapter is that the goals do not interfere with each other, as
multiple goals usually do in economic theory.
This combination of flexibility in the application of scarce resources
and rules of conduct for the management of distributional conflicts
should therefore be the central characteristic of other areas where the
model can be applied fruitfully. It requires a great deal of specificity (as in
long-term employment relations). For example, it is hard to see how the
model would be beneficial for the organization of child care facilities,
which is one of the areas for which the benefits of corporatist institutions
are often praised. Running a day care centre has mainly to do with having
the child care workers there at the appropriate time and the appropriate
place. Little distributional conflict is going on there, apart from the issue
whether the worker or the firm has to pay. Corporatist organizations
might have a larger role to play in the organization of on-the-job-
training. There, the specificity is clear. However, one might doubt whether
corporatist organizations have the information available to decide who
has to take what training. My suspicion is that most corporatist training
schemes provide a lot of rights to taking courses with only a limited pay
off.
A similar reservation applies to the use of consultation by the govern-
ment on general policy issues, often hailed as one of the main benefits of
corporatism. In my view no hold up problem whatsoever is resolved by
these consultations. Their main effect, and that is probably very important,
is that they keep the unions and the employers’ federation aligned to the
general policy goals of the government. This helps to support the norms
that induces unions to restrain insider power. Support for the general goals
of the government helps to avoid the type of leapfrogging and insider wage
setting that in the end pushes unions towards antagonistic strategy. This
might be an important legitimation for consulting unions and employer
federations on all kind of policies it is not saying that these policy as such
become better designed and more warmly supported, as is sometimes
claimed. In summary, applying the present analysis of corporatism outside
the area of wage formation requires careful identification of the specific
investment involved and the other relevant mechanisms. Simple hand




1 In many new employment relations the choice will obviously be just a formality,
because the other employees in that company are already a part of a collective
labour agreement whereby the union negotiates on the annual wage increase.
This is of particular concern, however, to new companies which were not
previously included.
2 The situation in Canada is somewhat different. Contrary to the United States,
membership rates have not been declining there. The most likely explanation
for this divergence in historical development are some slight difference in the
procedures for a union vote in a firm.
3 An exception might be the case where investment in search by workers and
firms makes up for a large share in the specific investments, like in construction,
cleaning and retail trade. Investments in search have to be made before players
have the opportunity to solve the hold up problem by bargaining on a contract.
Mandatory extension of collective agreements can solve this problem, see
Teulings and Hartog (1998: Chapter 2).
4 The word ‘centralized’ probably reflects a far too rigid interpretation of the way
in which the central negotiations in these economies affect the eventual labour
market outcome. I suspect that the actual operation of these ‘centralized’
systems is not too much different from what I have described in this chapter.
5 Much damage could already have been caused in the meantime particularly due
to the fact that the period is long enough for the unemployed to observe their
qualifications decreasing. In order to speed up adjustment to worsened
economical circumstances, pleas for wage moderation fulfil a useful purpose.
6 See Teulings and Hartog (1998: Chapter 5).
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10 Renegotiating social and 
labour policies in the 
European multi-level system
Any role for corporatist patterns?
Gerda Falkner
Introduction
The forecast for corporatist policy styles1 is usually dim. Sometimes even a
general decline has been predicted for national corporatism. Alongside
shifting powers at the EU level, mainstream scholarly thinking anticipates a
development towards transnational pluralism. A closer analysis of recent
developments at both levels, however, suggests some qualifications to these
prognoses.
This chapter will first present the standard arguments as to the decay of
corporatism in Europe. These will, after a brief outline of the relevant
political science concepts, be contrasted with countervailing evidence. The
conclusions will discuss the role and the impact of prevailing corporatist
‘spots’ within contemporary European governance.
Please note that parts of this text were written in 1995 and presented at
the ECSA-USA Biennial Conference in South Carolina (11–14 May 1995).
The full first draft entitled ‘Corporatist Patterns of Decision-Making and
Europeanisation: No Future in the Multi-level Game?’ was presented at two
conferences in early 1996 (EU Human Capital and Mobility Programme
Network Conference, at the European University Institute, Florence; ECPR
Joint Sessions of Workshops, Oslo). This is a revised and shortened version
of the resulting print publication.2 Later developments could not be in-
cluded in very great detail for reasons of length, but they are referred to
where essential for the argument.
Meanwhile, other authors have presented similar and/or further argu-
ments on the persistence of the varieties of corporatism in Europe, most
importantly Philippe Schmitter and Jürgen Grote. We agree on a number of
crucial points, notably that the EU is no macro-corporatist system and will
probably never develop into one; and that national corporatism is not dead
but has changed in character, not least because of European integration. My
specific point is that the EU is not in principle different from national
political systems in that it employs, or tries to employ, a variety of governance
patterns – including in some instances corporatist ones (but at a meso level).
The patterns vary across policy areas and the mix can vary over time.3
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The forecast: a fading out of corporatism?
For the national systems, some experts have predicted a decline of cor-
poratism and convergence of industrial relations in the direction of
disorganisation (e.g. Lash and Urry 1987). Three main arguments have
been used to underline this trend (see overview in Traxler 1995a: 3f.):
deregulation; decentralization of bargaining; and disorganization in the
narrow sense, i.e. the decline in organizing capacities of the major interest
groups. Windolf (1989) expected ‘productivity coalitions’ within single
enterprises to replace corporatist systems at the macro and meso levels.
The relevant background to such assumptions were changes in production
patterns and the rise of the service sector, along with liberalization and
increased competition in world markets.
For West European states, the progress in economic integration since the
mid-1980s was expected to further the decline of national corporatism.
First, Europeanization of previously national competences dismantled not
only ‘national sovereignty’ (as vague as the concept may be), but also cut
down the fields of possible social partner influence within national systems
(e.g. Seidel 1989: 92; Wimmer and Mederer 1990: 208; Korinek 1994:
139f.). The effects of this were expected to be multiple, as a loss in
bargaining chips could also hinder subsequent cross-sectoral log-rolling
(Tálos 1994: 176f.; Falkner 1993b: 94).
Second, pluralist patterns of interest politics at the European level were
expected to cause repercussions at the national level. Industry was seen to
draw political strength from its organizational weakness at the European
level, where it successfully rejected centralized negotiations with labour
(Streeck and Schmitter 1991: 206ff.). This was expected to impact– at least in
the long run – upon the balance of power in the member states. At the policy
level, the absence of EC social policy harmonization might bring about
regime competition and social dumping, thus weakening labour’s bargaining
power. Capital’s threat of exit, by contrast, gained substantially in weight due
to the market liberalization programme ‘Europe 1992’ (e.g. Falkner 1993a).4
In a nutshell: much debated threats to national corporatism originate at the
national, the European and the world market levels.
As regards the applicability of the corporatist approach at the European
level, the mainstream assessment during the pre-Maastricht era was
effectively summarized by Streeck and Schmitter’s 1991 paper entitled
‘From National Corporatism to Transnational Pluralism’. There, the
authors state that:
interest representation around and within the Community was always
much more ‘pluralist’ than corporatist; more organizationally frag-
mented; less hierarchically integrated; more internally competitive;
and with a lot less control vested in peak associations over their
affiliates, or in associations over their members.
(Streeck and Schmitter 1991: 200)
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Concerning the procedural dimension, their major point was 
that in the uniting supra-national Europe, it was not only the case that
labour was and continues to be under-organized, but there also was never
a real possibility of a mutually organizing interaction effect, a Wechselwir-
kung, between labour and the two other major players in the political
economy, capital and the state.
(Ibid.: 204; emphasis in original)
The EC was thought to fall short of the indispensible contribution of public
power, of an ‘active, interventionist, non-liberal state which may . . . institu-
tionalize labour as well as capital as principal participants in a centralized
structure of political bargaining’ (ibid.; see also Traxler and Schmitter
1995: 200). Streeck and Schmitter came to the conclusion that: 
The evolutionary alternative to neo-liberalism as a model for the
European political economy is clearly not . . . neo-corporatism. More
likely appears an American-style pattern of ‘disjoint pluralism’ . . .
characterized by a profound absence of hierarchy and monopoly
among a wide variety of players of different but uncertain status.
(Ibid.: 227)
Many authors have since supported their conclusions.5 However, while
none of the above-mentioned arguments is wrong, others have tended to
be neglected: mainly the usefulness of corporatist policy styles for the
legitimation of both policies and polities – even at the EU level. My
argument is that public–private co-operation in decision-taking, under
conditions which privilege a few private interests, will persist as one among
several modes of governance. There is indeed qualitative change rather
than a general retreat of non-pluralist patterns.
The academic debate on (neo-)corporatism6 has continued ever since the
notion was rediscovered by Lehmbruch and Schmitter in 1974.7 Over time,
corporatism has developed into a ‘highly complex phenomenon (or set of
phenomena) of which different dimensions are covered by diverse concep-
tualizations’ (Lehmbruch 1982: 2). Predominantly, there are two dimensions:
the procedural and the structural ones. With regard to patterns of policy-
making, Lehmbruch opposed ‘corporatist’ co-operation of organizations and
public authorities to ‘pluralist’ pressure politics (e.g. Lehmbruch 1982: 8). A
corporatist mode of policy formation was described as one ‘in which formally
designated interest associations are incorporated within the process of
authoritative decision-making and implementation. As such they are officially
recognized by the state not merely as interest intermediaries but as co-
responsible ‘partners’ in governance and social guidance’ (Schmitter 1981:
295). With regard to the institutional set-up of corporatist systems, Philippe
Schmitter (1979: 138) formulated the typical characteristics as a limited
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number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and
functionally differentiated categories, recognized, or licensed (if not created)
by the state, and granted a deliberate representational monopoly.9 Already
Schmitter stressed, however, that these ideal types would hardly ever be met
in reality (ibid.: 14).
During the 1980s, corporatist patterns were already being traced
outside the ‘macro’ level of trans-sectoral political systems. ‘Meso-corpor-
atism’ or ‘sectoral corporatism’ were used to denominate corporatist
‘arenas’ at the level of industrial sectors, subnational units or single policy
areas (Lehmbruch 1982: 27; Cawson (ed.) 1985; Streeck 1994: 17).
Academic attention subsequently shifted to other fashionable labels such
as, above all, ‘policy networks’ (Marsh and Rhodes 1992; Kenis and
Schneider 1991). This theoretical shift paid tribute to the empirical
finding that policy-making increasingly happens in sectoral or even issue
specific sub-polities.10
Even long after the heyday of ‘corporatism’ in the late 1970s and early
1980s, the concept still belongs to the basic political science toolkit. To give
just one example: when elaborating dimensions and types of policy
networks, van Waarden used ‘corporatism’ as a distinctive feature, referring
to it as ‘the degree of integrated participation by economic interest groups
in the public policy process’ (1992: 29). Obviously, there is still a need for a
label characterizing a form of public–private interaction which includes
only a small number of privileged societal interests (typically: labour and
employers) who are co-actors in public policy-making. That is not-
withstanding the fact that due to economic and political developments, it is
now less likely that, within otherwise fragmented polities, corporatist
patterns should still cover all important areas of public policy as Lehmbruch’s
ideal type of macro-corporatism assumed.
Because of its connotations with regard to the systemic level, it seems
advisable not to use the label ‘corporatism’ as such any longer, but rather to
look for ‘corporatist policy communities’11 in specific policy areas or
sectors. This concept allows us to capture corporatist patterns below the
macro level. I hold that even in the absence of classic macro-corporatism
across many or all policy areas, corporatist patterns may still today
characterize policy processes in the European multi-level system. The
functional scope of corporatist arrangements (cross-sectoral, sectoral/policy
specific, or micro-level) and the specific economic policy orientation should
both be seen as empirical questions. 
My central argument is that even under the condition of a multiplicity
of diverse sectoral systems (be it at the state or the EU levels), it is highly
relevant to distinguish specific patterns of interest politics. The overall
view might appear pluralist simply because of a variety of co-existing 
sub-systems (cf. also Cawson 1992: 117). But sectoral differences should
not be overlooked and in specific areas, corporatist patterns may still
prevail.
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National politics: continuing diversity and 
supply-side corporatism
Against frequent expectation, recent studies have revealed that there is not
convergence, but continuing divergence of the national structures of industrial
interest intermediation in Europe (see Traxler 1995a and the contributions
to Crouch and Traxler (eds) 1995). As far as corporatist patterns prevail,
there are two particularly interesting factors to be mentioned: first, they
may sometimes even be prompted (instead of harmed) by European
integration; second, economic developments may bring about a new brand
of ‘supply-side corporatism’ which is considered an asset in international
market competition.
First, it seems that the effects of Europeanisation do not unilaterally
prompt a decline in corporatist patterns, but may, depending, for example
on the specific institutional set-up and the political situation in a member
state, also favour the contrary. Thus, Andersen (1995) describes the imple-
mentation of the Single Market’s banking policy in Denmark to have
brought about increased centralization of collective bargaining, not a
decentralization: ‘cartels have developed into associations and industrial
trade unions’ (ibid.: 262). In this case, the institutional set-up of interest
politics was changed in the direction of corporatist patterns12. In Norway, a
procedural aspect developed similarly: Parliament approved a law on the
extension of collective agreements in order to prevent social dumping
when Norway became a member of the European Economic Area (Traxler
1995a: 12). 
The brief history of Austrian EC membership shows that the well-known
system of ‘social partnership’ managed to establish a system of co-
ordinated tripartite policy-making with a view to adopting ‘national’ posi-
tions on EC draft law. Concerning the implementation of EC Directives,
the major associations’ de facto right to consultation in the legislative
process was for the first time laid down by law. At least during the first years
of EC membership, social partnership seems not to have suffered (Karlhofer
and Tálos 1996). 
A further important fact is that the Union increasingly builds on innova-
tive regulatory patterns involving decision-making at lower levels and
partly by the social partners. The recent European Works Councils Directive
is a major example of this (see Falkner 1996). The Maastricht Social Agree-
ment explicitly provides that the implementation of Directives at the
member state level may be realized by management and labour (see below).
Already the Single Market Programme has made some governments try
to revitalize incomes-policy concertation (e.g. the Portuguese, Spanish and
Italian; Traxler and Schmitter 1995: 212). EMU could well induce a similar
development with even wider functional scope: the Maastricht Treaty’s
convergence criteria have put considerable strain on the member states’
budgets, but cuts in expenditure are hard to sell to the public without the
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consent of the major interest groups. Thus, we witness efforts to reach
tripartite agreements between governments and societal interests with a
view to imposing austerity in many member states (e.g. Italy, Portugal,
Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Austria, France, etc.), even beyond those which
used to be labelled corporatist (mainly Austria, Germany, the Netherlands
and Sweden). The names for such pacts typically focus on the fight against
unemployment, but they mostly aim at a whole bundle of measures which
are often designed with a view to EMU membership (predominantly cuts in
public spending, pay moderation and measures to enhance competitive-
ness).
To sum up: notwithstanding other effects of European integration, there
are indicators that sometimes, corporatist patterns might also originate or
be strenghtened as a sort of spillover from EC politics.
Second, when it comes to policy contents, many of the corporatist
arrangements which are now prompted by European integration seem not
really novel in kind. In fact, they fit into a broader trend: Traxler has
observed that ‘in contrast to the assumption of the disorganisation thesis
. . . there seems to be a growing need for a new type of ‘supply-side’
corporatism aimed at backing a country’s competitiveness’ (1995a: 13).
This refers to a change in the functions of corporatist systems rather than
a general movement towards pluralist pressure politics. Compared to the
Keynesian demand-side corporatism, the new version targets qualitative
aspects of industrial relations rather than the regulation of aggregate
demand or prices (see Traxler 1995c for the Austrian case). In fact,
successful economic restructuring depends not in the least place on high-
trust relations and collective goods, which the firms cannot provide
themselves with satisfactorily (Traxler 1995b: 36f.). The prime areas for
‘supply-side corporatism’ are thus vocational training (Crouch 1995),
environmentally friendly methods of production, and industrial policy.
After all, productivity coalitions at the company level (Windolf 1989)
might be ‘a complement rather than an alternative to corporatist
structures above this level’ (Traxler 1995a: 14). While the tripartite pacts
undertaken with a view to achieving EMU as outlined above usually stick
with supply-side economics, they go beyond qualitative aspects of
industrial relations only and target budgetary austerity and monetary
stability.
Clearly, there are counter-examples (e.g. the failure of a tripartite
employment pact in Germany under Chancellor Kohl) and countervailing
trends to the ones outlined above (they are well known from the literature
and were briefly outlined at the beginning). It is neither possible nor
necessary here to give a full account of the development of interest inter-
mediation patterns in all EC member states. A distinctive literature on the
recent ‘new social pacts’ has emerged recently (see, for example, Schmitter
and Grote 1997 who already referred to an earlier version of this article;
Rhodes 1998; Hassel 1998).
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The core of my argument is simply that there is no unidirectional
decline of corporatist governance, even if the contemporary cases seem
different in function and often more narrow in scope than before. But what
about the prospects of corporatist patterns at the EU level?
Euro-politics: not only pluralism
Much of the literature focuses on the improbability of the emergence of a
supranational form of macro-corporatism comparable to national patterns
in the 1970s (e.g. Traxler and Schmitter 1995: 213; Kohler-Koch 1992:
103; Streeck and Schmitter 1991: 227). The very feature of the EU political
system is, however, fragmentation. There are enormous cross-sectoral
differences in policy style – a fact which has become increasingly topical
during the 1990s (e.g. Greenwood et al. 1992a). Much more attention
should thus be paid to co-operative public–private patterns at the meso
level, where some authors have already detected structures alien to classic
pluralism.13 Furthermore, the possibility of co-evolution of political regimes
and interest politics (Greenwood et al. 1992b: 243f.; Eichener and Voelzkow
1994a: 17; Kohler-Koch 1996: 215f.) has become of scientific interest.
Implications for the development of more co-operative, maybe even
‘corporatist’ policy styles have yet to be revealed. If it is true that since the
early days of European integration (against the expectations of neo-
functionalists), private organizations have not taken the lead but rather
followed political initiatives (see e.g. Kohler-Koch 1995: 16), then major
constitutional innovations such as the Single European Act and the
Maastricht Treaty should prompt specific developments of interest group
organization and of their involvement in public policy-making alongside
relevant new regimes at the sectoral level. This will be examined with
regard to the Maastricht Social Agreement.
EC social policy: towards a corporatist policy community
A prime example of co-evolution of political/administrative structures (what
might be called ‘the state’ at the national level) and interest politics is the
recent development in the realm of EC social policy. Due to unanimity
requirements, the ‘social dimension’ had traditionally lagged behind
economic integration and was stuck in a classic ‘decision-making trap’
(Scharpf 1988). In 1991, however, the so-called Maastricht Social Agree-
ment introduced a new social policy regime. Originally, it only applied to
the member states, although not the UK.14 Explicit Community competences
were extended to many more social policy matters than before; majority
voting is now possible for a much wider range of issues; and new patterns
of ‘corporatist decision-making’ were introduced. The very establishment
of the new regime is, in fact, attributable to the major European
interest groups’ anticipation of significant changes in the EC social policy
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provisions15 which made UNICE (employers) conclude an agreement with
ETUC (workers) and CEEP (public enterprises) in October 1991. Their
joint proposals on the future involvement of the social partners were
immediately submitted to the IGC. They promoted corporatist patterns of
EC social policy along the lines which had earlier been developed by the
Commission and the Belgian government (see e.g. Ross 1995: 183; Falkner
1998: 89–95).
The Social Agreement contains three layers of social partner particip-
ation in the policy process: first, the Commission now has a legal obligation
to consult both management and labour before submitting social policy
proposals. Second, a member state may entrust management and labour, at
their joint request, with the implementation of Directives adopted pursuant
to the Social Agreement. And third, but most importantly, management
and labour may, on the occasion of such consultation, inform the Com-
mission of their wish to initiate negotiations in order to reach agreements
instead of traditional EC legislation. Such agreements may, at the joint
request of the signatory parties, be implemented by a Council decision on a
proposal from the Commission. In particular, the incorporation of the
latter aspect in the Maastricht Treaty suggests that all major actors at the
EU level (including not only the major interest groups and the Commission
but also the governments in the Council) are ready to participate in ‘a
mode of policy formation in which formally designated interest associations
are incorporated within the process of authoritative decision-making and
implementation’ (Schmitter 1981: 295) – the classic formula for procedural
corporatism.
Under this new social policy regime, the procedures of decision-making
(see next section) as well as the structure of interest representation (see
p. 263) have undergone significant developments which brought them
much closer than they were a few years ago to the above-mentioned
procedural and structural definitions of corporatist patterns. In other
words, a corporatist policy community has emerged.
Corporatist policy-making procedures
Although observers had initially doubted whether the far-reaching powers
attributed to labour and management in the Maastricht Treaty would
actually be put into practice, this happened in a number of cases has
already.
The first application of the new procedures saw no formal negotiations
but only ‘talks on talks’ (Gold and Hall 1994: 181) on a collective agree-
ment between the two sides of industry. It eventually led to a traditional
Council Directive on European Works Councils.16 It was already a major
innovation, however, that in autumn 1993, the UNICE had declared that it
was ‘ready to sit down with the Commission and/or the European unions to
develop a . . . procedure for information and consultation that is acceptable
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to all parties . . .’ (EIRR 238: 13). Until then, it had always strictly rejected
any EC-level initiative on employee information and participation in the
enterprise.17
The second decision-making process under the new social policy regime
has indeed led to a Euro-collective agreement among the three major
federations. On 14 December 1995, the ETUC, UNICE and CEEP adopted
a Framework Agreement on Parental Leave,18 providing an individual right
for a minimum of three months’ time off while employment rights are
being retained. Via a Council Directive implementing the agreement, the
standards agreed by the social partners were made binding for the member
states (initially, for all except the UK, but since the Labour government has
meanwhile adhered to the Social Agreement concluded at Amsterdam, all
relevant Directives were extended to the UK). This procedure provided a
solution to what had been perceived as a major obstacle to the devel-
opment of corporatist patterns at the Euro-level (e.g. Keller 1995;
Obradovich 1995; Traxler and Schmitter 1995), namely that CEEP, ETUC
and UNICE (at least de facto) lack the powers to directly implement their
agreements via their member organizations.
Like the issue of implementation, the fact that none of the three major
Euro-federations has a general bargaining mandate has also worried
scholarly writers on the Maastricht Social Agreement a great deal (e.g.
Keller 1995; Obradovich 1995; Streeck 1995; Traxler and Schmitter 1995;
Turner 1995). Indeed, negotiating mandates are being given on a case-to-
case basis. After the parental leave case, this was repeated in the collective
negotiations on atypical work which in summer 1997 led to the second
Euro-level agreement, on part-time work; in the case of fixed-term work
(see Europe, 16 January 1999, no. 13), on and most recently in the
agreement on telework (EIRR, August 2002). Of the three issues which
were not negotiated by the social partners since the Social Agreement came
into force (the reversal of the burden of proof in sex discrimination cases,
sexual harassment at work and information/consultation of workers in
national enterprises), only the latter issue was controversial (a majority of
UNICE members would have preferred to negotiate).19 This led to
pressures for further reform of the voting procedures in UNICE).
There is no space here to discuss details of the Agreements (but see
Falkner 2003), whose standards have sometimes been harshly criticized
(not least by unions from the socially more advanced member states,
notably the German DGB). It is important to mention, however, that a
realistic yardstick must be applied. This implies that, first, both the
viewpoints of industry and of labour have to be taken into consideration
(the former partly criticizes the agreements for going too far). Second, not
only the highest national standards within the Community should be the
reference point in the judgement of the results of a Euro-collective bargain,
but also the lowest. Although three months of parental leave are below the
existing amount in most member states, there are several whose labour law
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had so far not known a statutory right for parental leave at all (Ireland,
Luxembourg and Belgium), and several details might bring improvements
also elsewhere.20 Third, one has to keep in mind the alternative of
collective bargains, i.e. Council Directives on EU social standards. Like the
recent collective agreements, recent social policy Directives decided by the
Ministers themselves have also been criticized for being too minimalist in
ambition. In fact, the huge differences in standards and the pressures of
economic competition make it practically impossible for both governments
and social partners to harmonize at a high speed, without paying attention
to the costs involved. In any case, the Parental Leave Agreement was even
somewhat more favourable for workers than various earlier compromise
texts discussed in the Council. In the part-time case, too, the Council had
already contemplated comparable low-ambition solutions before the social
partners came into play. Just as at the national level, it seems that the
results of corporatist deals thus depend on the politicians as much as on
the interest representatives: there is not only dense contact but even
interdependence within corporatist policy communities. 
Replacing what is ‘the State’ at the national level, there are two EC
institutions involved in corporatist patterns under the Social Agreement.
The Commission has significant influence without directly participating in
the negotiations because it supplies the social partners with a document
that constitutes the basis of their talks. Furthermore, the Council may only
implement a collective agreement on a proposal by the Commission. Thus,
the Commission’s power of initiative is extended to the corporatist
procedures. In addition, the EC Council is involved in some ‘corporatist
exchange’, too – not only at the stage of implementing an agreement but
also during the decision-making process. Only if a necessary majority of
Council members seems willing to adopt social law will the UNICE usually
be interested in striking bargains (since it views them as a ‘minor evil’, see
e.g. Tyskiewicz in Europe, 7 October 1996, no. 24). The Council, in turn,
has an interest in successful collective bargains in order to legitimize both
material EC social law, and (what was in the past at least as important) non-
decisions, in front of a public which is increasingly critical about the lack of
a ‘social dimension’ of European integration. Despite the fact that
negotiations, in the narrow sense, are being conducted solely among the
social partners, the co-operative policy-making style emerging under the
Social Agreement therefore has features quite similar to ‘tripartism’
between the State, capital and labour at the national level.21
Since the ideal-typical description of procedural corporatism as developed
by Lehmbruch and Schmitter fits well with the new decision-patterns which
have developed under the Maastricht Social Agreement,22 it is of interest if
there are also developments regarding the relevant system of interest
groups, i.e. in the structural dimension of the definition of corporatism as
outlined above.
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Corporatist structure follows strategy
Changes related to the structure of the system of interest representation
concern intra-group reforms (towards more competences and decision
capacity) as well as the development of a core group of decisive interest
groups (towards monopolistic representation in the relevant social partner
negotiations). These developments are even more significant if one con-
siders that prior to the Maastricht Social Agreement, the participation of all
relevant Euro-associations in binding negotiations with each other and the
EC institutions was by no means undisputed in their member organisations
(be it national unions or employer federations).
The ETUC was first to adapt its structure with a view to enhancing
negotiating capacity at the European level. In 1991, the internal structure
and the decision-making process (including voting by two-thirds majority)
was reformed with a view to limiting dangers of blockade, and the European
Industry Committees were allowed to vote too (except in financial and
statutory matters; Ebbinghaus and Visser 1994: 239; for details see e.g.
Dølvik 1997: 166ff.). This may be regarded as progress concerning the
problem of co-ordinating territorial and functional interests – both now
directly represented within the umbrella of the ETUC. Further amend-
ments to the ETUC constitution were decided during its May 1995
Congress. The Executive Committee now has a responsibility to ‘determine
the composition and mandate of the delegation for negotiations with
European employers’ organisations’, and to ‘ensure the convergence at
European level of the demands and contractual policies of affiliated
organisations’ (Article 11). A change in the UNICE’s statute in June 1992
directly aimed at meeting the challenges of the Social Protocol. The
organization was formally assigned the task of representing its members in
the dialogue between the social partners provided for in the Social
Agreement (Article 2.1 of the Statute). The Council of Presidents is in
charge of defining the positions to be taken in the social dialogue. That
collective agreements have still to be adopted unanimously has already
been challenged recently (especially by the new President Georges Jacobs;
see e.g. Europe, 11 July 1998: 14). That the federation of enterprises with
public participation, CEEP, also adapted its Rules of Procedure in order to
meet the challenges of the Social Agreement is less surprising since it had
traditionally been more open to EU-level negotiations with labour than had
UNICE.23
But what about the plethora of lobbies, expected to hinder any effective
corporatist negotiations at the European level? Is there any help from
European state institutions (e.g. Traxler and Schmitter 1994) which would
prompt encompassing but monopolistic patterns of interest representation
such as exist in some national systems? Empirical evidence shows that this
is the case. Both the Council and the Commission actively supported the
monopolization of collective negotiations under the Social Agreement by
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the three major cross-sectoral interest federations (ETUC, CEEP and
UNICE). The EC institutions’ involvement can be assimilated to the
‘licensing’ (Schmitter 1979) in corporatist national systems even though it
partly relies only on giving incentives for self-organisation of the ‘social
partners’. In its ‘Communication on the Application of the Social Agree-
ment’ (COM(93) 600 final, 14 December 1993; par. 22 ff.), the Commission
defined a set of criteria for organizations to be included in consultations
preceding legislative proposals pursuant to the Social Agreement. It is the
same range of almost thirty associations which may, during the process of
consultation, theoretically decide to negotiate on a collective agreement.
However, the Commission considers that it is up to the organizations
themselves to develop their own dialogue and negotiating structure (see
ibid.: par. 26). Thus, responsibility lies with the representatives of labour
and management. This was a successful tactical move since a formalized
narrow definition of the ‘social partners’ under the Social Agreement might
have been challenged in and finally reversed by the ECJ.
Support for the (not at all unexpected) constellation of de facto only three
negotiating Euro-groups was nevertheless expressed when the Commission
suspended several legislative processes on the joint request of the ‘big
three’ (although it had received responses from many more organisations
during the consultations; see e.g. EIRR, 260: 3). Subsequently, the Council
indeed implemented the collective agreements signed by the same three
peak federations. In the parental leave case, the European Council
explicitly welcomed the fact that it was for the first time possible to reach
agreement with ‘the social partners’ on a draft Directive (European Council
1995: point 6).
On both sides of industry, smaller interest groups24 protested in vain
against the three major federations’ de facto monopoly (or rather: ‘oligo-
poly’) on negotiating as cross-sectoral social partners in the frame of the
Social Agreement. The Euro-association of the small and medium-sized
enterprises (UEAPME) even filed an unsuccessful law suit against the
Council.25 The Commission urged to seek ways of satisfying those groups in
order not to endanger the legitimacy of the new corporatist decision
patterns, e.g. via encouraging linking structures with the major groups (e.g.
in COM(93) 600 final). Meanwhile, several Euro-groups on the employer
side were included in the social partner negotiations on an observer basis.
UEAPME concluded a co-operation agreement with UNICE. It must be
consulted before UNICE represents employer positions in the social
dialogue, but it does not have a veto right (see e.g. Europe, 17 December
1998: 16). Thus, the representativeness and public acceptance of the
collective agreements seem improved, but the greater decision-taking
capacity of the exclusive group with only three players was upheld.
To conclude: not all details of Schmitter’s ideal-type description of a
corporatist interest group system are met under the Social Agreement (but
this is not the case for any extant national system, either).26 However, the
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quintessence of structurally corporatist patterns is, maybe surprisingly to
many observers, meanwhile present. Only a few groups, which are not
under competition with each other for membership, negotiate. They proved
capable of striking deals and were acknowledged by ‘the state’ (i.e. the
Commission and the Council) as legitimate representatives of ‘labour and
industry’ at the EU level.
In general, the patterns which evolved under the Maastricht Social
Agreement (which replaced the EC-Treaty’s old social provisions under the
Amsterdam Treaty and are now binding for all member states) do not
replicate exactly any of the various national patterns of corporatism. How-
ever, the crucial attributes of such a policy style can be found concerning
the patterns of policy-making as well as the structure of interest represent-
ation. A corporatist policy style is thus no longer alien at the EU-level. The
developments since the Maastricht IGC furthermore indicate that EU
Treaty reforms should not be disregarded as potential agents for change in
interest politics. Due to the fragmented system of EC politics, develop-
ments will certainly not lead in the same direction for all or even many
policy areas.27 At least in one other field, however, the post-Maastricht era
has already brought developments in the direction of co-operative gover-
nance including labour and management, as well.
Employment policy concertation at the EU level
One of the most controversial aspects of the EMU, as provided for in the
EU Treaty, is its effect on employment. While the convergence criteria were
developed to fight nominal divergence (i.e. to reach convergence of the
development of prices), no precautions were taken with regard to fighting
divergence of the non-monetary aspects of the economies of the member
states, particularly in terms of their unemployment rates.
. . . during the Maastricht negotiations, I proposed making
employment part of the criteria. Not all the national delegations
agreed to this. They committed an error, we see that today.
(Jacques Delors quoted in Europe, 3 February 1996: 2b) 
As austerity programmes with a view to reaching the convergence
criteria are currently being implemented in the member states, a possible
negative effect on employment is the subject of heated debate (Heylen and
Van Poeck 1995; Busch 1994).28 Even Jacques Santer admits that the fear of
unemployment is ‘undermining confidence in the single currency’ (quoted
in Europe, 1 February 1996: 4). These developments have brought about a
trend towards co-ordination of national policies with a view to fighting
unemployment. Although the decision process is not ‘corporatist’ is the
narrow sense, involvement of the social partners is a distinctive feature.
Subject of debate are measures to be carried out at the national level as well
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as possible greater effects on the employment of EU policies (structural
funds; transeuropean networks).
The roots of this policy go back to the Delors White Paper on Growth,
Competitiveness, and Employment (December 1993; cf. EC Bulletin
Supplement 6/93). Together with a Commission report on the national
employment policies, this programmatic discussion paper was presented to
the European Council of Essen in December 1994. On this basis, the Heads
of State and Government adopted a medium-term strategy for the fight
against unemployment to be implemented via multi-annual employment
programmes in the member states. Five major aims were defined:
investment in vocational training, flexibility of the labour market, reduction
in non-wage labour costs, improvements in active labour market policy and
in measures to help groups particularly affected by unemployment. In
order to analyse progress, the European Council of Essen introduced a
surveillance procedure (so-called ‘Essen follow-up’). In the context of this
chapter, the most interesting aspect of this initiative is the collaboration of
a wide range of actors at all levels of the EU system, including the social
partner organisations both at the national and at the European level (see
also European Council 1995: point 2). In the 1995 Joint Report, social
partner participation was indeed given prime importance during all stages
of the process (European Council 1995: Annex 2).
The ‘Essen follow-up’ has increased the social partner activities at the
European level significantly, highlighting a growing belief in the need for
‘concerted action’ for employment by the EC institutions and the social
partners at the Euro-level. During the 1996–7 Intergovernmental Con-
ference, the possibility of giving more priority to employment within the
EU’s general objectives as well as an employment chapter in the EC Treaty
were a major issue, and indeed, the ‘Essen procedures’ were formalized in
the Amsterdam Treaty’s new employment chapter.29 On the basis of a
report by the Council and the Commission, the European Council each
year adopts conclusions on the employment situation in the Community.
On this basis, the Council draws up guidelines which the member states
must take into account in their employment policies. The Council annually
examines the implementation of the employment policy guidelines and
may, acting by a qualified majority on a recommendation from the
Commission, make recommendations to member states (cf. Article 128 EC
Treaty).30
The role allocated to the social partners under the new procedures does
not repeat the corporatist patterns under the Maastricht Social Agreement.
One may speculate that this might have been different if the Santer
initiatives had been followed by any substantial social partner agreement.
Contrary to the situation in 1991 when the pre-Maastricht social partner
input to the Intergovernmental Conference was negotiated, there was,
however, no realistic threat of legislation which might have made industry
prefer corporatist deals instead. In fact, it was known already at an early
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stage of the pre-Amsterdam IGC that the majority of member states wanted
no supranational employment policy in the narrow sense but only a co-
ordination of national policies.
The decision patterns legally agreed in the Amsterdam Treaty’s employ-
ment chapter are not explicitly corporatist (unlike those in the Social
Chapter of that Treaty) since the social partners are only mentioned when
the Employment Committee has to consult them. This new Committee
consists of member state and Commission representatives and is to pro-
mote co-ordination between member states on employment and labour
market policies (cf. Article 109s, i.e. now Article 130 EC Treaty, after
renumbering). De facto, however, the three major federations of employers
and workers (UNICE, CEEP and ETUC) have played a more significant
role, particularly in the decision-shaping phase. Meetings before European
Council summits which bring them together with the Heads of State and
Governent (or the Troika representing them) were recently used to a large
extent for the discussion of employment matters. Furthermore, a number
of meetings were held between the Council of Social and Employment
Ministers, the Commission, the President of the EP Committee of Social
Affairs and ETUC/UNICE/CEEP, on employment matters. Twice a year,
there are now meetings of the Troika and the social partners with a view to
the major federations’ participation in the implementation of the
employment guidelines (on the first meeting see Europe, 8 November
1997: 5). 
In December 1998, UNICE, CEEP and ETUC adopted two common
positions which served as an input for the European Council, on the employ-
ment policy guidelines for 1999 and on the reform of the Standing
Committee on Employment (Europe, 14 December 1998: 16). In the
Presidency conclusions of the Vienna summit, the governments called for
even more participation and responsibility of the social partners in
employment matters (Europe, 13 December 1998: 11). In June 1999 the
Cologne European Council finally established a so-called ‘macro-economic
dialogue’ between various actors involved in wage negotiations and
monetary, budget and fiscal policies, including most notably the Euro-level
social partners and the European Central Bank.
The practice of employment policy co-ordination thus reveals how much
the state(EU)–labour–employer relations at the European level have
recently been in a state of flux. Even outside a corporatist Treaty basis, the
three major cross-sectoral federations of employers and employees may be
pragmatically included in EU decision processes in a variety of ways,
according to area-specific circumstances and considerations. In the employ-
ment case, a few privileged interest groups (once again ETUC, UNICE and
CEEP) have on occasion even been invited to the negotiation table of the
Social Affairs and Employment Council. Since they are not formal co-
decision-takers (as under social policy decision rules) this might best be
termed a form of enhanced consultation. It nevertheless indicates that
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along the corporatist–pluralist continuum, manifold shades of inclusion/
exclusion of interest groups exist in the various fields of EU policy-
making.
Conclusions
Contrary to certain scholarly expectations, a general fading out of cor-
poratist policy styles has failed to occur in Europe. The future of
public–private interaction in the European multi-level system does not
purely consist in pluralistic pressure politics by an unlimited number of
private interests acting in an uncoordinated way and without discrimination
on the part of ‘the state’ (be it the national governments or the EC
institutions). Definitely, the 1970s’ Keynesian macro-corporatism has not
come back and may never do so. However, a multiplicity of patterns
continues to exist at the national level, and ‘supply-side corporatism’
(Traxler) coexists with more pluralist styles. In several cases, the establish-
ment of the EMU has indeed prompted tripartite economic policy arrange-
ments between governments, labour and industry. At the level of the
fragmented EU political system, too, huge differences exist in the particip-
ation of private interests in policy-making. Alongside with policy areas
which fit the pluralist paradigm, there are corporatist patterns to be found
elsewhere. The prime example is the post-Maastricht social policy regime
which gives the ‘social partners’ the right to agree on standards which are
subsequently made binding for the whole EC/EEA area, in a an outright
corporatist policy community. Other policy fields, like employment pro-
motion, are located somewhere along the pluralism–corporatism continuum
of policy-making (but in this case at quite some distance from the extreme
pluralist end, where lobbies individually try to influence governments in a
competitive way).
In analysing social and employment policies, this contribution highlights
one side of the coin only. However, this is the ‘dark’ side which was partly
not even thought to exist (notably at the EU level). By contrast, arguments
why corporatist patterns may increasingly be disadvantaged by recent
economic and social trends as well as by European integration are well
known from the literature (and they are not discarded here, although
counter-tendencies are being studied).
If the argument is neither that classic national neo-corporatism will
come back nor that there is a single EU system of interest intermediation
(including all sectoral EC systems) developing along corporatist lines, what
is the range and the weight of the argument presented here? With a view to
the EU, my point is, first, that there is little use in searching for an
overarching characteristic for the sum of all policy areas: too huge are the
differences, and there is little indication for convergence. To label this
deeply segmented system ‘pluralist’ simply because the bird’s eye view on
all sectors results in a non-corporatist picture seems an undue simplific-
268 Gerda Falkner
ation. Second, due to the orientation towards both ‘pluralism’ and a
‘systemic’ viewpoint, the potentials of change in the European system of
interest intermediation were often underrated. Evidence shows that there
was indeed a co-evolution of the policy-making rules and the system of
interest intermediation in the case of the Maastricht Social Policy Agree-
ment. If Treaty changes had such a potential in one area, that might also
hold true for others. This is of major interest for the political scientist and
of impact for practitioners – even if potentials for change do not yet
indicate a specific direction of that change (in other words: different Treaty
changes might as well bring about more pluralist patterns instead of
formerly more co-operative public–private interaction). With a view to the
national systems, it seems that neither world-wide economic developments
nor European integration simply put an end to all corporatist patterns.
While Keynesian macro-corporatism might indeed be outdated, other but
still non-pluralist forms such as area-specific corporatist policy commun-
ities might survive.
How can one explain the unexpected resilience of corporatist patterns?
It seems that the dimension of the ‘unburdening of the state’ still matters.
Governments need the legitimizing support of the major interest groups to
a particularly great extent in times of tighter budgets. The need to push
through welfare cuts, often against the will of large clusters of society,
causes governments to attempt a dispersion of responsibility. The so-called
‘social partners’ often look like ideal co-actors: While they may gain some
concessions for their clientele (normally at the expense of less organized
interests), the involvement of the major interest groups supports both social
legitimacy and compliance. The process of establishing EMU increased the
need for co-operative governance in order to generate social acceptance for
short-term austerity plans with a view to reaching the convergence criteria.
At the European level, the Heads of State and Government seem to
perceive a similar incentive. When the employment situation and discus-
sions on the perceived absence of a ‘social dimension of the EMU’
endangered the permissive consensus for European integration, they tried
to involve the ‘social partners’ in various activities with regard to employ-
ment policy and social policy.
Why do the major interest goups go along with this? With the progress
of European integration, self-interest of national interest groups in the
participation of Euro-level policy-making tends to increase. From the
perspective of national ‘social partners’, strengthening the Euro-groups
was, for a long time, considered as a loss in power. With tribute to the
specific situation of multi-level governance, however, corporatist patterns at
the EC-level might not be a zero-sum-game after all (see also Kohler-Koch
1992: 99f.). In areas where competences are meanwhile transferred to the
EU and may be decided without unanimity, national interest groups have
already lost their grip. They can only win if they are able to collectively,
along with their counterparts from other member states within a Euro-
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federation, to act in the supranational arena. Indeed, to be one of several
participants at the higher level is certainly more beneficial than not
participating at all. In addition, innovative regulative patterns have
recently allowed for mutually beneficial effects: if collective agreements at
the Euro-level, such as on the issue of parental leave, are to be imple-
mented in a ‘cascading’-like pattern where politics filter down from the
supranational to the national, sub-national and even enterprise-level,
national and sub-national actors might in the end even be strengthened.31
From the perspective of interest federations at the Euro-level, such
decentralization will, in practice, cause a deflation of pressure on intra-
group interest unification and thus facilitate agreement.32
Compared to Keynesian macro-corporatism in the 1970s and early
1980s, contemporary corporatist arrangements work under the condition
of supply-side economics and open markets. Even tripartite deals in the
member states now often differ from classic neo-corporatism in supposedly
sovereign nation states in the sense that their objective is to implement EC
level policies (or to facilitate adaptation to them), rather than independent
policy-making.33 Even if the patterns of interest representation and the
participation of private interests in public policy-making show corporatist
features, the action radius and the political weight of such arrangements
tend to differ from those of the 1970s. All of the corporatist arrangements
now work in the shadow of the internal market and of the EMU. Thus, they
are not fully independent in their policy options. Notably measures which
increase public spending or which put burdens on business are much
harder to entertain because the convergence criteria and internationalized
markets account for a hanging slope towards monetarist and neo-liberal
policy options. In the words of Thomas Hüglin,34 corporatist exchange now
tends to take place within the neo-liberal agenda.
The smaller scope of policy influence is certainly a disadvantage mainly
from the viewpoint of labour. Nevertheless, the participation in such schemes
(in exchange for minor concessions by the employers) is frequently per-
ceived as the only available option to secure jobs in times of open markets
and restrictive public finances, while the employers and the governments,
in turn, aim at increasing both the compliance with and the social
legitimacy of the policies on the agenda. The balance of power between
labour and management assumed for corporatist arrangements in earlier
literature may always have been doubtful – but with completely open
economic borders, the political resources of labour (mainly to strike) tend
to be further devaluated in comparison to capital’s exit option. Only with
an even stronger backing from ‘the state’ than before35 and under great
societal pressure can there nowadays be some sort of equal weight: e.g. if
there is a realistic threat of legislation in the case of absence of industry’s
readiness to bargain with labour; or if a failure of collective negotiations
could create social unrest. But in general, labour’s leverage is significantly
lessened under the conditions of austerity-oriented convergence criteria for
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EMU, open economic borders and high unemployment. In fact, it seems
no coincidence that social and employment policies are currently the prime
areas of (non-pluralist) participation of the major societal interests in
public policy-making, both at the national and the European level. These
fields are of immediate interest to the citizens, so that public opinion may
exert some counter-balance to the lessened bargaining power of the unions
vis-à-vis capital. One might even speculate that it will be hard for both
national governments and the emerging EU polity to afford not to employ,
in these areas, a governance mode with a high potential for ‘legitimizing’
policy outputs, i.e. involving the major and privileged societal interests in
corporatist policy communities.
This leads to the final conclusion that under specific circumstances,
scenarios will persist that include a small and stable set of private actors
with a high capability to act and implement in a way that is more ‘para-
state’ (i.e. connected to public authority and binding in character) than
‘social-political governance’ (Kooiman 1993; the latter refers to an unstable
and issue-oriented co-ordination of a wide range of societal actors).
However, it appears that within the contemporary European multi-level
system, such corporatist patterns represent only one mode of governance
among many. Political scientists should neither at the national nor at the
European level expect the convergence of different policy styles towards an
overarching ideal-type, be that ‘pluralist’ or ‘corporatist’. Finally, evidence
suggests that, both at the national and the European levels, the cultivation
of corporatist patches is quite instrumental, with a view to ensuring
compliance with the politics of the EMU and liberalized world markets. In
that sense, current corporatist patterns often seem to belong less to the
realm of political structure than to political strategy.
Notes
1 The ‘policy style’ refers to both the patterns of policy-making and imple-
mentation (Richardson et al. 1982).
2 In Current Politics and Economics in Europe, 8/4, 1999. An earlier version had
appeared in the European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 1 (1997) no. 11
(http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1997–011a.htm). Thanks for helpful comments to their
anonymous referees, to Frans van Waarden, and to the participants of the
conferences where the text was discussed.
3 By summer 2002, the emphasis in EU social policy (which makes up the main
empirical part of this chapter) had shifted from minimum harmonization
(where the quasi-corporatist mode of decision-making described below applies)
to open co-ordination. There, the decision patterns are still remote from classic
pluralism but nevertheless not outright corporatist. This does, however, not
question the basic argument presented in this chapter. At least to date the
corporatist design of decisions on EC social policy directives agreed in the EC
Treaty has not been changed, and only very recently another collective Euro-
agreement has been concluded (on telework). Although there are now fewer
Commission proposals on social regulation than at earlier periods, there are a
few relevant projects to which corporatist patterns could still be applied in the
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near future. In any case, this is not the only example of a kind of corporatist
policy community at EU level, and the fact that further ones could at least
potentially develop (assuming there is backing from the Commission and the
Council) is highlighted by the post-Maastricht developments in that field.
4 For an overview on the pessimist expectations concerning European integra-
tion’s effects on national corporatism, see van Waarden (1994: 218ff.)
5 This was even the case with research carried out around the time of the
Maastricht Treaty’s signature or later (e.g. Keller 1993, 1997; Falkner 1993b;
Traxler and Schmitter 1994, 1995; Sadowski and Timmesfeld 1994). For a
nuanced view including ‘possibly some signs of corporatism’ see Mazey and
Richardson (1994: 30) and most notably the authors mentioned in note 13.
Andersen and Eliassen 1991 briefly mention that they expect Euro-corporatism
if the European Parliament is significantly strengthened.
6 By calling the newly depicted features of democratic systems ‘neocorporatism’,
‘liberal corporatism’ or ‘democratic corporatism’, scholars wanted to distinguish
them from their fascist counterparts predating the Second World War. After two
decades of debate on contemporary corporatism, the evocation of the spectre of
fascism and authoritarian rule seems less probable, hence the use of the term
‘corporatism’ without prefix here. On various concepts of corporatism within
political science and industrial relations, see e.g. Williamson 1989; Streeck 1994.
7 In short, their concept opposed the pluralist way of analysing the role of
organized interests in the political life of Western democracies, popular in post-
war political science. Governments were no longer perceived as only passively
influenced or ‘captured’ by a huge number of independenly acting pressure
groups. The latter were seen as not only ‘representing’, but also actively
governing their members’ interests. The new perspective considered the state as
a constituent actor in the organization of collective interests in society (Streeck
1994: 9).
8 First publication: 1974.
9 A pluralist system, by contrast, comprises an unspecified number of multiple,
voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchically ordered and self-determined (as to
type and scope of interest) categories not licensed, recognized, subsidized,
created or otherwise controlled by the State, without monopoly of represent-
ational activity within their respective categories.
10 In fact, changes were over time noted even in the classic macro-corporatist
system, i.e. the Austrian (e.g. Tálos 1994: 27; Tálos et al. 1993). Like during the
early years of Austrian ‘social partnership’ immediately after the Second World
War (Tálos 1985: 64), it is since the mid-1980s again a selection of issues rather
than socio-economic policy in its full variety that is subject to such patterns of
policy-making (Müller 1985: 220).
11 This typology was developed in a recent book on EU-level industrial relations
and social policy (Falkner 1998).
12 Kohler-Koch (1992: 102f.) notes that the necessity of participating in the
European policy process has indeed, at times, also increased the action potential
of federations at the national level, e.g. the need to co-ordinate has favoured the
merging of actors.
13 See Greenwood and Ronit (1992) for the pharmaceutical sector; Cawson (1992)
for consumer electronics; Eichener and Voelzkow (1994b) for health and safety
in the workplace; Eichener and Voelzkow (1994c) for technical harmonization
and standardization.
14 For details see Falkner 1998.
15 This goes along well with established knowledge. With regard to the growth of
European interest group federations, Kohler-Koch (1994: 171) observed that
they did not develop parallel to an increase in the EC’s policy-making powers,
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but rather, ‘the anticipation of a growing importance of the EC in a rather
vague sense . . . stimulated the establishment of transnational organizations
(and not) the actual transfer of powers’; see also Greenwood et al. 1992b: 244.
16 For details see e.g. Falkner 1998: 97–113.
17 That, in the end, the UNICE could not overcome the disapproval of the
attempted compromise with regard to European Works Councils by its British
member CBI in March 1994 (for details see below and Falkner 1996), however,
prompted another significant intra-goup reform: according to an internal
agreement of April 1994, the CBI participated later on but did not have a veto
right in negotiations pursuant to the Social Agreement. Therefore, the CBI was
not be bound by an agreement of which it did not approve.
18 For details see Falkner 1998: 114–28.
19 The others were broadly perceived not to represent ‘appropriate’ issues for
collective bargaining since they are usually a matter of legal regulation even at
the national level.
20 See e.g. Falkner 1998: 121–3.
21 It should furthermore be mentioned that the EC institutions were actively
involved in the development of the Euro-level interest groups. Especially for
labour, organizational and financial support is manifold.
22 It should be stressed that even in national corporatist systems, by no means
each and every decision process is actually dominated by the social partners. If
non-agreement of the major interest groups in one or the other case would
already disqualify a political system or policy area from being ideal-typically
corporatist, there would actually not be corporatism even in Austria which is
usually traded as the hallmark of it (see e.g. Karlhofer and Tálos 1999).
However, even where the most far-reaching possibility (i.e. a collective
agreement instead of a Council decision specifying social standards) does not
come into effect in current EU social policy, the social partners are not only
repeatedly consulted but their quasi-compromises in pre-negotiations may
even influence bargaining in the Council (they reportedly did so in the Works
Councils case) and the interest groups may still come into play during the
national implementation processes.
23 For details see e.g. Falkner 1998: 159f.
24 These are mainly the UEAPME (representing small and medium-sized enter-
prises) and the EuroCommerce (representing firms in retail, wholesale and
international trade) on the employers’ side, and the CESI (representing inde-
pendent trade unions) and the CEC (representing professional and managerial
staff) on the workers’.
25 The argument that the signatory parties of the parental leave collective
agreement were not representative and that the Council should not have turned
the agreement into a Directive was rejected by the ECJ (case T-135/96 decided
17 June 1998).
26 Absent is the criterion of compulsory group membership which is, however, also
rare in typical corporatist systems at the national level. Even in Austria, not all
decisive actors of the social partnership have compulsory membership (notably
not the Trade Union Confederation). There is still a long way to go in the
direction of a truly and formalized hierarchical internal structure of the Euro-
groups. Most important is, however, the fact that the internal structures were
already adapted and proved to be sufficiently potent to allow a number of deals
to be adopted (which was not expected by most observers). It is, for example, a
significant development which would have been unthinkable a few years ago that
the ETUC now adopts binding agreements against the will of several influential
members, including the DGB. While even more far-reaching reforms than those
adopted so far were discussed (for the ETUC see e.g. Dølvik 1997) or are being
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discussed at present (notably within UNICE), it is not surprising that internal
group reform is a step-by-step process rather than a singular ‘quantum leap’.
27 Due to extreme differences that tend to exist both in sectoral EC regimes and in
patterns of interest representation in the single sectors, one should not expect
the sum of diverse sectoral developments to add up to a coherent cross-sectoral
system of interest politics (e.g. also Eising and Kohler-Koch 1994: 182f.).
28 A study by the rather pro-European Austrian Institute for Economic Research
(WIFO) revealed that the austerity programmes might cost 2 per cent of the
Union’s purchasing power and actually increase unemployment by 1.5 per cent
(Der Standard, 25 February 1996).
29 Cf. Articles 125–30 EC Treaty (formerly Articles 109n–s).
30 As opposed to the economic policy guidelines pursuant to Article 103 EC Treaty,
there are no sanctions provided for in the new employment chapter (some
governments, notably the Swedish and the Austrian, had promoted this in vain).
Nor is there any mention the possibility of publishing such recommendations to
a member state, which might have created public pressure.
31 See also the case of the European Works Councils Directive (e.g. Falkner 1996).
32 To some extent, there is also a normative pattern of response from interest
groups to European integration: some peak representatives within the major
national groups, in actual fact, rank the general goal of European unification
quite high within their general political priorities (e.g. in Germany and Austria
where securing peace in Europe via the EU is often opposed to the dark ages of
fascism and the Second World War). When confronted with the post-Maastricht
legitimacy crisis, some leaders fear a far-reaching backlash and thus feel urged
to support the ‘European enterprise’. One way for them to become active is to
provide legitimation through co-operation with governments and EC institu-
tions in the making and implementation of European policies.
33 For a study on the implementation of six labour law Directives in all fifteen EU
member states, including the impact on national public–private relations, see
http://www.mpi-fg-koeln.mpg.de/fo/multilevel_en.html#Proj5.
34 To whom I am very grateful for this suggestion!
35 Indeed, a significant role of the ‘state’ was always assumed for corporatist
arrangements (cf. e.g. Schmitter’s 1979 definition quoted above) but it seems to
even gain in importance.
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11 The renaissance of 
national corporatism
Unintended side-effect of 
European economic and 
monetary union, or calculated 
response to the absence of 
European social policy?
Jürgen Grote and Philippe Schmitter
Some years ago, we opened an earlier version of this chapter (Schmitter
and Grote 1997) with the following remarks:
The (re)discovery of corporatism in the mid-1970s was ironic. At the
very moment that academics started using the concept to analyze
trends in advanced capitalist societies, the practice had already peaked
and it continued to decline during the 1980s. Then, just as many
observers had announced its demise, corporatism has risen again and
now seems to be carrying its twin burdens of interest associability and
policy-making to new heights during the 1990s. Are students of
European politics and society forever going to be condemned like
Sisyphus to dragging this concept-cum-practice into their work, only to
see it come crashing down later?
We concluded that corporatism would be heading back up the hill goaded
as before by an architectonic national state. This would just be about on
time. Corporatist practices had bottomed out after the mid-1980s and were
likely to hitting their peak sometime after 1998–9 – more or less at the very
moment that monetary unification was to occur!
Now, after monetary union, we see no reason to revise yesterday’s assump-
tion. Corporatism’s (re)discovery in the 1970s may have been ironic, but no
less so than in the premature death certificate issued to it by authors such
as Scott Lash and John Urry (1987) in the 1980s. They proclaimed a new
era of ‘disorganized capitalism’ at the very time when the 20–25 year
political cycle that sustains corporatist practices had just begun to turn
upwards. If anything, ensuing developments not foreseen (or even imagin-
able) three years ago seem to confirm our earlier hypothesis. 
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In Germany, a first attempt to reach a tripartite agreement had failed
resoundingly in 1996. Two years (and one government) later, a compre-
hensive macro-level pact, the Bündnis für Arbeit, was signed by the peak
associations of labour, capital and the government on 7 December 1998. In
his New Year’s address, the president of DGB, Dieter Schulte, seemed even to
been affected by our Sisyphean metaphor when he observed that ‘we are only
at the beginning and still have a steep and upward way to go’.1 Similarly,
after the Agreement of 23 July 1993 had initiated a new system of binding
rules in the area of industrial relations, Italy’s social partners hammered out
a comprehensive Patto Sociale on 22 December 1998.2 Further east on the
shores of the Mediterranean, the General Confederation of Greek Labour
(GSEE) and the two national employer associations SEB (industry) and ESEE
(trade) opened a dialogue with government on ‘Competitiveness, Growth
and Employment’ on 14 May 1997. The social pact they signed on 11
November 1997 was the first in modern Greek history.
Of the fifteen EU member states, only France and the United Kingdom
continue to abstain from ‘concerted’ policy-making among consenting peak
associations. Even territorially and linguistically divided Belgium managed
to solve the structural problems that had delayed the implementation of
three comprehensive agreements reached in the 1990s. In France, the main
obstacle has been the persistent ideological cleavage within the labour
movement that had institutionalized such a process of surenchère, i.e.
competitive overbidding between union federations, that state intervention
became the default option. For example, the Loi Robien of 11 June 1996 was
drafted by the Jospin government and passed by its parliamentary majority
in an attempt to achieve economic and social goals that elsewhere in Europe
have been the subject of voluntary social pacting. In Britain, the Labour
Party still seems to be suffering from the trauma induced by the failed Social
Contract of the mid-1970s. Together with the subsequent eighteen years of
Thatcherism, the country seem to have passed the point of no return for the
building of any kind of centralized policy concertation between capital and
labour. Trade unions have been weakened more than elsewhere, and
employer associations do not seem to be any better off (Crouch et al. 1999).
Moreover, large parts of the British population seem to have given up any
hope of combating unemployment by collective means, which has been one
of the cornerstones of recent pacts in the rest of Europe.3
But let us first reculer pour mieux sauter: go back briefly to past experi-
ences with national corporatism and to the reasons that were adduced for
its demise in the latter half of the 1970s and 1980s and try to see if we can
find any hints about why it was resuscitated in the 1990s.
The past
The ‘corporatist approach’ emerged as one subspecies of a much broader
genus of theorizing in political economy that has been labeled ‘institution-
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alist’. Its central claim was (and still is) that behaviour – economic, social or
political – cannot be understood exclusively in terms of either the choices
and preferences of private individuals or the habits and impositions of
public agencies. Somewhere between markets and states existed a large
number of ‘self-organized’ and ‘semi-public’ collectivities that individuals
and firms relied upon more or less regularly to structure their expectations
about each other’s behaviour and to provide ready-made solutions for their
recurrent conflicts. These corporatist practices might have seemed, from an
abstract and external point of view, inflexible in their demands and sub-
optimal in their performances, but they did save considerably on search
and information costs, while supplying a psychologically reassuring famili-
arity to those who worked within them. Normatively, they may have
represented ‘second best solutions’ for all involved, but operationally, if one
takes into consideration the uncertain ‘shadow of the future’, the particip-
ants seemed prepared to bear the mutual burden of rigidities and
inefficiencies – at least, until some manifestly better solution presented
itself.4
Moreover – and this is especially important for the corporatist sub-
species – their ‘standard operating procedures’ demanded specialized
personnel. Those who came to occupy such positions developed a strong
vested interest, not just in the maintenance of existing practices, but also in
their future development. Some of the dues, rents and subsidies these
associational leaders extracted from members and interlocutors could be
‘invested’ in further legitimation and task expansion. In other words, the
trajectory of this non-market and non-state arrangement was not just a
passive reflection of the demand for its services by individuals and
authorities. It could (and did) acquire a dynamic of its own that served to
carry its burdens further up the slope than might otherwise have been the
case.
For corporatists – analysts as well as protagonists – differences in the
nature of intermediary institutions at the national level were regarded as
crucial in determining the policies adopted and their eventual outcomes.
Only when specially organized intermediaries were involved and only when
the process of negotiation empowered them as monopolies to represent the
collective interests of some encompassing group and to take subsequent
responsibility for any decisions made, could one speak of corporatism
strictu sensu. It was not enough just to consult various interests. Effective
participation was not open to any organization. The macro-process of
interest conflict and compromise depended upon the ‘active assent’ of peak
associations representing comprehensive class, sectoral or professional
interests. In more specialized sectors and under very special auspices, this
could even result in the creation of so-called ‘private interest governments’
that had a great deal of autonomy from and authority over both members
and interlocutors in the way in which they allocated resources (Streeck and
Schmitter 1985).5
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The corporatist literature of the 1970s tended to stress two ideal-typical
clusters of conditions: (1) associational properties; and (2) decision-making
characteristics.6 Under the former rubrique, they looked about for such
things as monopoly of representation, hierarchic co-ordination across associ-
ations, functional differentiation into non-overlapping and comprehensive
categories, official recognition by state agencies and semi-public status,
involuntary or quasi-compulsory membership, and some degree of
heteronomy with regard to the selection of leaders and the articulation of
demands. In terms of decision-making the search was on for ‘concertation,’
i.e. for contexts in which there was regular interaction in functionally
specialized domains, privileged and even exclusive access, consultation
prior to legislative deliberation, parity in representation, active and con-
current consent and not just passive acquiescence or majority voting as the
usual decision rule, and devolved responsibility for policy implementation. 
Needless to say, in the real world these traits did not always cluster
together: e.g. monopolies of representation were granted (often de facto) to
associations without much public control over leadership or the nature of
demands; functional councils were established within the administration or
higher executive office, but legislatures refused to accept their status, much
less to allow them to consider and amend proposals beforehand. Most
disconcertingly, the associational properties and the decision-making
characteristics did not co-vary in some instances. Supposedly, policy
concertation could not persist without monopolistically structured, hier-
archically ordered, officially recognized and functionally delimited associa-
tions. Even where the latter did not exist initially, once concertation was up
and running it should have encouraged the development of these pro-
perties in collaborating interest associations. Sometimes, the incongruencies
were temporary when, for example, negotiations for the annual or biannual
‘social contract’ broke down momentarily over a specific issue and yet the
basic structure of intermediation remained unchanged, or when negoti-
ations concerning macro-economic policies persisted between peak class
associations, despite the fact that one or another of them had suffered a
‘defection’ by a faction that opted for exerting pressure through other
channels. Occasionally, great efforts were made to bring about a concerted
outcome despite the prevalence of class, sectoral and professional interests
that were ‘incorrectly’ organized – if they were organized at all. Great
Britain during the 1970s and Italy in the early 1980s were apposite cases –
and they appropriately failed in short order. 
In addition to the above-mentioned intrinsic causes (inappropriate
associational formats and/or exclusionary decision-making arrangements),
what have been the extrinsic factors that have been used to account for the
demise of corporatism? The arguments advanced to explain this were, at
the time, quite convincing. At first, the problem seemed to be just the
persistently lower growth rates and slack labour markets that emerged in
the aftermath of the two oil shocks – along with the consequent fiscal crisis
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of the state. The surplus was simply not there to make the sort of side-
payments that had facilitated compromises in the past and organized
intermediaries were noticeably reluctant to share responsibility for the
management of declining resources. 
Gradually, however, other difficulties emerged which suggested that
merely reversing the decline in growth and the increase in unemployment
might not result in a return to the statu quo ante at the level of macro-
concertation. The displacement of employment from the traditional ‘hard-
core’ of manufacturing to service and, in some cases, to public employment
had a serious impact on the recruitment of union members. The very core
interest categories upon which macro-corporatist compromises had been
built were becoming increasingly disaggregated and dispersed. The whole
process of centralized negotiations concerning wages, benefits and working
conditions came under severe pressures. 
Moreover, new production technologies based on micro-electronics cut
across traditional job classification systems and professional categories, and
created possibilities for flexible production in relatively small units. In one
sense, these processes increased the need for ‘active assent’ on the part of
workers – and, therefore, the need for capitalists to bargain with them over
the quality as well as the quantity of their contribution, but in another sense
this was occurring in highly differentiated settings not easy to reduce to a
standard contract and, hence, difficult for either trade union or employer
peak associations to capture and control. Both types of intermediaries
found themselves increasingly shut out of the negotiation process – where it
occurred at all.
Of course, the real culprit – everyone’s favourite deus ex machina – was
(and still is) globalization. Sharpened international competition (and
greater international mobility of capital) lay behind many of these
developments, but also played a more direct (and menacing) role. The
overt threat to move to another site or to discontinue production altogether
put great pressure on workers to make concessions at the level of the
enterprise, thereby undermining what had previously been negotiated at
the national or sectoral level. Similarly, the heightened competition between
firms made unified responses and commitments from business associations
more difficult. Governments and state agencies, sensitive to these trends in
the international environment through the balance of payments as well as
to the direct pressure from those involved, multiplied the subsidies and
exemptions designed to benefit specific sectors – and sometimes even
individual firms. 
If low growth rates, labour force restructuring, technological innovation
and global competitiveness were not material causes enough, the ideo-
logical attractions of neo-liberalism seemed to seal the fate of any serious
attempt to negotiate one’s way through the labyrinth of major economic
restructuring. The upshot of these trends seemed quite clear to many
analysts in the 1980s. At best, ‘national corporatism’ had to shift from the
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macro to the meso level of aggregation. And even then, the question
remained whether the process would stop there or disintegrate even further
until the only ‘systematic dialogues’ left would be taking place at the level
of firms and the ‘voluntary and active assent’, so obviously necessary for
improving competitiveness in a more globalized marketplace, would emerge
from the interactions of individual workers and employers – stalked by the
shadow of future dismissals and plant closures. Not a very encouraging
prospect – but, so it seemed, a realistic one!
We now know that it was overdrawn. ‘Systemic dialogues’, even between
representatives of gesamtwirtschaftliche interests, began re-emerging in the
late 1980s and presently seem to be proliferating. A number of countries
have been attempting in the 1990s to reap the benefits of policy con-
certation between consenting interest associations, not all of which have the
‘appropriate’ organizational structures. What is more, they have been trying
to do this at the highly visible and comprehensive national level, even if
they have occasionally tried to fulfil new purposes with these efforts. To
what extent do these more recent arrangements involve a completely
different bundle of substantive policies? And, does this mean that, this
time, corporatist practices are likely to travel further, before they inevitably
come tumbling down again? 
The present
All those death certificates issued to corporatism in the 1980s carried the
same generic signature.7 Despite some difference in the symptoms of their
agonizing, the autopsies uniformly declared that it had died of disfunc-
tionitis, i.e. neo-corporatist arrangements could no longer perform the
imperative tasks that had been assigned to it by neo-Keynesian policy
makers operating within the confines of their respective nation-states.
Lacking any legitimacy of its own, its demise passed virtually unnoticed by
the mass public and was not even mourned by those academics who had
made a career out of (re)discovering it.8
E pur si muove! The corpse of corporatism has risen – again – and is
rolling its dual burdens back up the slope of interest politics during the
1990s. It seems that some sort of associative governance – intersectoral as
well as intrasectoral – is still an imperative of the functioning of modern
capitalism, pace the more extreme protestations of neo-liberals. For, if
capitalism requires an effective mechanism for ensuring orderly competition
among producers and a mutually acceptable distribution of income between
capital and labour, then, where the firms and individuals involved are
associated with each other and, hence, capable of articulating their interests
collectively, active assent can only be obtained through a systematic dialogue
between the organizations that represent these interests.
The diagnostic error of those who presided over the autopsy of corpor-
atism in the 1980s seems to have been in assuming that the same functions
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would have to be performed by the same organizations at the same level for
this particular mode of interest intermediation/policy-making to survive.
They did not acknowledge the possibility that different functions might be
performed at the same level of aggregation by the same (or analogous)
organizations. In any case, studying national-level arrangements became an
increasingly redundant exercise and many shifted their attention to the
study of changes in levels and in the composition of sectoral and territorial
pacts9 – i.e. to dimensions where corporatism did survive the neo-liberal
assault of the 1980s and, in part, quite successfully. All the more surprising
must have been the resurgence of policy concertation at the macro-level –
especially remarkable in countries which do not seem to possess, at least
not ex ante, an appropriately configured set of interest associations. A rapid
perusal of the descriptive literature would reveal that the negotiating and
implementing of tripartite or bipartite social pacts is back on the agenda –
but not always where one might have expected it on the basis of the
experiences of the 1960s and 1970s.10
Ireland is a case in point. Having been previously described as hope-
lessly pluralist and non-macro-contractualist in the Anglo-Saxon tradition,
the country quietly developed a tradition of centralized wage bargaining
from 1987 to 1993. Four consecutive economic and social accords were
signed between government, the FUEC (the Federated Union of Employers),
and the ICTU (the Irish Congress of Trade Unions). The three year
‘Programme for National Recovery’ in 1987 aimed at creating a fiscal and
monetary environment conducive to the promotion of higher rates of
economic growth. It included a broad package of measures: greater equity
in taxes, reduction of inequalities, employment-generating measures, a
ceiling on pay increases, measures for the low-paid and working time
reduction. The second agreement signed in 1990, the ‘Programme for
Economic and Social Progress’, the third in 1993, the ‘Programme for
Competitiveness and Work’, and the fourth, the ‘Partnership 2000 for
Inclusion, Employment and Competitiveness’ (1997) contained essentially
the same measures – despite their differences in nomenclature. As
demonstrated by Anke Hassel (1998: 636), these accords were embedded
and backed up by pre-existing bi- and tripartite institutions (National
Economic and Social Council, Employer Labour Conference, Labour
Court, Joint Labour Committees), but have themselves helped building up
new formal structures for concertation (Labour Relations Commission,
Central Review Committee, etc.). 
Finland is a rather different case. Having been a relative late-comer to
Scandinavian-style corporatism, it continued quietly, if fitfully, to practice
corporatism throughout the 1980s. However, in the early 1990s when the
collapse of the Soviet economy left them in exceptional economic distress,
the Finns revived and expanded macro-level concertation. The initial
tripartite deal between the government, the Confederation of Finnish
Industry and Employers (TT) and the Confederation of Finnish Trade
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Unions (SAK) covered the period from 1 January 1992 to 31 October 1993.
It was successfully renegotiated after a massive currency devaluation when
workers agreed to a freeze on wages in exchange for government promises
to refrain from laying-off civil servants, to support housing programmes, to
grant tax relief to the lower-paid and to impose new taxes on those still in
full-time employment. This macro-concertation has subsequently continued
in a bipartite fashion between the TT and the SAK, with the additional
participation of the Confederation of Technical Workers (STTK) and the
Confederation of Professional Workers (AKAVA). Leaving aside basic wage
issues (still covered by the previous agreement), they focused on a compre-
hensive package of measures designed to alleviate unemployment: lower
wages for apprentices and newly recruited workers, reform of unemployment
insurance, greater scope for decentralized bargaining, restrictions of
political or sympathy strikes, and modifications in working time and
workplace consultation. 
The situation that emerged in Spain was completely different, in both its
initial timing and intent. Macro-level concertation began in the late 1970s
— just as it was declining elsewhere in Europe. The famous Pacto de la
Moncloa in 1977 did ostensibly deal with issues of economic and social
recovery, but it was signed by the leaders of political parties and primarily
aimed at improving the prospects for the consolidation of democracy. In
the terminology of Terry Karl (1985), it constituted a ‘foundational’ pact
among political elites, not a ‘managerial’ pact between economic and social
groups. As such, it was quite successful and, as we shall see, closely observed
and occasionally imitated by other countries involved in similarly uncertain
regime transitions. The initial Moncloa Pact did give rise to a series of
subsequent efforts as ‘managerial tripartite concertation’ between the
government, the Spanish Confederation of Employers’ Organizations
(CEOE), and various combinations of the socialist-oriented General Workers
Union (UGT) and/or the communist-oriented Workers’ Commissions
(CC.OO). After seven years of fitful success and five Acuerdos, these
negotiations collapsed completely – ironically, during the protracted
hegemony of the Socialist Party (PSOE) in government, a factor which
elsewhere and earlier was of crucial importance for the success of macro-
corporatism! 
After a lengthy period of sporadic and inconclusive bipartite negoti-
ations between government and business associations and government and
trade unions, tripartite policy concertation raised its head again. A first
attempt was made in 1993 to reach a comprehensive social pact by
voluntary means. When this was abandoned by both employers´ and
workers´ representatives, the Socialist government issued an ultimatum
that if no agreement emerged before the end of the year, it would put its
own proposal before parliament (where it then enjoyed a comfortable
majority). Despite a general strike on 27 January 1994, the consequent law
(containing less rigid recruitment hiring procedures, permission for private
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and part-time employment agencies, reformulated apprenticeship contracts,
incentives for creating part-time work, greater flexibility in working hours
and less rigidity in collective redundancies) was passed and the measures
were successfully implemented. The reluctant social partners seemed to
have learned from that experience at having been shut out. Although the
Toledo Pact (1994) and the Agreement on the financing and structure of
the state social security and pension system were only signed by govern-
ment and the trade union confederations (CC.OO and UGT), the latter,
together with the employers (CEOE and CEPYME), managed to agree to a
proper bilateral pact on 8 April 1997. This occurred after years of difficult
negotiations and, hardly astonishing, only after massive threats of govern-
ment intervention. El País described this agreement as ‘probably the most
important social agreement signed in Spain over the past fifteen years’. 
Adjacent Portugal also went through a major regime change in the mid-
1970s, but it did so without the benefit of a Moncloa-style foundational
pacto. Instead, after a much more tumultuous process of democratization, it
gradually and more easily than Spain settled into a process of managerial
pacting at the macro-level, beginning with the creation in 1984 of a
Permanent Council for Social Concertation. From 1987 through 1992, peak
associations of business (industry, commerce and sometimes even agricul-
ture) reached regular agreements with the General Union of Workers
(UGT) on incomes policy and other issues.11 In a near-classic repetition of
what had occurred in Northern Europe a decade or more earlier, the
Portuguese ‘social partners’ exchanged moderation in wage demands and
greater flexibility in management practices for more generous social
measures and improvements in labour legislation, as well as for adjust-
ments in the calculation of economic indicators to bring them more in line
with the country’s EU partners. As had been the case before, when
conditions of growth and employment began to deteriorate after 1992, it
became increasingly difficult to make the necessary concessions. No
comprehensive agreement was signed for the next four years – just when
the process was being revived next door in Spain (where, incidentally,
economic conditions were even worse)! On 20 December 1996, however,
government and Portuguese peak associations (UGT, CCP, CAP, CIP)
hammered out a rather comprehensive tripartite deal (Acordo de
Concertação Estratégica) including issues such as incomes policy, working
time reduction, introduction of a minimum income on an experimental
basis, and tax reductions for low income-earners. Interestingly, the Acordo
also foresaw the reduction of social security contributions for those
employers belonging to employers’ associations – a measure clearly aimed
at providing incentives for the strengthening of organizational cohesion
(Rhodes 1997). While the UGT felt the agreement to be a ‘historic event,’
the larger of the two unions, the post-communist CGTP, claimed that ‘it is
providing corporatist arrangements by establishing a labour relations
centre’ and consequently abstained from signing it. In the words of Hassel
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(1998: 643), the Portuguese case might have to be removed from the list of
successful social pacts, if the CGTP were to persist in its hostile attitude
toward concertation. 
Belgium has had a long-standing tradition of centralized bargaining on
social questions within the framework of its National Labour Council.
Collective agreements, once reached voluntarily within it, subsequently
acquire the coercive force of public law. Interrupted in the mid-1970s – as
so often happened elsewhere – the practice of negotiating two-year
bipartite agreements was revived in 1987 and has been in operation ever
since. Nevertheless, the restricted scope of these accords led the govern-
ment in 1991 and again in 1993 to attempt the sponsorship of a much
broader (and tripartite) pact on national competitiveness, employment and
welfare. The resistance of the General Labour Federation of Belgium
(FGTB) ended these talks – before they could even begin. The government
then responded by passing new legislation that aimed at accomplishing the
same objectives: changing the basis of wage indexation, freezing real wages,
reducing social security contributions, encouraging enterprise-level negoti-
ations on job flexibility, instituting special employment contracts for young
people and reducing social security expenditures. Despite strong labour
resistance to these measures (including a 24-hour general strike), the
bipartite concertation process in Belgium continued to function at least
until 1997–8 when negotiations to conduct a central agreement totally
broke down.12 However, this did not mark the end of the era of centralized
negotiations. Since the head of state and the government have signalled
their willingness to grant more autonomy to bilateral negotiations, the
relations between the partners have again improved. They claim that they
are now willing to widen the scope of their negotiations and to accept a
stronger commitment to reform.
Marino Regini has recently analysed the rather puzzling trajectory of
macro-corporatism in Italy (Regini 1996). Not only does he demonstrate
empirically that its practice is far from dead in a country that had always
been regarded as unusually resistant to its appeal, but he argues
theoretically that 
the recent attempts at concertation between [Italian] governments [NB
the unusual plural] and interest associations are apparently more
successful and acquiring greater stability in the countries whose
political and organizational features do not meet the supposed
‘preconditions’ of neo-corporatism, and possibly because of such
differences.
Italy has been (and remains) a country with a fragmented system of interest
intermediation and patterns of interorganizational bargaining that have
been characterized as a pathological mixture of pluralism and consocia-
tionalism (Pizzorno 1993). Its only prior tripartite agreement of any
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importance, the Anti-Inflation Accord of January 1983 , did not give rise to
stable concertation in the subsequent decade, as did happen in Ireland and
(as we shall see) the Netherlands. However, as Regini observes, it did give
rise to a less visible, but quite encompassing, system of ‘micro-concertation’
at the level of enterprises or industrial districts, which were successful in
satisfying the needs and expectations of both employers and workers.
These, in turn, led to the development of a significant degree of trust and
consensus so that when the issue of potential macro-level agreements
emerged in the 1990s, the system could take advantage of the opportunity
– which it had not been previously capable of doing.
Regini refers to three agreements which, he claims, marked ‘the most
radical reforms in the history of the Italian welfare state:’ first, the
Tripartite Agreement reached in July 1992 (under the Amato government);
second, the 23 July 1993 Agreement on wage costs (signed by the Ciampi
government); and, in particular, the May 1995 Pension Agreement (negoti-
ated by the Dini government). In the later 1990s, these were followed by a
tripartite agreement on employment (Patto per il Lavoro) and by the more
recent Patto Sociale. The most challenging element of Regini’s analysis,
which only refers to the pre-1995 period, is the assertion that all this has
been accomplished without any major changes in the organizational
structure of either capital or labour.13
The 1993 agreement clearly remains the most important one achieved
by Italian interest associations and the state throughout the 1990s
(Telljohann 1998). It helped, first, to surmount the traditionally conflictual
system of industrial relations by institutionalizing binding rules and,
second, to re-legitimize the trade union movement. Since it was limited to
this specific, ‘institutional’ type of political exchange (formal recognition of
the role of unions in collective bargaining at central and enterprise levels
against an agreement to dismantle the scala mobile, the automatic wage
indexation system) and since it was not immediately followed by material
concessions and an active labour market policy, the agreement remained
rather precarious and, in any case, did not prevent rank and file unrest
(ibid.).
All the above cases could be discounted for one reason or another. Some
were bipartite; others were tripartite. Some have been conducted in
exceptional circumstances; others have been convened more routinely.
Most importantly, they have been either too recent to have produced any
major effects or not yet sufficiently ‘embedded’ to survive major changes in
government in power or shifts in the business cycle. Whatever their actual
or potential contribution to ‘the governance of contemporary capitalism,’
they have yet to be picked up by anyone as a ‘model’ worthy of imitation.
This is definitely not true of the Netherlands. There is hardly a West
European prime minister or central bank president who has not recently
referred with admiration to the virtues of that country’s macro-economic
performance and, specifically, to its ‘full part-time economy’.14 Jelle Visser
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(1996) has demonstrated that, since the late 1980s, the Dutch polity has
achieved simultaneously several things that elsewhere have been
impossible. It has reformed its welfare policies and social security system
without severe cuts or protests. Moreover, unemployment has been reduced
from a very high 13 per cent in the mid-1980s to only 6.7 per cent in 1996
– the lowest level in contemporary Europe.15 This has been done despite
following a policy of strict fiscal conservatism aimed at monetary stability
and budgetary discipline. The Netherlands is currently one of the few
countries that satisfy the convergence criteria imposed by European
Monetary Union. And, contrary to other countries’ experiences, privatiz-
ation of public enterprises has played virtually no role in temporarily
augmenting Dutch public receipts.
The key to this superior performance, Visser finds, is in a set of major
changes in the Dutch system of industrial relations – both in the structures
and the strategies of its component organizations. The turning point came
in 1982, considerably before the other cases we have reviewed above. The
Netherlands had been one of the first countries to drop out of the postwar
‘high corporatist elite’. Growing worker mobilization had destroyed its well-
established practice of macro-concertation; the domestic policy debate had
come to equate it with institutional sclerosis (ibid.: 2); and economists were
issuing stern warnings about the ‘Dutch disease’, i.e. about the way in which
windfall revenues from the exploitation of natural gas discoveries had
produced wage and price hikes, steady inflation, and a corresponding loss
of international competitiveness and jobs. Visser quotes the Swedish
political economist, Göran Therborn, who described the Dutch economy in
1986 as ‘the most spectacular employment failure in the advanced capitalist
world’, and shows that it was precisely this sense of crisis, widely shared by
the population, that resulted in the subsequent changes in structure and
strategy. The trade unions, in particular, were vulnerable to loss of
membership and the burden of soaring unemployment. They began to
recognize that ‘improving the profitability of Dutch industry was a sine qua
non for any job strategy’ (ibid.: 12). 
Only in this context can one understand the novelty and comprehensive-
ness of what came to be known as the 1982 Agreement of Wassenaar – ‘the
mother of all accords’ in Visser’s words. Wassenaar, he argues, was for the
Netherlands ‘what Saltsjöbaden (1938) had been for post-war Swedish
labor relations.’ It contained in anticipation virtually all of the measures
that began appearing a decade later in the other social pacts we have
discussed above. It coupled rigid budgetary measures in a sort of Maastricht
avant la lettre to wage restraint and major reforms in welfare institutions.
The trade unions gave up their Holy Grail of automatic compensation for
price inflation and the employers’ associations withdrew their veto a
reduction in the working week. Moreover, the Wassenaar Accord turned out
not to be just a ‘one-shot’ exercise. It was followed by an array of no less
than seventy-eight subsequent reports, guidelines, joint opinions, reports of
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advice, recommendations and agreements covering the most diverse labour
market issues. They marked the beginning of a continuous process of bi-
and tripartite bargaining most recent product of which was the New
Direction Accord concluded in December 1993 in which worker and
employer organizations ‘renewed their pledge to continue a policy of wage
moderation, in favour of investment, job creation, working-time reduction
and extra measures for training’. Moreover, the more recent agreements
have inserted provisions in favour of a more differentiated and flexible
implementation through negotiations at lower levels, possibly with the
involvement of works councils, personnel or union representatives. Visser
calls this a policy of ‘centralized decentralization.’ Along with the central
co-ordination between peak associations and their sectoral affiliates, strict
monitoring procedures were introduced at the enterprise level. Employee
consultation and participation rights spread throughout the country. 
Corporatism, quite obviously, ‘has again become the dominant
figuration in Dutch industrial relations’ (Visser 1996: 27). Its trade unions
are broadly representative. Their membership has remained stable and
even showed recent signs of increasing. Despite organizational pluralism,
they do not compete sharply with each other. Employers are equally well
organized – and have become less confessionally divided. Over the whole
process, but discretely in the background, lurks the Dutch state with its
coercive ‘shadow of hierarchy’ and there is always the ‘shadow of the future’
to remind the negotiators that they could both be worse off – if they fail to
agree. Recurrent (but informal) interaction and mutual adjustment have
discouraged short-term opportunism and contributed to the building of
longer-term trust. That trust is decisive for this form of policy to work is
demonstrated by Visser (1998) with a view to a couple of successive
agreements. The one on ‘Flexibility and Security’ (April 1996) and the
more comprehensive pact ‘Agenda 2000’ have both been prepared and
discussed in the Foundation of Labour (Stichting van de Arbeid) and both
contain quite innovative qualitative measures (more attention to the lower
paid and to ethnic minorities and a further shift in industrial relations from
a macro- towards a micro-economic perspective). All this leads the author
to conclude by observing that the Dutch case proves that ‘countries do have
considerable autonomy in shaping institutions and policies, in spite of the
common challenges and pressures of integration and internationalization’
(Visser 1996: 29).
Austria with its extraordinary continuity in reaching class compromises
between its ‘chambered’ peak associations proves the same point. Franz
Traxler (1996) argues forcefully against assuming that either globalization
or regional integration will undermine the prospects for national concert-
ative arrangements, especially when – as in the Austrian case – the
functional content of concertation has shifted from demand to supply
issues (Angebotskorporatismus). Brigitte Unger (2002) shows that the
pressures of internationalization have always be taken into account by the
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participants in Austria’s Sozialpartnerschaft and that there is no reason to
believe that the Single European Market or European Monetary Integra-
tion will lead to its demise. It has become more difficult to sustain specific
mechanisms, such as the Paritätische Kommission. After its fifty years of
existence, Unger finds that it has entered the organizational equivalent of a
typical male ‘mid-life crisis’: the participants think that the best times are
over; they look back with regret to the glorious past; they feel increasingly
impotent in face of external pressures; and, finally, they attempt to
overcome this with a fuite en avant, i.e. by leaving the (national) family and
taking up with a (supra-national) lover in Brussels. Behind this imaginative
metaphor (Is it just a metaphor?), Unger finds considerable evidence for
a major shift in the substance of the more recent accords, for example, in
the Joint Report on the Consolidation of the National Budget of
September 1995 (see also: Grote 1999). Just as in other pacts reviewed in
this chapter, the previous objectives of ‘full-employment’ – or ‘a high level
of employment’ – have shifted to ‘increases in employment’; and the
former emphasis on ‘solidarity’ has changed to ‘efficiency’ and ‘budget
consolidation’. She concludes by dismissing the possibility of transposing
the Austrian arrangements to the level of an EU Social Dialogue or set of
collective agreements and stresses that the future of Austria’s concerted
political economy lies in Vienna, not in Brussels.16
Corporatism in Switzerland has not (yet) had to face the tensions
generated by EU membership. Hence, it has essentially remained stable –
not only with regard to its organizational structure – but, more peculiarly,
with regard to the content of its agreements. As demonstrated by Klaus
Armingeon (2002), Swiss social partnership has always differed in
important aspects from that of Austria or Scandinavia. Its functional
equivalent to the more formal structures of the other countries is the
Vernehmlassungsverfahren procedure (Article 32.3 of the Swiss Constitution)
according to which interest associations are granted the constitutional (and,
hence, virtually irremovable) right to be consulted before drafts of
legislation are debated and decided in parliament. Also, the actual
negotiations under the terms of the Swiss Social Peace Treaty of 1937 take
place at the sectoral level, which allows for more flexible accommodation to
changing market conditions. Finally, Swiss practices are rooted in a very
stable overlap between parliamentary and corporatist policy-making – itself
rooted in a long-standing coalition between the Social Democratic Party
and the trade union movement. Contrary to the general trend in Europe,
the party affiliation of union members in Switzerland has increased, not
decreased – and the famous 2+2+2+1 formula for establishing the national
executive has guaranteed Social Democratic participation in government
continuously since 1947. 
Unchallenged by EU membership or the Maastricht convergence criteria
(which, incidentally, Switzerland would have no difficulty in meeting) and
unthreatened in the recent past by major economic crisis, the Swiss macro-
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concertation may, nevertheless, be facing an uncertain future. Real wages
have stagnated and there has been little economic growth since 1992
(Armingeon 2002). The country never attempted to ‘govern’ the business
cycle and, therefore, ‘[Swiss] corporatism could never profit from the rise of
neo-Keynesian macro-economic steering and it never suffered from its
failure’ (ibid.: 2002). This also means that Switzerland may be singularly ill-
equipped with policy instruments for dealing with its current economic
stagnation. Any comprehensive wage-tax-welfare bargain between organized
capital and labour would require the consent by the Federal government,
all twenty-six cantonal governments and a large number of local authorities
– not to mention a probable referendum. So, Switzerland has been working
at its own, in terms of macro-level arrangements, much more steady and
slow pace. The country is definitely ‘out of synchrony’ with its more
Europeanized neighbours. In the 1990s, it hardly seemed likely that the
system could be induced to take on new substantive burdens in response to
an expanded policy agenda.
If this evidence from Western Europe were not enough to convince the
reader that macro-corporatism was back on the agenda, consider what has
been happening in Eastern Europe! There is virtually not a single country
that has not, in the course of trying simultaneously to transform its
economy and its polity, experimented formally with macro-level corporatism.
Admittedly, there is an element of irony in these experiences: they look
suspiciously like efforts at copying Western practices when these very same
practices were no longer functioning as they used to. Which does not mean
that macro-corporatism might not be of some utility in the Eastern cases;
just that it is highly unlikely to produce the same effects.
Hungary was the first. Its National Interest Conciliation Council was set
up in 1988 at the initiative of the government – even before the regime
change had occurred. It was re-established and reformed in 1990 and
seems to have played a significant role in drafting legislation on industrial
relations and distributing the assets of the former trade union movement,
despite the fact that it is very pluralist in its representative structure. No
less than seven confederations of workers and seven confederations of
employers participate, along with a shifting set of government represent-
atives.
The Czech Council for Economic and Social Agreement was created in
October 1990, hence, after democratization had begun. It has a more
classic composition, with monopoly peak associations for capital and labour
and designated seats for three ministries. Its relations with the neo-liberal
government of Klaus have been tenuous, but it has produced annual
agreements since 1991 that seem to have had some effect on wage and
employment issues, as well as the content of new legislation. Interestingly, it
was renamed in 1995: the Council for Dialogue of Social Partners in
manifest tribute to its Austrian neighbour. Slovakia ‘inherited’ a similar
arrangement when it became independent in 1993.
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Bulgaria is another case in point. Its National Commission for the Co-
ordination of Interests was established by national tripartite agreement –
and not by government initiative as in the previous cases – and quickly
acquired a monopolistic and hierarchic structure of representation. After
producing three agreements on price liberalization, income indexation,
pension levels, privatization and labour law reform, it was abruptly
dissolved in November 1991 by the incoming neo-liberal government of
Dimitrov, only to be recreated in May 1992 as the National Council for
Social Partnership and then again in January 1993 as the National Council
for Tripartite Partnership. These changes were brought about by strong
pressures from the trade union movement, which in Bulgaria as in
Czechoslovakia seem to have retained much of the monopolistic organiz-
ational structure and high density of membership that it had under the
ancien régime communiste. 
Poland has been a bit of a deviant case – perhaps, precisely because of the
enormous initial presence and subsequent fragmentation of the Solidarity
Movement. It did not even get the semblance of a macro-corporatist
arrangement until 1993 and then only for issues concerning privatization:
the Tripartite Commission on Control over the Implementation of the Pact
on State Enterprises. This subsequently converted itself in the Tripartite
Commission on Socio-Economic Issues, but its effectiveness has been
paralysed by conflicts between competing trade union confederations.
The list could be extended. Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus, Romania, even
Kazakhstan have experimented with tripartism in one form or another. But
let us not be misled by this explosion of activity. As Petra Stykow points out in
the monograph, which we have used extensively in putting together the
above survey of developments in Eastern Europe, ‘the actual political
importance of tripartite bodies paints a bleak picture for all (Eastern
European) countries’ (Stykow 1996: 3). They may be modelled on (largely
defunct) Western experiences, but they are not performing the same
functions. Their creation has been much more dependent upon govern-
mental initiatives and their survival much more contingent upon eventual
governmental defections; their internal structure much less organizationally
concentrated and paritätisch (which is due in large part to the weakness of
associations of capitalists); their policy impact much more symbolic. Which
does not mean, she shrewdly argues, that these institutions are ‘superfluous’
or ‘empty’. They have been, in fact, quite important – but not for their role in
managing the economic transition. Just like the Spanish Pacto de Moncloa,
their real purpose is to embody a ‘foundational’ agreement among members
of an emerging national political elite. Eventually, macro-corporatist pacting
may stimulate the development of ‘appropriate’ class, sectoral and
professional associations (they did in Spain) and they might even facilitate
the governance of an emerging capitalist economy, but their immediate
functions have been to reduce uncertainty among competing elites and to
broadcast an image of orderly cooperation to the citizenry at large. 
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The future
In a deservedly obscure article written at the height of despair with the
neo-corporatist arrangements of the post-war period, one of us reminded
his readers that corporatism has had a historical tendency to disappear and
to reappear (Schmitter 1989). Its modern ideological revival can be con-
veniently traced to the papal encyclical, Rerum Novarum of 1891 – although
the resuscitation and extension of the Chamber system for artisans, indus-
try and commerce and even for agriculture in some parts of Central
Europe had begun some twenty years earlier. The concept re-emerged after
the First World War, this time in a more secular and statist guise, and found
its most public expression in the corporazioni of Fascist Italy, followed by
imitators in Portugal, Spain, Brazil, Vichy France, etc. Several of the smaller
European democracies began practising something analogous after the
Second World War — although they were carefully to avoid the previous
label. 
All this puts its ideology-cum-practice – roughly – on a twenty to twenty-
five year cycle17 – with, of course, lags for particular countries and
exemptions for particular sectors. This was a very speculative conclusion
when it was advanced in the mid-1980s. For it to have acquired the status
of plausible theory, one would have to come up with variable and
contingent conditions that ‘drive’ actors to shift their preference from
one solution to another – and then back again in a period of twenty to
twenty-five years. One obvious candidate could be found in Albert O.
Hirschman’s (1982) notion of ‘shifting involvements.’ Actors collectively
prefer one set of goods over another – say, private goods – until
diminishing marginal returns and crowding effects set in and they switch
to a different set of preferences – say, for more public goods. Pluralist-
pressure politics would correspond to the private ‘phase;’ corporatist-
concertation politics to the public one – and involvement with each could
be expected to shift back and forth ad infinitum. Another possible
candidate would be the twists and turns of the business cycle. The fact
that the ups and downs of the macro-economy do not quite seem to
correspond exactly in time to those of corporatist arrangements could be
dismissed on grounds that institutions tend to be ‘viscous’ and, therefore,
to take more time to learn about the changing context, to reflect the new
balance of forces and to overcome the resistance of their internally vested
interests. Whatever the basic sentiment or calculus behind it, the cyclical
theory of corporatism is appealing – at least, to those who advocate or
study such arrangements. Presumably, once consumers were satiated with
private goods or once workers were again fully employed, the appeal of
neo-liberal diatribes against government planning, incomes policies,
production of public goods and the regulation of sectors would decline
and neo-corporatist concertation would become a more attractive policy
option at whatever level (including the supra-national). 
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Unfortunately, neither of these elegant theoretical speculations about
the mechanism underlying corporatism’s twenty to twenty-five year cycle
seems adequate to explain its present revival. There is no evidence that
consuming individuals are fed up with private goods and shifting their
preferences to public ones – although there is some indication that the
appeal of manifest neo-liberalism has waned. As was shown above, problems
such as unemployment, low growth rates, the decline of union membership
and new production technologies have not only not diminished: they are
dramatically persistent and even increasing in several of the polities that
have recently been experimenting with macro-concertation. 
European societies have long been affected by the challenges and
opportunities noted above. More recently, they have had to face something
novel: the European Union – or, more particularly, the completion of the
Single European Market and monetary unification. Purely as a matter of
temporal coincidence, there is reason to suspect that the resurgence of
national corporatism has something to do with these supra-national
developments. Albeit the institutions of the European Union may not have
intended to produce such a change in interest politics within its member
states, the indirect impact has been substantial. Market liberalization and
enhanced competition has put enormous pressure on national welfare
states without supplementing or substituting their policies with a Europe-
wide set of labour standards or bargaining mechanisms.18 Its expanded
transnational economic citizenship (mainly for the benefit of capitalists and
consumers) has not been accompanied by a corresponding development of
supra-national social citizenship (that might benefit workers, the
unemployed and the retired). Faced with this increase in the ‘imbalance of
class forces’, trade unions in most member states seem to have recognized
that policy concertation on wages and working conditions at the national
level represented their best line of defence. Business associations have
reluctantly gone along with this effort as a way of insuring social peace and
gaining greater ‘flexibility’ in the workplace. 
Of course, European imperatives are unlikely to have presided over the
initial resurgence of macro-corporatism in such countries as the
Netherlands, Belgium and Ireland. At the time, they were collectively more
focused on improving competitiveness and diminishing unemployment,
but once the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht on EMU began to be
taken seriously, making the requisite adjustments in budgetary and borrow-
ing policies quickly moved to the top of the agenda for concertation.19
National governments, faced with a manifest loss of sovereignty in an area
– the fixing of exchange and interest rates – which had been essential to
their macro-economic decision-making, were desperate to regain some
degree of autonomy in their policy process. The European-national state,
quite obviously, still possesses its capacity to act as ‘the architect of a
corporatist order’ as Gerhard Lehmbruch has argued in the case of Germany
(Lehmbruch 1996: 741) and that, internationalization notwithstanding,
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there is still quite some room for manœuvre has been demonstrated by
Jelle Visser for the case of the Netherlands. We have found evidence in a
broad range of countries that the nation-state is still capable of drawing up
and implementing such plans. 
The future of this new cycle of macro-corporatism will depend primarily
on the future evolution of the European Union. And this, not because the
EU is likely to be successful in constructing an edifice of Euro-corporatism
around either its embryonic Social Dimension or its various sectoral policies.
Schmitter and Streeck (1991) argued some time ago that the pattern of
interest politics emerging around Brussels was much more pluralist than the
patterns prevailing in most of its member states and that this trend was
likely to continue for several reasons: size, complexity, multiple layers of
access, differing national practices, and so forth. We see no reason to revise
this assessment, pace those who have struggled to find traces of concertation
in specific sectors (Greenwood 1997; Mazey and Richardson 1992) or those
who predict a more promising future for collective negotiations on social
and employment issues at the European level (Falkner 1998).20 The EU has
neither of the two qualities which were present at the founding of national
corporatisms: (1) an autonomous redistributive capacity; or (2) a relative
equilibrium of class forces. And it is highly unlikely to acquire such state-like
properties in the foreseeable future (Schmitter 1996). 
Where the impact will be felt is primarily via the ‘Europeanization’ of
national interest politics, i.e. as member (and, even, non-member) govern-
ments strive to meet their increasing EU obligations. Especially in the
event that monetary unification is accomplished, they will have to rely more
and more on the negotiated consent of their respective social partners in
order to obtain the ‘voluntary and active assent’ that is so important for
competitive success. Most national interest associations are unlikely to
‘supranationalize’ themselves and shift their attention and allegiance
exclusively to Brussels. The costs are too high and the uncertainty of
depending on the cooperation of others is too great – especially when
further enlargement means a growing number of less well-known and more
diverse others. However, these associations will become deeply penetrated
in their internal politics by issues defined at the level of ‘Europe,’ and they
may find it increasingly expedient to ally with previous interest competitors
in joint attempts to defend distinctive national policies. The primary
‘growth potential’ for macro-corporatist architects in the future lies in the
feverish efforts of national governments to adapt to the single market
directives, the product and professional standards, the judicial verdicts and
the monetary convergence criteria that will increasingly be regulated by
supra-national authorities. The boundaries, territorial and functional, of
interest politics have shifted irrevocably, which paradoxically implies a
greater not a lesser reliance on previous structures of national inter-
mediation – provided they can be exploited to fulfil new tasks and still
manage to reproduce the old loyalties.
The renaissance of national corporatism 297
Because the EU is incapable of replicating the experience of its member
welfare states, i.e. of defining and defending a minimal degree of common
social policies for its citizens by isolating them from the raw pressures of
national and international competition (Streeck 1996a, 1996b), it must
tolerate – even encourage – these national polities to adjust as best as they
can on their own. Defending one’s own institutions by investing in cor-
poratist arrangements, even at the risk of alienating one’s members, may
be the best available option available to national labour movements. For
the foreseeable future, the cyclical fate of such practices will depend less
and less on the ‘classic’ variables of rising costs, diminishing returns,
shifting involvements, perverse effects or declining legitimacy and more
and more on the role that they play in promoting national competitiveness
within a market increasingly regulated (but not redistributed) at the
European level. Eventually, its Sisyphean burdens will get heavier and
national corporatisms will decline in importance. The only hope of
breaking the cycle may be to ‘supranationalize’ the practice of corporatism.
Only by transposing its scale to cover all of Europe and by extending its
scope to include a broad range of social citizenship rights may it finally and
definitively deposit its twin burdens of associability and policy-making at
the top of the hill where it will become a routine practice of an (enlarged)
EU and an important component of its (eventual) democratization. Not a
likely scenario, but one well worth simulating – and stimulating.
Notes
1 Dieter Schulte recommends that one should not overload the basket of demands
while approaching the top of the hill. See: the DGB’s web page (http://www.
dgb.de/cgi/a/pms.cgi?id=564).
2 In contrast, however, to the German agreement that immediately preceded it,
this one engaged no less than thirty-two signatories. Consultations conducted
among the rank and file of the larger of the three unions (CGIL) immediately
after the December 1998 Agreement demonstrated that about 85 per cent of its
members approved of it (see CGIL 1999).
3 According to Lionel Fulton (1998: 647), TUC membership declined from 12.2
to 6.6 million between 1979 and 1997. At the same time, the figure of those
believing unemployment to be ‘the most important problem facing the country’
dropped from 81 per cent in 1993 to 28 per cent in 1998.
4 This more appealing alternative appeared in the 1980s when the neo-liberal
mantra of deregulation, privatization and internationalization became so
‘hegemonic’ among capitalists – in manifest conflict with the operative principles
of neo-corporatism. It should be added that corporatist arrangements were
potentially more vulnerable than their pluralist rivals because they never bene-
fited from an elaborate, status-conferring, ideology. Their ideological origin in
Catholic thought and their association with authoritarian practices in the inter-
war period made it difficult to justify them openly after 1945. Only in Austria
under the label of ‘Social Partnership’ did they become an integral part of public
ideology – which explains, in part, why its practice there has been less Sisyphean.
5 Needless to say, the conditions needed to produce stable private interest govern-
ments were much more demanding than for ordinary corporatist arrangements.
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See Streeck (1992) and Grote (1992, 1995) for details on the German artisan
and small firm sector – a prime example of this peculiar type of arrangement.
6 For early work contrasting these two enabling conditions, see Schmitter (1974)
and Lehmbruch (1974).
7 Corporatism did survive in a few exceptional instances. Austria, of course, is
everyone’s extreme case and we shall return to it below. Norwegian corporatism
in the 1980s exhibited clear signs of incipient morbidity, especially in tensions
between sectors and between organizations representing white and blue collar
workers, but it managed to survive. Of course, its survival can easily be dis-
missed due to the fortunate transfusion of petroleum revenues into the
agonizing body politic. The peculiarities of the Swiss case, still in line with the
Sozialfriedensvertrag of 1936, are commented upon later in the text.
8 For reflections on the various ways in which corporatism was evaluated in the
1970s and 1980s, see Offe (1995). Interestingly, the one cell of Offe’s that might
have keep corporatism alive despite its (allegedly) fatal case of disfunctionitis –
the one that combines a favourable and a normatively based evaluation of it –
has been ‘almost empty’ (p. 123). To fill it, Offe had either to go back to the
1920s (Otto Bauer) or forward to the ‘real utopian’ speculations of Joshua
Cohen and Joel Rogers, Philippe C. Schmitter and Jane Mansbridge. These
have been conveniently gathered together in Erik Olin Wright (ed.), 1995 –
along with the above-mentioned essay by Offe.
9 For example, the debates on the future of the European regions, on multi-level
governance and on flexible specialization in industrial districts are replete with
the most exotic references to the corporatist paradigm, usually with some qualifier
attached: enterprise, techno-, staged, as well as corporatist policy networks of all
kinds (see, among others, Heinze and Schmid 1994). So called ‘territorial pacts’
now belong to the most important instrument of structural policies in Italy. In
other areas not directly related to labour market issues, but where capital and the
state felt threatened by the emergence of new social movements, governments and
interest associations have also been finding new ways to make use of arrangements
for policy concertation. Lauber and Hofer (1997) have catalogued some 133 such
voluntary agreements on environmental issues in the Netherlands, 25 to 30 in
Denmark and 17 to 28 in Austria that deal with either product- or substance-
related matters. According to the views of an Enquete Commission of the German
Bundestag (Enquete Kommission 1998), corporatist concertation belongs to the
essentials of ‘Good Environmental Governance’.
10 Most of the following information has been taken from various issues of the
European Industrial Relations Review (EIRR) and the International Labour Review
(ILR), in particular, from a discussion of social pacts in ILR; No. 30 of
September 1994. Further information comes from a Special Issue on ‘Bündnisse
für Arbeit in Europa’ of the German DGB´s Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte
(10/1998) and the consultation of web sites of some of the major national trade
unions and employer associations.
11 The communist-oriented General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP)
participated in the negotiations, but steadfastly refused to sign the agreements.
12 Interestingly, the most important obstacle to the conclusion of the agreement
was a refusal by the EU Commission to accept the system of reducing social
security contributions to firms which were subject to international competition.
13 Organizational fragmentation remains a characteristic of Italy’s system of
interest intermediation. Note the thirty-two signatories to the most recent pact
(22 December 1998) which we have mentioned in the introduction. The same
argument could be extended – mutatis mutandis – to several other Mediterranean
cases: Spain, Portugal and even Greece.
14 For example, the governor of the Banque de France, Jean-Claude Trichet, was
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quoted in Le Monde (23 January 1997) as having said that ‘la France devrait
s’inspirer du modèle économique néerlandais; et notamment de sa réussite en
matière de création d’emplois à temps partiel’. From one of the lowest levels in
Europe in the 1970s, part-time work climbed to 35 per cent of total
employment by 1995.
15 According to Visser, this is due in part to the substantial increase in part-time
work which was not – at least, initially – an objective of the macro-concertation
process. He cites an official who admits ‘it just came our way’ (Visser 1996: 4).
16 Unger cites a national survey carried out among the (obligatory) members of
both the Wirtschaftskammer and the Arbeiterkammer in which 81.7 per cent of
industrialists and 90.6 per cent of workers opted for the maintenance of the
chamber system.
17 For example, an article in the Financial Times (4 July 1987) reminded readers
that Britain’s National Economic Development Council (Neddy), a corporatist
experiment founded in 1962, was just being abolished – twenty-five years later –
by the Thatcher government. The author (John Elliot) warned his readers in the
title: ‘Don’t Dance on Neddy’s Grave’ and prophesied that ‘. . . the pendulum
will swing back and someone in Downing Street will echo the sentiments of
Edward Heath who [said] “We have to find a more sensible way of resolving our
differences!” ’ 
18 The exception to this generalization is agriculture, where a very comprehensive
European-level welfare programme has been developed and where corporatist-
type sectoral arrangements have largely replaced national negotiations and
arrangements.
19 In fact the Netherlands, Belgium and Austria may have come to this revelation
much earlier since their currencies became tied to the Deutschmark some time
before Maastricht – hence, the relatively earlier revival of macro-corporatism in
the first two cases and the new lease on life given to Austrian Sozialpartnerschaft
in the late 1980s. The fact that Luxembourg has long ago given up its national
currency may even help to explain why it has so persistently (if quietly) been
practising corporatism since the 1950s!
20 Note that Grote (1992, 1995), in his contributions to the books which opened
the debate on the fate of Euro-corporatism (Greenwood et al. 1992; Greenwood
1995), did not find incidents of the phenomenon – at least not in the
sector/policy domain studied by him (small enterprise policy).
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